Thèse (Ph.D.) - Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 2006. / Comprend des réf. bibliogr. : f. 269-306. Également disponible en format microfiche.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 5621.pdf: 971098 bytes, checksum: c5d30431f6d74b2c37a4e7b0a76b6491 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-28 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / The purpose of this thesis is analyze the changes in the thinking of Rudolf Carnap in relation to the analysis of language before the innovations of the work of Alfred Tarski. To this end, we will seek to explain the syntactic analysis of language presented by Carnap in his work "Logical Syntax of Language". Secondly, the semantic analysis of the language proposed by Alfred Tarski. To then discuss the influence of Tarski in the later work of Rudolf Carnap. / Esta tese tem por finalidade examinar as mudanças do pensamento de Rudolf Carnap em relação à análise da linguagem frente às inovações dos trabalhos de Alfred Tarski. Para tanto, buscaremos esclarecer a análise sintática da linguagem apresentada por Carnap em sua obra a Sintaxe Lógica da Linguagem , e a análise semântica da linguagem proposta por Alfred Tarski, para, então, discutir a influência de Tarski nos trabalhos posteriores de Rudolf Carnap.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / e recent literature in philosophy of science has been reassessing the positivist legacy. One of the items on the agenda is the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by positivists such as Carnap and the so-called post-positivists , such as Kuhn. Although the laer came to be viewed as a critic of several important positivist theses, more recent authors such as Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik and Grünberg, maintain that several of the most characteristic theses of the Kuhnian view of science were already present in Carnap s philosophy. Against this kind of reading, authors such as Oliveira and Psillos argue that within Carnap s philosophy there is no place for Kuhnian theses like incommensurability, holism or the theoryladenness of observations. e first article of this dissertation presents the reasons for each of those readings and assesses them having in view the perspectives from which they are offered. It argues that it is possible to show that some aspects of Kuhn s thesis have a counterpart in the works of Carnap, although those theses vary in importance for Carnap and Kuhn. e second article presents aspects that can be seen as antagonistic in the two views, namely, the conceptions that relate to that distinction made famous by Reichenbach between contexts of discovery and justification. / A literatura recente em filosofia da ciência vêm reavaliando o legado positivista. Um dos itens dessa reavaliação é a suposta oposição entre as teses defendidas por positivistas como Carnap e os chamados pós-positivistas , como Kuhn. Embora este último tenha sido percebido como um crítico de diversas teses positivistas importantes, autores mais recentes como Friedman, Reisch, Earman, Irzik e Grünberg, sustentam que várias das teses mais características da concepção kuhniana da ciência já estariam presentes na filosofia positivista. Contra esse tipo de leitura, autores como Oliveira e Psillos argumentam que não há na filosofia de Carnap e outros positivistas lugar para teses como a da incomensurabilidade, do holismo ou da impregnação teórica das observações, características das concepções kuhnianas. O primeiro artigo desta dissertação apresenta as razões para cada uma dessas leituras e avalia cada uma tendo em vista a perspectiva a partir da qual elas são oferecidas. Defende que é possível mostrar que algumas teses kuhnianas têm uma contraparte já nos trabalhos de Carnap, muito embora tais teses ocupem posições e importâncias diferenciadas em Carnap e Kuhn. O segundo artigo apresenta aspectos que podem ser vistos como antagônicos nas filosofias de ambos, a saber, as concepções que dizem respeito àquela distinção feita famosa por Reichenbach entre contextos de descoberta e justificação.

Orientador: Enéias Júnior Forlin / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-22T09:43:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Casagrande_GiulianoTommasini_M.pdf: 1136464 bytes, checksum: 6be19fea15ce2b7bb7c42051ab9192b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Nas Meditações, Descartes faz uso de todos os argumentos céticos imagináveis com o objetivo de abalar as crenças em que se baseia a visão natural de mundo e descobrir se há alguma verdade infensa à dúvida. Após constatar a existência indubitável do eu pensante e determinar sua natureza, Descartes procura salvar, por meio da demonstração da existência de um Deus veraz, o valor objetivo das idéias sensíveis. Neste trabalho, partindo da premissa de que o único subjetivismo autêntico é originário de uma dúvida cética como a cartesiana, investigaremos a hipótese de que tal solo da subjetividade é desprovido de sentido porque a atitude crítica de avaliação do conhecimento de que ele resulta pressupõe uma ordem de generalização e de abrangência naturalmente insustentáveis. Para tanto, utilizaremos a crítica de Schlick e Carnap às proposições externas (globais). Com efeito, a dúvida cartesiana não diz respeito a uma parcela do mundo, mas ao mundo em sua totalidade. O problema estaria na extensão da dúvida e no caráter espiritual atribuído ao ego. De maneira análoga, o conceito de um Deus metafísico (indiferente aos elementos do sistema do mundo empírico) estaria sujeito à mesma acusação de falta de sentido formulada por Schlick-Carnap / Abstract: In his Meditations, Descartes employs all imaginable skeptical arguments in order to shake the beliefs that ground the natural worldview and to find if there is some truth beyond doubt. After discovering the indubitable existence of the thinking self and determining its nature, Descartes tries to save, by demonstrating the existence of a truthful God, the objective value of sensible ideas. In this work, assuming that the only genuine subjectivism comes from a skeptical doubt like Descartes', we will investigate the hypothesis that such subjectivism is devoid of any sense, because the critical attitude of evaluation of knowledge from where it results presupposes a naturally unsustainable generalization and scope. In order to do that, we will employ the critique of external (global) propositions developed by Schlick and Carnap. Indeed, the Cartesian doubt is not related to a part of the world, but to the world as whole. The problem would lie in the extent of doubt and in the spiritual character assigned to the ego. In the same way, the concept of a metaphysical God, indifferent to the elements of the empirical framework, would be subjected to the same accusation of lack of sense formulated by Schlick-Carnap / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature. Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.

Univ., Diss.--Oldenburg, 2007.

The demarcation problem aims to articulate the boundary between science and pseudoscience. Solutions to the problem have been notably raised by the logical positivists (verificationism), Karl Popper (falsificationism), and Imre Lakatos (methodology of research programmes). Due, largely, to the conclusions drawn by Larry Laudan, in a pivotal 1981 paper which dismissed the problem of demarcation as a “pseudo-problem”, the issue was brushed aside for years. Recently, however, there has been a revival of attempts to reexamine the demarcation problem and synthesize new solutions. My aim is to survey two of the contemporary attempts and to assess these approaches over and against the broader historical trajectory of the demarcation problem. These are the efforts of Nicholas Maxwell (aim-oriented empiricism), and Paul Hoyningen-Huene (systematicity). I suggest that the main virtue of the new attempts is that they promote a self-reflexive character within the sciences. A modern demarcation criterion should be sensitive towards the dynamic character of the sciences. Using, as an example, a case study of Traditional Chinese Medicine, I also suggest that the potential for conflict between demarcation conclusions and the empirical success of a pseudoscientific discipline is problematic. I question whether it is sensible to reject, as pseudoscientific, a discipline which seems to display empirical success in cases where the rival paradigm, contemporary western medicine, is not successful. Ultimately, I argue that there are both good theoretical and good pragmatic grounds to support further investigation into a demarcation criterion and that Laudan’s dismissal of the problem was premature. / Graduate / 0422 / 0402

The demarcation problem aims to articulate the boundary between science and pseudoscience. Solutions to the problem have been notably raised by the logical positivists (verificationism), Karl Popper (falsificationism), and Imre Lakatos (methodology of research programmes). Due, largely, to the conclusions drawn by Larry Laudan, in a pivotal 1981 paper which dismissed the problem of demarcation as a “pseudo-problem”, the issue was brushed aside for years. Recently, however, there has been a revival of attempts to reexamine the demarcation problem and synthesize new solutions. My aim is to survey two of the contemporary attempts and to assess these approaches over and against the broader historical trajectory of the demarcation problem. These are the efforts of Nicholas Maxwell (aim-oriented empiricism), and Paul Hoyningen-Huene (systematicity). I suggest that the main virtue of the new attempts is that they promote a self-reflexive character within the sciences. A modern demarcation criterion should be sensitive towards the dynamic character of the sciences. Using, as an example, a case study of Traditional Chinese Medicine, I also suggest that the potential for conflict between demarcation conclusions and the empirical success of a pseudoscientific discipline is problematic. I question whether it is sensible to reject, as pseudoscientific, a discipline which seems to display empirical success in cases where the rival paradigm, contemporary western medicine, is not successful. Ultimately, I argue that there are both good theoretical and good pragmatic grounds to support further investigation into a demarcation criterion and that Laudan’s dismissal of the problem was premature. / Graduate / 0422 / 0402

Distinktionen mellan analytiska och syntetiska sanningar spelade en viktig för filosofer som Leibniz, Hume och Kant. Men det var först med Frege som begreppet analyticitet fick en definition som inte bara tycks vara explicit utan som också hade en bred tillämpbarhet. Den förmodade distinktionen analytiskt/syntetiskt har dock senare ifrågasatts av filosofer såsom Quine. Denna uppsats avser i första hand att visa att Quines argument, i artikeln Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), mot analyticitet inte är tillräckligt starka för att bevisa att den fregeanska definitionen av analyticitet är cirkulär. I detta sammanhang har uppsatsen även undersökt kronologiskt viktiga epoker där Quine engagerar sig i den analytiska/syntetiska distinktionen i sitt arbete före liksom efter 1951. Den mer moderna traditionen, som delar in analyticitet i två kategorier – metafysisk och epistemisk analyticitet – går tillbaka till Boghossian (1996). Boghossian försvarar en uppdaterad version av Wittgensteins och Carnaps åsikt att analyticitet skall anges i termer av implicita definitioner I motsats till Boghossian anser Williamson att det inte finns något sätt att uppfatta analytiska sanningar som gör analyticitet användbar inom filosofin. Inom ramen för uppsatsens syfte kommer även dessa ’post-quineanska’ försök att beskriva analyticitet och den analytiska förklaringen av a priori att redovisas och kritiskt granskas. / The distinction between analytic and synthetic truths has played an important role for philosophers such as Leibniz, Hume and Kant. However, it was Frege who gave the notion of analyticity a definition that not only appears to be unambiguous but is also widely applicable. However, the supposed analytic/synthetic distinction was later challenged by philosophers such as Quine. This thesis aims primarily to show that Quine’s arguments, in the article Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951), against analyticity are not sufficient to show that Frege’s definition of analyticity is circular. In this context, the paper has also examined chronologically important periods where Quine is engaged in the analytic/synthetic distinction before and after 1951. The more modern tradition, which separates analyticity into two broad categories – metaphysical and epistemic analyticity – goes back to Boghossian (1996). Boghossian defends an updated version of Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s view that analyticity should be stated in terms of implicit definitions. In contrast to Boghossian, Williamson believes that there is no way of understanding analytic truths that makes analyticity useful in philosophy. Within the scope of this thesis, these ‘post-Quinean’ attempts to describe analyticity and the analytic explanation of a priori will also be presented and critically reviewed.

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