This thesis argues that the role of the United Nations’ (UN) human rights regime is to constitute all peoples into a specific universal standard of civilization, which this thesis identifies as the UN meta-civilization. Meta-civilization is defined as the UN’s colonial and imperial impulse to legislate, implement and enforce human rights in ways which are meant to uniquely ‘civilize’. Analysis of the doctrinal and theoretical foundations of international law illustrates the historical and contemporary power dynamics that enable the UN to ‘universalize’ human rights. As a case in point, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAoC) political dialogue highlights the UN’s constitution of the meta-civilization. The case study proves the UN meta-civilization is hegemonic in its claim to universality. In the end, this analysis demonstrates that more consideration about the appropriate utility of human rights within the theories and practices of international relations and international law is required. / Graduate

This article considers the nature of interpretation as important question in constitutional interpretation from a theonomic epistemological perspective. Theonomic epistemology is summarily described. The modem language philosophy's view of the nature of interpretation is then investigated, after which a theonomic definition of interpretation and hermeneutics is suggested. Different approaches to interpretation commonly found in legal practice are evaluated on the basis of the suggested definition. The theonomic approach is then applied to another issue in constitutional interpretation, the nature of the judicial function, and broad guidelines are given for the practical application of theonomic epistemological considerations. / Hierdie artikel ondersoek die wese van interpretasie as belangrike vraagstuk by grondwetuitleg vanuit die perspektief van die teonome epistemologie. Die teonome epistemologie word oorsigtelik beskryf. Die modeme taalfilosofie se beskouing van interpretasie word dan behandel, waama 'n teonome definisie van interpretasie en hermeneutiek voorgestel word. Die verskillende uitlegbenaderings wat algemeen in die praktyk voorkom, word aan die hand van die voorgestelde definisie geevalueer. Vervolgens word die teonome benadering op 'n ander vraagstuk van grondwetuitleg - die aard van die regterlike funksie - toegepas, en word bree riglyne vir toepassing van teonome epistemologiese oorwegings in die praktyk van regspraak gegee. / Department of Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é examinar as teses centrais do positivismo jurídico de John Austin e de H. L. A. Hart. Analiso inicialmente as críticas que Hart faz à teoria do direito como comando, proposta inicialmente por Austin na primeira metade do século XIX. Em seguida, ocupo-me das críticas de Ronald Dworkin ao positivismo jurídico, bem como das tentativas recentes de se retomar a teoria do direito como comando. Por fim, procuro mostrar de que forma a discussão em torno das críticas ao positivismo legal foi recebido no contexto do debate teórico-jurídico no Brasil. / The aim of this dissertation is to examine John Austins and H. L. A. Harts defense of legal positivism. I firstly analyze Harts criticism of Austins theory of law as command. Then I examine Ronald Dworkins criticism of legal positivism, as well as recent attempts to resume and defend the theory of law as command. In the final part of this dissertation I examine the how the debate on legal positivism was received in the context of Brazilian tradition of legal theory.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo desta dissertação de mestrado é examinar as teses centrais do positivismo jurídico de John Austin e de H. L. A. Hart. Analiso inicialmente as críticas que Hart faz à teoria do direito como comando, proposta inicialmente por Austin na primeira metade do século XIX. Em seguida, ocupo-me das críticas de Ronald Dworkin ao positivismo jurídico, bem como das tentativas recentes de se retomar a teoria do direito como comando. Por fim, procuro mostrar de que forma a discussão em torno das críticas ao positivismo legal foi recebido no contexto do debate teórico-jurídico no Brasil. / The aim of this dissertation is to examine John Austins and H. L. A. Harts defense of legal positivism. I firstly analyze Harts criticism of Austins theory of law as command. Then I examine Ronald Dworkins criticism of legal positivism, as well as recent attempts to resume and defend the theory of law as command. In the final part of this dissertation I examine the how the debate on legal positivism was received in the context of Brazilian tradition of legal theory.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-12-15T14:56:33Z No. of bitstreams: 1 johnnymarcelohara.pdf: 444091 bytes, checksum: b65313fd55be84eb388cb99d33b9f30e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-12-15T15:03:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 johnnymarcelohara.pdf: 444091 bytes, checksum: b65313fd55be84eb388cb99d33b9f30e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-12-15T15:03:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 johnnymarcelohara.pdf: 444091 bytes, checksum: b65313fd55be84eb388cb99d33b9f30e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-15T15:03:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 johnnymarcelohara.pdf: 444091 bytes, checksum: b65313fd55be84eb388cb99d33b9f30e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-25 / O presente estudo pretende relacionar a Teoria da Argumentação, de Chaim Perelman e Olbrechts-Tyteca, (com base no Tratado da Argumentação e em Ética e Direito) ao ensino jurídico, através da utilização, nos âmbitos pertinentes à razão argumentativa, da estrutura retórica, como ponto de partida para o estudo da sistemática do direito e, em especial, como metodologia de ensino, complementar à dogmática do positivismo jurídico (a partir da Teoria Pura do Direito, de Hans Kelsen). Estabelecida a relação entre a argumentação e o ensino do Direito, suscita-se sua relevância em face da crise instalada no ensino jurídico, particularmente quanto à abordagem de noções e princípios fundamentais que permeiam o direito, diante do constitucionalismo vigente no Brasil. Como ilustração, foram realizadas entrevistas com diretores de faculdades de Direito. / This study aims to relate the Theory of Argumentation, by Chaim Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, (based on the Argumentation Treaty and on Ethics and Law) to the teaching of Law, through the use, in areas relevant to the Argumentation, the rhetorical structure as a starting point for the systematic study of law and in particular, as a teaching methodology, complementary to the dogma of legal positivism (based on the Theory of Pure Law, by Hans Kelsen). By creating a relationship between the Argumentation and the teaching of Law, this intends to raise its relevance in light of the established crisis in the legal education, particularly on the approach to concepts and fundamental principles that underlie the law, within the current constitutionalism in Brazil. In order to illustrate this thesis, interviews were conducted with Law School Directors.

This dissertation identifies institutional positivism and historically grounded pluralism as interpretive trends in the Canadian case law on Indigenous-state relations, and explores tensions between these trends. These are tensions between practices of judicial interpretation, not between theories of interpretation or legal concepts. They are practices developed case- by-case, with interpretive trends emerging over time through series of cases addressing similar issues in related contexts. Institutional positivist approaches insist that judicial recognition of Indigenous legal orders and accommodation of Indigenous interests must take place within established constitutional forms founded on state sovereignty. Historically grounded pluralist approaches show greater willingness to balance principles of state sovereignty against principles of popular sovereignty and of Indigenous priority in Canadian territory. While the two approaches overlap significantly, their differences sometimes lead to contrasting legal conclusions on key issues of, e.g., treaty interpretation, the relationship between Indigenous legal orders and the state legal system, and the jurisdictional dimension of Aboriginal title. This dissertation examines these positivist-pluralist tensions in the context of the current period of ideological transition and rapidly evolving imaginaries of Indigenous-state relations. Chapters 1 and 2 explore the case law to highlight concrete ways in which this ideological transition finds doctrinal expression in both positivist and pluralist modes. Chapters 3 and 4 offer broader reflections on philosophical debates relating to legal positivism and the role of popular sovereignty in constitutional interpretation by Canadian courts. The final chapter then considers the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in Canadian law, with a focus on implementing legislation recently adopted by British Columbia and on two recent judgments that split the Supreme Court of Canada on the proper role of the Canadian judiciary in coordinating Canadian state law with non-state legal orders (Indigenous in one case and international in the other). This concluding chapter explains how the ongoing interplay of positivist and pluralist concerns will inevitably shape the reception of UNDRIP in Canadian law and the ongoing elaboration of Canadian Aboriginal law more generally. / Graduate / 2022-08-26

<p>This dissertation offers a critical analysis of the dominant philosophical theory of law today: Hartian positivism. The arguments proffered are not meant to strike at the underlying methodology of that account. Rather, they are intended to demonstrate that it performs sub-optimally with regard to its own jurisprudential aspirations. More specifically, this thesis contends that the Hartian position is unable to model the law in a way that captures the de facto terms of institutional governance, while also being able to give due theoretical credence to the normative structures and mechanisms that are widely deployed to regulate it. With this conclusion in hand, a new theory of law is suggested – one that seeks to stay true to the methods and aspirations of its predecessor, but which has been constructed so as to surpass its descriptive-explanatory capabilities. In this way, the following dissertation means to push analytic jurisprudence beyond the Hartian pale, and into new areas of theoretical discourse.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

[pt] Pretende-se propor um paradigma ecológico alternativo ao paradigma da modernidade que, estruturado sob uma racionalidade instrumental, produziu um conhecimento mecanicista e fragmentado, a partir de um pensamento disjuntor e reducionista, baseado na concepção da natureza como ser inanimado e pronto para a dominação do homem. Tal visão de mundo, validada pela ciência, legitimou o uso insustentável dos recursos naturais e a ideia mitológica de progresso ilimitado, responsáveis pela deflagração, no século XX, de grave crise ambiental, que produziu sérias injustiças socioambientais entre países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento, bem como no próprio âmbito interno das nações. Embora tenha sido atribuído ao meio ambiente uma perspectiva integrada da relação homem-natureza, com a conscientização ambiental iniciada na década de 1970 e consolidada com a constitucionalização brasileira do Direito Ambiental, ocorrida em 1988 - que abraçou um olhar antropocêntrico alargado -, a estrutura jurídica como um todo ainda se revela fundamentalmente arraigada na doutrina positivista, amparada no pensamento simplificador, possuindo como fundamentos a certeza, a previsibilidade, a segurança e a ordem. Sucede que o Direito Ambiental se baseia em aspectos como incerteza, imprevisibilidade, insegurança e desordem e, por isso, não consegue dialogar com o sistema jurídico em si, que valoriza aspectos opostos àqueles concernentes ao meio ambiente e à sua tutela. Além de promover a baixa efetividade do Direito Ambiental, a disparidade mencionada induz e legitima movimentos de retrocesso ambiental, haja vista que a legislação ambiental, embora contenha em si elementos finalísticos de tutela ao meio ambiente, é de difícil implementação na prática, caracterizando, assim, a função simbólica do direito ambiental. É preciso, pois, romper com o paradigma moderno em favor do paradigma da complexidade, ecologizando todo o sistema jurídico, de modo a transformar a racionalidade dominante em uma racionalidade ambiental, por meio da inserção de regras, princípios e valores que modifiquem as mentalidades e ideologias das instituições, governos, estabelecimentos de ensino e paradigmas de conhecimento, com o intuito de construir um futuro sustentável, equitativo, plural e democrático. / [en] This dissertation intends to propose an alternative ecological paradigm to the paradigm of modernity that, structured under an instrumental rationality, produced a mechanistic and fragmented knowledge, starting from a breaker and reductionist thinking, based on the conception of nature as an inanimate being and ready for the domination of the men. This world-view, validated by science, legitimized an unsustainable use of natural resources and a mythological idea of unlimited progress, responsible for the emergence, in the twentieth century, of a serious environmental crisis, that produced serious socio-environmental injustices between developed and developing countries, as well as within the internal realm of nations. Although an integrated perspective of the human-nature relationship with an environmental awareness has begun in the 1970s and has been consolidated with the brazilian constitutionalization of Environmental Law in 1988 - which embraced a broad anthropocentric view -, the legal structure as a whole still remains fundamentally rooted in the positivist doctrine, supported by simplistic thinking, having as its foundation certainty, predictability, security and order. It turns out that environmental law is based on aspects such as uncertainty, unpredictability, insecurity and disorder and, therefore, it can not dialogue with the legal system itself, which values aspects opposed to those concerning the environment and its protection. Besides promoting the low effectiveness of Environmental Law, such disparity induces and legitimizes environmental backtracking movements, given that environmental legislation, although it contains in itself final elements of protection of the environment, it is difficult to be implemented in practice, thus characterizing the symbolic function of environmental law. It is necessary, therefore, to break with the modern paradigm in favor of the paradigm of complexity, greening all the legal system, in order to transform the dominant rationality into an environmental rationality, through the insertion of rules, principles and values that modify mentalities and ideologies of institutions, governments, educational establishments and knowledge paradigms, with the aim of building a sustainable, equitable, plural and democratic future.

A pretensão do positivismo jurídico é o esclarecimento teórico para se realizar uma descrição correta do direito. A presente dissertação busca verificar qual a abordagem mais adequada para se alcançar a concretização da separação do direito da moral, sendo que o fio condutor é a obra de H.L.A. Hart, na qual se destaca o livro The Concept of Law. Dessa maneira, o problema a que se propõe o trabalho é evidenciar a complexidade da separação do direito da moral. Pretende-se demonstrar, principalmente através da teoria e obra de Herbert Hart, que Oliver Holmes e Hans Kelsen ao apresentarem seus projetos para separação do direito da moralidade, trataram o direito do ponto de vista descritivo, perdendo a caracterização do próprio direito. O primeiro capítulo é dedicado a apresentar e explicar o projeto positivista, já que condutas exigíveis por regras jurídicas não se confundem com as condutas exigidas por regras morais, ainda que conjuntamente possam existir. Ainda nesse capítulo apresentam-se algumas noções importantes para a compreensão e desenvolvimento do trabalho em relação à teoria de Hart, em especial no que tange ao ponto de vista interno e externo. No segundo capítulo é abordada a obra de Holmes, The Path of the Law, e as principais críticas construídas por Hart e discutidas por Stephen Perry e Scott Shapiro. Partindo-se da perspectiva do homem mau presente na teoria, pretende-se demonstrar que esta é insuficiente para compreender a teoria do direito, em especial nas razões pelas quais um cidadão segue o direito, já que nem todos estariam preocupados em qual é a sanção que receberão do Estado caso desobedeçam à regra. No terceiro e último capítulo demonstra-se quais os problemas da teoria de Kelsen apontadas por Hart. Especialmente no que se refere à ideia de Kelsen de que o direito é só forma, podendo ter qualquer conteúdo, enquanto que Hart acredita que o direito deve possuir conteúdo mínimo. Segundo Kelsen, a estrutura normativa é pressuposta, sendo que a regra funciona como esquema de interpretação e a principal função desta é a sanção. O objetivo final do trabalho é demonstrar que neste projeto de tentar salvar a autonomia do direito, Holmes e Kelsen descaracterizaram o fenômeno jurídico como uma prática social. / The claim of legal positivism is the theoretical clarification to perform a correct description of the law. This work aims to verify the most appropriate approach to achieving the implementation of the separation of law from morality, and the common thread is the work of H.L.A. Hart, which stresses the book The Concept of Law. Thus, the problem that is proposed work is to show the complexity of separating law from morals. We intend to show, especially through the theory and work of Herbert Hart, that Oliver Holmes and Hans Kelsen when presented their projects for separating the right of morality, they treated law of the descriptive point of view, losing the characterization of the law itself. The first chapter is dedicated to present and explain the positivist project, as required by legal conduct rules are not confused with the conduct required by moral rules, albeit jointly may exist. Although this chapter presents some important concepts for understanding and development work in relation to Hart's theory, especially with regard to internal and external point of view. The second chapter discussed the work of Holmes, The Path of the Law, and the main criticisms built by Hart and discussed by Stephen Perry and Scott Shapiro. Starting from the bad man present perspective in theory, intended to demonstrate that this is insufficient to understand the theory of law, in particular the reasons why a citizen follows the law, since not everyone would be worried about what is the sanction which receive if they disobey the rule. In the third and last chapter shows is that the problems of Kelsen's theory pointed out by Hart. Especially with regard to the idea of Kelsen that law is shaped and can have any content, while Hart believes that law should have a minimum content. According to Kelsen, the regulatory framework is presupposed, and the rule works as interpretation scheme and the main function of this is the sanction. The ultimate goal of the work is to demonstrate that this project of trying to save the autonomy of law, Holmes and Kelsen misrepresent the legal phenomenon as a social practice.