L'objectif de cette thèse est de découvrir comment les systèmes démocratiques contemporains appréhendent l'existence en leur sein de la force armée et comment ils parviennent à utiliser cette force armée, tout en respectant leur principe de gouvernement. L'angle adopté est celui de l'histoire des institutions et du droit comparé (principalement Etats-Unis et France). Les deux axes de réflexion sont mobilisés autour de la recherche d’un équilibre à la fois vertical (entre les pouvoirs constitués et la force armée) et horizontal (entre les pouvoirs constitués entre eux par rapport à la force armée). / This dissertation aims at understanding how contemporary democratic systems deal with the existence of the armed forces within them and how they manage to use them, while respecting their principle of government. The two methods chosen are, on the one hand, the history of the institutions and, on the other hand, the study of the parallels between the legal systems (mainly that of the United States and of France). Using these tools, the dissertation aims at finding a balance both vertical (between the constitutionnal powers and the armed forces) and horizontal (between the constitutionnal powers themselves regarding the armed forces).

This dissertation assesses how Islamic finance fares as an example of 'civil compromise' in Islamic law. By focusing on the Islamic project finance sector, my research examines how the industry's main stakeholders (representing faith, capital, and power) cooperate and compete to bring about this compromise through the 'Game of Islamic Bank Bargains'. The Islamic finance industry is a work in progress, and while it has made some significant strides, it is still a niche in the global conventional financial order rather than an alternative to it. It has fallen short of fulfilling its originally-stated social justice aspirations, but has provided a previously unavailable form of banking and finance for Muslims to transact, at least formalistically, in accordance with widely-believed tenets of their faith. Thus, those who hold up Islamic finance as a universal panacea or dismiss it outright as a fraud have both got it wrong. It is neither. It is, rather, a complex myriad of incentives and aspirations of a multitude of stakeholders muddled together across numerous geographies and evolving incrementally and constantly. The state of the industry is the result of how the stakeholders (the shariah scholars, lawyers, bankers, government officials, and customers) have pursued their self-interest in the Game of Islamic Bank Bargains. My research examines who are the 'winners' and 'losers' of this game, and what religious, commercial, and political factors have influenced this outcome. I assess what may incentivise the incumbent 'winners' to guide the Islamic finance industry away from a formal and legalistic approach towards one that also incorporates principles from Islamic economics. I explore how the 'losers' - whose interests are not accounted for due to their lack of sufficient financial and political clout - can sway the outcome of the game in their favour.

The United States Constitution had been in existence for almost two hundred years before the Supreme Court decided that some violations of constitutional rights may be too insignificant to warrant remedial action. Known as "harmless error," this statutory doctrine allows a court to affirm a conviction when a mere technicality or minor defect did not affect the defendant's substantial rights. The doctrine aims to promote judicial efficiency and judgment finality. The Court first applied harmless error to constitutional violations by shifting the statutory test away from the error's effect on substantial rights to its impact on the jury's verdict. Over time, the test evolved even further, now allowing a court to disregard the constitutional error when a majority of justices believe that the untainted record evidence shows that the defendant is, in fact, guilty. This sacrifice of individual and institutional constitutional protections at the altar of judicial efficiency and judgment finality subverts the harmless error doctrine's purposes and strikes at the core of America's founding ideals. In particular, it allows appellate courts to invade the jury's role as the finder of fact and guilt, to sidestep their constitutional role to review and correct errors and protect the Constitution, and to incentivize government actors to commit constitutional violations with little-to-no ramifications. After conducting a comprehensive review of the harmless error doctrine and its development, this thesis traces through many substantive, theoretical, and practical problems with the doctrine's current application. It then proposes that the Constitution and the values that it protects should once again be elevated above the harmless error doctrine's pragmatic concerns of judicial efficiency and judgment finality.

Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.

Law and development mainstream conceptions of labour market policies, while still marked by long-dominant views of contract law as economically superior to any labour regulation, have recently incorporated certain specific labour (human) rights. Core labour rights are thus accepted by global policy-makers, on the basis of their radical distinction from non-core labour standards and their rationalization according to certain foundational principles. This thesis criticizes the prevailing dichotomies between core labour rights and non-core standards, on the one hand, and contract law and regulation, on the other, bringing to bear the post-legal realist idea of legal indeterminacy. It argues that the organizing legal concepts that justify these dichotomies contain gaps and ambiguities that often lead to contradictory and indeterminate outcomes. It thus suggests that the core/non-core labour standards and contract/regulation distinctions are unproductive and should be rejected if a better conception of labour governance is to come to fruition.

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze four of the most commonly applied theories in jurisprudence by means of using the philosophical framework of in-tegral theory. Natural law, legal positivism, legal realism and critical legal theory were analyzed to find out how they relate to each other and to see what their strengths and weaknesses are in an integral perspective. The integral theory was created by the American philosopher Ken Wilber (1949-). Two of the main com-ponents of the theory are the four quadrants and the levels of development. The quadrants describe dimensions and perspectives of reality, and consists of the inner individual (subjective) quadrant, the outer individual (objective) quadrant, the inner collective (intersubjective) quadrant and the outer collective (interob-jective) quadrant. Individual values develop through different levels in a specific order, as is described in the second component of the integral theory. Different adult individuals can therefore be on different levels of development. This devel-opment is not only seen in individuals, but is also seen in historical and collective development. The levels that both individuals and societies develop through in-cludes (but are not limited to): the absolutistic (traditional) level, the rational (modern) level and the relativistic (postmodern) level.When using the integral theory to analyze the four theories in jurisprudence it became apparent that they can be mapped onto the integral framework. Natural law, which focuses on morality, can be placed in the intersubjective quadrant, and is mostly associated with the traditional level of development. Legal positiv-ism stems mostly from the interobjective quadrant where law is first and fore-most a system of rules that are enforced by different societal institutions. Legal positivism is typically associated with the modern level of development. Legal realism is also typically associated with the modern level of development and focuses a lot on the objective quadrant: on empiricism and on what judges actu-ally do. Critical legal theory is strongly associated with the postmodern level of development. It emphasizes different kinds of oppression in the intersubjective and in the interobjective quadrant. This thesis presents further examples of how the integral theory can be applied in legal theory and practice.

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Certain Small Island Developing States (hereinafter the "SIDS") such as Kiribati or Tuvalu are often incorrectly called "sinking islands" because their highest points are located just a few meters above the sea level. Sea level rise may turn their territories to uninhabitable land gradually disappearing beneath the tide. Worsening of the environmental conditions causes internal displacement, migration and other problems. SIDS repeatedly brought their plight to the United Nations Security Council (the "UNSC") during its meetings in 2007, 2011, 2015, 2018 and 2019. They demanded that the UNSC should deal with their situation as a potential security issue and safeguard more equal distribution of environmental security risks and costs. During the UNSC negotiations, various states attempted to interpret and re-interpreted the UNSC mandate in order to suit their interests. The representatives of SIDS suggested that the UNSC should be a body based on the principles of distributive justice decision-making and thus safeguard fairer sharing of threats and burdens, including those of environmental character. The rapidly developing states strongly opposed; they implicitly claimed that the UNSC should be based rather on the principles of commutative justice, i.e. decide in strictly given situations of violations of...

Les arguments du mouvement Critical Legal Studies sur l’indétermination du droit ne sont doublés d’aucune théorie sur la légitimité des interprétations qu’offrent les juges et donc d’aucun critère juridique pour critiquer une décision. La théorie pluraliste critique du droit, qui prend acte de la pluralité du droit officiel pour redéfinir le phénomène juridique plutôt que de nier qu’il puisse exister, pourrait toutefois fournir un tel critère. En effet, elle présente plusieurs correspondances avec les travaux de Dworkin, qui défend que les citoyens sont en droit d’obtenir les fruits d’une attitude interprétative en germe dans le concept même de droit. Ces deux théories maintiennent que le droit sert à reconnaître la valeur de l’histoire d’un groupe dans sa conception de lui-même tout en soutenant qu’il doit trouver une pertinence contemporaine pour être effectif et légitime. Les pluralistes priorisent toutefois la résonance actuelle des règles de droit et croient que toute communauté est divisée entre diverses définitions du bien. Selon eux, le droit est avant tout un procédé pour penser la conduite humaine et lui conférer un sens, qui dépend des capacités créatrices des citoyens. Chaque règle est alors la cause d’une pluralité d’ordres juridiques concurrents. Suivant ce portrait, seule l’acceptation d’une interprétation par un groupe, sa capacité à lui reconnaître un sens, pourrait rendre cette interprétation légitime. Ce critère nous mène vers un modèle de justice négociée où deux personnes s’adressent à un juge pour développer une lecture en commun du droit, pour identifier une interprétation légitime dans leurs univers juridiques respectifs. / No theory of the legitimacy of judges accompanies the Critical Legal Studies’ arguments on the indeterminacy of law, which entails there are no criteria to identify a legitimate interpretation. Critical legal pluralism, which redefines law to take account of its inherent plurality rather than denying its very possibility on these grounds, could however provide such criteria. Indeed, it presents many resemblances with Dworkin’s theory of law which argues that citizens are entitled to reap the benefits of the interpretative nature of law. Both theories defend that law allows to bridge a group’s past, which is essential to its self-understanding, with the present, and both insist that law must be made to appear relevant in the present. Pluralists however prioritize the current significance of law and stress that communities are split by a variety of definitions of the good. According to them, law is mainly a process to think about human conduct and grant it meaning, and it depends as such on citizens’ creative capacities. Accordingly, only an interpretation that is accepted by a group and seen as meaningful can be considered legitimate. This criterion forces us to consider a form of negotiated justice, where two persons consult a judge to develop a common reading of a rule which would be legitimate in each person’s legal universe.

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