La littérature académique sur la Palestine depuis les « Accords d'Oslo » a substantiellement avancé notre compréhension des aspects sociaux, politiques et économiques à leur sujet. Néanmoins, un examen en profondeur des structures juridiques qu'Oslo a créées et de leur rôle, et leur impact social et politique reste encore nécessaire. Cette étude se propose de contribuer à cette fin, en se concentrant sur le processus constitutionnel et de construction institutionnelle en Palestine depuis Oslo. Cette recherche essaie de répondre à certaines questions fondamentales soulevées par ce processus : D'abord, en ce qui concerne la rédaction constitutionnelle palestinienne elle-même : comment les forces politiques palestiniennes ont-elles (ou n'ont-elles pas) négocié et se sont-elles entendues (ou non) sur la rédaction et l'approbation de la Loi Fondamentale de 1997 et sur ses modifications ultérieures ? Qui étaient les principaux acteurs de ce processus, et comment leurs propres positions et objectifs politiques ont-ils influencé le processus constituant ? Quels ont été les principaux déterminants sociaux, politiques et juridiques du processus constitutionnel dans chacune de ses étapes ? Dans un second temps, ce travail s'intéresse à l'impact que les structures juridiques, les pratiques et les discours légaux ont eu sur la société palestinienne : quel rôle a joué le droit dans les transformations sociales et politiques ayant lieu dans les territoires palestiniens occupés après Oslo ? / Most studies about the “Oslo process” have done much to advance our understanding of the social, political and economic aspects of the agreements. Nevertheless, a deep consideration of the legal structures that “Oslo” created, their role and socio-political impact has not yet been sufficiently addressed. This work intends to contribute to this end by focusing on the constitutional-institutional developments in Palestine during Oslo. This study intends to suggest answers to some fundamental questions regarding the constitutional process – defined as both legal text and practices – in Palestine: First, regarding the Palestinian constitutional drafting itself, how did (or did not) Palestinian and external political forces negotiate and agree on the drafting and approval of the Basic Law of 1997 and on its subsequent amendments? Who were the main actors in this process and how did their own political positions and objectives influence it? What were the main social, political and juridical determinants of the constitutional process in each of its stages? Second, this study looks at the impact that legal structures, practices and discourse had in the Palestinian social and political space: i.e. did law have a role or influence in the social and political transformations that took place in the occupied Palestinian Territory after Oslo? What were the main social, political and symbolic structures, relations, categories, and representations which were transformed or redefined and the orientations of the new definitions?

The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rene Zamlutti Junior.pdf: 2474327 bytes, checksum: f390c48f07dc5bf5beaf5145277325cd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-16 / This study aims to demonstrate the existence of a truly constitutional interpretation, which, though founded on traditional hermeneutical techniques, departs from the so-called general legal interpretation, because of the peculiarities that distinguish the constitutional rules of the infra-constitutional norms. Although the majority within the terms of the existence of a typical constitutional interpretation, autonomous from the general legal interpretation, there is considerable portion of doctrine which does not recognize this autonomy. It will seek to demonstrate, first, what are the fundamental differences, formal and material that exist between constitutional and infra-constitutional norms, especially in the current historical period, in which the advent of Social States and called neoconstitutionalism reconfigured the profiles of the constitutions and the State's role, shifting the constitutional text to the center of the legal universe and raising human and fundamental rights to the north interpretive condition of other rules of existing systems. The current role of constitutions and constitutional courts will be analyzed in light of the internationalization of constitutional law and called trans-constitutionalism. Finally, established the existence of a truly constitutional interpretation, will seek to demonstrate how this interpretive process occurs in the plurality of legal systems environment, national and supranational, which both relate to the same legal problem, creating possible antinomies that must be resolved not by traditional hierarchical criteria, non-existent in this context, but by the dialogue between those legal systems / O presente trabalho busca demonstrar a existência de uma interpretação autenticamente constitucional, que, embora fundada nas técnicas hermenêuticas tradicionais, aparta-se da chamada interpretação jurídica geral, em razão das peculiaridades que distinguem as normas constitucionais das normas infraconstitucionais. Embora seja majoritário o entendimento no sentido da existência de uma interpretação tipicamente constitucional, autônoma em relação à interpretação jurídica geral, há considerável parcela da doutrina que não reconhece essa autonomia. Buscar-se-á, assim, demonstrar, em primeiro lugar, quais são as diferenças fundamentais, formais e materiais, existentes entre as normas constitucionais e infraconstitucionais, especialmente na atual quadra histórica, em que o advento dos Estados Sociais e do chamado neoconstitucionalismo reconfiguraram os perfis das constituições e o papel do Estado, deslocando os textos constitucionais para o centro do universo jurídico e elevando os direitos humanos e fundamentais à condição de norte interpretativo das demais normas dos ordenamentos vigentes. O atual papel das constituições, bem como dos tribunais constitucionais, será analisado à luz da internacionalização do direito constitucional e do chamado transconstitucionalismo. Finalmente, estabelecida a existência de uma interpretação autenticamente constitucional, buscar-se-á demonstrar como esse processo interpretativo ocorre no ambiente de pluralidade de ordens jurídicas, nacionais e supranacionais, que incidem simultaneamente sobre um mesmo problema jurídico, gerando eventuais antinomias que devem ser solucionadas não pelo tradicional critério hierárquico, inexistente nesse contexto, mas pelo diálogo entre as referidas ordens jurídicas

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-07-03T15:13:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Danilo Pereira Lima.pdf: 888138 bytes, checksum: 26439db5c0ed5474f6fa9350a7264a42 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-03T15:13:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Danilo Pereira Lima.pdf: 888138 bytes, checksum: 26439db5c0ed5474f6fa9350a7264a42 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-25 / Nenhuma / As revoluções burguesas, ocorridas no contexto europeu do século XVIII, foram fundamentais para a elaboração de diversos mecanismos jurídicos de contenção do despotismo monárquico. No mesmo sentido, a independência das treze colônias americanas exerceu uma influência extremamente importante no constitucionalismo moderno, ao favorecer o fortalecimento da doutrina da supremacia constitucional e apresentar instrumentos jurídicos que evitam as arbitrariedades tanto do Poder Executivo, como do Poder Legislativo. Contudo, no Brasil, estas questões foram incorporadas de maneira incoerente pelo estamento burocrático, que, durante a vigência de regimes autoritários, importou das experiências europeia e estadunidense as principais instituições elaboradas pelos movimentos revolucionários. Aqui, o domínio estamental se sobrepôs ao direito e passou a utilizar todos esses mecanismos constitucionais em causa própria. Dessa maneira, é possível perceber que a permanência de uma dominação estamental prejudicou por muito tempo o fortalecimento de uma jurisdição constitucional no contexto brasileiro, impedindo que o direito alcançasse a autonomia necessária para limitar o exercício do poder político. / The bourgeois revolutions that occurred in the European context of the eighteenth century were essential for the development of various legal mechanisms to contain the monarchical despotism. Similarly, the independence of the thirteen American colonies exerted an extremely important influence on modern constitutionalism, to promote the strengthening of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy and present legal instruments that avoid the arbitrariness of both the Executive Branch, as the Legislature. However, in Brazil, these issues have been incorporated in a manner inconsistent by bureaucratic stratum, which, during the term of authoritarian regimes, imported European and American experiences of the main institutions developed by the revolutionary movements. Here, the estamental domain overlapped law and started using all these constitutional mechanisms for its own sake. That way, you can see that the permanence of a estamental domination caused damages to the strengthening of a in the Brazilian context, preventing the law reached the necessary autonomy to limit the exercise of political power.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:21:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus Pieroni Santini.pdf: 1558694 bytes, checksum: d5a5149d399bc9957fafdbac996db6d6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-10-09 / This dissertation deals with the evolution of judicial review under Brazilian law in the light of the phenomenon of constitutionalism. Through this work, we place the institute in question within the framework of a phenomenological study of constitutionalism is to demonstrate that through this mechanism of protection that ensure superiority and normative force of the Constitution, removing any contradiction that may antagonize the precepts constitutional. The strong inspirations of the diffuse model North American origin, as well as the model concentrate Austrian origin and the remnants of the existing political model French were instrumental in the adoption of a hybrid system of supervision of the constitutionality of laws and normative acts in general. Only with the Constitution of 1988, saw the victory of the concentrated control of constitutionality, which was raised to the center of the protective system constitutional. Moreover, all the techniques introduced by the set of rules on the subject attempts to minimize the reflected diffuse control jurisdiction. Therefore, a system matrix faithful to the American, of judicial review of constitutionality and diffuse, evolved into a model that honors the jurisdiction concentrated constitutionality / A presente dissertação trata da evolução do controle de constitucionalidade no direito brasileiro à luz do fenômeno do constitucionalismo. Por meio desse trabalho, buscamos situar o instituto em questão no âmbito de estudo fenomenológico do constitucionalismo para demonstrar que é por meio desse mecanismo de proteção que se asseguram a superioridade e a força normativa da Constituição, afastando toda e qualquer antinomia que venha a hostilizar os preceitos constitucionais. As fortes inspirações do modelo difuso de origem norte-americana, bem como do modelo concentrado de origem austríaca e os resquícios existentes do modelo político francês foram determinantes para a adoção no direito brasileiro de um sistema de fiscalização híbrido de constitucionalidade das leis e atos normativos em geral. Só que com a Constituição brasileira de 1988, assistiu-se a vitória do controle concentrado de constitucionalidade, que foi guindado ao centro do sistema protetivo constitucional. Por outro lado, todas as técnicas trazidas pelo conjunto normativo sobre o tema traduzem tentativas de minimizar o controle difuso jurisdicional. Logo, de um sistema fiel à matriz norte-americana, de controle judicial e difuso de constitucionalidade, evoluímos para um modelo que prestigia a jurisdição concentrada de constitucionalidade

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Eduardo Rodrigues Evangelista.pdf: 424526 bytes, checksum: 1af98a662cb1adebea1a0bdd82a40eda (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-19 / The present paper aims, primarily, at investigating the repercussion on the incidence of the principle of legality of neo-constitutionalism as a legal system established in order to support the Democratic Rule of Law. Thus, in the first chapter, there is an attempt to demonstrate the basics of the formation of the State, with emphasis on its instrumental character, its purpose towards the achievement of the common good and its legal foundation in constitutionalism. In the second chapter, the characterization of the legality in the face of the liberal state and the welfare state was undertaken. In the third chapter, the authors demonstrated the evolution of the Democratic Rule of Law as a political system, which counted on the legal basis of neoconstitutionalism, highlighting the impact thereof for the new design and implementation of the legality / O presente trabalho se propõe, precipuamente, a investigar a repercussão sobre a incidência do princípio da legalidade do neoconstitucionalismo, enquanto sistema jurídico instituído para embasar o Estado Democrático de Direito. Desta maneira, no primeiro capítulo, procurou-se demonstrar as noções básicas da formação do Estado, ressaltando o seu caráter instrumental, sua finalidade voltada para a consecução do bem comum e sua fundamentação jurídica no constitucionalismo. No segundo capítulo, empreendeu-se à caracterização da legalidade em face do Estado Liberal e do Estado Social. No terceiro capítulo, demonstrou-se a evolução para o Estado Democrático de Direito, como sistema político, e que contou com a fundamentação jurídica do neoconstitucionalismo, acentuando os impactos deste para a nova concepção e aplicação da legalidade

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:34:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Juliana Mongon Petroni.pdf: 891182 bytes, checksum: d7decc8c64ba4ec85cdddc1bfafeb137 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-18 / The proposal of this study is to present and discuss issues related to the apparent paradox of constitutional democracy demonstrated by Frank Michelman. Based on Post's ( procedural democracy ) and Dworkin's ( democracy as a right ) ideas, Michelman seeks to demonstrate the "paradox of constitutional democracy", i.e., on the one hand, for the procedural view, it is stated that there won't be a democracy if the contents of the basic law can not be decided by the people and, second, it seeks to withdraw from the political decisionmaking process the content of a democratic regime. Those Michelman's studies brought a huge impact on constitutional doctrine and made Jünger Habermas pronounce himself about this issue. Habermas, analyzed the main ideas presented by Michelman and demonstrated that, in fact, these are complementary notions, not a paradox. This interesting debate between Habermas and Michelman brought a big impact for democracies that, created by a Constitution, established limits on popular sovereignty, which, according to Michelman, would be undemocratic, a paradox. / O presente estudo tem como proposta apresentar e discutir questões relacionadas à aparente relação paradoxal entre democracia e constitucionalismo demonstrada por Frank Michelman. Com base no pensamento de Post ( democracia procedimental ) e de Dworkin ( democracia como direito ), Michelman busca demonstrar o que denomina de paradoxo da democracia constitucional , i.e., por um lado, na visão procedimental, afirma-se que não haverá democracia se o conteúdo da lei básica não puder ser decidido pelo povo e, por outro, busca-se retirar do processo político decisório parte do conteúdo de um regime democrático. Tais estudos de Michelman trouxeram um grande efeito na doutrina constitucional e implicaram o pronunciamento de Jünger Habermas, o qual, ao analisar as principais ideias apresentadas por Michelman, demonstrou que, na verdade, tratam-se de noções complementares, e não de um paradoxo. Este interessante debate entre Habermas e Michelman traz um enorme impacto para as democracias que, instituídas por meio de uma Constituição, estabelecem limites à soberania popular, os quais, segundo Michelman, seriam antidemocráticos, um paradoxo.

South Korea has been one of the most successful newborn republics since 1948, and yet, since the new millennium, it has been embroiled in a controversy over the issues of constitutionalism and successful government, with the public expressing concerns about transparency, democracy, and competitiveness. Of particular concern is the public's perception of constitutional government. The purpose of this study was to better understand the elements of governmental success and best practices for constitutionalism in the country's framework of democratic experimentalism. Three prongs of inquiry rooted in the democratic experimentalist tradition (lessons learned from private governance, national institutions, and new concepts of rights) were examined. Dorf and Sabel's theory of constitution of democratic experimentalism was used to help answer the research question, which was, how democratic experimentalism supports constitutional government in South Korea. Data were collected through interviews with 16 legal/government professionals under the age of 40, and then coded and thematically analyzed. Findings identified 9 identified key themes as vital for the success of constitutional government in South Korea. Results suggest that constitutionalism and democratic experimentation need to be considered together when seeking to understand the South Korean constitutional government. Implications for positive social change include helping future investigators to better interpret the Korean constitutional system and supporting decision makers and public servants in making better informed decisions to further more democratic and transparent government.

From the 1980s onwards, there has been a general transformation in social policy in line with the transformation of the welfare state worldwide. While the neoliberal restructuring of capital and the state has initiated this transformation in the 1980s, neoliberal globalization and competitiveness pressures upon the competition states have accelerated this process through necessitating the reordering of priorities around policies that pursue market ascendancy. As a result, the international governance framework has been reshaped in a way that aims to separate economic policy from the political influences of the governments and to provide capital a &lsquo / protected domain&rsquo / , which refers to &ldquo / new constitutionalism&rdquo / . On the other hand, the Europeanization process can be described as the extension of new constitutionalism in the EU level / therefore, it reshapes the social policy understanding through confining it with the boundaries of the EU economy. The thesis attempts to explain the processes of neoliberal restructuring, new constitutionalism and Europeanization to provide a theoretical framework to the analysis of the social security reform in Turkey. It aims to examine the impact of the processes of new constitutionalism and Europeanization on the social security reform and to analyze the reform process taking into consideration class relations and, then, to make a critical analysis of the transformation.

In recent times, the Supreme Court of Canada has utilized the ancillary powers doctrine as a means of expanding police powers at common law. Less apparent is the fact that the proliferation of these coercive powers has been achieved solely on the basis of the Court’s unorthodox—and, indeed radical—use of precedent. Put shortly, it is my thesis that the ancillary powers doctrine has precipitated the undemocratic expansion of both state and judicial power. The actual powers created by the Court are, in themselves, fraught with deficiencies and incapable of delivering on the twin promises of providing fairness and predictability in the law. This is due to the fact that any ad hoc judge-made power will be created retrospectively and shown to lack comprehensiveness. Correspondingly, the constitutional protections available to Canadians have waned in strength, leaving them more susceptible to governmental intrusion. In constructing this thesis, I have reviewed both the historic and contemporary case law that has forged the ancillary powers doctrine in Canada. Significantly, the emergence of this doctrine could not have occurred without Parliamentary acceptance and condonation of the Court’s actions. However, it is on the basis of the Court’s perception that Parliament has failed to close off supposed “gaps” in police powers that the Court has been willing to enter the lawmaking fray. Moreover, the Court’s actions have effectively obviated the need for government to legislate and prospectively stipulate the powers possessed by its agents. Therefore, I have situated this institutional interplay within the “theory of gaps” devised by Hans Kelsen. This model is offered as a plausible explanation for how Waterfield/Dedman became conceived in Canada and, why, it has been permitted to take root. Importantly, the Kelsenian analysis that I advance is explanatory only. It does not present a defence or justify for the proliferation of common law powers in favour of the police or judiciary. The lawmaking paradigm, as described above, has had a pernicious effect upon constitutionalism in Canada. It is for this reason, I argue that the ancillary powers doctrine holds an illegitimate place in Canadian law, and should be reversed.