Este trabalho busca inspiração na teoria política de Hannah Arendt com vistas a formular uma noção de política da psicanálise de orientação lacaniana. Os conceitos da teoria arendtiana que servem, especialmente, a esse diálogo são: ação política, estabelecimento de compromissos e pluralidade política. Do aporte teórico de Jacques Lacan comparecem, com especial destaque: o ato psicanalítico, a transmissão e a lógica da sexuação feminina. O princípio que reuniu ambos os autores foi o de que a ação é o dispositivo máximo de superação da repetição seja no âmbito político, seja no do sujeito do inconsciente. Ao localizar a ação política no espaço público, Arendt chama a atenção para o fato de ela ser realizada pelos homens, no plural, e em condições de igualdade; e, ainda, de ser lócus da liberdade enquanto capacidade de iniciar. Em contrapartida, a autora postula que aquilo que foi fundado pela ação conjunta adquire permanência no corpo político a partir do compromisso que se estabelece entre os indivíduos políticos, o que dá origem ao mundo. Em suma, temos que a concepção arendtiana de política tem em seu centro as noções de ação e de mundo. Do lado da psicanálise, encontramos no ato um dispositivo capaz de promover um novo início na vida subjetiva. Contudo, o ato em si mesmo não é capaz de constituir uma dimensão política, já que nem implica uma coletividade, nem o engendramento do mundo. Nesse sentido, nossa tese propõe que seja preciso acrescentar a noção de transmissão à de ato para se formular uma política da psicanálise. Isso requer que, juntamente com a categoria da verdade, seja levada em conta a do saber, já que, ao contrário da primeira, é o último que carrega uma exigência de transmissibilidade. A noção de transmissão, ainda, se mostra fundamental para nosso argumento, ao colocar em jogo uma transferência de trabalho entre vários sendo esse o significante com o qual nomeamos a coletividade que é engendrada pela dimensão política da psicanálise. Assim, ato e transmissão se colocam como categorias capazes de sustentar uma noção de política da psicanálise. Além disso, aproximamos a pluralidade política arendtiana da lógica da sexuação feminina lacaniana, com vistas a situar o tipo de coletividade que decorre dessa concepção de política em relação a outras que prezam pela unificação do corpo político. Nesse debate, consideramos como mecanismos que causam a unificação do corpo político o antagonismo e a representação, tal como encontrada na soberania e no populismo. Destacamos, ainda, que esse percurso de investigação nos permitiu refletir diretamente sobre dois importantes temas da teoria política, a partir de uma perspectiva psicanalítica, nomeadamente: a liberdade e a autoridade. Por fim, demarcamos que a pesquisa toma alguns princípios da teoria psicanalítica como fundamento de sua metodologia, a saber: a leitura e a escrita enquanto atos que concernem ao real; a consideração da dimensão transferencial da investigação e a noção de inspiração enquanto guia para posicionar os parceiros nessa interlocução sendo a última uma recomendação de Lacan quando trata da política de sua Escola / This work seeks inspiration in Hannah Arendts political theory in order to formulate a notion of politics of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The Arendtian concepts that are mainly used in this dialogue are: political action, compromise, and political plurality. From Lacanian theory, we especially use: psychoanalytic act, transmission, and the feminine logic of sexuation. Arendt and Lacan have a common ground on considering that action overcomes the repetition, in political or in the unconscious subject spheres, respectively. The Arendtian political action is performed by men in the plural, and it is the locus of freedom as new beginnings. Besides promoting new beginnings, the action is supposed to assure the existence of what was brought into life, being the latter the function of compromise between political individuals. Arendt calls the world a space created between men through the action of compromise. In sum, the Arendtian conception of politics is based on the notions of action and world. In its turn, psychoanalysis affirms that the act performs new beginnings in subjective life. However, the act itself is not able to constitute a political dimension since it neither implies a collectivity, nor creates a world between individuals. In this sense, we propose that it is necessary to put together the notions of act and transmission (of knowledge) in order to formulate a psychoanalysis notion of politics, since the latter brings people together, in causing the work transference. Thus, act and transmission sustain the politics of psychoanalysis. Moreover, we put together the Arendtian political plurality and the Lacanian feminine logic of sexuation for the sake of formulating a conception of politics that works against the unification of the political body. So, we contrast this conception of politics with the ones that lead to the political bodys unification. In this debate, we consider antagonism and representation, as we found in the sovereignty the populism, to be ways of political bodys unification. This investigation also addresses two major political theory topics from the psychoanalysis point of view, namely, freedom and authority. Finally, the research considers some psychoanalytical propositions as guidelines to its methodology, namely, reading and writing as operations concerning the Real, the transferential level of the research process, and the notion of inspiration as a principle to guide the dialogue between theories

Esta tese se insere no campo da teoria política normativa e tem como tema o estudo do debate sobre o conceito de liberdade. Nossa proposta consiste em analisar o conceito de liberdade como não interferência, de Isaiah Berlin; o conceito de liberdade como não dominação, de Philip Pettit; e a ideia de liberdade construtivista, de Nancy Hirschmann, para assim colocar esses conceitos em relação entre si. Objetivamos indicar a possibilidade de diálogo entre as diferentes correntes teóricas apontadas, como também propor uma leitura sobre o conceito de liberdade, para assim ampliarmos o nosso entendimento sobre o que é ser livre. Acreditamos que articular elementos das diferentes teorias pode enriquecer essa reflexão que pretende ser teórico-normativa, mas que, ao mesmo tempo, ambiciona refletir sobre as condições de liberdade para os diferentes sujeitos, tendo em vista as suas vidas nas sociedades contemporâneas e plurais. Nosso argumento é de que o exercício de compreender diferentes visões de liberdade de forma articulada é um caminho profícuo para abordarmos a indagação sobre quem é o sujeito livre. Desse modo, procuramos não apenas retomar criticamente os conceitos dos autores citados, mas também oferecer um possível diálogo entre as distintas concepções de liberdade tratadas nesta tese. Além disso, propomos usar o tema da opressão para articular elementos do pensamento dos três principais autores retomados aqui: Isaiah Berlin, Philip Pettit e Nancy Hirschmann. Defendemos que a ideia de não opressão pode ser uma abordagem teórica e política para discutirmos a liberdade. Tal chave de leitura nos permite pensar não só os espaços de liberdade, mas as diferentes experiências das pessoas. Assim, a liberdade considerada como não opressão relaciona a liberdade com a liberdade de escolha e, ao mesmo tempo, indica a necessidade da não dominação e atenção à construção do sujeito que escolhe. As escolhas se inserem em relações complexas, e a leitura da liberdade pela ideia da opressão é uma ferramenta normativa atenta a importantes aspectos políticos dessas escolhas / This thesis belongs to normative political theory field and has as its theme the study of the debate on the concept of freedom. Our proposal is to analyze Isaiahs Berlins concept of freedom as non-interference, Philip Pettits concept of freedom as nondomination, and Nancy Hirschmanns idea of constructivist freedom, and thereby to put these concepts in relation to each other. We intend not only to indicate the possibility of a dialogue between these different theoretical views, but also to propose a new way of developing the concept of freedom in order to expand our understanding of what is to be free. We believe that the articulation of elements taken from different theories can enrich this reflection that intends to be theoreticalnormative, but at the same time aspires to reflect about the conditions of freedom of the different subjects regarding their lives in plural and contemporary societies. Our argument is that the exercise of understanding different views of freedom in an articulated manner is a fruitful way to approach the question of who is the free subject. Thus, we not only approach critically the concepts of these authors, but we also offer a possible dialogue between the different conceptions of freedom treated in this thesis. In addition, we propose to use the theme of oppression to articulate elements of the thoughts of the three main authors discussed on this thesis: Isaiah Berlin, Philip Pettit and Nancy Hirschmann. We defend that the idea of non oppression, can be a theoretical and political approach to discuss freedom. This key of reading allow us to think not only spaces of freedom, but the different experiences of people. Thus, freedom considered as non oppression relates freedom to freedom of choice and, at the same time, indicates the necessity of non domination and attention to the construction of the choosing subject. The choices are embedded in complex relationships, and reading freedom by the idea of non oppression is a normative tool aware of important political aspects of these choices

Neste estudo, busquei trazer histórias de vida de mulheres pobres livres, forras e escravas que viveram na fronteira entre a escravidão e a liberdade, no recôncavo sul da Bahia, nos anos de 1850-1888. Conhecido como recôncavo mandioqueiro, essa parte da província da Bahia teve, durante todo o século XIX, grande inserção econômica por se tratar de um importante polo de produção de gêneros de primeira necessidade que abastecia os mercados da capital. Sendo assim, atraía todo tipo de gente em busca de meios de sobrevivência, incluindo mulheres pobres livres, escravas ou recém saídas do cativeiro. Muitas delas, conseguiram com trabalho e astúcia sair do cativeiro e construir um patrimônio significativo; outras, com pouca sorte, penaram até a morte angariando meios de sobrevivência. Partindo de um conjunto amplo de fontes documentais de natureza diversa, tais como: testamentos, inventários post mortem, registros eclesiásticos e notariais, processos cíveis e criminais, posturas municipais e jornais, cruzados com dados coletados no Censo de 1872, tracei os caminhos percorridos por essas mulheres na construção de suas autonomias. A análise destes dados possibilitou uma maior aproximação das relações quotidianas vivenciadas por essas mulheres no contexto da escravidão e no imediato pós-abolição que, bem longe de ser pacífico e brando, mostrou-se ser marcado por toda sorte de violência. / In this study, I sought life histories of poor women that lived in the threshold between slavery and freedom. The study takes place in Bahia state in Brazil, in a region called South Reconcavo, during the period of 1850-1888. That part of the country had high economic relevance during the whole XIX century due to the production of necessity goods that were sold at the state capital. Different sorts of people were attracted to that area seeking work oportunities and ways of survival including poor free or enslaved females. Many of these women struggled to reach freedom and overcame poverty reaching some wealth. Others instead struggled just to survive till end of life. A broad set of documents from various sources were analyzed such as wills, post mortem inventories, church records, notary records, civil and criminal justice documents, newspapers and data from the Census of 1872. I was able to track the paths taken by those women to build their autonomy in life. The analysis of this data enabled a better view of the daily hardships faced by women during slavery and after abolition, when different examples of violence were observed.

Existem alguns assuntos que mesmo tendo relevância do ponto de vista jornalístico muitas vezes não fazem parte dos noticiários. Por interesses ideológicos, econômicos ou políticos ocorre um processo de silenciamento sobre temas que passam a não figurar em reportagens ou mesmo em pequenos textos noticiosos nas páginas dos jornais. Por meio desta pesquisa de dissertação, procurou-se investigar especificamente os conteúdos relacionados ao sistema prisional brasileiro publicados nas primeiras páginas dos jornais Folha de S. Paulo e O Globo. Durante um período de três anos consecutivos, todas as capas foram analisadas, bem como suas respectivas matérias jornalísticas das páginas internas que faziam referência ao esse sistema. A partir daí foi possível identificar ausências, lacunas ou omissões de tópicos importantes para a compreensão e contextualização da complexidade do universo que compõe os procedimentos legais de investigação, julgamento e execução penal, tanto quanto as condições em que isso é realizado. Tal identificação se deu através do cruzamento das informações contidas nas matérias analisadas com as informações, na íntegra, das fontes de domínio público que eventualmente fizeram parte desses textos. / There are some issues that even having a journalistic relevance are often not part of the news. By ideological, economic or political interests, a process of silencing takes place on subjects that do not appear in reports or even in small news texts on the pages of newspapers. Through this dissertation research, we sought to investigate specifically the contents related to the Brazilian prison system published in the first pages of the newspapers Folha de S. Paulo and O Globo. During a period of three consecutive years, all the covers were analyzed, as well as their respective journalistic articles of the internal pages that made reference to this system. From that point on, it was possible to identify absences, or omissions of important topics for understanding and contextualizing the complexity of the universe that makes up the legal procedures for investigation, prosecution and criminal execution, as well as the conditions in which this is done. Such identification took place through the crossing of the information contained in the analyzed material with the information of the sources of public domain that occasionally became part of these journalistic texts.

Logo após a sua publicação, 1943, a obra O Ser e o Nada de Sartre foi alvo de comentários críticos que apontavam seu caráter idealista. Essas leituras enfatizavam a incompatibilidade entre a afirmação sartriana de uma liberdade absoluta do homem e as condições históricas que acabariam por determiná- lo. Quando Sartre publicou em 1960 a sua Crítica da Razão Dialética (\"encontro\" com o marxismo), tudo se passou como a confirmação do idealismo presente em O Ser e o Nada, a ponto de se operar a divisão de seu pensamento em antes e depois da Crítica. Sartre, no entanto, ao defender o absoluto da liberdade afirma também que não há liberdade sem situação. Tentaremos enfatizar essa difícil relação entre liberdade e situação a partir da apresentação da concepção sartriana de liberdade, bem como pelo exame da proposta psicanalítica de Sartre. / Right after its publication in 1943, Sartre\'s Being and nothingness has received critical commentaries that pointed out its idealistic character. These lectures emphasized the incompatibility between Sartre\'s assertion of man\'s absolute freedom and the historical conditions which would determine it. When Sartre publishes, in 1960, his Critique of dialectic reason (\"encounter\" with Marxism), everything is seen as the confirmation of the idealism of Being and nothingness, overcoming the division of his thought in before and after the Critique. However, when Sartre defends the absolute of freedom he also affirms that there is no freedom without situation. We will try to emphasize this difficult relation between freedom and situation through the presentation of Sartre\'s concept of freedom, as well as through the examination of his psychoanalytic proposal.

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La libre disposition de soi doit-elle accueillir des limites imposées par le Droit ? Une première approche, instinctive,est de répondre par la négative car le Droit n’aurait pas vocation à s’ingérer dans les rapports intimes que l’on entretient avec soi et qui ne concernent en conséquence pas la société. Il faut pourtant se rendre à l’évidence : le Droit est légitime à intervenir dans la libre disposition de soi car l’intimité est poreuse, et laisse passer entre ses mailles la présence d’autrui, ce qui autorise les pouvoirs publics à intervenir ponctuellement dans ce domaine a priori dédié à la vie privée. C’est à l’aune de l’ordre public que le législateur ou les juges déterminent si la libre disposition de soi peut s’épanouir sans danger pour autrui ou pour l’intérêt général. Cet ordre public, dans ses composantes classiques de direction et de protection, paraît néanmoins actuellement à la peine pour contenir les volontés individuelles qui s’expriment avec force conviction. Tant le juge que le législateur se sont en conséquence tournés vers un autre instrument juridique de nature à encadrer la libre disposition de soi. De facture plus récente, la dignité de la personne humaine vient soit protéger la libre disposition d’individus en situation de faiblesse ; soit au contraire limiter la libre disposition de soi, protégeant la personne contre son gré. La deuxième acception de la dignité est celle qui prédomine entre les mains du législateur et des juges, laissant la libre disposition de soi à la merci d’un instrument peu nuancé.Il faut donc rechercher un instrument juridique qui permette d’assurer la cohésion sociale sans pour autant éteindre les aspirations individuelles. C’est un équilibre particulièrement délicat à trouver en ce que ces deux objectifs sont le plus souvent diamétralement opposés. La recherche doit s’orienter vers l’ordre public car celui-ci est un concept éminemment évolutif. C’est un ordre public qui doit être de direction, eu égard aux faits qu’il accompagne, avec toute la fermeté requise, les individus dans la découverte des options qui leur sont les plus favorables et qu’il n’a pas vocation à protéger à tout prix la libre disposition de soi. Son adaptabilité aux circonstances de l’espèce est rendue possible grâce à l’application du principe de proportionnalité in concreto. Ce nouvel ordre public ne serait enfin qu’une coquille vide, sans l’objectif du Bien commun, qui permet de discriminer entre les usages licites et illicites de la libre disposition de soi. Encadrée par l’ordre public de direction de la personne, cette dernière peut s’exprimer sans verser dans des extrêmes dommageables à l’individu ou à la société. / Must free self-determination accept limits imposed by law? A first approach, instinctive, is to answer in the negative because the Law would not have vocation to interfere in the intimate relations that one maintains with oneself and which consequently does not concern the society. However, we must face the obvious: the law is legitimate to intervene in the free disposition of oneself because the intimacy is porous, and leaves between the meshes the presence of others, which authorizes the public authorities to intervene punctually in this area a priori dedicated to privacy. It is on the basis of public order that the legislator or judges determine whether free self-determination can flourish without danger for others or for the general interest. This public order, in its classical components ofleadership and protection, nevertheless appears to be struggling to contain the individual wishes that express themselves with conviction. Both the judge and the legislator have accordingly turned to another legal instrument ofa nature to regulate the free disposition of oneself. More recent, the dignity of the human person comes to protect thefree disposition of individuals in situation of weakness; or on the contrary, to limit the free disposition of oneself,protecting the person against his will. The second meaning of dignity is the one that predominates in the hands of thelegislator and the judges, leaving the free disposition of oneself at the mercy of a little nuanced instrument. We musttherefore look for a legal instrument that will ensure social cohesion without extinguishing individual aspirations. Itis a particularly delicate balance to find in that these two objectives are most often diametrically opposed. Research must be oriented towards public order because it is an eminently evolving concept. It is a public order that must beof direction, given the facts that it accompanies, with all the firmness required, individuals in the discovery of the options that are most favorable to them and that it is not intended to to protect at all costs the free disposition ofoneself. Its adaptability to the circumstances of the case is made possible by the application of the principle of proportionality in concreto. This new public order would finally be nothing but an empty shell, without the objectiveof the common good, which makes it possible to discriminate between the licit and unlawful uses of free self determination.Framed by the public order of direction of the person, the latter can express himself without endangering the individual or the society.

What to do about sexual harassment on campus has troubled higher education leaders for decades. The courts and regulatory authorities have clearly stated that institutions must develop and implement clear policies that prohibit unlawful harassment and provide a procedure for harassment complaints. Once a complaint is received, the institution is responsible for investigating and taking appropriate action to stop future misconduct. When the accused harasser is an instructor, additional factors must be considered. For example, instructors may have particular due process rights associated with their status or, depending on the nature of the allegations, an interest in academic freedom or free speech rights that may be breached by the institution's response to the complaint. Recent guidance from the United States Departments of Justice and Education direct institutions to be aggressive in encouraging victims to report harassment and to take decisive action to ensure that no further harassment occurs, even before the investigation is concluded and guilt is assessed. Institutions are concerned that this regulatory pressure goes too far and exposes institutions to liability for infringing the rights of accused instructors. This study examines litigation in the federal appeals courts from 1993-2013 involving lawsuits filed by harassment victims and accused higher education instructors. The study evaluates institutional responsibilities to victims and accused instructors as reflected in 58 different appellate decisions for the purpose of answering two research questions: 1. How have courts responded to lawsuits against colleges and universities brought by alleged victims claiming that they were harassed by instructors? 2. How have courts responded to lawsuits alleging that colleges and universities have infringed on the rights of instructors who have been accused of sexual harassment? The litigation environment was relatively consistent in overall frequency during the study's time frame. Given the small fraction of cases that ever reach the court of appeals, it is apparent that sexual harassment litigation remains a frequently litigated subject. Cases involving some aspect of the institution's response to harassment complaints or retaliation for complaining about harassment were by far the most frequently litigated issues in victim cases. Lawsuits by faculty most often alleged violations of free speech rights or due process shortcomings. Institutions prevailed in a significant majority of all the cases indicating that they had a good understanding of the rights of the parties on both sides of these disputes. The study concludes with a discussion that highlights the lessons learned from the court rulings, some recommendations for policy and practice, and consideration of the dilemmas presented by the recent federal guidance for colleges and universities.

The academic study of rape has historically ignored the recovery experience of the person being raped. Beyond medical and physical effects, and the possibility of legal prosecution, little attention has been paid. Existing research loses sight of the survivor's experience, ignoring the fact that a rape affects every aspect of life. The trauma is not only physical, but also impinges on the emotional, intellectual and interpersonal spheres. Rape can be, and often is, a life-threatening experience: one that needs to be faced and dealt with before there can be any sort of productive future. While it has been demonstrated that rape strips away a sense of safety and well-being, very little work has addressed how this can be regained, especially from feminist perspectives. A rape renders every aspect of identity subject to destruction and must be renegotiated and rebuilt if one is to survive. Survivor is the right term-there is no other word to describe it. The feminist canon has struggled for decades to open a discourse into the division between the sexes, critiquing the notion that masculinity equals aggression and proclaiming the falsity of the notion that men are genetically programmed to dominate. Despite this, stereotypes remain. In part because of this, feminist researchers and theorists who address the topic of rape have been preoccupied with increasing public education and awareness. Women's perspectives of rape have been neglected. The act of identity renegotiation involves three steps: understanding the event, accepting the trauma, and recovering one's identity by adapting what was to define what is. As feminist thought recognizes that there is no one definitive characteristic meant by "woman", this project by no means claims to include every survivor's path, but instead offers an overview of what might be involved. What I hope to accomplish through this project is illustrating how the process of renegotiation crosses into every sphere of identity: that is emotional, intellectual, physical, spiritual and psycho-social.