La protection des droits fondamentaux par l’Union européenne et la problématique de la qualification juridique de l’Union ne sont pas isolées. Au contraire, elles sont profondément liées. Sous l’effet de la protection des droits fondamentaux, l’Union peut être classée dans la catégorie des fédéralismes. Cette nature fédérative exerce en retour une influence sur la protection des droits fondamentaux. La protection des droits fondamentaux et la nature de l’Union forment ensemble l’identité de l’Union. Cette identité pourrait-elle se concrétiser par une Fédération de droit ? Cette hypothèse de qualification, qui s’inspire du modèle de l’État de droit et repose sur les exigences du cosmopolitisme, vise une Fédération dont l’un des objectifs fondateurs est la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cette hypothèse offre certaines clés de compréhension sur l’articulation du processus de fédéralisation et de la protection des droits fondamentaux. Cependant, à bien des égards, l’articulation entre ce processus et cette protection est conflictuelle. Les obstacles à cette qualification sont nombreux. Les États membres souhaitent en effet préserver leur souveraineté. Les impératifs du fédéralisme économique ou les attentes d’une sécurité fédérative soulèvent également de multiples inquiétudes. Ces obstacles affectent tant le processus de fédéralisation que la protection des droits fondamentaux. En conclusion, ils empêchent de qualifier pleinement l’Union de Fédération de droit. / The protection of fundamental rights by the European Union and the issue of the Union's legal nature are not isolated. On the contrary, they are deeply linked. The Union can be classified in the category of federalism under the effect of the protection of fundamental rights. In return, this federative nature has an influence on the protection of fundamental rights. The protection of fundamental rights and the nature of the Union together form the identity of the Union. This identity could be a federal rule of law (Fédération de droit)? This hypothesis, which is based on the rule of law model and the requirements of cosmopolitanism, aims at a Federation whose founding objectives include the protection of fundamental rights. This hypothesis offers some keys to understanding how the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights are articulated. However, the relationship between this process and the protection of fundamental rights is often conflictual. There are many obstacles to this qualification. Indeed, Member States wish to preserve their sovereignty. The imperatives of economic federalism or the expectations of federal security also raise multiple concerns. These obstacles impact both the federalization process and the protection of fundamental rights. In conclusion, they prevent this qualification of european federal rule of law.

There is a large and diverse body of empirical research on constitutional change and "new constitutionalism" in contemporary societies, yet a general theory of constitutional change is still lacking. Researchers interested in democratic constitutionalism are confronted with various competing assumptions and explanations regarding particular, often unrelated, cases. In order to facilitate cross-referencing and conceptual consistency in the study of new constitutionalism in Latin America, this chapter provides an overview of the main theoretical perspectives on constitutional change beyond the specific regional context of Latin America, classifies the existing studies on constitutional change, and discusses their individual advantages and shortcomings.

No description available.

No description available.

[pt] Há dois séculos, o Brasil se tornava independente pela via do constitucionalismo, um período controverso em que diversas propostas em forma normativa, além do projeto da Constituinte e do Conselho de Estado, foram apresentadas para a constituição do Império brasileiro. O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar esses projetos e bases constitucionais datados entre 1822 e 1824 e comparar suas estruturas de governo e as liberdades individuais sob uma ótica teórica contemporânea aos fatos, especificamente as ideias do publicista franco-suíço Benjamin Constant. Para isso, foram empregados os métodos dedutivos e da Nova História, considerando a perspectiva de António Manuel Hespanha, e preceitos e técnicas do Direito Comparado. A pesquisa se justifica pela ausência de estudos exploratórios das demais formulações normativas publicizadas e a necessária adição de outros elementos e novas leituras para a melhor compreensão do debate público em torno da história constitucional brasileira. / [en] Two centuries ago, Brazil became independent through constitutionalism, a controversial period where several proposals in normative form, in addition to the project of the Constituent Assembly and the Council of State, were presented for the constitution of the Brazilian Empire. The objective of this dissertation is to analyze these projects and constitutional basis dated between 1822 and 1824, comparing their government structures and individual liberties from a theoretical perspective contemporary to the facts, specifically the ideas of the French-Swiss publicist Benjamin Constant. For this, deductive and New History methods were used, considering the perspective of António Manuel Hespanha, and precepts and techniques of Comparative Law. The research is justified by the absence of exploratory studies of other published normative formulations and the necessary addition of other elements and new readings for a better understanding of the public debate around Brazilian constitutional history.

[pt] A dissertação propõe uma investigação sobre projetos de liberdade e descolonização conduzidos por mulheres negras entre os anos de 1989 e 1997 na África do Sul e 1983 e 1989 no Brasil. O estudo aborda esses projetos como expressões de aspirações, estratégias de luta e resistência, voltadas para a conquista de direitos e compromissos constitucionais. Ademais, entende-se que a partir da investigação, escuta e compreensão das lutas contra as relações de poder, pode-se alcançar políticas de emancipação, na medida em que o saber localizado e sensível do sujeito marginalizado fornece uma perspectiva epistêmica privilegiada. Na primeira parte, o trabalho abordará o marco teórico e os fundamentos da pesquisa, enquanto em uma segunda parte se concentrará na identificação dos movimentos, das mulheres ativistas e das ações realizadas tanto no contexto brasileiro quanto no sul-africano. Na terceira parte, serão analisadas as conquistas constitucionais obtidas a partir da ação e estratégias empreendidas por mulheres negras em seus respectivos contextos. O objetivo final é verificar a possibilidade de estabelecer um diálogo entre as experiências das mulheres negras brasileiras e sul-africanas nesse período específico. É possível identificar uma cultura constituinte atlântica a partir da atuação de mulheres negras brasileiras e sul-africanas, em seus respectivos processos históricos em busca de uma estrutura constitucional democrática? No âmbito desse questionamento, espera-se não apenas reafirmar o protagonismo de suas narrativas e trajetórias, mas construir uma ponte sul-sul. O pensamento afrodiaspórico, sobretudo o amefricano, oferece as bases epistêmico-metodológicas desta investigação. / [en] The dissertation proposes an investigation into freedom and decolonization projects led by black women between the years 1989 and 1997 in South Africa and 1983 and 1989 in Brazil. The study addresses these projects as expressions of aspirations, strategies of struggle and resistance, which aimed to achieve rights and constitutional commitments. Furthermore, it is understood that through the investigation, listening, and understanding of struggles against power relations, policies of emancipation can be achieved, to the extent that the localized and sensitive knowledge of the marginalized subject provides a privileged epistemic perspective. In the first part, the work will address the theoretical framework and research fundamentals, while in a second part it will focus on identifying movements, women activists, and actions carried out both in the Brazilian and South African contexts. In the third part, the constitutional achievements obtained through the actions and strategies undertaken by black women in their respective contexts will be analyzed. The ultimate goal is to verify the possibility of establishing a dialogue between the experiences of black Brazilian and South African women in this specific period. Is it possible to identify an Atlantic constituent culture through the actions of black Brazilian and South African women, in their respective historical processes in search of a democratic constitutional structure? Within the scope of this question, it is hoped not only to reaffirm the protagonism of their narratives and trajectories but also to build a South-South bridge. Afro-diasporic thought, especially Amefrican thought, provides the epistemic-methodological foundations of this investigation.

Ending colonialism requires the revitalization of not only indigenous systems of law, but also the indigenous legalities of which they form part. This means that Canada’s unique form of liberal constitutionalism cannot serve as the constitutional framework within which indigenous law is revitalized. Rather, we shall have to advert to the fact that indigenous law was and is generated by unique indigenous legal processes and institutions, which find their authorization in unique indigenous constitutional orders, which are in turn legitimated by indigenous peoples’ unique and varied creation stories. Through the gifts of diverse Anishinaabe writers and orators, and through work with my circle of elders, with aadizookaanan, in community, and on the land, I present one view of Anishinaabe legality. I give special emphasis to its earth-centric ‘rooted’ form of constitutionalism, which is characterized by mutual aid and its correlate structure, kinship. In the second half, I examine the problem of colonial violence in contemporary indigenous-settler relationships. I identify two principles necessary for indigenous-settler reconciliation and I consider how commonly proposed models of indigenous-settler relationship fare against them. I conclude that one vision of treaty, treaty mutualism—which is a form of rooted constitutionalism—is non-violent to indigenous peoples, settler peoples and to the earth. Finally, I consider counter-arguments on themes of fundamentalism, power, and misreading. / Graduate

This study on "The road to constitutionalism and democracy in post-colonial Africa: the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo" revolves around a major research problem: What has been the road to constitutionalism and democracy in Africa since independence and how can constitutionalism and democracy be established and consolidated on the African continent? The importance of the problem and its implications for the life of millions of African people and the state of the literature still dominated by persons foreign to Africa make constitutionalism and democracy one of the most fascinating and challenging intellectual projects, particularly among African scholars. This work is a contribution to the development of knowledge and to the building and consolidation of constitutionalism and democracy in Africa. It revisits and critically examines the concepts and the various discourses and voices we have heard form both inside and mostly outside the continent. It highlights the African struggle, explores the major trends, and stresses the challenges and prospects for constitutionalism and democracy in Africa. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a case study. The research deals with the unfinished struggle of the people of the Congo and explains why the Congo has gone from DRC to DRC via Zaire, from one crisis of the Congo in the 1960s to another crisis of the Congo since the early 1990s and why the DRC history has been rehearsing in a vicious circle of coups and countercoups, rebellions, unsuccessful national conferences, authoritarian and unconstitutional regimes. Central to the crisis in many African states, including the DRC, is the crisis of constitutionalism and democracy and the failure of the post-colonial state. The study ends with the conclusion that constitutionalism and democracy also belong to Africa and constitute a prerequisite for African survival and renaissance. / Constitutional and Public International Law / LL.D.

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.