Ten einde arbitrere uitoefening van die diskresionere bevoegdhede waarmee staatsarnptenare beklee word, te voorkom en te beperk, is beheer van sodanige bevoegdhede noodsaaklik. In die verhandeling word die rol wat die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika, 1993 (Wet 200 van 1993) kan vervul in die uitoefening van beheer oor die diskresionere bevoegdhede van staatsarnptenare ontleed. Sodanige ontleding geskied met verwysing na die Handves van Menseregte en instellings en ampte wat hulle gesag en bevoegdhede aan die 1993-Grondwet ontleen. Bykomend hiertoe, word ondersoek ook ingestel na die belang en relevansie van konstitusionalisme binne die konteks van publieke administrasie. / In order to prevent and to limit the arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers with which public officials are endowed, it is necessary to control such powers. This dissertation explores the role which the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act 200 of 1993) can fulfil in the exercise of control over the discretionary powers of public officials. Analysis of the role of the 1993-Constitution in this regard, is done with reference to the Bill of Rights and institutions and offices which derive their authority and powers from the Constitution. In addition hereto, the importance and relevance of constitutionalism within the context of public administration is also explored. / Public Administration / M.A.

This short dissertation deals with separation of powers and federalism in African constitutionalism through the South African case. It investigates the extent to which the new South Africa complies with these two principles. The separation of powers in the new South Africa gives rise to a sui generis parliamentary regime, which is borrowing both from the Westminster model and the presidential one. On the other hand, the principle of federalism has been taken into consideration seriously, but South Africa has not become a fully-fledged federation. The result is a well-matched marriage between semi-parliamentarism and quasifederalism, which is the South African contribution to constitutionalism and democracy required by the African Renaissance. The dissertation comes to the conclusion that all in all the new South Africa complies with the two constitutional principles under consideration. It is a constitutional state, one of the very few exceptions on a continent laboriously emerging from authoritarianism. / Law / Thesis (LL.M.)--University of South Africa, 1998. / LL. M. (Law)

La Loi constitutionnelle de 1867 ne contient aucune disposition expresse concernant un quelconque pouvoir pour les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux de conclure des traités internationaux - ce pouvoir étant réservé, à l'époque de l'adoption de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, au pouvoir impérial britannique. Aussi, une seule disposition prévoyait les modalités de mise en oeuvre des traités impériaux au sein de la fédération canadienne et cette disposition est aujourd'hui caduque. Puisque l'autonomie du Canada face à l'Empire britannique ne s'est pas accompagnée d'une refonte en profondeur du texte de la constitution canadienne, rien n'a été expressément prévu concernant le droit des traités au sein de la fédération canadienne. Le droit constitutionnel touchant les traités internationaux est donc Ie fruit de la tradition du «constitutionnalisme organique» canadien. Cette thèse examine donc ce type de constitutionnalisme à travers le cas particulier du droit constitutionnel canadien relatif aux traités internationaux. Elle examine ce sujet tout en approfondissant les conséquences juridiques du principe constitutionnel du fédéralisme reconnu par la Cour suprême du Canada dans le Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec, [1998] 2 R.C.S. 217. De manière plus spécifique, cette thèse analyse en détail l’affaire Canada (P.G.) c. Ontario (P. G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (arrêt des conventions de travail) ou le Conseil prive a conclu que si l'exécutif fédéral peut signer et ratifier des traités au nom de l'État canadien, la mise en oeuvre de ces traités devra se faire - lorsqu'une modification législative est nécessaire à cet effet - par le palier législatif compétent sur la matière visée par l'obligation internationale. Le Conseil Prive ne spécifia toutefois pas dans cet arrêt qui a compétence pour conclure des traités relatifs aux matières de compétence provinciale. Cette thèse s'attaque donc à cette question. Elle défend la position selon laquelle aucun principe ou règle de droit constitutionnel canadien ou de droit international n'exige que l'exécutif fédéral ait un pouvoir plénier et exclusif sur la conclusion des traités. Elle souligne de plus que de très importants motifs de politique publique fondes notamment sur les impératifs d'expertise, de fonctionnalité institutionnelle et de démocratie militent à l’encontre d'un tel pouvoir fédéral plénier et exclusif. L'agencement institutionnel des différentes communautés existentielles présentes au Canada exige une telle décentralisation. Cette thèse démontre de plus que les provinces canadiennes sont les seules à posséder un pouvoir constitutionnel de conclure des traités portant sur des domaines relevant de leurs champs de compétence - pouvoir dont elles peuvent cependant déléguer l'exercice au gouvernement fédéral. Enfin, cette thèse analyse de manière systématique et approfondie les arguments invoques au soutien d'un renversement des principes établis par l'arrêt des conventions de travail en ce qui concerne la mise en oeuvre législative des traités relatifs à des matières provinciales et elle démontre leur absence de fondement juridique. Elle démontre par ailleurs que, compte tenu de l'ensemble des règles et principes constitutionnels qui sous-tendent et complètent le sens de cette décision, renverser l’arrêt des conventions de travail aurait pour effet concret de transformer l'ensemble de la fédération canadienne en état quasi unitaire car le Parlement pourrait alors envahir de manière permanente et exclusive l'ensemble des champs de compétence provinciaux. Cette conséquence est assurément interdite par le principe du fédéralisme constitutionnellement enchâssé. / The Constitution Act, 1867 contains no express provision on federal or provincial treaty-making powers. These powers were reserved to the Imperial government at the time when the Constitution Act, 1867 was adopted by the Imperial Parliament. The Constitution Act, 1867 also contained only one provision that dealt with the implementation of Imperial treaty obligations in the Canadian federation and that provision is now obsolete. Because Canada's gradual autonomy from the British Empire was not accompanied by a thorough modification of the text of the Canadian constitution, nothing has been expressly provided in relation to treaty powers in the Canadian federation. Canadian constitutional law dealing with treaty powers is therefore a pure product of the Canadian "organic constitutionalism" tradition. This thesis examines this form of constitutionalism through the specific case of the treaty powers in Canada. In particular, this study hopes to deepen our understanding of the multiple legal consequences of the constitutionally entrenched principle of federalism recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. More specifically, the thesis presents an in-depth analysis of Canada (A. G.) v. Ontario (A.G.), [1937] A.C. 326 (the Labour Conventions case) where the Privy Council decided that the federal executive power could sign and ratify treaties in the name of Canada but that the implementation of treaty obligations - when legislative action is required - is the responsibility of the legislature that has jurisdiction over the obligations' subject-matters. The Privy Council did not specify, however, which institution(s) has the power to conclude treaties in relation to provincial subject-matters. This thesis tackles this problem. It is demonstrated in this thesis that no rule or principle of Canadian constitutional law nor of international law grants plenary and exclusive treaty-making powers to the federal executive. It highlights some very important policy reasons based on the needs for expertise, for institutional effectiveness and for respect for democracy not to recognize such plenary and exclusive treaty-making powers to the federal executive. The institutional arrangements necessary for the survival and flourishing of the diverse existential communities require that the federal executive does not possess such powers. It is moreover demonstrated that only provinces possess the constitutional powers to conclude treaties related to their subject-matters - the exercise of which powers may however be delegated to the federal government. Finally, the thesis presents a systematic and in-depth analysis of the arguments invoked in favour of reversing the rules set out in the Labour Conventions case in relation to legislative implementation of treaty obligations related to provincial subject-matters. It demonstrates that those arguments have no legal basis. Moreover, the thesis shows that because of the many underlying and interconnected constitutional rules and principles that support and give meaning to the Labour Conventions case, reversing that decision would have the concrete effect of transforming the Canadian federation into a quasi-unitary state because Parliament would thus be allowed to oust provinces from the entirety of their legislative jurisdiction. This consequence is most certainly prohibited by the federal principle entrenched in the Constitution.

L’année 2014 est marquée par les référendums sur la souveraineté de l’Écosse et de la Catalogne, deux nations partageant de nombreux points communs sur les plans de l’histoire et de la culture. Le cadre juridique pré-référendaire de chacune de ces régions est fondamentalement le même: l’existence juridique de l’Écosse et de la Catalogne est directement issue de la volonté d’un État central unitaire, respectivement le Royaume-Uni et l’Espagne. La compétence législative de tenir un référendum sur l’autodétermination de ces régions est d’ailleurs ambiguë. Devant ce dilemme, le Royaume-Uni permet à l’Écosse d’organiser un référendum sur sa souveraineté. Il en résulte un processus démocratique juste, équitable, décisif et respecté de tous. De son côté, l’Espagne interdit à la Catalogne d’en faire de même, ce qui n’empêche pas Barcelone de tout mettre en œuvre afin de consulter sa population. Il en découle un processus de participation citoyenne n’ayant rien à voir avec un référendum en bonne et due forme. 20 ans après le dernier référendum sur la souveraineté du Québec, l’étude des référendums de l’Écosse et de la Catalogne nous permet de mettre en lumière la justesse, mais aussi l’incohérence partielle des enseignements de la Cour suprême du Canada dans son Renvoi relatif à la sécession du Québec. D’un côté, la nécessité d’équilibrer les principes constitutionnels sous-jacents de démocratie et de constitutionnalisme est mise en exergue. Parallèlement, les concepts de question et de réponse claires, d’effectivité et de négociations post-référendaires prennent une toute autre couleur face à un nouvel impératif absent des conclusions de la Cour suprême : celui des négociations pré-référendaires. / The year 2014 is marked by the referendums on sovereignty of Scotland and Catalonia, two nations that have a lot in common in terms of history and culture. The pre-referendum legal framework for each of these regions is basically the same: the legal existence of Scotland and Catalonia comes directly from the will of a unitary central state, respectively the United Kingdom and Spain. The legislative competence to hold a referendum on self-determination of these regions is also ambiguous. Faced with this dilemma, the United Kingdom allows Scotland to hold a referendum on sovereignty. This results in a fair democratic process, equitable, decisive and respected by all. For its part, Spain prohibits Catalonia to do the same, which does not prevent Barcelona to spare no effort to consult its population. The outcome is a public participation process that has nothing to do with a referendum in due form. 20 years after the last referendum on Quebec sovereignty, the study of the Scottish and Catalan referendums allows us to point out the accuracy but also the partial inconsistency of the teachings of the Supreme Court of Canada in its Reference re Secession of Quebec. On one hand, the need to balance the underlying constitutional principles of democracy and constitutionalism is highlighted. At the same time, the concepts of the clear question and answer, effectiveness and post-referendum negotiations take on another color in face of a new imperative that is absent from the conclusions of the Supreme Court: the pre-referendum negotiations.

La constitutionnalisation du droit pénal désigne l’emprise croissante de la Constitution sur la matière pénale du fait de l’enrichissement des principes constitutionnels et de la diversification des contrôles de constitutionnalité. Le Conseil constitutionnel n’est pas le seul à l’origine de ce phénomène, même s’il en est l’acteur principal. Toutes les autorités de contrôle, de conception et d’application du droit pénal contribuent, par le partage de leurs compétences et l’échange de leurs doctrines, à l’existence d’un droit pénal conforme à la Constitution et à la construction du volet pénal de la norme suprême. En outre, si la constitutionnalisation s’inscrit dans la promotion de la Constitution, elle est surtout au service de la légitimation de la matière pénale elle-même. L’ensemble des principes constitutionnels, tels qu’énoncés dans les textes et interprétés par le Conseil, sont empreints d’une philosophie humaniste. Leur consécration et leur respect permettent la reconnaissance et l’adhésion du justiciable, amené à percevoir le droit pénal comme juste et justifié. La constitutionnalisation est donc un processus porté par le rapprochement des autorités et porteur de légitimation pour le droit pénal. Mais, si elle est un processus, le droit pénal constitutionnel en est le résultat. La constitutionnalisation donne, en effet, naissance à un droit pénal nouveau, le droit pénal constitutionnel. Placé sous l’emprise de la Constitution, le droit pénal est désormais élaboré et appliqué à la lumière de la norme suprême, et ne peut être compris ni appréhendé sans une référence à celle-ci. / Constitutionalization of criminal law refers to the growing ascendancy of the Constitution over criminal law due to the densification of constitutional principles and the diversification of constitutionality controls. The Constitutional Council is not the only body wherefrom this phenomenon originated, although its prime contributor. By sharing their powers and exchanging doctrines, all authorities that control, elaborate and apply criminal law make it compliant with the Constitution and contribute to the construction of the criminal part of the Supreme Law. Moreover, whilst constitutionalization promotes the Constitution, it first and foremost contributes to the legitimization of criminal law itself. All constitutional principles, as set out in statutes and construed by the Council, are imbued with a humanistic philosophy. Formalization of and compliance with these principles encourage individuals to accept and subscribe to criminal law, as they see it as fair and well-founded. Constitutionalization is therefore a process driven by the growing interaction of authorities and a factor of legitimization of criminal law. Yet, whilst constitutionalization is a process, constitutional criminal law is its outcome. Constitutionalization does indeed give birth to a new kind of criminal law, constitutional criminal law. Now under the influence of the Constitution, criminal law is elaborated and applied in the light of the Supreme Law, and cannot be understood nor comprehended without reference to it.

Étatique.Cette thèse se propose d’étudier la pensée d’Alberdi et de démontrer qu’elle est, fondamentalement, une pensée de la complexité des catégories fondée sur la conscience du caractère hybride de l’ordre sociopolitique qui lui est contemporain. Alberdi est héritier de deux cultures, une culture traditionnelle d’Ancien Régime et une culture révolutionnaire dont le langage s’est également imposé avec l’Indépendance. La grande question qui se pose à lui est celle de l’ordre à redonner au corps social qui a perdu la légitimité de l’ordre transcendant d’Ancien Régime. L’historiographie traditionnelle a souvent récupéré la figure et les discours du publiciste pour en faire l’éminent précurseur ou représentant de diverses tendances, parfois contradictoires, et notamment, pour l’ériger en figure de proue de la « modernité », du libéralisme contemporain ou encore de l’« État argentin » contemporain. Alberdi est au contraire, encore pleinement imprégné de la culture juridique traditionnelle et il cherche à adapter les langages dont il dispose à la réalité qui est la sienne, dans un aller-retour constant entre réalité et discours, puisque l’une modèle les autres et vice versa. Des catégories comme celles d’« individu », « Liberté », « administration » se sont imposées avec la Révolution, mais le publiciste les resémantise en fonction de son contexte, encore traversé de dynamiques très traditionnelles. L’individu, ainsi, recoupera globalement la catégorie excluante du « vecino ». L’« administration » apparaîtra souvent sous sa plume dans son sens ancien d’« administration de justice » et non pas dans son sens moderne. Par ailleurs, la « modernité » du Tucuman est toute relative puisqu’il laisse un rôle fondamental aux sources de droit traditionnelles et ne s’inscrit dans un volontarisme juridique qu’occasionnellement, et avec précaution. Jouant sur plusieurs échelles, il parle le langage de la modernité politique au niveau national et celui du droit traditionnel au niveau local lequel demeure le socle de stabilité du corps social. Ma thèse est que ce socle traditionnel d’une part, et les catégorie de « commerce » (prise dans sa polysémie) et d’économie politique d’autre part, seront les deux instruments fondamentaux permettant à l’auteur de repenser le lien, de créer une société à partir du corps social traditionnel. Loin de considérer l’ordre au seul niveau national, sa démarche s’inscrit en outre dans une perspective internationale : ce n’est que par l’échange pacifié entre nations que l’on pourra clore le cycle des révolutions atlantiques et retrouver un ordre ; celui-ci sera immanent certes, mais il devra nécessairement transcender le cadre de la nation. / This thesis points to study Alberdi’s thought and to demonstrate that it’s fundamentally a thought of the complexity of the categories founded on the hybrid character of the order which is contemporary to him. Alberdi inherited the legacy of two cultures, the traditional culture of Ancien Régime and a revolutionary culture whose language also imposed itself with the independance. The major question for Alberdi is which order to give back to the social body since it lost the legitimacy of the Ancien Régime’s transcendent order. The traditional historiography often pick up Alberdi’s figure and speeches to convert him in the eminent precursor or representative of distinct tendencies, sometimes contradictories, and especially to promote him as the « modernity »’s, the contemporary liberalism’s and the contemporary Argentinian State’s figurehead. Quite the contrary, Alberdi is still rather immerged in the traditional legal culture, and he tries to adapt the availables languages to his reality, in permanent backs and forths between reality and speeches since the first models the seconds and viceversa. Some categories like « individual », « Liberty », « administration » imposed themselves with the Revolution but the publicist gives them another significations (je ne sais pas comment traduire “resémantiser”?) according to his context considerably penetrated with traditional dynamics. The « individual », so, intersects the excluding category of the « vecino » overall. In the same way, Alberdi preferentially uses the term of « administration » in its old meaning of « justice’s administration », not in its modern acceptation. Besides, the publicist’s « modernity » is to be reconsiderated seeing as he leaves a fundamental role to the traditional legal sources and doesn’t fall into legal voluntarism but occasionally and cautiously. He actually plays on different scales : he speaks the political modernity’s language on the national scale and the traditional legal’s one on the local level (local level which remains the stability base of the social body). My thesis is that this traditional base on one hand and the categories of « trade » (understood in his polysemic acceptations) and « political economics » on the other hand will be the two fundamental instruments which enable the autor to rethink the link, to create a society based on the traditional social body. Far from considerating the order on the very national level, his approach also fits into an international perspective : the pacified exchanges between the nations would be the only way to end the atlantic revolutions’s cycle and to recover an order : this order will admittedly be immanent, but it necessarily will transcend the national frame.

Nesta investigação será analisada a reconfiguração político-territorial do Vice-Reino do Novo Reino de Granada, no final do século XVIII e nas duas primeiras décadas do século XIX. Em primeiro lugar, examinar-se-á a organização político-territorial do Vice-Reino, estabelecida pela monarquia espanhola. Em segundo lugar, analisar-se-á a formação de juntas de governo, congressos, Estados provinciais e confederações, que, após a dissolução da monarquia, em 1808, foram legitimadas por meio de atas, constituições de tipo moderno e guerras. Esses acontecimentos modificaram a organização política e territorial do antigo Vice-Reino, entre 1809 e 1816. / This research analyzes the political and territorial reconfiguration of the Viceroyalty of New Kingdom of Granada, in the late eighteenth century and the first two decades of the nineteenth century. In the first place, the political and territorial organization of the Viceroyalty established by the Spanish monarchy will be examined. Secondly, the formation of governments juntas, congress, provincial States and confederations after the dissolution of the monarchy in 1808 will to be analyzed, as well as how they were legitimated by actas, constitutions of modern type and wars that changed political and territorial organization of the former Viceroyalty, between 1809 and 1816.

Submitted by JOSIANE SANTOS DE OLIVEIRA (josianeso) on 2017-06-23T12:29:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ivan Luiz Steffens_.pdf: 2099147 bytes, checksum: 1528164b7a4c5def5b75f204e444fd6b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-23T12:29:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ivan Luiz Steffens_.pdf: 2099147 bytes, checksum: 1528164b7a4c5def5b75f204e444fd6b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-12-06 / Nenhuma / A instituição formal do Estado Democrático de Direito pela Constituição de 1988 introduz uma mudança paradigmática com o compromisso de cunho social de construir uma sociedade livre, justa e solidária. No campo tributário, essa mudança sugere uma tributação voltada à consecução de tais fins, mediante o emprego da função redistributiva, com uma tributação progressiva. Todavia, apesar do novo quadro institucional, a tributação nacional mantém a regressiva, promovendo, assim, uma redistribuição de renda às avessas. O trabalho objetiva abordar a forma como a tributação vem sendo construída e exercida, bem como a sua conformidade com o paradigma do Estado Democrático de Direito. A análise perpassa os contornos conceituais do Estado Democrático de Direito, a influência advinda do Estado Social e do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo ao pós-guerra e o emprego da função fiscal nesses modelos estatais. No segundo momento, estudam-se os princípios constitucionais em matéria tributária, a partir da Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito, classificados em dois grupos, tendo em vista a sua relação com a segurança jurídica e a solidariedade. Por fim, examina-se a composição da carga tributária e o seu debate nos meios de informação, congregado com a possibilidade de maior transparência na tributação. Também se analisa a possibilidade de redistribuição da carga tributária, mediante a aplicação dos princípios constitucionais nas tributações sobre a renda, o patrimônio e o consumo. Os resultados da pesquisa indicam a necessidade de modificação estrutural da tributação em busca de maior progressividade, diante da atual regressividade, o que pode ser alcançado mediante a utilização do arsenal principiológico já disponibilizado pela Constituição. / The formal establishment of the Law and Democratic State by the 1988 Constitution introduces a paradigm shift with the commitment of a social nature to build a free, just and solidary society. In the tax field, this change suggests a targeted taxation to achieve these ends by the use of the redistributive function, with progressive taxation. However, despite the new institutional framework, the national taxation keeps regressive, and has promoted a redistribution of income in reverse. The study aims to address how taxation is being constructed and exercised, as well as its compliance with the paradigm of democratic rule of law. The analysis runs through the conceptual outlines of Law Democratic State, arising influence of the welfare state and Constitutionalism Contemporary post-war and the use of tax function in these state models. In the second phase, the study runs for the constitutional principles on tax matters, from the Hermeneutics of the Law Review, classified into two groups with a view to its relationship with the legal security and solidarity. Finally, it examines the composition of the tax burden and its discussion in the media, gathered with the possibility of greater transparency in taxation. It also analyzes the possibility of redistribution of the tax burden by applying the constitutional principles on taxes on income, wealth and consumption. The survey results indicate the need for structural modification of taxation in search of greater progressivity, given the current regressivity, which can be achieved by using the principle arsenal already provided by the Constitution.

Submitted by Silvana Teresinha Dornelles Studzinski (sstudzinski) on 2015-06-01T13:10:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus Bassani de Matos.pdf: 1796553 bytes, checksum: 21e87bf981b91625c7d64bd4b9880b11 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-01T13:10:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mateus Bassani de Matos.pdf: 1796553 bytes, checksum: 21e87bf981b91625c7d64bd4b9880b11 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-23 / Nenhuma / No âmbito do Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo, a tributação no Brasil é analisada a partir da chamada Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito, demonstrando que sua função redistributiva não vem sendo almejada e observada, nos termos preconizados pela Constituição Brasileira. Apesar do fundamental papel que a tributação desempenha, os atores sociais responsáveis pela sua elaboração, institucionalização e manejo, mostram-se refratários às mudanças paradigmáticas operadas pela filosofia da linguagem e pelo movimento constitucional. Isso ocorre tanto no âmbito dos Poderes constituídos, como na doutrina em matéria tributária, que acriticamente referenda as posições exaradas por aqueles Poderes. Nessa conjuntura, reconhecendo-se a normatividade do texto constitucional, o papel central da linguagem desenvolvido a partir da viragem ontológico-linguística e o caráter transformador atribuído ao Estado Democrático Direito, analisa-se o papel dos princípios que devem conformar o exercício da função tributária. Somente a partir de uma compreensão autêntica da tributação, que as promessas constitucionais podem ser cumpridas, por meio da progressividade tributária e dos mecanismos de redistribuição de riquezas, na adequada aplicação do princípio da capacidade contributiva – expressão do princípio da igualdade em matéria tributária. Nesta perspectiva, há uma série de instrumentos e mecanismos à disposição do imaginário jurídico nacional, no sentido de recuperar o papel de centralidade da tributação na construção de uma sociedade livre, justa e igualitária e, portanto, adequada à Constituição vigente. Basta, pois, suspender os prejuízos inautênticos acerca dos princípios e regras que ora balizam a tributação no Brasil para, a partir disso, permitir que normas comprometidas com a função redistributiva possam ser instituídas, implementadas e interpretadas e, com isso, garantir que as grandes promessas constitucionais alcancem sua concretude. / In the framework of Contemporary Constitutionalism, the taxation in Brazil is analyzed from the called critical hermeneutics of Law, showing that its redistributive function has not been desired and observed, in recommended terms by the Brazilian Constitution. Despite the fundamental role that the taxation develops, the social actors responsible for its preparation, unconstitutionalization and management, showing refractories to the paradigmatic changes operated by the philosophy of language and by the constitutional movement. That occurs both in the scope of constituted Powers as in the doctrine in the tax matters, which uncritically endorses the positions that have been entered by that Powers. In this conjuncture, recognizing the normativity of the constitutional text, the central role of the language developed by the ontological-linguistic shift the transformer character assigned to the Law Democratic State, it is analyzed the role of the principles that must shaping the exercise of taxation function. Only from understanding authenticates taxation, that the constitutional promises must befulfilled by the means of tax progressivity and by the mechanisms of wealth redistribution, in the proper application of the principle of ability to pay – expression of the principle of equality in tax matter. In this perspective, there is a series of instruments and mechanisms in the provision of national legal imaginary, in order to recover the role of centrality of the taxation in building a free society, fair and equitable and, therefore appropriate to the current Constitution. That is, so, suspend inauthentic injuries on the principles and rules that sometimes trivialize the taxation in Brazil and, from this, allow that rules that are committed to the redistributive function may be instituted, implemented and interpreted and, therefore to ensure that major constitutional promises reach the ir concreteness.

Submitted by Maicon Juliano Schmidt (maicons) on 2015-07-13T19:40:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Santiago Artur Berger Sito.pdf: 1223303 bytes, checksum: 1d8229905ae79f24d71835401e4ee9aa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-13T19:40:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Santiago Artur Berger Sito.pdf: 1223303 bytes, checksum: 1d8229905ae79f24d71835401e4ee9aa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-20 / Nenhuma / Em tempos de Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo, o presente trabalho surge com um objetivo pontual e determinado: lançar luzes sobre duas propostas que surgem no interior do constitucionalismo emergente do segundo pós-guerra, para averiguar como ambas as teorias do direito, em uma perspectiva ampla (mas que problematizam a intepretação e a decisão, de certo modo), analisam o problema (interpretativo) deixado pelo(s) positivismo(s). A proposta se compreende dentro de um paradigma filosófico alinhavado com a fenomenologia hermenêutica, que desconsidera os métodos (no sentido cartesiano) como instrumentos de averiguação da verdade. Ao fazê-lo, em um primeiro momento, embrenha-se em perquirir parcela do que foi feito neste ambiente teórico representado pelo Constitucionalismo Contemporâneo, bem como em seus reflexos no Brasil. Em um segundo momento, especificamente duas teorias são estudadas: de um lado, a proposta de Jürgen Habermas, na Teoria Discursiva do Direito, em que são convocados postulados morais de Klaus Günther, filósofo que trabalha a questão dos discursos de fundamentação/justificação e os discursos de aplicação; de outro lado, a Crítica Hermenêutica do Direito, conjuminada por Lenio Luiz Streck, estribado em aportes da Filosofia Hermenêutica de Martin Heidegger, da Hermenêutica Filosófica de Hans-Georg Gadamer, bem como da Teoria Integrativa de Ronald Dworkin. Tais investigações permitirão fazer um comparativo na forma como a interpretação e a compreensão se dão em ambas as vertentes. Por fim, visando obter um comprometimento com o contexto teórico da atualidade, colocam-se as propostas discursivas em foco, concluindo que os aportes hermenêuticos sugerem uma via de acesso ao conhecimento, em direito, mais alinhada com os avanços da filosofia. Em linhas gerais, o trabalho apresenta-se como uma ferramenta de análise que, ao definir suas bases, deixa claro o lugar da fala e, com fidelidade ao programa, pergunta-se pelas condições da interpretação no atual paradigma jusfilosófico. / In times of Contemporary Constitutionalism, this work comes with a timely and specific goal: to shed light on two proposals that arise within the emerging constitutionalism of the second postwar period, to ascertain how two theories of law, in a wide perspective (but that study the issues of interpretation and decision, in a certain way), analyze the problem left by the positivism(s). The proposal is understood within a philosophical paradigm basted with hermeneutic phenomenology, which disregards the methods (in the cartesian way) as a tool for finding the truth. And in doing so, at first, penetrates into a portion of what was done in this theoretical environment represented by the Contemporary Constitutionalism and its consequences in Brazil. In a second step, specifically two theories are studied: on one hand the proposal of Jürgen Habermas, Discoursive Theory of Law, which called moral propositions of Klaus Günther, a philosopher who works the question of the reasons/justification discourses and application discourses; on the other side to Critical Hermeneutics of Law, gathered by Lenio Luiz Streck, using in intakes of Hermeneutic Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, the Philosophical Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the Integrative Theory of Ronald Dworkin. Such investigations will allow a comparison in how the interpretation and understanding occur in both brands. Finally, to obtain a commitment to the theoretical context of today, assesses the relevance of the proposals, concluding that the hermeneutic contributions suggest a means of access to knowledge in law, more in line with advances in philosophy. In general, the work presents itself as an analysis tool that, when determining their bases, makes clear the place of speech, and with fidelity to the program, will the conditions of interpretation in the actual law-philosophical paradigm.