Cette étude traite de la question de l’inter-normativité entre le droit et la morale dans le domaine spécifique de la limitation des droits de l’homme au nom de la morale, et dans le champ juridique formé par la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Même si la Convention européenne comporte déjà un but de restriction de la protection de la morale, le sujet de la thèse requiert une conceptualisation plus large et moins formelle du phénomène à analyser. La notion de « norme morale limitative » peut alors être utilisée pour couvrir l’ensemble des modes de pertinence de la morale en sa fonction de limitation des droits. La thèse examine l’introduction de la norme morale limitative dans le contentieux européen à travers l’inter-normative nationale, et vérifie son niveau de pertinence lors de la désignation de l’applicabilité de la Convention. Elle établit le contexte axiologique de l’ordre public européen dans lequel la norme morale est évaluée. L’examen de la question, en tenant compte des différents types de valeur que la norme morale peut viser à protéger ou promouvoir, met en lumière l’affaiblissement juridique des motifs moralistes et paternalistes dans la justification de la limitation des droits. En revanche, la norme morale limitative devient plus difficilement contestable dans l’argumentation lorsqu’elle se veut protectrice d’autrui. Toutefois, la zone d’interférence entre la morale et la protection d’autrui est en mutation. Ce dernier facteur devient exclusivement pertinent dans le domaine des conflits axiologiques émergents, en limitant la norme morale limitative à des matières de réglementation plus classiques. / The thesis deals with the question of inter-normativity between the law and the moral in the specific context of limitation of human rights in the name of the moral and in the legal context created by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Convention of Human rights includes already a restriction to the protection brought by the moral. The topic of the thesis provides a much broader conceptualization of the phenomena. The notion of « limitative moral norm » can be used to cover all modes of the moral as a limitation of rights. This study analyses the introduction of the limitative moral norm in the European litigation and verifies its level of efficiency in the applicability of the Convention. The thesis establishes the axiological background of the European public policy in which the moral norm is evaluated. The moralist and paternalistic motifs are legally poor when it comes to justify the limitation of rights. However, the limitative moral norm becomes difficult to contest when it comes to protect the rights of others. Nevertheless, the interference zone between the moral and the protection of the other is changing. This latter factor becomes exclusively efficient in the context of emerging axiological conflicts, limiting the scope of the limitative moral norm to fields of classical regulation.

L’autonomie personnelle a été consacrée par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme comme principe interprétatif des garanties de la Convention, et tout particulièrement de l’article 8, qui protège le droit au respect de la vie privée. Dans ce domaine, le principe d’autonomie personnelle implique « le droit de disposer de son corps », incluant « des activités (…) d’une nature physiquement ou moralement dommageables ou dangereuses pour la personne ». Ce principe a été « emprunté » au droit nord-américain par le juge de Strasbourg, pour être opportunément intégré au corpus de la Convention. En effet, celui-ci souhaite marquer la libéralisation du droit au respect de la vie privée européen, justifiant une disposition corporelle absolutiste. Or, le droit interne est censé accueillir le principe d’autonomie personnelle, et donc, de loin en loin, admettre celle-ci, malgré son attachement à un encadrement strict des possibilités d’utiliser son corps. Toutefois, en dépit de ses virtualités, le principe d’autonomie personnelle est doublement limité. En effet, s’agissant du droit européen, ce principe conduit à fonder le droit au respect de la vie privée sur une conception subjective de la dignité, ontologiquement « a normative ». S’agissant du droit français, nonobstant les possibilités toujours plus nombreuses de disposer de son corps, la réception aboutie du principe semble compromise par un ordre public corporel pérenne. Au total, le principe d’autonomie personnelle ne semble menacer, pour l’heure, ni la stabilité de la Convention, ni l’équilibre jusque-là sauvegardé entre la disposition corporelle et l’ordre public y afférant en droit français. Néanmoins, ce constat invite à la modestie, au regard des enjeux scientifiques et politiques toujours plus pressants que suscite l’accès à l’humain. / The personal autonomy was consecrated by the European court of human rights as an interpretation principle of the guarantees of the Convention, and especially the article 8, protecting the right to respect for private life. In this field, the principle of personal autonomy implicates « the right to use one’s own body » including « activities (…) physically or morally harmful or dangerous for the person ». This principle was « borrowed » from north american right by the judge of Strasbourg, to be integrated to the corpus of the Convention with opportunity. Indeed, he wants to mark the liberalization of the european right to respect for private life, justifying an absolutist body using. Yet, the french right is supposed to welcome the principle of personal autonomy, and so, admit this one, despite its severe supervision of the possibilities of body using. Nevertheless, in the face of its virtualities, the principle of personal autonomy is limited in two ways. Indeed, concerning european right, this principle leads to justify the right to respect for private life on a subjective conception of dignity, intrinsically « no normative ». Concerning the french right, in spite of the possibilities always more importants of body using, the reception with success of the principle seems impaired by a perennial public order. Finally, the principle of personal autonomy doesn’t seem to threaten, for now, nor the stability of the Convention, neither the balance safeguarded until now between the body using and the public order concerning it in french right. However, this constatation invites to self-effacement, regarding to scientific and political issues always more pressing that human access sparks off.

Em meio ao contexto da Guerra Fria, a segunda metade do século XX trouxe para a América Latina, em oposição às lutas por emancipação popular, ditaduras civis-militares que perpetraram gravíssimas violações de Direitos Humanos contra a população que deveria estar sob a guarida dos Estados. Em resposta a isso, movimentos de resistência tanto pacíficos quanto armados eclodiram pelo continente. Um dos episódios de resistência mais emblemáticos deste período no Brasil foi a chamada Guerrilha do Araguaia, da qual chegaram a participar 86 indivíduos – quase todos estudantes universitários que viram nas armas o único meio de derrubar a ditadura. A reação do Exército não tardou e, destes 86, 70 foram vítimas de desaparecimento forçado. Em 2010, o Estado brasileiro foi condenado pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos a localizar os desparecidos e a punir os responsáveis por essas violações, entre outras medidas. Transcorrido um ano da sentença, o Brasil entregou à Corte seu Relatório de Cumprimento, o qual é objeto de análise deste trabalho a partir do marco teórico da Justiça de Transição. / As a consequence of the Cold War, the second half of the twentieth century brought to Latin America, in opposition to the popular struggles for emancipation, civil-military dictatorships which perpetrated serious Human Rights violations against the population who should be under the protection of the States. In response to this, both peaceful resistance movements as well as armed ones erupted across the continent. One of the most iconic episodes of resistance in Brazil was the Guerrilha do Araguaia, which involved 86 individuals at its best moment – almost all of them college students who saw armed resistance as the only way to overthrow the dictatorship. The Army’s reaction came soon after and, of the 86 who joined the guerrilla, 70 were victims of enforced disappearance. In 2010, the Brazilian State was held responsible for these disappearances before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which demanded the State to locate those who were still missing and to punish those responsible for the violations, among other measures to be taken. One year after the sentence was issued, Brazil handed in its Compliance Report, which is the object of study of the present work under the theoretical framework of Transitional Justice.

Analisa a figura jurídica da Responsabilidade Internacional Estatal por violações aos direitos humanos, na teoria e na prática, com ênfase no Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos. Para tanto, relata a evolução histórica do conceito de responsabilidade internacional e sua interação atual com os direitos humanos, assim como os elementos característicos, natureza jurídica e exceções destas possíveis violações por parte dos órgãos ou funcionários do Estado ao qual pertence à suposta vítima, seja nacional ou estrangeiro. Alega que no sistema Interamericano, existe uma desigualdade de legislações e falta de conscientização por parte dos Estados da importância que tem o respeito ao sistema regional de proteção dos direitos humanos ao qual voluntariamente se têm submetido. / It analyses the legal figure of the State International Responsibility for violations to the human rights, in the theory and in practice, with emphasis in the Inter-American System of Human Rights. In such a way, it tells the historical evolution of the concept of international responsibility and its current interaction with the human rights. Also, the characteristic elements, legal nature and exceptions for possible violations of the institutions or employees of the State witch belongs the supposed victim, either national or foreign. It claims that in Inter-American system an inequality of legislations exist, also, and awareness of the States about the importance that must be the respect to the regional system of protection of the human rights, witch voluntarily has been submitted.

Em meio ao contexto da Guerra Fria, a segunda metade do século XX trouxe para a América Latina, em oposição às lutas por emancipação popular, ditaduras civis-militares que perpetraram gravíssimas violações de Direitos Humanos contra a população que deveria estar sob a guarida dos Estados. Em resposta a isso, movimentos de resistência tanto pacíficos quanto armados eclodiram pelo continente. Um dos episódios de resistência mais emblemáticos deste período no Brasil foi a chamada Guerrilha do Araguaia, da qual chegaram a participar 86 indivíduos – quase todos estudantes universitários que viram nas armas o único meio de derrubar a ditadura. A reação do Exército não tardou e, destes 86, 70 foram vítimas de desaparecimento forçado. Em 2010, o Estado brasileiro foi condenado pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos a localizar os desparecidos e a punir os responsáveis por essas violações, entre outras medidas. Transcorrido um ano da sentença, o Brasil entregou à Corte seu Relatório de Cumprimento, o qual é objeto de análise deste trabalho a partir do marco teórico da Justiça de Transição. / As a consequence of the Cold War, the second half of the twentieth century brought to Latin America, in opposition to the popular struggles for emancipation, civil-military dictatorships which perpetrated serious Human Rights violations against the population who should be under the protection of the States. In response to this, both peaceful resistance movements as well as armed ones erupted across the continent. One of the most iconic episodes of resistance in Brazil was the Guerrilha do Araguaia, which involved 86 individuals at its best moment – almost all of them college students who saw armed resistance as the only way to overthrow the dictatorship. The Army’s reaction came soon after and, of the 86 who joined the guerrilla, 70 were victims of enforced disappearance. In 2010, the Brazilian State was held responsible for these disappearances before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which demanded the State to locate those who were still missing and to punish those responsible for the violations, among other measures to be taken. One year after the sentence was issued, Brazil handed in its Compliance Report, which is the object of study of the present work under the theoretical framework of Transitional Justice.

J’examine les conditions de transposition du modèle de la « communauté épistémique » au domaine de la délibération et des évaluations pratiques. Je réponds ainsi à la question suivante :comment les droits de l’homme acquièrent-ils une signification objective dans le système de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ?Dans la première partie (analyse institutionnelle), je montre que la « sociabilité » est le premier enjeu de la protection des droits de l’homme au Conseil de l’Europe (ch. 1). Cet objectif de « sociabilité » n’est pas étranger à la question de leur « signification objective » car, au minimum, l’effectivité du système européen est suspendue à la réalisation d’un « ordre public » en la matière (ch. 2). Dans la deuxième partie (analyse épistémologique), je montre qu’une perspective épistémique sur les droits fondamentaux permet de rendre compte de l’effectivité (« praticabilité », rationalité) du système européen mais suppose le développement d’un critère dynamique (« d’acculturation ») de la rationalité d’un système de droit international (ch. 3) ainsi qu’un modèle épistémologique dans lequel « l’acceptabilité sociale » vaut comme instance d’adjudication rationnelle, et non seulement d’acceptation empirique, d’une définition des droits (ch. 4). Je teste, dans la troisième partie (analyse argumentative), les conditions de réalisation d’une telle « communauté épistémique » à la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme à travers l’analyse critique du contrôle des ingérences par les juges européens (ch. 5). Je défends enfin la valeur opératoire d’une théorie philosophique de l’argumentation pour la protection des droits de l’homme en Europe (ch. 6). / I consider the conditions of adaptation of a model of « epistemic community » to the field of practical deliberation and evaluations. By doing so, I am able to answer the following question: how do human rights acquire an objective meaning within the system of the European Convention of Human Rights? In the first part (institutional analysis), I show that “sociability” is what is primarily at stake in the protection of human rights within the Council of Europe (ch.1). This goal of ensuring “sociability” is not foreign to the issue of the “objective meaning” of human rights, for in that regard, the mere efficiency of the European system depends on the implementation of a “public order” in the field of human rights (Ch. 2). In the second part (epistemological analysis), I show that an epistemic perspective on fundamental rights allows one to account for the efficiency (“practicability”, rationality) of the European system, but that it presupposes the development of both a dynamic criterion (“acculturation”) for the assessment of the rationality of an international system of rights (ch. 3) and of an epistemological model in which “social acceptability” would not only serve as a benchmark for the empirical acceptation of a definition of rights but also as a benchmark for their rational adjudication (Ch. 4). In the third part (argumentative analysis), I test the conditions in which such an “epistemic community” is carried out by the European court for human rights, through a critical analysis of the way European judges deal with interferences in human rights (Ch. 5). Eventually, I defend the operating value of a philosophical argumentation theory for the protection of human rights in Europe (Ch. 6). / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Depuis la fondation de la République Turque en 1923, la laïcité constitue le principe le plus discuté et controversé, notamment car le rejet d’un des autres principes n’a jamais été perçu, comme c’est le cas pour la laïcité, comme impliquant un rejet de la République elle-même. Que signifie la laïcité pour la Turquie ? Le renforcement de l’autorité des élites ? Ou le sens de la République ? Aujourd’hui, comment comprenons-nous la laïcité, et avons-nous besoin de la redéfinir ? Sans réaliser une analyse poussée des fondements socio-religieux du pays, les travaux étudiant la laïcité turque ont tendance à se borner à des descriptions formelles et rigides. La laïcité est le principe juridique exprimant la neutralité de l’État envers toutes les croyances religieuses, et sa purification de toutes références religieuses. Néanmoins dans les faits, nous n’avons jamais vu une telle application de laïcité, si pure et théorique. Ce qui fait de la laïcité un instrument d’oppression est en réalité, un ensemble de symboles et de mythes encerclant le sens de la laïcité. Cet ensemble de symboles et de mythes constitue une religion politique, rigide et incontestable. Pour cette raison, les travaux étudiant l’application du principe de laïcité ont perçu les symboles de la religion politique comme une laïcité distincte et particulière. Dans notre travail, nous allons étudier les bases historiques et philosophiques de la laïcité en Turquie. Notre but est de mettre en relief les origines de la laïcité et son évolution en tant que religion politique, opposée à l’Islam traditionnel et politique. Dans la dernière partie de notre travail, nous allons étudier la laïcité en Turquie dans le contexte de la démocratie, à la lumière de la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, afin de savoir s’il est nécessaire de la redéfinir. / Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 the secularism « la laïcité » is discussed much more than any other topic and its denial meant the denial of Turkish Republic. However, what does secularism mean for Turkey? Is it the reinforcement of elite’s authorities? Or is it the definition of Republic? Nowadays, how do we understand secularism and do we need to redefine it? In Turkey most of the academic works about secularism are still not brining any additional value rather than staying as another description of secularism. The dictionary description of secularism « la laïcité » is that, the state must be natural against all religious beliefs and do not stand as a reference point for any religion. But in practice, the secularism cannot be defined as straight as its definition, it never appears with those sharp borders and in that purity. The factors, which are transforming secularism from a legitimate view to a control mechanism, are its symbols and myths that are considered as part of secularism. Actually, these myths and symbols are forming an undeniable political religion. For that reason most of the previous academic works which are analyzing secularism by considering these myths and symbols as an add-on to the term of secularism, pushed us to look and create a new definition of this concept. In this work, we will analyse the historical and philosophical basis of secularism. We will also trace the origin and the formation of secularism as a political religion opposite to the traditional and political Islam. In this work, we will analyse the historical and philosophical basis of secularism. We will also trace the origin and the formation of secularism as a political religion opposite to the traditional and political Islam.The final part of work will observe secularism in the light of the jurisprudence of the European Convention of Human Rights and, the democracy in order to understand if the notion of secularism in Turkey requires redefinition.

The diploma thesis regarding The Legal Aspects of Mandatory Vaccination and its European Context was created in order to map the legal regulations of mandatory vaccination in the Czech Republic and to describe the repressions of unvaccinated children in the Czech Republic and in other member states of the European Union. Part of the thesis consists of a jurisprudence research of The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, The European Court of Human Rights and The Court of Justice of the European Union related to the field of mandatory vaccination. Special focus is given to the comparison of the number of mandatory vaccinations in the member states of European Union as well as to the comparison of their legislations. The fundamental question reflected in the diploma thesis is the one of the human rights of individuals guaranteed by the European Union, international conventions and national legislations of the states and the possibility for them to be limited in order to protect the public health. In the thesis, there are listed and described the human rights affected by the whole concept of vaccination and also the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order to allow the human rights to be restricted. For this purpose the cases from legal practise serve as a support. In addition, there is a chapter regarding the promotion of newly developed vaccines for voluntary vaccinations, which reveals the marketing tools used for this purpose. For a better understanding of the field of mandatory vaccination, there is included a chapter titled The Insight of Expertise Necessary for the Interpretation and Application of Law. This chapter completes the aspects of mandatory vaccination from the medical point of view, lists the mandatory vaccinations in the Czech Republic and member states of the European Union and the vaccines used for performing the vaccinations. Keywords: human rights, mandatory vaccination, jurisprudence of The European Court of Human Rights and The Court of Justice of the European Union, repressions of unvaccinated children

This thesis aims to identify divergent interpretations of particular ECHR's articles in jurisdiction of the CJEU and the ECtHR using methods of analysis and comparison. An interim target is to define the scope and powers of the CJEU and the ECtHR in relation to the ECHR. Initial hypothesis states: "The EU accession to the ECHR would help to eliminate inconsistencies in interpretation of the ECHR and to define a clear relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR."

The right of freedom of expression is often mentioned as one of the most significant human rights. Despite its importance and necessity for functioning and development of any democratic society, this right is not without limits. The aim of this theses is to find the limits of the right of freedom of expression within the system of the ECHR which represents one of the most important documents in the human rights field at the international level. The important position of freedom of expression will be proved by an analysis of the theoretical context of freedom of expression in the system of the ECHR as well as by examination of the work of the European Court of Human Rights and its case law connected to the right of freedom of expression.