nÃo hà / A contribuiÃÃo de melhoria à um tributo previsto desde a ConstituiÃÃo Federal de 1934, artigo 124; atualmente, prevista na ConstituiÃÃo Federal de 1988, artigo 145, III. A competÃncia à comum a todos os entes polÃticos: UniÃo, Estados, Distrito Federal e MunicÃpios. A contribuiÃÃo de melhoria possui um carÃter justo porque à cobrada das pessoas que possuem seus imÃveis valorizados em decorrÃncia da obra pÃblica, porÃm, à um tributo esquecido pelos fiscos. Analisou-se neste trabalho a contribuiÃÃo dos fatores econÃmicos para o incremento da arrecadaÃÃo nos MunicÃpios brasileiros durante o ano de 2009, advindo da cobranÃa de contribuiÃÃo de melhoria. Nesse sentido, utilizando-se de um modelo de regressÃo linear simples, constatou-se que a arrecadaÃÃo contribuiÃÃo de melhoria à relacionada positivamente com o aumento da populaÃÃo, do Ãndice FIRJAN e dos tributos ContribuiÃÃo de IntervenÃÃo no DomÃnio EconÃmico â CIDE e Imposto Territorial Rural â ITR. De outro lado, exercem influÃncia negativa na arrecadaÃÃo da contribuiÃÃo estudada os montantes das transferÃncias oriundas do Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da EducaÃÃo â FNDE e do Fundo de ParticipaÃÃo dos MunicÃpios â FPM, evidenciando o desincentivo para a administraÃÃo municipal em se autofinanciar, quando presentes as transferÃncias desses fundos. / The contribution of improvement is a tribute planned since the Constitution of 1934, Article 124; currently provided for in the Constitution of 1988, Article 145, III. Competence is common to all political entities: Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities. The contribution of improvement has a righteous character is charged because of the people who have their properties valued due to public work , however, is a tribute forgotten by the tax authorities. Analyzed in this work the contribution of economic factors to increase the collection in the Brazilian municipalities during the year 2009, arising from the levying of contributions for improvement. In this sense, using a simple linear regression model, it was found that the revenue contribution of improvement is positively related with the increase in population, the index FIRJAN and taxes Contribution for Intervention in the Economic Domain - CIDE and Rural Land Tax - ITR. On the other hand, negatively influence the collection of contribution studied the amounts of transfers arising from the National Fund for Education Development - ENDF and the Municipalities Participation Fund - FPM, highlighting the disincentive for municipal administration in finance them, when the present transfers these funds.

A presente tese de doutorado analisa, de forma crítica, como as receitas de recursos naturais devem ser arrecadadas, distribuídas aos entes federativos e aplicadas no Direito Financeiro Brasileiro. Para tanto, parte-se do exame dos contornos econômicos e políticos da exploração de recursos naturais, apresentando breve histórico sobre a cobrança de royalties no estrangeiro, da evolução da legislação brasileira sobre as compensações financeiras, discutindo então a natureza jurídica destas receitas públicas no direito pátrio. Com base nessas premissas, apresentam-se considerações gerais sobre a concentração geográfica de recursos naturais e o dilema da repartição de receitas provenientes da exploração destes recursos nas federações, procedendo-se então ao estudo do modelo de repartição federativa de receitas de compensações financeiras adotado pelo Brasil. Reconhecendo-se a constante evolução deste modelo e apontando-se suas virtudes e seus defeitos, desenvolve-se uma avaliação de proposições normativas de mudanças dos critérios atualmente adotados, especialmente no que diz respeito à equalização fiscal enquanto elemento de promoção de desenvolvimento subnacional e redução das desigualdades inter-regionais e intrarregionais, bem como de coesão política nacional. Finalmente, são discutidos os aspectos teóricos e práticos da aplicação das receitas oriundas da exploração de recursos naturais, bem como analisada a prática brasileira. Com fundamento nesta análise, as vinculações legais das receitas de recursos naturais e a constituição de fundos públicos financiados por estas receitas são avaliadas no contexto brasileiro. As conclusões preliminares desses pontos informam, então, o estudo sobre o papel relevante do controle de contas, da fiscalização e da transparência fiscal na promoção da eficiência e da justiça do gasto público no contexto das receitas de recursos naturais. / This doctoral thesis presents a critical analysis of the collection, intergovernmental distribution and expenditure of natural resource revenues under Brazilian Public Finance law. In order to provide a comprehensive discussion of such proposition, the thesis first examines the economic and political aspects of the natural resources industry, then presents a brief historical overview of natural resources royalties under both comparative and Brazilian law and continues with an analysis of the legal status of royalties in Brazil. Building on such premises, the thesis proceeds with general remarks on the geographical concentration of natural resources in federal countries and on decentralization arrangements for royalties, as well an on the Brazilian revenue sharing instruments. Acknowledging the continuous evolution of these instruments and evaluating their costs and benefits, a discussion on alternative revenue sharing arrangements is presented, especially regarding the promotion of equalizing goals and political cohesion among subnational units of governments in Brazil. Finally, the thesis discusses the theoretical and practical aspects of public expenditures of royalty revenues, presenting an analysis of the Brazilian praxis. Building on this analysis, an evaluation of revenue earmarking procedures and natural resources funds is presented. The preliminary conclusions therein enable a discussion of accountability, public auditing and fiscal transparency in the context of natural resources revenue expenditures.

O propósito deste trabalho é analisar a regulação jurídica brasileira da intervenção do Estado, por meio da tributação, sobre a economia. Esta tarefa se desenvolve em três momentos teórico, dogmático e histórico/institucional que se estendem ao longo dos três capítulos do trabalho, respectivamente. O primeiro momento lida com a dimensão doutrinária jurídica de análise, interpretação, metodologia e abordagem deste fenômeno. Buscamos recuperar historicamente a trajetória da doutrina do direito tributário brasileiro em contraposição à doutrina do direito econômico brasileiro, recuperando o conceito de extrafiscalidade como ponto limite da doutrina tributária e ponto de partida para uma análise sistemática da intervenção estatal pela tributação. O segundo momento é a tentativa de traçar uma abordagem pertinente para essa análise da extrafiscalidade tributária pelo direito econômico, problematizando-a à luz do ordenamento brasileiro, sobretudo, em nível constitucional. Para tanto, assumimos as categorias de Eros Roberto Grau, sobre a intervenção estatal na economia, e as de Richard A. Musgrave, sobre as finalidades da política fiscal, para aprofundarmos a classificação do fenômeno quanto à sua forma (indução), suas técnicas (oneratórias/ desoneratórias), suas finalidades (extrafiscalidade alocativa/ extrafiscalidade distributiva/ extrafiscalidade estabilizadora) e seu regime de competências. O terceiro momento remonta um panorama da evolução histórica do sistema tributário nacional, seus principais diplomas normativos, encadeado em uma narrativa que envolve os atores, interesses, ideias e modelos institucionais e jurídicos adotados pelo Brasil, principalmente em torno do federalismo fiscal. Por fim, concluímos haver uma tendência à separação progressiva do regime jurídico da fiscalidade e da extrafiscalidade, por conta da própria trajetória econômica, política, histórica, normativa e institucional do sistema tributário brasileiro. Fato diante do qual resta ao conhecimento jurídico, como saber tecnológico que é, reconhecer, compreender, se aprofundar e performar. / The purpose of this paper is to analyze the legal regulation of the Brazilian state intervention through taxation on the economy. This task is unfolded in three parts - theoretical, dogmatic and historical/ institutional - that are developed in the three chapters of the work, respectively. The first deals with the doctrinal legal dimension of analysis, interpretation, methodology and approach of this phenomenon. We seek to recover the historical trajectory of the Brazilian tax law doctrine in contrast with the Brazilian economic law doctrine, recovering the concept of taxation based on police powers as a threshold point of the tax law doctrine and a starting point for a systematic analysis of state intervention through taxation. The second part is an attempt to draw a pertinent approach to the analysis of the taxation based on police powers by the economic law doctrine, questioning it under the lens of the Brazilian legal system, especially at the constitutional level. Therefore, we assume Eros Roberto Graus categories about the state intervention in the economy, and Richard A. Musgraves categories about the aims of fiscal policy, to further classify the phenomenon by its shape (induction), its techniques (overtax/ exonerate), its purposes (allocative/ distributive/ stabilizer) and its regime of competence. The third part is an overview of the historical evolution of the Brazilian tax system, its main laws and regulatory instruments, through a narrative that involves actors, interests, ideas, and institutional and legal models adopted by Brazil, particularly around fiscal federalism. Finally, we conclude that there is a tendency to a progressive separation between the legal regime of taxation based on revenues and of the legal regime of taxation based on police powers because of the economic, political, historical, normative and institutional trajectory of the Brazilian tax system. As a consequence of that, we believe that legal thought should, as technological knowhow, recognize this fact, understand it, deepen it and perform it.

Si la littérature du biais inflationniste de la Nouvelle École Classique, au travers des concepts decrédibilité et de transparence, a conduit à l'indépendance des Banques centrales, sa critique par laNouvelle École Keynésienne l'a réduit à une indépendance instrumentale et a mis en exergue le rôlede sa gouvernance, de l'importance de sa relation avec la sphère politique pour la légitimité de sonaction, ainsi que le rôle essentiel des Conseils de politique monétaire (CPM).Aussi bien en théorie que dans les faits, ce cadre institutionnel qui reflète la gouvernance montre uneBanque centrale non pas séparée du politique mais plutôt en relation avec celui-ci. Dans la mesure oùles décisions de politique monétaire sont prises par un CPM, la gouvernance concerne également sonorganisation et les procédures d’élaboration de la décision.L’objectif de cette thèse est d’analyser à la lumière de ses développements récents, la gouvernance àla BCEAO et à la BEAC qui sont les Banques centrales couvrant les deux unions monétaires de lazone franc, à savoir l’UEMOA pour la première et la CEMAC pour la seconde. Cette thèse a aussipour objectif de montrer que la pérennisation de ces deux unions monétaires passe par une meilleuregouvernance et la nécessité d’un fédéralisme budgétaire en leur sein impliquant donc une plus forteunion politique. Toutefois, nous soulignons les obstacles rendant très difficile la réalisation de cetteultime étape de l’intégration. / If the literature of the inflationary bias of the New Classical School, through the concepts of credibilityand transparency, led to the independence of Central Banks, its review by the New Keynesian Schoolreduced it to an instrumental independence and has highlight the role of its governance, of theimportance of its relationship with politicians for the legitimacy of its action and the essential role of theCouncils of monetary policy.In theory and in practice, this institutional framework that reflects governance shows a Central Bank(MPC) not separated from politics but rather in connection therewith. Insofar the monetary policydecisions, the governance, and procedures for the preparation of the decision are taken by a CPM.The objective of this thesis is to analyze in the light of recent developments, governance at theBCEAO and the BEAC which are the central banks covering two monetary unions from franc zonenamely WAEMU and CAEMC. This thesis also aims to show that the sustainability of these twomonetary unions through the benefits might enjoy better governance and the need for fiscal federalismwithin them thus implying a stronger political union. However, we highlight the barriers embarrassingthis final stage of integration.

Il primo capitolo offre un sommario della letteratura teorica ed empirica relative ai cicli di bilancio a livello nazionale e locale, iniziando dai primi cicli politici di bilancio detti “tradizionali” fino ad arrivare ai modelli detti di “political agency”. Viene discusso il filone di letteratura che scaturisce da quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica, cominciando dai primi modelli di segnalazione fino ai più recenti modelli teorici sull’effetto di selezione e di disciplina svolto dalle elezioni politiche. Un’enfasi particolare viene data alla rassegna dei test empirici basati su quest’ultimo tipo di modellistica e, in particolare, sul nesso tra decentralizzazione e trasparenza a livello locale. Il secondo capitolo è incentrato sulle tematiche del ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassazione e alla spese in un campione di comuni italiani. Le stime econometriche indicano un forte ciclo elettorale relativo alla tassa comunale sugli immobili (ICI) e, utilizzando le predizioni teoriche dei modelli a informazione incompleta sul differente comportamento dei sindaci che possono correre per un secondo turno e di quelli che sono invece impossibilitati a ricandidarsi, viene mostrato come i sindaci al primo turno che possono ricandidarsi manipolano in maniera più intensa l’imposta comunale sugli immobili applicata alla prima casa. Le stime effettuate sul comportamento differente dei sindaci con limite di mandato e senza limite di mandato, relative alle scelte di tassazione applicate alla base imponibile ICI ordinaria, indicano pure la presenza di un effetto di disciplina di partito. Questo capitolo, inoltre, compie un passo avanti rispetto a precedenti stime sui cicli elettorali fondati solo sulla dinamica delle spese correnti e in conto capitale senza tenere in considerazione la natura di competenza o cassa delle poste di bilancio corrispondenti. Sono presentate alcune evidenze in merito all’esistenza di un ciclo elettorale nella spesa in conto capitale registrata in contabilità come di cassa. Viene fornito anche un test econometrico sull’effetto dei vincoli del patto di stabilità interno sui comportamenti di spesa dei comuni. Nell’ultimo capitolo, sono ulteriormente approfonditi i risultati presentati nel secondo capitolo relativi alle scelte differenti dei comuni sulle aliquote ICI ordinaria e prima casa, esplorando il nesso tra cicli opportunistici razionali e trasparenza degli strumenti fiscali. Viene presentato un modello formale a informazione incompleta che predice come gli incentivi politici per usare due diversi strumenti fiscali possono essere diversi, a seconda delle caratteristiche di trasparenza annesse ai medesimi strumenti. Le predizioni teoriche sottoposte a stima empirica sono le seguenti: 1) i sindaci al primo mandato utilizzano maggiormente l’addizionale IRPEF introdotta per i comuni nel 1999 rispetto ai sindaci che non possono più correre; 2) il turnover politico dovrebbe diminuire dopo la riforma che ha introdotto l’addizionale IRPEF e, in particolare, per i sindaci che usano maggiormente tale strumento; 3) la riforma dovrebbe agevolare la decisione dei sindaci di correre per un secondo mandato, essendo agevolata la probabilità di rielezione. I test empirici presentati utilizzando un campione di comuni italiani confermano le predizioni teoriche contenute nel modello. / The first chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature about political budget cycles at national and local level, starting from earlier traditional political business cycles models to political agency models. This last strand of literature is discussed, starting from earlier signalling models to the more recent advancements in theoretical predictions about the selection and disciplining effect of elections on politicians. A particular emphasis is given to the full review of empirical tests based on political agency models predictions about the links between accountability and decentralization, especially at the local level. The second chapter focuses on the issues of electoral cycles in taxes and expenditures for a sample of Italian municipalities. Econometric estimates show a strong electoral cycle on municipal property tax, and extending political agency models' implications about the differences in tax-setting behavior between first- and second-term mayors, evidence is shown of a stronger electoral manipulation of property rates applied to main residence tax base when mayors run for re-election. Estimation of property tax rates' sensitivity to term-limited mayors' fiscal behaviors also uncovers a party discipline effect on tax rates applied to business and non homeowner property tax base. Furthermore, this chapter goes beyond previous econometric estimates of expenditure cycles focusing solely on the dynamics of current and capital expenditures without taking into account the basis on which outlays are recorded in local budgets. Some preliminary evidence points to the existence of an electoral cycle in cash-recorded budgetary investment outlays. An econometric test on the effect of formal expenditures restraints on municipal spending behaviors concludes the chapter. In the last chapter, results from the second chapter relative to business and main residence property tax rates’ choices are further investigated, exploring the link between opportunistic rational cycles and accountability of tax instruments. A formal political agency model predicts that the political incentives for using the two different property taxes may be different, according to their level of transparency. Three empirically testable implications derives from theoretical predictions: 1) first-term mayors should use a local income tax surcharge, introduced in 1999 in Italy, more than second-term mayors; 2) political turnover should be lower following the reform, and in particular for mayors using more the local income tax surcharge and 3) the reform might also affect the decision to run again by mayors, as it should be easier to get re-elected after the reform. Empirical estimates using a sample of Italian municipalities are presented, confirming theoretical predictions of the model.

This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government. Chapter 1 focuses on local public goods as instruments for special interest politics at the supra-local level, with an emphasis on public infrastructure. To capture the implications of long-run relationships between political parties and their loyal supporters, I set out a dynamic probabilistic voting model which predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run `machine politics' considerations with the more immediate concern to win over swing voters. To assess the empirical relevance of both forces, I analyse rich data on road spending from a panel of electoral districts in Québec. Empirical results exploiting the province's linguistic fragmentation provide robust evidence that partisan loyalty is a key driver of the geographic allocation of spending. Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in local public good provision. I study the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. The model predicts that the net effect of a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) balances the benefits of vertical complementarity against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of partial decentralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. I exploit the peculiarities California's school finance system and the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to estimate the extent to which politicians are punished or rewarded for observed policy outcomes, and how this channel is affected by the degree of centralization. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district's degree of centralization is high. Increased federal involvement after 2001 is associated with sharper local electoral accountability.

This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government. Chapter 1 focuses on local public goods as instruments for special interest politics at the supra-local level, with an emphasis on public infrastructure. To capture the implications of long-run relationships between political parties and their loyal supporters, I set out a dynamic probabilistic voting model which predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run `machine politics' considerations with the more immediate concern to win over swing voters. To assess the empirical relevance of both forces, I analyse rich data on road spending from a panel of electoral districts in Québec. Empirical results exploiting the province's linguistic fragmentation provide robust evidence that partisan loyalty is a key driver of the geographic allocation of spending. Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in local public good provision. I study the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. The model predicts that the net effect of a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) balances the benefits of vertical complementarity against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of partial decentralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. I exploit the peculiarities California's school finance system and the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to estimate the extent to which politicians are punished or rewarded for observed policy outcomes, and how this channel is affected by the degree of centralization. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district's degree of centralization is high. Increased federal involvement after 2001 is associated with sharper local electoral accountability.

La question des disparités territoriales, pourtant ancienne, se pose aujourd'hui de manière accrue et renouvelée avec l'ouverture européenne et la globalisation qui induisent une concurrence des territoires toujours plus forte. Or, si celle-ci n'est pas maîtrisée, les conséquences peuvent se révéler importantes en termes de cohésion spatiale. Ainsi, une réflexion approfondie sur les outils de traitement de la question sensible des disparités territoriales s'avère tout à la fois pertinente et nécessaire. Nous retenons ici deux types d'intervention publique qui peuvent apparaître aujourd'hui comme les outils les plus significatifs de réduction des disparités territoriales et que nous étudions dans un contexte de mobilité interrégionale. La thèse est donc organisée autour de deux parties bien distinctes, mais complémentaires quant au fond. La Partie I traite de la péréquation financière comme outil de réduction des disparités territoriales. Le Chapitre 1 a pour vocation d'offrir une revue approfondie et raisonnée de la littérature sur la péréquation financière dans un contexte de mobilité des agents économiques et par conséquent dans une perspective d'efficacité économique. Le Chapitre 2 s'inscrit dans la suite du premier et étudie la capacité d'un système transparent de péréquation financière à restaurer l'efficacité économique. La Partie II de la thèse s'intéresse quant à elle à un second instrument de réduction des disparités territoriales, la coopération intercommunale et à son implication sur la pression fiscale. Le Chapitre 3 évalue cette question d'un point de vue théorique tandis que le Chapitre 4 consiste en une analyse empirique appliquée au cas Français. / The question of territorial disparities, although not a new one, appears to be a very topical issue with European opening and globalization. If the higher competition between territories that arises in this context is not controlled, the consequences can be extremely important in terms of social cohesion. Thereby, a detailed analysis about the instruments used to deal with the sensitive issue of territorial disparities is both relevant and necessary. We then focus on two types of public intervention that appear as the most important instruments used in the reduction of territorial disparities and that we analyze in a context of mobility. The thesis is then organized in two parts that are distinct but complement each other. The Part I is interested in the issue of fiscal equalization as a device to reduce fiscal disparities. The Chapter 1 provides a detailed survey of literature on equalization payments in a context of economic agents' mobility and therefore in an economic efficiency perspective. The Chapter 2 is in line with the first one and analyses the ability of a transparent equalization scheme to be efficiency enhancing. The Part II of the thesis studies a second instrument reduction of territorial disparities, inter-municipal cooperation, and its impact on fiscal pressure. The Chapter 3 look at this issue from a theoretical point of view, while the Chapter 4 is an empirical analysis applied to the French case.

Submitted by Rafael Cardim (rafaelcardim1@hotmail.com) on 2012-05-08T19:04:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Cardim_Dissertação_versão final.pdf: 914269 bytes, checksum: 7686e0a9a428b524ef1be77a2abe3ce8 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-05-08T19:28:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Cardim_Dissertação_versão final.pdf: 914269 bytes, checksum: 7686e0a9a428b524ef1be77a2abe3ce8 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-05-08T19:29:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cardim_Dissertação_versão final.pdf: 914269 bytes, checksum: 7686e0a9a428b524ef1be77a2abe3ce8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 16-04-12 / O objetivo desse artigo é estimar o efeito-preço das transferências incondicionais, condicionais e da renda para os municípios brasileiros. De acordo com Dahlby (2011) um aumento de transferência lump-sum tem, além do efeito renda, um efeito preço decorrente do uso de impostos distorcivos. Dessa forma, um governo local que recebe uma transferência lump-sum, pode diminuir o custo marginal de financiamento público (MCF) e permanecer com o mesmo nível de serviço. Assim, o efeito gasto das transferências pode ser maior do que o decorrente da renda, explicando o flypaper effect. Usando dados de impostos sobre propriedade (IPTU), primeiramente calculamos o custo marginal de financiamento público (MCF) deste imposto. Em seguida, estimamos se as transferências lump-sum efetivamente diminuem o custo marginal de financiamento público (MCF). / This study aims to estimate the price effect of unconditional transfers, conditional and income to Brazilian municipalities. According Dahlby (2011) an increase in lump-sum transfer has, besides the income effect, a price effect resulting from the use of distortionary taxation. A local government that receives a transfer can reduce the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) and stay with the same level of service. Thus, the spending effect of transfer may be greater than that reflected in the income, explaining the flypaper effect. Using data from property taxes (IPTU), first we calculate the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). Then, we estimate that the different transfers effectively reduce the marginal cost of public funds (MCF).

This work studies the effect of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) on public finances of municipalities Alagoas, since from the same edition, in 2000, the municipalities are trying to adapt to the new rules laid down by the Supplementary Law. In this study, the LRF was treated as a new framework for public finance in Brazil, and its deployment part of a roader process of recasting the role of the state in the economic system, begun in the 1980s and intensified in the 1990s, especially after the implementation of the Real Plan in 1994, from which time the federal government sought to extend its control over the public finances of subnational governments. Accordingly, the LRF can be considered one of the main mechanisms used for this purpose. The results obtained after fiscal year 2000 confirm the success of the LRF to promote the framework for subnational fiscal adjustment required by the federal government. Such governments, because they are more susceptible to the rigors of LRF, sought fiscal balance more forceful. In this context, the aim of this study was to analyze whether municipalities alagoanos are complying with the limits imposed by the LRF, in relation to the implementation of Personnel Costs (DP) and control of Net Consolidated Debt (DCL), ensuring fiscal balance public accounts from 2000 to 2010. The statistical results indicate that these municipalities are meeting these limits, however it was found that this condition does not guarantee a consistent fiscal balance and long term. It was found also that the share of current spending and especially personnel costs in total expenditure increased over this period, while the relative share of public investment was reduced. The LRF little altered condition of dependence of municipalities alagoanos by funds from intergovernmental transfers. The conclusions of this study indicate that close to the concept of fiscal responsibility needs to be expanded beyond mere balance of public accounts, since only such a condition does not guarantee that the public sector is allocating and distributing resources efficiently. / Este trabalho estuda o efeito da Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF) sobre as finanças públicas dos municípios alagoanos, visto que desde a edição da mesma, no ano 2000, os municípios brasileiros estão tentando se adaptar às novas regras estabelecidas por essa Lei Complementar. Neste estudo, a LRF foi tratada como um novo marco para as finanças públicas no Brasil, sendo sua implantação parte de um amplo processo de reformulação do papel do Estado no sistema econômico, iniciado na década de 1980 e intensificado nos anos de 1990, principalmente após a implantação do Plano Real, em 1994, ocasião a partir da qual o governo federal buscou ampliar seu controle sobre as finanças públicas dos governos subnacionais. Nesse sentido, a LRF pode ser considerada um dos principais mecanismos utilizados para esse fim. Os resultados fiscais obtidos após o ano 2000 confirmam o sucesso da LRF em promover o enquadramento das esferas subnacionais no ajuste fiscal pretendido pelo governo federal. Tais governos, por estarem mais suscetíveis aos rigores da LRF, buscaram o equilíbrio fiscal de forma mais contundente. Nesse contexto, o objetivo geral deste estudo foi analisar se os municípios alagoanos estão cumprindo os limites impostos pela LRF, em relação à execução das Despesas com Pessoal (DP) e o controle da Dívida Consolidada Líquida (DCL), garantindo o equilíbrio fiscal das contas públicas no período de 2000 a 2010. Os resultados estatísticos indicam que esses municípios estão cumprindo tais limites, entretanto verificou-se que tal condição não garante um equilíbrio fiscal consistente e de longo prazo. Constatou-se, ainda, que a participação dos gastos correntes e especialmente os gastos com pessoal nas despesas totais aumentaram no período analisado, enquanto que a participação relativa dos investimentos públicos foi reduzida. A LRF pouco alterou o quadro de dependência dos municípios alagoanos por recursos oriundos de transferências intergovernamentais. As conclusões que encerram este trabalho indicam que o conceito de responsabilidade fiscal precisa ser ampliado para além do mero equilíbrio das contas públicas, visto que apenas tal condição não garante que o setor público esteja alocando e distribuindo recursos de forma eficiente.