La liberté religieuse est une liberté fondamentale reconnue dans les démocraties. Elle est invoquée devant la Cour européenne par des religions mais aussi par des individus. Les nouveaux cultes et leurs adeptes acquièrent des droits collectifs et individuels plus étendus. En France, des principes fondamentaux conduisent le législateur et le juge à consacrer et garantir le pluralisme religieux : toutes les croyances ont la même valeur. Chacun est libre de pratiquer sa religion en public ou en privé, notamment dans sa famille. Le juge garantit le respect de la conscience de l’individu lorsqu’il est saisi. Mais la libre pratique religieuse des membres de la famille connait certaines limites qui sont purement objectives et non fonction du type d’appartenance religieuse. Pourtant, la perception du phénomène religieux par les autorités n’est pas toujours égalitaire. Le traitement politique, social et judiciaire des religions minoritaires notamment, remet parfois en cause le pluralisme. Si l’appréciation in concreto des situations par le juge est le principe, le manque d’homogénéité de la jurisprudence, qui met en exergue certains préjugés, ajouté aux réticences des juges du droit à contrôler plus avant les motivations des juges du fonds, entament la garantie du pluralisme. Les condamnations de la Cour européenne le montrent. Les difficultés concernent notamment les questions de l’appréciation de la faute, cause de divorce, ou de l’intérêt de l’enfant. La référence à un standard, étalon d’une bonne pratique religieuse, est parfois latente. En la matière, l’analyse souveraine des juges du fond est souvent sacralisée, ce qui peut poser des difficultés, tout comme le manque d’ouverture de certains experts qui rendent des avis qui peuvent, in fine, avoir un impact fort sur le juge. L’absence de pré-majorité religieuse et l’application stricte du principe de laïcité à l’école posent aussi certains problèmes. Les solutions étrangères sont intéressantes sur ces questions. / Religious freedom is a fundamental freedom recognised by democracies. Not only religious groups, but also individuals, bring it up before the European Court. New religious groups and their members are granted more collective and individual rights. In France, fundamental principles bring legislators and judges to define and guarantee religious pluralism: all beliefs are equal. Everyone is free to practice his or her religion in public or in private, especially within the family. Judges referred to guarantee that the individual conscience will be respected. Nevertheless, the free religious practice of family members has objective limits, regardless of the religion one belongs to. Still, the way the authorities view the religious practice is not always the same. The political, social and legal treatment of minority religions in particular puts sometimes religious pluralism in question. Even if usually the judge appreciates situations in concreto, pluralism sometimes fails to be guaranteed due to a lack of homogeneity in the jurisprudence, tainted with prejudice, as well as the reticences of the ordinary judges to check more in depth the motivations of the trial judges. The condemnations of the European Courts are proof to this. The difficulties concern for the most part the appreciation of the fault, cause for divorce, or of the interest of the child. The reference to a standard of good religious practice is sometimes latent. In this matter, the expertise of the trial judges is often considered as sacred, and this can lead to some difficulties, as well as the lack of open-mindness of some experts who give opinions that can, in fine, influence the judge. The absence of religious age pre-majority and the strict application of the principle of secularism at school also pose some problems. Foreign solutions on this matter are interesting.

Thesis: Abortion in the light of case law of European Court of Human Rights This thesis focuses on the legal regulation of abortion in selected European countries in order to find single European standard. It concentrates primarily on issues of assessing violations of particular articles of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the European Court of Human Rights or former European Commission of Human Rights in relation to specific cases associated with abortion. Abortion means the deliberate termination of pregnancy by means of surgery or administration of drugs to induce abortion. Abortion is a major ethical issue that raises number of discussions and disputes. The complexity of the problem is due to the fact that on the one hand there is the mother's right to freely decide to terminate or continue the pregnancy and on the other hand, there is considerable right of the embryo/foetus to life. The whole text of the thesis is interwoven with finding a balance between these competing interests of women and the unborn child based on my own opinion or the opinion of the international judicial body. It analyzes two main approaches, which are pro-choice approach in favour of women's freedom of choice, and pro- life approach arguing that the foetus has right to life. Both approaches...

One of the key issues discussed over the last few years in connection with the ECHR is a large number of individual applications lodged to the court although the court does not have sufficient capacity to resolve them. The majority of the cases falls into category of so- called repetitive cases. This thesis aims to identify the tools, ECHR disposes of, and to what extent those tools may affect national legislation and case law of national courts. Reforms of problematic institutes at the national level implemented as a result of the ECHR decisions are able to exclude the future influx of repetitive cases to this transnational judicial authority. The process of the influence of ECHR case law on national legal systems is analyzed on the example of Russian Federation, which currently holds the first place regarding the number of individual applications that have been filed with the ECHR.

Thesis deals with the issue of dissolution of political parties. States should recognise that everyone has the right to associate freely in political parties. As a particularly far-reaching measure, enforced dissolution of political party may only be justified in the case of party that advocates the use of violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The dissolution of a political party is an exceptional measure in a democratic society and should be govern by the principle of proportionality. Apart from Czech legislation and recent judicial cases, this thesis is focused on Slovak and German experience with political party ban. Relevant decisions of European Court of Human Rights are introduced as well. In the first chapter the term "political party" is defined. Essential role of the political parties in parliamentary democracy as well as its extraordinary status among associations is emphasized. This part of thesis discusses situations when state can interfere with freedom of association or freedom of speech. Legally defined reasons for the dissolution of political parties are explained. These legal reasons are defined by criteria abstractly formulated, therefore a statutory interpretation...

La sentence internationale est communément réputée obligatoire et non exécutoire et l’exécution est conçue comme une phase « post-adjudicative » relevant de l’imperium de l’Etat. L’étude des mécanismes de surveillance de l’exécution des arrêts et décisions des Cours européenne et interaméricaine des droits de l’homme permet un renversement de ces postulats. Alors que les articles 46§2 de la CEDH et 65 de la CADH prévoient des surveillances de nature politique de l’exécution desdits arrêts et décisions, la pratique a été toute autre. Il s’avère que les procédures de surveillance en question sont respectivement quasi juridictionnelle et juridictionnelle et continuent autrement le procès. Elles sont aussi contentieuses, car les organes de surveillance tranchent des différends relatifs à l’exécution des arrêts et décisions, selon les principes directeurs du procès. Les contentieux de l’exécution européen et interaméricain permettent alors une redéfinition du procès en droit international et attestent que la notion de phase « post-adjudicative » n’existe pas. Ces procédures de surveillance ont en outre une double finalité. La première s’attache au contrôle de deux types de comportements étatiques, des comportements imposés et escomptés. Ces contrôles révélant que l’Etat n’est pas libre de ses moyens d’exécution, visent à aboutir au résultat de l’exécution effective de l’arrêt ou de la décision juridictionnelle telle que cette exécution est conçue par les organes de surveillance. La seconde finalité consiste en des suivis d’actes rendus au cours des surveillances et desquels résulte une chose à exécuter. D’un point de vue procédural, les suivis de cette chose qui émerge des précisions apportées à la chose jugée et aux comportements étatiques, révèlent l’existence de nouveaux types de recours dans le contentieux international. D’un point de vue substantiel, les suivis de la chose sont une contrainte formelle pour l’Etat qui n’est libéré des procédures de surveillance que s’il exécute l’arrêt ou la décision conformément à la chose à exécuter. Ces suivis sont donc des voies d’exécution et attestent alors de la force exécutoire interne des arrêts et décisions des Cours européenne et interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, que les organes de surveillance garantissent. / In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, an international decision is deemed binding and non-enforceable, and execution is generally perceived as a “post-adjudicative” phase, belonging to the State’s imperium. Study of the supervision of execution of the judgments and decisions of the European and Inter-american Courts of Human Rights reveals that these basic assumptions can be challenged. Whereas articles 46§2 of the ECHR and 65 of the ACHR provide for political modes of supervision of execution of the judgments and decisions of the European and Inter-american Courts of Human Rights, the practice has been completely different. It appears that the said supervision procedures are respectively quasi judicial and judicial and arise in the continuation of the trial. They are also contentious, given that the supervision authorities resolve disputes relating to the execution of judgments and decisions in accordance with due process principles. These procedures contribute to redefining the concept of trial in international law and illustrate that the notion of “post-adjudicative” phase does not exist. They also serve a double purpose. First, they allow control of two types of the State conduct, imposed and expected conduct. Illustrating that the State is not free in choosing its means of execution, such control aspires to achieve the effective execution of the judgment or judicial decision. The second purpose consists in following up on the resolutions and/or orders made in the course of supervision and which result in a res executiva. This res executiva, which would have emerged on the basis of clarifications made to res judicata and State conduct, in turn becomes the subject of the follow-up procedures. The consequences of such follow-up are twofold : from the procedural point of view, it creates new forms of appeals; from the substantive point of view, it formally constraints the State and achieves enforceability of judgments and decisions, guaranteed by the supervision authorities.

C’est par un regard systémique que sont abordés dans cette étude les rapports entre les ordres juridiques européens, Union européenne et Conseil de l’Europe, et les ordres juridiques nationaux sur le terrain spécifique de la protection des droits fondamentaux. L’ensemble des interactions a atteint un degré de sophistication tel qu’il est devenu difficile d’organiser leur analyse. L’approche par l’identification d’un système européen de protection des droits fondamentaux permet de dégager des règles, qui se présentent comme des effets de ce systèmes pour les ordres juridiques précités. Ainsi, la présomption de protection équivalente entre les droits fondamentaux est envisagée comme un élément déclencheur, formalisant les interactions entre les ordres juridiques dans un système. Celui-ci fonctionne grâce aux principes de subsidiarité, de proportionnalité et de sécurité juridique. Ces trois principes sont les règles du système, révélées par le regard englobant du système. Dans l’ensemble, il apparaît que l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme serait pertinente mais ne représente pas une étape indispensable. En revanche, il serait souhaitable d’avancer vers une harmonisation matérielle plus poussée, qui pourrait être réalisée par les juges européens. Il suffirait d’élaborer des notions européennes communes et des obligations positives identiques à la charge des États, afin d’assurer une protection effective des droits fondamentaux. / The relationship between the two european legal order, the European Union and the Council of Europe, and national legal orders is analysed through a systemic vision, on the specific field of protection of Fundamental rights. Their relation has become so intense that it is hard to organise a study about them. That is why the systemic approach helps consider those relations as a whole. The first step, that shifts the interaction between the legal orders mentioned into a system is the presumption of equivalent protection. Follows the discovery of the rules of the system, that are also an effect of this system. More precisly, the rules are the principle of subsidiarity, proportionality and legal certainty. It appears that there is no need for the European Union to acceed to the European Convention of Human Rights, even if it would make the legal relation easier. However, it could be useful for the effectiveness of Fundamental Rights to deepen the substantial harmonisation between the european legal orders through the identification by the judges of european autonomous concept and common positive human rights obligations.

1 Abstract This PhD thesis focuses on the legality of evidence in criminal proceedings in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights ("the Convention"). At first sight it might seem that this field is only remotely connected with the Convention. In fact, none of the provisions of the Convention expressly regulates issues of evidence and the European Court of Human Rights ("the ECtHR") traditionally refuses to rule on the legality and the admissibility of evidence having regard to its subsidiary role and the doctrine of fourth instance. Yet the days when the question of the legality of evidence was exclusively a matter of domestic law are now long gone, as is evidenced by the relatively abundant jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the former European Commission of Human Rights (jointly "the Convention organs"). Moreover, Strasbourg case-law has been evolving dynamically in this area. It is thus one of the challenges currently facing both legal science and practice which stand before the difficult task to capture and influence these developments. The gathering of evidence in criminal proceedings often conflicts with the fundamental rights of individuals. Consequently, it is not surprising that the jurisprudence of the Convention organs dealing with issues of evidence has developed particularly in the...

The UN Migrant Workers Convention (CMW) that provides for fundamental human rights for migrant workers and members of their families has been adopted in 1990. Until today, none of the EU Member States has signed or ratified it. The EU Member States argue that there is no need for them to accede to the CMW, as, inter alia, the rights contained in it are already secured by other international human rights instruments and in the EU legal instruments. Additionally to the claim of the CMW redundancy for the current EU legal framework, the Member States have several times repeated the fear that the ratification of the CMW could give irregular migrants more rights and increase irregular migration to the EU. Inspired by these two in fact contradictory arguments, this research aims to explore the scope of irregular migrants related human rights protection under international and European law and verify the basis of the EU Member states claims by comparing the scope of rights of irregular migrant workers in the EU with the standards embedded in the CMW. The main research questions posed are What human rights are the irregular migrants entitled to in the EU, based on international and European legal instruments? Is the CMW indeed redundant and unnecessary in the legislative framework of the European Union or is it...

Det finns en utbredd kritik riktad mot Europadomstolen och dess tillämpning av religionsfriheten (artikel 9 i Europakonventionen). Akademiker har anklagat domstolen för att ha demonstrerat enbiasi fall som rör islam och slöjan. Domstolens bedömningar har upplevts som godtyckliga. Muslimer har framhävt att de upplever att de inte kan räkna med att få en rättvis domstolsprocess. Denna allvarliga kritik mot Europadomstolen ligger till grund för studiens övergripande syfte som är att undersöka vilka förutsättningar som finns för rättvisa i fall som rör religionsfriheten och slöjan.                       Forskare har uppmanat domstolen att anamma fyra proceduriella rättvisekriterier (deltagande, neutralitet, respekt och tillit) i syfte att åstadkomma rättvisa domstolsprocesser. Studien börjar därför med att analysera det huvudsakliga materialet, fyra rättsfall som alla behandlar en slöjbärande muslimsk kvinna utifrån de proceduriella rättvisekriterierna. Dessa kriterier kompletteras med en moralfilosofisk förståelse för alla individers grundläggande rätt till rättfärdigande. Studiens tes är dock att en proceduriell förståelse av rättvisa riskerar att vara otillräcklig. Det teoretiska ramverket består därför även av en substantiell förståelse av rättvisa, som istället för att fokusera på domstolens tillvägagångssätt fokuserar på utfall. Resultatet bekräftar denna tes genom att först anamma en förståelse för att vårt praktiska förnuft riskerar att vara invävt med ideologi. Det är inte förrän vi tillämpar ett dekonstruerande och dekoloniserande perspektiv som vi ser vad det är som hindrar domstolen från att upprätta substantiell rättvisa för slöjbärande kvinnor. Slöjan som symbol och sekularism som begrepp har tillskrivits särskilda värden vilket gör att domstolen förstår dessa som i direkt strid med varandra. Det är inte förrän domstolen självkritiskt reflekterar över och dekonstruerar dessa inneboende värden som substantiell rättvisa är möjligt. Studiens uppfattning är att muslimska slöjbärande kvinnor systematiskt nekas en verklig möjlighet till upprättelse i Europadomstolen. / The European Court of the Human Rights has been widely criticized regarding its implementation of the freedom of religion (article 9 in the European Convention on Human Rights). Researchers have noticed that the Court has demonstrated a bias in cases concerning Islam and the Islamic veil. The Courts judgements have been understood as arbitrary and European Muslims have argued that they do not have a fair chance to a just court procedure. This serious critique aimed at the Court grounds the aim of this study which is to explore the conditions for justice regarding freedom of religion cases and the Islamic veil in the European Court of Human Rights.                        Researchers have advised the court to apply four procedural justice criteria (participation, neutrality, respect and trust) in order to secure just and fair court procedures. Therefore, from a procedural understanding of justice, the study starts with an analysis of the main material, which is four cases, all concerning women wearing the Islamic veil. The theoretical framework is supplemented with a moral understanding of everyone’s basic right to justification and the two procedural justice criteria reciprocity and generality. However, the thesis of this study is that a procedural understanding of justice might be unsatisfying when discovering the general conditions for justice in the Court. The theoretical framework therefore needs to include substantive justice. Instead of focusing on pure procedural justice itaims at establishing substantively just outcomes. The result of this study confirms this thesis by acknowledging that our practical reason might be infused with ideology. It is not until a deconstructing and decolonial perspective is applied that it becomes clear what is hampering the court from establishing substantively just outcomes for women wearing the Islamic veil. As the veil and the term secularism has been ascribed certain values and ideas, the court put these two phenomena in direct contrast with each other. Substantive justice is not achievable until the court, in a self-critical manner deconstructs these values and ideas. The main result of this study is that until then, Muslim women wearing the Islamic veil are systematically denied substantive justice.

La Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme, depuis les années 1990, connait une extension de ses compétences ratione personae et ratione loci sans précèdent. Faire face à ce phénomène exceptionnel requiert des instruments nouveaux. L’objet de cette étude réside dans l’examen des techniques adaptées par la Cour afin de maintenir le niveau de protection des droits de l’homme garantis par la Convention. Par ailleurs les organes et les Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe participèrent grandement à l’effort de conservation du niveau d’excellence de protection des droits de l’homme en Europe. Ce sont ces aspects précis qui sont passés en revue et apprécié sous l’angle de leurs apports et parfois, inconvénients. Sujet d’étude apporté dans un espace-temps précis, il demanderait dans un avenir d’être complété et apprécié sous cet angle. / The European Court of Human Rights, since the 1990s, recognizes an unprecedented extension of its competence ratione personae and ratione loci. In order to face this exceptional phenomenon new instruments are required. The purpose of this study is the examination of new techniques adapted by the Court to maintain the level of protection of human rights guaranteed by the Convention. Other organs and Member States of the Council of Europe participated actively to the efforts in order to conserve the excellent level for the protection of human rights in Europe. These are specific areas having been reviewed and valued in terms of their contribution and sometimes their disadvantages. Prepared in a particular space-time, this study would ask in the future to be completed and assessed from this angle.