This essay aims to shed light upon the philosophical dignity of Edith Stein’s critique of the early Heideggerian conception of sociality in her text ”Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie”, from 1936. I will argue that Stein’s critique of Heidegger’s concept of sociality comes to be substantiated through her existential-philosophical approach to his understanding of the transcendent character of Dasein. By objecting to Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ecstatic temporality, Stein points out his inattentiveness to authentic otherness in Being and Time, which reaches out into a problem surrounding Mitsein. I will further demonstrate how Stein, by ascribing to Dasein an enduring and sustaining quality in the midst of ecstasy, uses Heidegger’s concept of Dasein in order to formulate her own social ontology.

A partir de uma leitura epistemolÃgica de vÃrios escritos do psicÃlogo estadunidense, Carl R. Rogers, em que ele declara âafinidadesâ teÃricas com o pensamento do filÃsofo dinamarquÃs, SÃren Kierkegaard, o objetivo maior deste estudo à confrontar os conceitos de âIndivÃduoâ, delineado por Kierkegaard, e o conceito de âPessoaâ, formulado por Rogers, em suas similaridades e diferenÃas. Contribuindo na constituiÃÃo de mais uma faceta da epistemologia da Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa (criada e desenvolvida por Rogers), à tambÃm intenÃÃo desta pesquisa, aproximar estes conceitos apoiando-se na hipÃtese de que a suposta influÃncia kierkegaardiana na obra de Rogers nÃo à tÃo significativa como ele (Rogers) e, sobretudo, seus comentadores, querem fazer crer. Estando Kierkegaard numa dimensÃo filosÃfica e epistemolÃgica de um cristianismo pietista e angustiado, em que sua meta maior era mostrar o verdadeiro âdevir cristÃoâ, e que o âIndivÃduoâ à aquele que escolhe existir ligado subjetivamente numa relaÃÃo tensionada com Deus, dificilmente poderia sua filosofia servir de base em outro contexto tÃo heterogÃneo como era o da psicologia humanista norte-americana, onde Rogers tinha seu espaÃo e que considerava a âPessoaâ como um âorganismo digno de confianÃaâ que guarda em si mesma as potencialidades de se construir em todas as suas esferas e em direÃÃo a uma existÃncia congruente e autÃntica. Aproximando os conceitos de âIndivÃduoâ e de âPessoaâ em suas semelhanÃas e diferenÃas, descrevendo atà onde a influÃncia de Kierkegaard no pensamento rogeriano à verÃdica, pretende-se mostrar o lugar de fato da filosofia kierkegaardiana na construÃÃo da psicologia centrada na pessoa efetuada por Rogers. / From a epistemological reading of some writings of the American psychologist, Carl R. Rogers, in which he declares âtheoretical affinitiesâ with the thought of the Danish philosopher, SÃren Kierkegaard, the biggest objective of this study is to collate the concepts of âIndividualâ, delineated by Kierkegaard, and the concept of âPersonâ, formulated by Rogers, in its similarities and differences. Contributing to the constitution of one more face of the Person-Centrered Approaching epistemology (created and developed by Rogers), is also intention of this research, to approximate these concepts taking as support the hypothesis of that the supposed kierkegaardian influence in Rogerâs production is not so significant as he (Rogers) and, over all, his commentators, wants to make to believe. Being Kierkegaard in a philosophical and epistemological dimension of a pietistic and anguished Christianity, where its biggest goal was to show the true âChristian-to-beâ, and also that the âIndividualâ is that one who chooses to exist subjectively in a tensioned relation with God, hardly could his philosophy stand as another so heterogeneous context as it was the case of Humanist North America Psychology, where Rogers had space and that considered the âPersonâ as a âreliable worthy organismâ that keeps in itself the potentialities of constructing itself in all its spheres and in direction to an authentic existence and congruence. Approaching the concepts of âIndividualâ and âPersonâ in its similarities and differences, describing until where the influence of Kierkegaard in the rogerian thought is veridical, it is intended to show the place in fact of the kierkegaardian philosophy in the construction of the psychology centered in the person effected by Rogers.

A starting point for this thesis is that patients’ learning has not received sufficient attention and thus has not featured in the study programmes in the field of caring. Focus has instead been placed on patients being given information and advice about their illness and treatment, advice that they are then expected to comply with. Too little attention has been paid to the individual who lives with his/her illness and who should be considered to have significant experiences. The overall aim has been to analyze and describe the phenomenon of learning to live with long-term illness as well as to develop a didactic model that can help carers to support patients’ learning processes. The theoretical perspective in the thesis is lifeworld theory, which permeates ontological, epistemological and methodological standpoints and also the view on learning. The design and carrying out of the research is based on a reflective lifeworld approach. The empirical study consists of interviews with people who live with different types of long-term illnesses. The learning that follows life with a long-term illness is generated in such a way as to respond to the will to live the well-known everyday life. A greater understanding of the empirical results has been achieved by a lifeworld philosophical elucidation, with a particular focus on learning turning points and the importance of reflection. Based on the empirical results, the lifeworld philosophical elucidation and the caring science lifeworld didactics a didactic model has been formulated. This model is entitled: The challenge – to take charge of one’s life with long-term illness. The model contains four theses: 1) Confronting one’s life situation and challenging to make a change, 2) Positioning oneself at a distance when creating a new whole, 3) Developing self-consciousness and taking responsibility, 4) Making learning visible with the aim of providing development and balance in life. The results in the thesis show that a genuine learning is something that differs from the learning of information and that the learning must be supported at an existential level based on the sufferer’s situation and for a long period of time.

A starting point for this thesis is that patients’ learning has not received sufficient attention and thus has not featured in the study programmes in the field of caring. Focus has instead been placed on patients being given information and advice about their illness and treatment, advice that they are then expected to comply with. Too little attention has been paid to the individual who lives with his/her illness and who should be considered to have significant experiences. The overall aim has been to analyze and describe the phenomenon of learning to live with long-term illness as well as to develop a didactic model that can help carers to support patients’ learning processes. The theoretical perspective in the thesis is lifeworld theory, which permeates ontological, epistemological and methodological standpoints and also the view on learning. The design and carrying out of the research is based on a reflective lifeworld approach. The empirical study consists of interviews with people who live with different types of long-term illnesses. The learning that follows life with a long-term illness is generated in such a way as to respond to the will to live the well-known everyday life. A greater understanding of the empirical results has been achieved by a lifeworld philosophical elucidation, with a particular focus on learning turning points and the importance of reflection. Based on the empirical results, the lifeworld philosophical elucidation and the caring science lifeworld didactics a didactic model has been formulated. This model is entitled: The challenge – to take charge of one’s life with long-term illness. The model contains four theses: 1) Confronting one’s life situation and challenging to make a change, 2) Positioning oneself at a distance when creating a new whole, 3) Developing self-consciousness and taking responsibility, 4) Making learning visible with the aim of providing development and balance in life. The results in the thesis show that a genuine learning is something that differs from the learning of information and that the learning must be supported at an existential level based on the sufferer’s situation and for a long period of time.

Swedish compulsory school has recently been subjected to a number of political reforms. Between 2011 and 2014, for example, earlier grades, more national tests and a new curriculum plan (Lgr 11) were to be implemented. This thesis aims to examine those changes as they were experienced by teachers who teach history in Swedish upper primary schools. The theoretical framework is in-spired by existential philosophy, primarily as formulated in the works of Martin Heidegger and Hanna Arendt. In this way, the study highlights the teachers’ lived experience by making use of the concepts yearning, appearance, acting and mood. The study comprises of 36 interviews with 26 informants. The interviews were carried out and transcribed during 2014. The questions focus on both the existential being of the teachers’ lives as well as the ideological function of the history subject. This highly renders in the issue of how lived experiences of a specific school reform corresponded to the teachers’ own perception of a mean-ingful history education. Both the yearnings that were expressed by the participants and their de-scriptions of what they have experienced, have been related to the overall educational ideological functions stated by Gert Biesta (socialisation, subjectification and qualification) and Jonas Aspelin (existentialisation). Although the teachers’ narratives were greatly varied in some aspects, their interpretations of the new assignment seemed to be quite homogenous. Most of the teachers portrayed a situation characterised by performativity. Measurable knowledge and more frequent documentation seemed to be prioritised. Some of them stressed that they experienced less autonomy. In terms of history, the new curriculum was associated with more content knowledge, cognitive skills and procedural abilities. From the teachers’ perspective, pure qualification, rather than subjectification and social-isation, characterised the new curriculum. Still, the teachers’ feelings towards the curricular changes showed a great deal of divergence. Some of them embraced most of the new aspects. They claimed that clearly formulated require-ments in the history curricula provided them with security. They declared that their history teaching to some extent became more professional. In line with such beliefs, some teachers asserted that the strengthened focus on analytical skills improved their teaching. Particularly those who ex-pressed that they preferred such analytic procedural approaches described their experience in terms of confirmation and approval. Others appeared to struggle with the changes. While a few teachers even tried to resist the curricular changes, some found themselves forced to endure what appeared to be a totally new situation. They expressed disbelief, frustration and pain. Notably it was those most devoted to the existentialisational function of history teaching that usually seemed to express such alienation. As argued, they appeared to long for a lost possibility to engage their pupils, to bring history alive and to make meaning of the past.

Swedish compulsory school has recently been subjected to a number of political reforms. Between 2011 and 2014, for example, earlier grades, more national tests and a new curriculum plan (Lgr 11) were to be implemented. This thesis aims to examine those changes as they were experienced by teachers who teach history in Swedish upper primary schools. The theoretical framework is in-spired by existential philosophy, primarily as formulated in the works of Martin Heidegger and Hanna Arendt. In this way, the study highlights the teachers’ lived experience by making use of the concepts yearning, appearance, acting and mood. The study comprises of 36 interviews with 26 informants. The interviews were carried out and transcribed during 2014. The questions focus on both the existential being of the teachers’ lives as well as the ideological function of the history subject. This highly renders in the issue of how lived experiences of a specific school reform corresponded to the teachers’ own perception of a mean-ingful history education. Both the yearnings that were expressed by the participants and their de-scriptions of what they have experienced, have been related to the overall educational ideological functions stated by Gert Biesta (socialisation, subjectification and qualification) and Jonas Aspelin (existentialisation). Although the teachers’ narratives were greatly varied in some aspects, their interpretations of the new assignment seemed to be quite homogenous. Most of the teachers portrayed a situation characterised by performativity. Measurable knowledge and more frequent documentation seemed to be prioritised. Some of them stressed that they experienced less autonomy. In terms of history, the new curriculum was associated with more content knowledge, cognitive skills and procedural abilities. From the teachers’ perspective, pure qualification, rather than subjectification and social-isation, characterised the new curriculum. Still, the teachers’ feelings towards the curricular changes showed a great deal of divergence. Some of them embraced most of the new aspects. They claimed that clearly formulated require-ments in the history curricula provided them with security. They declared that their history teaching to some extent became more professional. In line with such beliefs, some teachers asserted that the strengthened focus on analytical skills improved their teaching. Particularly those who ex-pressed that they preferred such analytic procedural approaches described their experience in terms of confirmation and approval. Others appeared to struggle with the changes. While a few teachers even tried to resist the curricular changes, some found themselves forced to endure what appeared to be a totally new situation. They expressed disbelief, frustration and pain. Notably it was those most devoted to the existentialisational function of history teaching that usually seemed to express such alienation. As argued, they appeared to long for a lost possibility to engage their pupils, to bring history alive and to make meaning of the past.

In this research the difficult for the decision problem – a human right to death – is considered. The appeal to philosophical and existential aspects allowed to present a right phenomenon to death in a historical context of its origin and development, and also to define a place and a role of death in culture of mankind and in philosophy. The special attention is paid to research of a problem of death both in existential philosophy, and in the context of modern legal reality, in particular its role in category of somatic human rights. Research of a phenomenon of euthanasia, as main example of realization of the right to death, in its ethical and sociocultural aspects is conducted. Studying of a phenomenon of the right to death as subjective human right is inseparably linked with its free will, but also it demands the definition in the context of the relations of the person with the state as the citizen has to have a right to dispose of both own life, and death. / В данном исследовании рассматривается сложная для решения проблема – право человека на смерть. Обращение к философским и экзистенциальным аспектам позволило представить феномен права на смерть в историческом контексте его зарождения и развития, а также определить место и роль смерти в культуре человечества и в философии. Особое внимание уделяется исследованию проблемы смерти как в экзистенциальной философии, так и в контексте современной правовой реальности, в частности его роли в категории соматических прав человека. Проведено исследование феномена эвтаназии, как главного примера реализации права на смерть, в его этическом и социокультурном аспектах. Изучение феномена права на смерть как субъективного права человека неразрывно связано с его свободой воли, но также оно требует своего определения в контексте отношений человека с государством, так как у гражданина должно быть право распоряжаться как собственной жизнью, так и смертью.

PONTE , Carlos Roger Sales da . Sobre os conceitos de indivíduo em Sören Kierkegaard e de pessoa em Carl Rogers: semelhanças e diferenças . 2010. 119 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Psicologia) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Departamento de Psicologia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia, Fortaleza-CE, 2010. / Submitted by moises gomes (celtinha_malvado@hotmail.com) on 2011-12-07T18:28:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2012-01-09T15:10:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-01-09T15:10:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_dis_CRSDPonte.PDF: 785994 bytes, checksum: 43007e0aef45ddb8ddabd44c5772fc19 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / From a epistemological reading of some writings of the American psychologist, Carl R. Rogers, in which he declares “theoretical affinities” with the thought of the Danish philosopher, Sören Kierkegaard, the biggest objective of this study is to collate the concepts of “Individual”, delineated by Kierkegaard, and the concept of “Person”, formulated by Rogers, in its similarities and differences. Contributing to the constitution of one more face of the Person-Centrered Approaching epistemology (created and developed by Rogers), is also intention of this research, to approximate these concepts taking as support the hypothesis of that the supposed kierkegaardian influence in Roger’s production is not so significant as he (Rogers) and, over all, his commentators, wants to make to believe. Being Kierkegaard in a philosophical and epistemological dimension of a pietistic and anguished Christianity, where its biggest goal was to show the true “Christian-to-be”, and also that the “Individual” is that one who chooses to exist subjectively in a tensioned relation with God, hardly could his philosophy stand as another so heterogeneous context as it was the case of Humanist North America Psychology, where Rogers had space and that considered the “Person” as a “reliable worthy organism” that keeps in itself the potentialities of constructing itself in all its spheres and in direction to an authentic existence and congruence. Approaching the concepts of “Individual” and “Person” in its similarities and differences, describing until where the influence of Kierkegaard in the rogerian thought is veridical, it is intended to show the place in fact of the kierkegaardian philosophy in the construction of the psychology centered in the person effected by Rogers. / A partir de uma leitura epistemológica de vários escritos do psicólogo estadunidense, Carl R. Rogers, em que ele declara “afinidades” teóricas com o pensamento do filósofo dinamarquês, Sören Kierkegaard, o objetivo maior deste estudo é confrontar os conceitos de “Indivíduo”, delineado por Kierkegaard, e o conceito de “Pessoa”, formulado por Rogers, em suas similaridades e diferenças. Contribuindo na constituição de mais uma faceta da epistemologia da Abordagem Centrada na Pessoa (criada e desenvolvida por Rogers), é também intenção desta pesquisa, aproximar estes conceitos apoiando-se na hipótese de que a suposta influência kierkegaardiana na obra de Rogers não é tão significativa como ele (Rogers) e, sobretudo, seus comentadores, querem fazer crer. Estando Kierkegaard numa dimensão filosófica e epistemológica de um cristianismo pietista e angustiado, em que sua meta maior era mostrar o verdadeiro “devir cristão”, e que o “Indivíduo” é aquele que escolhe existir ligado subjetivamente numa relação tensionada com Deus, dificilmente poderia sua filosofia servir de base em outro contexto tão heterogêneo como era o da psicologia humanista norte-americana, onde Rogers tinha seu espaço e que considerava a “Pessoa” como um “organismo digno de confiança” que guarda em si mesma as potencialidades de se construir em todas as suas esferas e em direção a uma existência congruente e autêntica. Aproximando os conceitos de “Indivíduo” e de “Pessoa” em suas semelhanças e diferenças, descrevendo até onde a influência de Kierkegaard no pensamento rogeriano é verídica, pretende-se mostrar o lugar de fato da filosofia kierkegaardiana na construção da psicologia centrada na pessoa efetuada por Rogers.