À la suite d’une décision orale rendue le 28 janvier 2009 par la Chambre de première instance I dans l'affaire Lubanga, la Cour pénale internationale a institué un nouvel acteur du procès pénal international : le témoin susceptible d'auto-incrimination qui, à ce titre, est assisté d'un conseil. Ce « témoin assisté » a en commun avec le suspect leur suspicion, et, avec le témoin ordinaire, leur comparution à l’audience ès qualité de témoins. Il n’est cependant ni totalement un suspect – parce que non poursuivable devant la Cour – ni totalement un témoin, parce que notamment impliqué dans la procédure principale. L’évolution de cet acteur singulier du procès pénal international aura eu le mérite de permettre à la Cour de revisiter des notions classiques du droit international pénal. Grâce à lui, la qualité de « parties » n’est plus une forteresse réservée à l’accusation et à la défense. Le témoin ordinaire, considéré comme tiers passif à l’instance, partage désormais la barre avec un « témoin » actif pouvant diligenter des procédures « détachables » de la procédure principale. En sept ans d’existence, le témoin assisté a tellement impacté la procédure pénale internationale qu’une révision des textes fondamentaux de la Cour s’impose pour mettre un terme à la cacophonie jurisprudentielle des chambres sur l’étendue de ses droits et obligations. / Following an oral decision given by the Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga case, the International Criminal Court has introduced a new player into international criminal cases: the self-incriminating witness, who is assisted by a counsel. This "assisted witness", like the suspect, is under suspicion, and like an ordinary witness appears before the Court to testify. However, he is neither completely a suspect, since he cannot be convicted by the Court, nor completely a witness, since he is implicated in the criminal proceedings. The evolution of the role of this singular player in international criminal cases has given the Court the opportunity of reviewing traditional notions of international criminal law. Thanks to this situation, the status of the different parties is no longer restricted to prosecution and defense. The ordinary witness, considered as a passive third party in the trial, now shares the stand with an active witness who is able to speed up proceedings that are separable from the main proceedings. In seven years of existence, the assisted witness has had such an impact on criminal proceedings that it has become necessary to revise the core texts of the Court in order to put an end to the legal confusion among the different chambers regarding the extent of this witness's rights and obligations.

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Access to justice and the right to a fair trial are basic human rights explicitly stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as well as in the Swedish constitution. The fundamental meaning of these rights is that everyone should have an effective option for bringing their case to a court governed by the rule of law. Counsel fees and other process-costs may constitute a significant barrier to entry for an individual bringing his or her case to the court. Consequently, such cost-related barriers may deprive individuals of their right to a fair trial in practice. This fact is recognised in many legislations through legal aid provisions, reimbursement rules or similar mechanisms with the common purpose of eliminating, or at least lowering, the cost-barrier in question for the individual. Tax cases are often complex, and the average taxpayer would typically need to obtain legal counsel to vindicate his or her rights in a dispute with the tax authority. The taxpayer’s costs for such vindication may consequently be high. Swedish legislation stipulates that such costs under certain circumstances can be reimbursed by the state. In practice, however, the taxpayer seldom gets reimbursed for the full cost or even the majority of the cost, regardless of the outcome of the case. Even if the taxpayer wins the court case against the tax authority, it is not unusual that the taxpayer gets no reimbursement at all. This thesis analyses the Swedish reimbursement model for process-costs in tax cases and how it relates to the right to a fair trial. The question is whether the relevant legislation, and/or the courts’ application of it, risks being in breach of the ECHR’s and/or the Swedish constitution’s stipulated right to a fair trial. This thesis argues that it does; not as a result of the legislation itself, but because of the courts’ application of it. The risk of violating the right to a fair trial correlates primarily with two factors. These are what are at stake for the taxpayer (typically the disputed tax amount) and the complexity of the legal issues involved in the case. Trigger points for when the respective factor comes into play from a human rights perspective are analysed and discussed in the thesis. When they do, the absence of real possibilities of reimbursement of process-costs in a given tax case may constitute an unacceptable barrier for the individual to access justice and get a fair trial.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:25:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 3486.pdf: 964409 bytes, checksum: dc71f88a2d4ca3c054c8533cde46ae83 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-02-24 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / This study has it s center in the relevance of the discourse in all social practices. Among these, are found the judicial practice, regulationed by laws, penal, civil and criminal codes that try regulation the most of social relations. Considering the drugs traffic crime, the objective of this work it is comprehend individual-position in the process of (des) construction of juridical individual (counsel), in penal process concluded with the absolution from one of the fouler defendant. Standing in the discourse formulation´s level (and/or of constitution), we work the argumentation from of the historical-discursive process where the position of counsel individual (lawyer) is formed, it enabling motions of reading/interpretation. The corpus of analysis is formed by the decision acórdão conceded by the Justice Court of Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. This corpus exposes the practice of narcotic traffic of 3 young (the age between 20-30), whose crime happened in a gaúcha city, in 2003. In the judicial discursive practices, the purpose of the counsel s discourse is give an answer to the problem of the defendant with the purpose of absolution. This answer it seems to situated, many times, in an illusory perspective of completeness in the language, be rational and close, thinking on this way, be resolving the case/fact. To the discursive reflexion, resort on works from the french philosopher Michel Pêcheux and Michel Foucault. It is on the lard of various knowledge areas, like Discourse Analyses, Philosophy and Law that this work proposes the theorical-discursive reflexion. We observed the following considerations: 1) the activation of the Registrar of discourse memory in the fabric of criminal fact, 2) the operation of the senses, the comparison of the utterances of the defendants from the Criminal Investigation conducted by the Public Defender, 3) the s sdr defendant's "Z" built statements wish absolution: a) pick up only / just a ride, and b) real part in the imputation that he was being made, thus the formulation functioned as an effect of truth, 4) the Insurgency in sdr the Public Defender and Appellate of the subject showed that the FD has led to the authorization of the acquittal of the accused "Z" and impeded discourses of guilt and punishment, listed in determination of conviction in Judgement, and 5) the Public Defender Brazilian made discourses constituting meanings of victimology, thereby weakening mechanisms of criminology. / Este estudo centra-se na relevância do discurso em todas as práticas sociais. Entre essas, encontram-se as práticas do judiciário, regulamentadas por leis, códigos penais, criminais, civis que tentam regular a maioria das relações sociais. Levando em conta o crime tráfico de drogas, o objetivo deste trabalho é compreender a posição-sujeito no processo de (des) construção do discurso do sujeito jurídico defensor, em processo penal concluso com absolvição de um dos réus infratores. Permanecendo no nível da formulação do discurso (e ou da constituição), trabalhamos a argumentação a partir do processo histórico-discursivo em que a posição do sujeito defensor (advogado) é constituída, possibilitando gestos de leitura/interpretação. O corpus de análise é composto pela peça acórdão , concedida pelo Tribunal de Justiça de Porto Alegre, Estado do Rio Grande do Sul. Esse corpus revela a prática do tráfico de entorpecentes de três jovens (entre 20 a 30 anos), cujo crime ocorreu em cidade gaúcha, no ano de 2003. Nas práticas discursivas judiciais, a finalidade do discurso do defensor é dar uma resposta ao problema do réu com intuito de absolvição. Essa resposta parece estar situada, muitas vezes, em uma perspectiva ilusória de completude de linguagem, seja racional e fechada, assim pensando em estar resolvendo o caso/fato. Para a reflexão discursiva, recorremos a trabalhos dos filósofos franceses Michel Pêcheux e Michel Foucault. É no entremeio de diversas áreas do conhecimento, como Análise do Discurso, Filosofia e Direito que este trabalho propõe a reflexão teórica-discursiva. Como resultados, obtivemos as seguintes considerações: 1) ocorreu o acionamento da memória discursiva do escrivão na tessitura do Fato Delituoso; 2) o funcionamento-confronto dos sentidos dos enunciados dos reús deram-se a partir da Instrução Criminal dirigida pelo Defensor Público; 3) a sdr do réu Z construiu declarações que encejou a absolvição: a) pegara apenas/só uma carona; e b) verdadeira em parte a imputação que lhe estava sendo feita, assim, a formulação funcionou como efeito de verdade; 4) a sdr na Insurgência do Defensor Público e na Apelação do sujeito DP sustentou a FD que levou à autorização da absolvição do réu Z e impediu discursos de culpabilidade e punição, elencados na determinação de condenação na Sentença; e 5) a Defensoria Pública Brasileira formulou discursos constituindo sentidos de vitimologia, dessa forma, enfraquecendo mecanismos de criminologia.

The right to legal representation at labour proceedings of an administrative or quasi-judicial nature is not clear in our law, and has been the subject of contradictory debate in the South African courts since the1920’s. Despite the ambiguities and uncertainty in the South African common law, the statutory regulation of legal representation was not comprehensively captured in labour legislation resulting in even more debate, especially as to the right to be represented by a person of choice at these proceedings in terms of the relevant entrenched protections contained in the Bill of Rights. The Labour Relations Act 12 of 2002 (prior to amendment) is silent on the right to representation at in-house disciplinary proceedings. Section 135(4) of Act 12 of 2002 allows for a party at conciliation proceedings to appear in person or to be represented by a director or co employee or a member or office bearer or official of that party’s registered trade union. Section 138(4) of the same Act allows for legal representation at arbitration proceedings, but subject to section 140(1) which excludes legal representation involving dismissals for reasons related to conduct or capacity, unless all parties and the commissioner consent, or if the commissioner allows it per guided discretion to achieve or promote reasonableness and fairness. The abovementioned three sections were however repealed by the amendments of the Labour Relations Act 12 of 2002. Despite the repealing provision, Item 27 of Schedule 7 of the Amendment reads that the repealed provisions should remain in force pending promulgation of specific rules in terms of section 115(2A)(m) by the CCMA. These rules have not been promulgated to date. The common law’s view on legal representation as a compulsory consideration in terms of section 39 of the Constitution 108 of 1996 and further a guidance to the entitlement to legal representation where legislation is silent. The common law seems to be clear that there is no general right to legal representation at administrative and quasi judicial proceedings. If the contractual relationship is silent on representation it may be permitted if exceptional circumstances exist, vouching such inclusion. Such circumstances may include the complex nature of the issues in dispute and the seriousness of the imposable penalty ( for example dismissal or criminal sanction). Some authority ruled that the principles of natural justice supercede a contractual condition to the contrary which may exist between employer and employee. The courts did however emphasize the importance and weight of the contractual relationship between the parties in governing the extent of representation at these proceedings. Since 1994 the entrenched Bill of Rights added another dimension to the interpretation of rights as the supreme law of the country. On the topic of legal representation and within the ambit of the limitation clause, three constitutionally entrenched rights had to be considered. The first is the right to a fair trial, including the right to be represented by a practitioner of your choice. Authority reached consensus that this right, contained in section 35 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 is restricted to accused persons charged in a criminal trial. The second protection is the entitlement to administrative procedure which is justifiable and fair (This extent of this right is governed y the provisions of the Promotion of Access to Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000) and thirdly the right to equality before the law and equal protection by the law. In conclusion, the Constitution Act 108 of 1996 upholds the law of general application, if free and justifiable. Within this context, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 allows for specific representation at selected fora, and the common law governs legal representation post 1994 within the framework of the Constitution. The ultimate test in considering the entitlement to legal representation at administrative and quasi judicial proceedings will be in balancing the protection of the principle that these tribunals are masters of their own procedure, and that they may unilaterally dictate the inclusion or exclusion of representation at these proceedings and the extent of same, as well as the view of over judicialation of process by the technical and delaying tactics of legal practitioners, against the wide protections of natural justice and entrenched constitutional protections.

The right to legal representation at internal disciplinary hearings and arbitration proceedings at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and bargaining councils, where the reason for dismissal relates to misconduct or incapacity is a topic that is raised continuously and often debated. Despite no amendments to labour legislation pertaining to the issue at hand there was however a recent Supreme Court of Appeal judgment. This judgment alters one’s view and clarifies the uncertainties that were created around Rule 25 of the CCMA rules, it also brings a different perspective to the matter, but it will however continue to ignite significant interest. There is no automatic right to legal representation at disciplinary hearings, at the CCMA, and at bargaining councils where disputes involve conduct or capacity and this is the very reason why it is a contentious matter for all parties to grapple with. The dismissal of an employee for misconduct may not be significant to the employer, but the employee’s job is his major asset, and losing his employment is a serious matter to contend with. Lawyers are said to make the process legalistic and expensive, and are blamed for causing delays in the proceedings due to their unavailability and the approach that they adopt. Allowing legal representation places individual employees and small businesses on the back foot because of the costs. Section 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, provides everyone with the right to fair labour practices, and section 185 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 gives effect to this right and specifies, amongst others, that an employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. At internal disciplinary hearings, the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 is silent as to what the employee’s rights are with regards to legal representation and the general rule is that legal representation is not permitted, unless the employer’s disciplinary code and procedure or the employee’s contract allows for it, but usually an employee may only be represented by a fellow employee or trade union representative, but not by a legal representative. In MEC: Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that there exists no right in terms of the common law to legal representation in tribunals other than in courts of law. However, both the common law and PAJA concede that in certain situations it may be unfair to deny a party legal representation. Currently the position in South Africa is that an employee facing disciplinary proceedings can put forward a request for legal representation and the chairperson of the disciplinary hearing will have the discretion to allow or refuse the request. In Hamata v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that the South African law does not recognise an absolute right to legal representation in fora other than courts of law, and a constitutional right to legal representation only arises in respect of criminal matters.

La montée en puissance de l'obligation de conseil n'a pas épargné, dans son sillage, l'avocat et le notaire. Or, avec près de 65000 avocats et 11000 notaires en exercice sur le sol français, recensés en 2017, ils représentent les métiers du droit les plus exercés mais aussi les plus exposés au risque de voir leur responsabilité civile engagée en raison du manquement à leur obligation de conseil. Pourtant, les contours de cette obligation, dessinés par la jurisprudence, sont souvent diffus et imprécis. L'objectif de la thèse consiste donc à démontrer que l'obligation de conseil dispose d'un régime autonome, obéissant à des forces propres, permettant de la distinguer de notions voisines. Pour y parvenir, il faudra mettre en lumière la fonction de l'obligation de conseil. Cette analyse permettra de démontrer que l'avocat et le notaire sont tenus d'une obligation dont la portée est sensiblement identique. Curieusement, pourtant, en cas de défaillance de leur part, la jurisprudence a fait le choix de ne pas retenir un régime de responsabilité civile uniforme. Traditionnellement, en effet, c'est généralement à l'aune des règles de la responsabilité contractuelle que l'avocat doit répondre de sa défaillance tandis que la responsabilité du notaire est plutôt appréciée sur le terrain délictuel. Ce système, reposant sur une argumentation qui n'emporte pas pleinement la conviction, conduit à des inégalités de traitement de la victime mais aussi du professionnel fautif. Pour ces raisons, des solutions correctrices seront proposées afin d'harmoniser le régime de responsabilité civile applicable. / The overall increase of the obligation of counsel within the French legal system did not spare attorneys and notaries in its wake. With approximately 65000 practising attorneys and 11000 practising notaries in France, according to registered figures in 2017, they embody the most practiced legal professions. They are also the most likely to see their civil liability incurred in regards to a breach of their duty to provide legal advice. However, the outlines of this obligation, framed by case law, are often imprecise and diffuse. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the obligation of counsel has an autonomous regime subject to proper rules, highlighting the gap between adjacent concepts. In this context, the function of this obligation will be explained. This analysis will show that attorneys and notaries are bound to an obligation which the impact is roughly identical. However, in case of a breach of their obligation, case law does not design a unique regime of civil liability. Indeed, an attorney's liability is traditionally based on contractual liability, whereas a notary's liability is generally based on tort liability. This system, erected on a debatable argumentation, leads to inequalities of treatments for both victims and legal counsel. For these reasons, corrective solutions will be proposed in order to harmonise the civil liability regime applicable.

Text in Afrikaans / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 that took effect from 27 April 1994, gave an accused a constitutional right to legal representation. Although the right of an accused to be legally represented formed an integral part of the South African Law, the Constitution gave him the further right ofbeing provided with legal representation at the cost of the State . For the practical implementation ofthe Constitution extensive changes to the current Legal Aid Scheme are essential . This work is an investigation of the justification of an accused's right to legal representation and the right to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State . The practical implementation of the Constitution is discussed and suggestions are made that might be a solution to the current problem of the provision of legal aid at the State's expense. / Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 wat op 27 April 1994 in werking getree het, het konstitusionele erkenning verleen aan 'n beskuldigde se reg op regsverteenwoordiging . Alhoewel die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg was het die Grondwet verder gegaan en 'n beskuldigde die reg gegee om op staatskoste van regsverteenwoordiging voorsien te word . Om die Grondwet prakties uitvoerbaar te maak sal ingrypende veranderings aan die huidige Regshulpskema noodsaaklik wees . Hierdie werk behels 'n regshistoriese - en regsvergelykende studie van die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging en die reg om op staatskoste van regshulp voorsien te word . Die praktiese uitvoerbaarheid van die Grondwet word bespreek en voorstelle word aan die hand gedoen om die huidige situasie, wat betref die verskaffing van regshulp op staatskoste, te verbeter . / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

Les développements technologiques et la mondialisation ont permis aux gens d’avoir accès à l’information plus facilement et rapidement que jamais, provoquant ainsi des changements importants dans le milieu juridique qui doit s’adapter à la nouvelle clientèle sophistiquée et exigeante. Dans ce travail, nous nous penchons sur certains aspects devant être considérés par les avocats modernes assistant leur clientèle dans le cadre des transactions d’acquisition et de fusion. / Technological advancements and globalisation have allowed people to access information more rapidly and easily than ever, thus provoking significant changes in the legal profession to adapt to the new sophisticated and demanding clientele. In this research, we focus on certain aspects needed to be considered by modern lawyers in assisting their clients in the context of merger and acquisition transactions.

Each year, an estimated 318,000 defendants who do not comprehend the Miranda warnings waive their rights and provide incriminating evidence without the protection of counsel (Rogers, 2008), which make Miranda-related competencies one of the most pervasive pretrial issues. A wide range of issues could potentially affect an individual's capacity to provide a knowing and intelligent waiver. Previous Miranda research has focused narrowly on the effects of cognitive and developmental factors. The current study added to the Miranda literature by examining the impact of two highly prevalent conditions found in correctional populations, attention deficits and substance abuse. Adult defendants in custody (N = 118) were evaluated within 36 hours of arrest in order to assess both chronic psychological disorders and situational variables. Results indicate that attention deficits have a significant impact on defendants' ability to provide a knowing Miranda waiver, whereas substance use profoundly affected their reasoning about Miranda waiver decisions. This study represents the first systematic investigation of the effect of transient mental states on Miranda-related abilities with criminal defendants. Important implications for forensic practice are addressed.