Le passage du GATT à l’OMC a été voulu comme le passage d’un système basé sur le pouvoir à un système basé sur le droit. Pourtant, une analyse approfondie du contentieux de l’OMC révèle une image plus nuancée d’un mécanisme juridictionnel qui n’a pas pleinement réussi à évincer l’influence du pouvoir politique. Dans les faits, le mécanisme de règlement des différends de l’OMC apparaît comme un organe qui opère dans un contexte d’indépendance limitée en ce qu’il interagit avec les éléments politiques du système à différents égards. Dans cette perspective, et malgré un bilan généralement positif, de nombreux auteurs affirment la nécessité de renforcer le mécanisme. Ils invoquent certains différends qui n’ont pas été résolus suite à l’épuisement de la procédure contentieuse. À cet égard, et bien que la mise en œuvre des engagements étatiques joue assurément un rôle essentiel dans l’atteinte de la justice dans le contentieux de l’OMC, nous avons tenté de démontrer dans le cadre de cette thèse que la justice que dispense ce mécanisme va au-delà de l’idée répandue selon laquelle le système est essentiellement un instrument de mise en œuvre du droit. La thèse démontre que différentes formes de justice dispensées par le mécanisme peuvent inclure notamment une forme pragmatique de justice, qui ne se limite pas aux règles et aux procédures, mais qui consiste également à délivrer le meilleur résultat dans un différend spécifique. C’est cette justice pragmatique qui se manifeste particulièrement dans les différends mettant en jeu une asymétrie de pouvoir que nous avons cherché à analyser selon le cadre théorique du pragmatisme juridique. Il est donc question dans cette thèse de l’étude des moyens par lesquels les acteurs du mécanisme, à savoir les membres des groupes spéciaux et de l’Organe d’appel mais aussi les États, adaptent l’application des règles de droit selon le contexte spécifique de chaque différend. Les résultats obtenus peuvent à certains égards susciter des interrogations quant à leurs fondements juridiques mais ils mènent certes à contenir les effets du pouvoir politique qui demeure une réalité dans le cadre du processus de règlement des différends à l’OMC. / The transition from the GATT to the WTO was intended as the transition from a power-based system to a rule-based system. Yet an in-depth analysis of WTO litigation reveals a more nuanced picture of a jurisdictional mechanism that has not fully succeeded in crowding out the influence of political power. In fact, the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO appears as a body operating in a context of limited independence in that it interacts with the political elements of the system in different ways. In this perspective, and despite a generally positive assessment, many authors affirm the need to strengthen the mechanism by pointing to different instances of non-compliance that have persisted long after the exhaustion of the litigation procedure. In this respect, and while the implementation of State commitments certainly plays a key role in achieving justice in WTO litigation, this thesis aims to demonstrate that the WTO dispute settlement is not only an instrument of law implementation. The thesis will demonstrate that different forms of justice dispensed by the mechanism may include a pragmatic form of justice, which is not limited to rules and procedures, but which helps deliver the best result in a specific dispute so as to reflect the interests of the parties.. It is this pragmatic justice that manifests itself particularly in disputes involving an asymmetry of power and that we seek to explore through the theoretical framework of legal pragmatism. This goal will be achieved by studying the means through which the actors of the mechanism, namely the panelists but also the States, adapt the application of WTO rules according to the specific context of each dispute. The results obtained may in some respects raise questions as to their legal basis, but they certainly lead to the containme

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international. / International arbitration has remained an exclusive domain sovereign states until, in the late 50s, came the first bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The main feature of these BITs is undoubtedly the right, granted to investors, to direct international arbitration against recalcitrant States, an alternative to often ineffective local justice. More recently, in 1998, the appellate body of the WTO went to accept the opinion of an independent amicus curiae in a dispute between State members. Today, the admission of such opinions is clearly provided for in several recent BITs. But if investors benefit from a right of action before a neutral international arbitration body, the situation is quite different for the local population, who is often affected by the presence of foreign investors on its territory. The right to submit an opinion cannot replace the right to legal action. This therefore raises one question: in the current context of international investment law, is it possible for third parties (non signatories of BITs and not parties to the dispute) are entitled to a remedy direct international arbitration? We are of the opinion that the answer to this question is: yes. And the context of investment arbitration, because of the right to direct arbitration against States already granted to investors, constitutes a fertile ground for the implementation of this right of action in favour of third parties. The objection based on the absence of the parties’ consent to such right of action has been set aside in many international arbitration cases where the scope of consent has been extended to include non-parties or to submit to arbitration matters not contemplated at first. Also, the objection based on the absence of legal standing of third parties in International Law proves to be theoretical as foreign investors already have access to international justice despite the lack of this quality. There remains to determine what substantial International Law will constitute a valid legal basis for a third party claim. We will see that there exists legal instruments and international principles and that their violation by States or investors may result in the obligation to compensate the prejudice suffered, as well as it is possible to clearly define and indentify who the third parties could be.

L’arbitrage public international est demeuré un domaine exclusif aux États souverains jusqu’à la fin des années 50, alors que sont apparus les traités bilatéraux relatifs aux investissements (TBI). La principale caractéristique de ces TBI est sans conteste le recours direct de l’investisseur étranger en arbitrage international contre des États récalcitrants, une alternative aux tribunaux locaux souvent inefficaces. Plus récemment, en 1998, l’organe d’appel de l’OMC est allé jusqu’à accepter l’opinion d’amicus curiae dans un différend opposant des États et aujourd’hui, l’admission de ce type d’opinion est expressément prévue dans plusieurs TBI de nouvelle génération. Mais si l’investisseur bénéficie d’un recours devant une instance arbitrale neutre, il en va tout autrement pour la population locale qui se trouve souvent lésée par la présence, sur son territoire, d’investisseurs étrangers. Le droit de présenter une opinion ne peut remplacer le droit de faire valoir une réclamation. Se pose donc la question : est-ce que, dans le contexte actuel du droit de l’investissement international, des tiers (par rapport aux parties signataires de TBI et par rapport aux parties au différend) peuvent prétendre à une voie de recours direct en arbitrage international? Nous sommes d’avis qu’une telle voie de recours est actuellement possible et que le contexte de l’arbitrage relatif à l’investissement constitue un terrain fertile pour la mise en place de ce droit, étant donné la place déjà faite aux investisseurs. Nous verrons que les principales objections à l’admission de tiers à l’arbitrage international peuvent être rejetées. L’objection de l’absence du consentement des parties intéressées tombe quand on constate les nombreux cas d’arbitrage international où la portée du consentement a été étendue pour inclure des non-parties ou encore pour soumettre à l’arbitrage des matières non envisagées au départ. Par ailleurs, l’absence de qualité pour agir en droit international est un problème théorique, car les investisseurs y ont déjà accès malgré l’absence de cette qualité. Reste donc à déterminer quelle pourrait être la base d’un recours en droit substantiel international pour qu’un tiers puisse faire valoir une réclamation. Nous verrons qu’il existe des instruments juridiques et des principes internationaux dont la contravention pourrait très bien engager la responsabilité de l’État ou de l’investisseur fautif, tout comme il est possible de bien circonscrire les critères d’admissibilité des tiers à la procédure d’arbitrage international. / International arbitration has remained an exclusive domain sovereign states until, in the late 50s, came the first bilateral investment treaties (BITs). The main feature of these BITs is undoubtedly the right, granted to investors, to direct international arbitration against recalcitrant States, an alternative to often ineffective local justice. More recently, in 1998, the appellate body of the WTO went to accept the opinion of an independent amicus curiae in a dispute between State members. Today, the admission of such opinions is clearly provided for in several recent BITs. But if investors benefit from a right of action before a neutral international arbitration body, the situation is quite different for the local population, who is often affected by the presence of foreign investors on its territory. The right to submit an opinion cannot replace the right to legal action. This therefore raises one question: in the current context of international investment law, is it possible for third parties (non signatories of BITs and not parties to the dispute) are entitled to a remedy direct international arbitration? We are of the opinion that the answer to this question is: yes. And the context of investment arbitration, because of the right to direct arbitration against States already granted to investors, constitutes a fertile ground for the implementation of this right of action in favour of third parties. The objection based on the absence of the parties’ consent to such right of action has been set aside in many international arbitration cases where the scope of consent has been extended to include non-parties or to submit to arbitration matters not contemplated at first. Also, the objection based on the absence of legal standing of third parties in International Law proves to be theoretical as foreign investors already have access to international justice despite the lack of this quality. There remains to determine what substantial International Law will constitute a valid legal basis for a third party claim. We will see that there exists legal instruments and international principles and that their violation by States or investors may result in the obligation to compensate the prejudice suffered, as well as it is possible to clearly define and indentify who the third parties could be.

Esta dissertação concentra suas investigações nas contramedidas do direito internacional geral e da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). No âmbito do direito internacional, estudou-se a essência política da sociedade internacional descentralizada, bem como a tendência do processo de fragmentação do direito internacional em direção a regimes mais regulados pelo direito. Além disso, investigou-se a tentativa de ampliação da normatização das contramedidas por meio do Projeto de Artigos sobre Responsabilidade Internacional do Estado de 2001. No âmbito do regime especial da OMC, analisou-se o maior adensamento jurídico das contramedidas como ponto culminante na fase de implementação das decisões no sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC. Com base na avaliação sobre a necessidade de reforma do instituto das contramedidas da OMC, foram pesquisadas as principais propostas para sua modificação, buscando-se identificar a tentativa de redução do espaço político. A hipótese deste trabalho partiu da afirmação sobre a existência de uma tendência evolutiva no direito internacional geral e na OMC no que tange ao aumento da juridicidade do instituto das contramedidas. Entretanto, essa hipótese confirmou-se apenas parcialmente, pois a tentativa de aprimorar a regulamentação jurídica do instituto das contramedidas ocorre em meio à permanência de elementos políticos. / This thesis focused on countermeasures in general International Law and in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regarding International Law, the thesis studied the political foundation of the decentralized international society, as well as the trend of fragmentation of International Law towards law-based regimes. Moreover, this thesis researched the attempt to regulate countermeasures through the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Regarding the WTO special regime, the thesis analyzed its more law-based countermeasure as the last stage in the implementation of decisions in the WTO dispute settlement system. Based on the necessity of WTO countermeasures reform, the thesis investigated the main reform proposals, seeking to identify the attempt to reduce the political interference. The hypothesis of this research is the tendency towards a more law-based countermeasure in general International Law and in the WTO. However, this hypothesis has only been partially confirmed because political elements do not disappear despite the attempt to increase the legality of countermeasures.

Esta dissertação concentra suas investigações nas contramedidas do direito internacional geral e da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). No âmbito do direito internacional, estudou-se a essência política da sociedade internacional descentralizada, bem como a tendência do processo de fragmentação do direito internacional em direção a regimes mais regulados pelo direito. Além disso, investigou-se a tentativa de ampliação da normatização das contramedidas por meio do Projeto de Artigos sobre Responsabilidade Internacional do Estado de 2001. No âmbito do regime especial da OMC, analisou-se o maior adensamento jurídico das contramedidas como ponto culminante na fase de implementação das decisões no sistema de solução de controvérsias da OMC. Com base na avaliação sobre a necessidade de reforma do instituto das contramedidas da OMC, foram pesquisadas as principais propostas para sua modificação, buscando-se identificar a tentativa de redução do espaço político. A hipótese deste trabalho partiu da afirmação sobre a existência de uma tendência evolutiva no direito internacional geral e na OMC no que tange ao aumento da juridicidade do instituto das contramedidas. Entretanto, essa hipótese confirmou-se apenas parcialmente, pois a tentativa de aprimorar a regulamentação jurídica do instituto das contramedidas ocorre em meio à permanência de elementos políticos. / This thesis focused on countermeasures in general International Law and in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regarding International Law, the thesis studied the political foundation of the decentralized international society, as well as the trend of fragmentation of International Law towards law-based regimes. Moreover, this thesis researched the attempt to regulate countermeasures through the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Regarding the WTO special regime, the thesis analyzed its more law-based countermeasure as the last stage in the implementation of decisions in the WTO dispute settlement system. Based on the necessity of WTO countermeasures reform, the thesis investigated the main reform proposals, seeking to identify the attempt to reduce the political interference. The hypothesis of this research is the tendency towards a more law-based countermeasure in general International Law and in the WTO. However, this hypothesis has only been partially confirmed because political elements do not disappear despite the attempt to increase the legality of countermeasures.

När en investerare vill investera utomlands finns många risker som måste beräknas, analyseras och hanteras. Utöver olika ekonomiska risker finns politiska risker. En investerare kan, för att hantera dessa politiska risker, välja att investera i en stat med vilken Sverige har ett bilateralt investeringsskyddsavtal. Dessa avtal reglerar både materiellt investeringsskydd, det vill säga hur en investerare ska behandlas, och processuellt skydd, det vill säga möjligheten för en investerare att väcka talan mot staten investeraren investerar i genom ett internationellt skiljeförfarande. Sverige har idag 66 stycken bilaterala investeringsskyddsavtal i kraft, varav tolv stycken är slutna med länder inom EU. Antalet bilaterala investeringsskyddsavtal slutna mellan EU-länder, intra-EU BIT, ökade avsevärt i och med att unionen utvidgades år 2004 och 2007. Sedan dess har avtalens förenlighet med EU-rätten diskuterats i litteraturen, i skiljedomstolar och nyligen även i EU- domstolen i det så kallade Achmea-målet. I uppsatsen kartläggs och analyseras argumenten i diskussionen om relationen mellan intra-EU BIT och EU-rätten. Vidare analyseras vilken del av investeringsskyddet som intra-EU BIT-förespråkare anser vara mest betydelsefull. Från resonemanget och analysen i uppsatsen dras slutsatsen att det är ISDS-systemet, tvistelösningssystemet där en investerare kan väcka talan mot en stat, som kan anses utgöra den mest betydelsefulla delen av investeringsskyddet i intra-EU BIT:en. Därefter analyseras huruvida ett investeringsskydd innehållande ett ISDS-förfarande kan vara förenligt med principen om ömsesidigt erkännande och förtroende. I uppsatsen konstateras att ISDS-förfarandet inte kan vara förenligt denna princip och att problematiken inte kan lösas genom en juridisk debatt utan måste diskuteras på en politiskt hög nivå. / When investing abroad, an investor is faced with many risks that need to be thoroughly analysed in order to be mitigated. Risks are not only financial, but also political. An investor may, to mitigate these risks, choose to invest in states with which Sweden has a bilateral investment treaty, a so called BIT. BIT do not only regulate treatment of the investor and the investment, which is the material investment protection; but also the jurisdictional possibility of the investor to raise charges against the state of in which the investment has taken place in case of violation of investment rights, procedural investment protection. Today, Sweden has 66 BITs in force, out of which twelve are concluded with EU member states, so called intra-EU BIT. The number of intra-EU BITs grew significantly as a result of the enlargement of the union in the year of 2004 and 2007. Since then, the agreements’ compatibility with the EU legislation has been a subject of discussion within literature, investment arbitrations and recently in the European Court of Justice in the Achmea case. This thesis aims to establish and analyse the context of the discussions flourishing the relationship between the intra-EU BITs and the EU legislation. Additionally, the author intends to identify which argumentation regarding investment protection, that by intra-EU BIT praisers is considered to be the most impactful. As a result, the conclusion of the thesis is that it is the ISDS-system, the investor- state dispute settlement, in which an investor can raise charges towards a state, that is the most valuable part of the investment protection given by the intra-EU BITs. Accordingly, it is analysed weather investment protection containing an ISDS-system can be compatible with the principle of mutual trust and recognition. In the thesis it is concluded that the ISDS-system cannot be considered to be compatible with the principle and that this problem should be debated on a high political level and cannot be solved through a legal debate.

Dans l’arbitrage relatif aux investissements, on entend par exceptions préliminaires les incidents de procédure par lesquels les Etats contestent la compétence du tribunal arbitral ou la recevabilité de la requête de l’investisseur. Avec le développement du contentieux arbitral, le recours à cette technique contentieuse se fait de plus en plus fréquent, mais la présentation des exceptions préliminaires par les Etats et leur traitement par les tribunaux arbitraux sont souvent sources de confusion. Notre étude propose de préciser les concepts clés du contentieux international de compétence et de recevabilité et de revenir sur leur distinction dans un domaine spécialisé du contentieux international – le contentieux arbitral fondé sur les traités de protection et de promotion des investissements. La réaffirmation de la distinction entre les questions de compétence et de recevabilité permettra d’en proposer une classification en fonction de l’objet de l’exception préliminaire et de mieux saisir la portée de la notion d’exception préliminaire qui constitue un moyen de leur mise en oeuvre dans l’arbitrage transnational. Cette classification commandera le régime qu’il convient de réserver à chaque type de défense, afin d’ordonner la présentation des exceptions préliminaires par les Etats et leur examen par les arbitres, examen qui détermine leur faculté d’exercer la fonction juridictionnelle. / In investment treaty arbitration, preliminary objections can be defined as procedural issues raised by the States in order to contest arbitral tribunal jurisdiction or admissibility of an investor claim. With the rise of investment treaty arbitration, recourse to this litigation technique is getting more and more frequent. However, the submission of preliminary objections by the States, as well as their examination by the arbitral tribunals are frequently confusing. Our research focuses on the core concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility in international litigation in order to reconsider their distinction in a specialised field of international litigation - investment treaty arbitration. On the basis of this distinction, we propose a classification of preliminary issues according to their object. This classification will order the legal regime to be applied to each type of preliminary defence, thus putting some order in the submission of preliminary objections by the States and their examination by the arbitrators, examination which relates to their capacity to exercise their jurisdictional function.

本論文目的在藉由研析美國聯邦政府採購規則、歐盟採購指令及大陸政府採購法救濟制度，並比較GPA爭端解決機制及我國政府採購救濟制度，論述政府採購協定適用主體、適用客體及其爭端解決機制，從中尋求GPA與我國政府採購救濟制度規範不一致之處，為與政府採購協定之爭端解決機制之規範一致，並建立一個公平、公正及公開爭端解決機制，以吸引更多國外廠商來台參與投標，並帶動國際貿易商機。本研究結論建議如下： 一、建立異議及申訴前之諮商制度，經由爭議廠商與採購機關之事先諮商，有助爭端事先解決，以機先解決爭議。 二、廢除異議前置失權效規定，賦予爭議廠商得直接提起申訴之權，以加速程序進行並保障採購廠商應有之權益。 三、放寬異議及申訴主體資格，廠商採購權益之相關利害關係人，即得具有提出申訴之主體資格，以擴大解決採購紛爭。 四、增加異議或申訴之原因與事由，擴及未違反法令或條約、協定，廠商政府採購權益直接或間接遭受損害，即得提起救濟，以擴大行政自我預先審查功能與範圍。 五、採公開審議程序，以維護政府採購審議公平、公開審理，並保障申訴廠商之採購權益，避免造成書面審議失去公平判斷之可能。 六、明確規範暫停採購程序事由，避免事後因無法即時改正招標機關錯誤採購行為，而影響異議人之權益。 七、改正採購爭議審議委員會審議判斷，以符合政府採購協定（GPA）救濟有效性之要求。 / The purpose of the research is to study the inconsistency between GPA and Government Procurement Act in Taiwan by analyzing the subject, object and the dispute settlement mechanism and making comparison among U.S Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), EU Procurement Directives and China Government Procurement Law dispute settlement .In order to attract more foreign firms to participate in the vendors, and promote international trade opportunities. The main conclusion of the research is as follows: 1. It is suggested to establish a consultation mechanism to assist disputing parties to discuss and resolve their differences prior to the protests and appeals. 2. It is advised to add “causes and reasons” to protest and appeal on Government Procurement Act of Taiwan to expand administrative function and the scope of self-examination in advance. 3. In consideration of the interests of the vendors, it is recommended to abolish the regulation on the loss of efficiency right without protest. 4. To ensure the interests of the complained vendors, it is advised to broaden the qualification of objections and appeals. 5. Implement a transparent and open public review process to maintain the fairness of government procurement and secure the interests of the complained vendors. 6. It is important to define suspend procurement procedure clearly to avoid jeopardizing the rights of complaining suppliers and the entity. 7. In order to comply with the effectiveness of the relief requested under Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), it is necessary to correct the review decision of the Complaint Review Board for Government Procurement (CRBGP).

The theme of this thesis is the assessment of the prerequisites for the pluralism of law and non-state justice systems to improve the possibilities of solving disputes in society. The main research question is whether non-state justice systems fulfil a social role in providing justice. The thesis should offer a descriptive analysis of the concept of legal pluralism and methodological procedures for the inclusion of non-state justice systems in the state. The outcome of the work should be an overview of the possibilities of interaction between different legal systems, whether formal or customary, of the different ways of resolving disputes in this environment, and of the contribution of such proposals to the reform of the legal environment that count on the real situation in society. The thesis of procedural pluralism and participatory methods of solving disputes that have a user, a citizen in the center of these systems is offered as a starting point for new designs. The final part of the work will therefore explore current approaches to improving legal systems that aim to increase participation of user based on their needs, and will include some cases for comparing individual programs to improve legal systems.

Dans un contexte de globalisation de l'économie, de nouveaux procédés d'autorégulation ont suscité l'intérêt des acteurs privés. Initiées par les entreprises transnationales, ces régulations volontaires visent notamment à encadrer les relations de travail et à offrir une protection des droits sociaux fondamentaux aux travailleurs des filiales. Parmi ces initiatives, l'une a émergé à la fin des années 1980 : l'accord d'entreprise transnational. Ainsi, la protection des droits sociaux fondamentaux ne relève plus uniquement de la responsabilité des États mais se révèle davantage comme appartenant à la « responsabilité sociale » des entreprises via la négociation transnationale d'entreprise. L'absence de toute règle spécifique relative à une telle négociation laisse cependant en suspens certains problèmes juridiques. Répondre à ces incertitudes juridiques nécessite de clarifier des concepts et de mesurer l'effectivité des accords dans la concrétisation des droits sociaux fondamentaux. / In a context of economic globalization, new self-regulation processes have attracted the interest of private actors. lnitiated by transnational companies, these voluntary regulations aim in particular to regulate labour relations and to provide protection of fundamental social rights for workers within subsidiaries. Among these initiatives, one emerged in the late 1980s : the transnational company agreement. Thus, the protection of fundamental social rights is no longer the exclusive concern of States (responsibility), but appears more as belonging to the "social responsibility" of companies via the transnational company bargaining. However, the lack of any specific rules regarding such negotiations leaves some legal problems open. The legal uncertainties related to the transnational company agreements require the clarification of legal concepts and the assessment of the effectiveness of the agreements in the realization of fundamental social rights within transnational companies.