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IL COLLEGIO EPISCOPALE COME RAPPRESENTAZIONE DINAMICA IN FORMA DI RELAZIONI GIURIDICHEPAPA, ANTONIO FABRIZIO 14 May 2021 (has links)
Con il presente lavoro ci si pone l’obiettivo scientifico di dotare di una adeguata dogmatica giuridica quella complessa realtà che è costituita dal configurarsi delle relazioni interne al Collegio episcopale, avanzando anche nella comprensione dell’aspetto intrinsecamente comunitario dell’ufficio episcopale quale risultato del rapporto di unitaria successione all’ufficio apostolico di diritto divino. Leggendo l’appartenenza al Collegio di quei membri che lo compongono uti universi attraverso il fondamentale valore ecclesiologico che ha l’inserimento sacramentale di essi nel “simbolismo dei Dodici” (cap. I), si giunge a configurare la compagine di coloro che sono uniti nel ministero episcopale nei termini di “universitas collegialis personarum inaequali iure" (cap. III), appurando - appunto a partire dalla questione terminologica di “collegium” (cap. II) - come sia effettivamente possibile dar vita a riflessioni sempre più pregnanti sul contributo che il pensiero teologico fornisce ai fini della strutturazione anche giuridica dell’empiria interna al carattere normativo della Chiesa. Può risultare così più agevole individuare le relazioni tra quei nuclei di significato che hanno condotto, in ambito cattolico, sia ad una nuova messa a punto e valorizzazione (teorica e pratica) della dottrina della collegialità episcopale in seno al Concilio Vaticano II sia al sempre più vivace prospettarsi di interessanti orizzonti in sede di riflessione canonistica ed ecclesiologica attuale. / The present work has the scientific aim of endowing with an adequate juridical dogmatics the complex reality that is constituted by the configuration of the internal relations of the College of Bishops, advancing also in the understanding of the intrinsically communitarian aspect of the episcopal office as a result of the relationship of unitary succession to the apostolic office of divine law. By interpreting the belonging to the College of those members who make it up uti universi through the fundamental ecclesiological value of their sacramental insertion in the "symbolism of the Twelve" (chapter I), one arrives at configuring the group of those who are united in the episcopal ministry in terms of "universitas collegialis personarum inaequali iure" (chapter III), demonstrating - starting precisely from the terminological question of "collegium" (chapter II) - how it is possible to give rise to increasingly pregnant reflections on the contribution that theological thought provides for the purposes of structuring, also juridically, the empirical internal normative character of the Church. In this way, it will be easier to identify the relationships between those nuclei of meaning that have led, in the Catholic sphere, both to a new development and enhancement (theoretical and practical) of the doctrine of episcopal collegiality within the Second Vatican Council and to the increasingly lively prospect of interesting horizons in the current canonical and ecclesiological reflection.
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A Pragmatic Standard of Legal ValidityTyler, John 2012 May 1900 (has links)
American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law.
These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism.
In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method.
This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior.
The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent.
The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will.
Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.
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