A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a origem do conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural para Tomás de Aquino. Entre as hipóteses na literatura, encontram-se intepretações de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende das sensações de dor e prazer, de que os preceitos são valores autoevidentes e de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende do conhecimento intelectual das inclinações naturais. Assim, serão analisadas algumas passagens do comentário da Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles e da Suma de Teologia em que Tomás desenvolve a noção de apetite natural ou inclinação natural. Além disso, será tratada a distinção entre diferentes tipos de conhecimento prático. A partir dessas noções, serão apontados alguns indícios para a hipótese de que o conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural depende da apreensão intelectual das inclinações naturais. / The present dissertation aims to analyse the origin of knowledge of precepts of natural law for Thomas Aquinas. Between the hypotheses in literature, there are interpretations that knowledge of precepts depends on sensations of pain and pleasure, that precepts are self-evident values and that knowledge of precepts depends on intellectual knowledge of natural inclinations. Therefore, it will be analysed some passages of the commentary on Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics and of Summa Theologica were Thomas develops the notion of natural appetite or natural inclination. Further, it will be treated the distinction between different kinds of practical knowledge. Thereby, it will be pointed some indications for the hypothesis that knowledge of precepts of natural law depends on intellectual apprehension of natural inclinations.

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T12:25:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-andre-queiroz-de-lucena.pdf: 1390360 bytes, checksum: e69e9e9d57efb54a40c1c85c8c5a1e61 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-24T12:26:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-andre-queiroz-de-lucena.pdf: 1390360 bytes, checksum: e69e9e9d57efb54a40c1c85c8c5a1e61 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-24T12:26:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-andre-queiroz-de-lucena.pdf: 1390360 bytes, checksum: e69e9e9d57efb54a40c1c85c8c5a1e61 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este trabalho examina a formação da sociedade política na crítica de Rousseau ao jusnaturalista Samuel von Pufendorf. Enquanto o autor do Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens postula uma sociedade fundada nos mandatos da recta ratio, sociabilidade e cumprimento dos Deveres, Rousseau critica aqueles mandatos no que o faz reexaminar a natureza humana e as exigência da sociedade política. Daí, a oposição entre uma legitimidade baseada na alienação ao representante ou assembleia, e outra, formada pela vontade geral e liberdade do cidadão. Os temas implicam, portanto, em um e (ou) outro autor, na apresentação da teoria dos Seres Morais e dos princípios do direito político, do estado de natureza e das fórmulas contratuais. / This work examines the formation of the political society in criticism of Rousseau to the jusnaturalist Samuel Von Pufendorf. While the author of Le Droit La Nature et desgens posits a society founded in the mandates of the recta ratio,sociability and the fulfilment of duties, Rosseau criticizes those terms that makes him review the human nature and the requirement of the political society. Hence, the opposition between a legitimacy based on the alienation to the representative or House. And another one, formed by the citizen general will and freedom. The topics imply, therefore, in either of the author, on presentation of moral beings theory, the political right principles, the nature state as well as the contractual formulas.

A lei atual foi forjada sobre a premissa de que a humanidade está no centro do mundo e de que o homem é o único e legitimado senhor de todos os seres vivos. Desde que Darwin revelou para o mundo uma então chocante realidade sim, nós viemos de um símio ancestral os princípios filosóficos do antropocentrismo começaram a ruir. E os animais, que nós sempre pensamos como objetivos de uso e consumo humano, como sofás, mesas e cadeiras? E os seres que nós descobrimos serem tão relacionados a nós que os chamamos de primos ou humanlike? Eles ainda são bens móveis nas palavras fora de moda do direito posto? Pois agora que uma nova realidade está implodindo os antigos tabus de irracionalidade e instinto pavloviano, muitos juristas e filósofos passaram a defender a existência de direitos fundamentais (como à vida, à liberdade, e à integridade física) a vários animais, baseados na sua igualdade substancial aos seres humanos. Para os que sustentam tais ideias, os animais, como a maioria de nós, têm interesses considerados relevantes, o que significa que eles podem pensar racionalmente, evitando a dor e o sofrimento, e procurando o bem-estar, mas somente o pequeno grupo chamado de grandes primatas (no qual se incluem o próprio homem e, além dele, os outros hominoides e antropoides, isto é, os chimpanzés, gorilas, orangotangos e bonobos) conhecem os rudimentos (blocos construtores) da moralidade. Aos grandes primatas podem ser reconhecidos direitos subjetivos? A resposta pode ser encontrada tanto no jusnaturalismo (na teoria do direito natural), que concebe direitos inatos, partilhados, segundo Justiniano, entre todas as criaturas vivas, quanto na teoria do interesse de Ihering, em oposição à teoria da vontade de Windscheid. Conjuntamente, eles podem explicar um novo conceito de personalidade jurídica mínima para os grandes primatas. / Modern Law is founded over the premise that mankind is in the center of the world; that man is the sole master and ruler of all living beings. Since Darwin brought into the eyes of humanity a brand new shocking reality yes, we came from the apish ancestor philosophy principles of anthropocentrism have collapsed. What about those animals we always thought as mere objects like sofas, tables or chairs? What about those beings we have now discovered so close related to us that we are used to call them as kin or humanlike creatures? Are they still goods by the old-fashioned words of written law? For a new reality is overcoming ancient taboos of irrationality and pavlovian instincts, there are now many jurists and philosophers who defend basic rights (such as life, liberty and bodily integrity) to lots of animals, based on their substantial equality to humans. For those who claim in their favor, animals, like most of us, have interests considered relevant, which means that they can think rationally, avoiding pain and suffering, and seeking for wellness of living, but only the small group called the great apes (in which we include the man himself as also the other hominoids or anthropoids: chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos) know the building blocks of morality. Are they so entitled to have rights? The answer lies in both jusnaturalism (theory of natural rights), which conceives inherent rights of living, commonly shared, according to Justinian, by all living creatures, and in Ihering theory of interest opposed to Windscheids of will. Combined together they can provide a new concept of minimum notion of legal personhood for the great apes.

Substantive due process is one of the most cherished and elusive doctrines in American constitutional jurisprudence. The understanding that the Constitution of the United States protects not only specifically enumerated rights, but also broad concepts such as “liberty,” “property,” and “privacy,” forms the foundation for some of the Supreme Court’s most impactful—and controversial—decisions. This thesis explores the constitutional merits and politicizing history of natural rights jurisprudence from its application in Dred Scott v. Sandford to its recent evocation in Obergefell v. Hodges. Indeed, from slavery to same-same sex marriage, substantive due process has played a pivotal role in shaping our nation’s laws and destiny: But was it ever intended to? This paper first examines the legal arguments in favor of substantive due process to determine whether the judiciary was designed to be the “bulwark” of natural as well as clearly scribed law. Then, employing a novel framework to measuring judicial politicization, the thesis tracks the doctrine’s application throughout its most prominent case studies. Often arriving at nuanced conclusions, we observe that the truth is more often painted in some gradation of grey than in black or white.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a origem do conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural para Tomás de Aquino. Entre as hipóteses na literatura, encontram-se intepretações de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende das sensações de dor e prazer, de que os preceitos são valores autoevidentes e de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende do conhecimento intelectual das inclinações naturais. Assim, serão analisadas algumas passagens do comentário da Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles e da Suma de Teologia em que Tomás desenvolve a noção de apetite natural ou inclinação natural. Além disso, será tratada a distinção entre diferentes tipos de conhecimento prático. A partir dessas noções, serão apontados alguns indícios para a hipótese de que o conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural depende da apreensão intelectual das inclinações naturais. / The present dissertation aims to analyse the origin of knowledge of precepts of natural law for Thomas Aquinas. Between the hypotheses in literature, there are interpretations that knowledge of precepts depends on sensations of pain and pleasure, that precepts are self-evident values and that knowledge of precepts depends on intellectual knowledge of natural inclinations. Therefore, it will be analysed some passages of the commentary on Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics and of Summa Theologica were Thomas develops the notion of natural appetite or natural inclination. Further, it will be treated the distinction between different kinds of practical knowledge. Thereby, it will be pointed some indications for the hypothesis that knowledge of precepts of natural law depends on intellectual apprehension of natural inclinations.

Ao longo da história da filosofia, John Locke tem sido frequentemente apresentado sob o rótulo de pai do liberalismo, o que decorre, invariavelmente, de um modo peculiar de interpretação da noção de liberdade para o filósofo, que estaria estruturada em torno da ideia de não-interferência. Derivada frequentemente de propostas analíticas realizadas em um vácuo histórico, em que as ideias de Locke são tomadas como uma estática coleção, tal conclusão expressa uma perspectiva que não considera o caráter essencialmente discursivo da filosofia política e o campo problemático em que os conceitos foram pensados pelo filósofo. Se tomarmos a obra de Locke a partir de um campo mais abrangente, constituído por diferentes atos de discurso, em que sejam considerados as condições e o contexto em que os elementos textuais foram enunciados, recuperando-se o aspecto polêmico do texto, pode ser evidenciado um traço marcadamente republicano no conceito de liberdade formulado pelo autor. Partindo da perspectiva de John Pocock acerca do processo de formação do republicanismo inglês, segundo a qual as matrizes republicanas foram recebidas na Inglaterra a partir do século XVI, desencadeando um longo processo de anglicização da república, no qual diferentes momentos podem ser identificados, e tomando como pressuposto a ideia de dupla filiação do conceito moderno de liberdade, proposta por Jean-Fabien Spitz, o propósito deste trabalho é colher os elementos que apontam em que medida a noção de liberdade defendida por Locke em sua obra política pode ser considerada tributária dos argumentos desenvolvidos nos momentos precedentes em que se expressou o pensamento republicano na Inglaterra, o que permitiria incluí-la como referência de um importante ato do longo discurso que culminou na formulação do conceito republicano de liberdade. / Throughout the history of philosophy, John Locke has often been presented under the label of \"father of liberalism,\" which invariably follows from a peculiar way of interpreting his concept of freedom, as structured around the idea of non-interference. Coming from analytical proposals often elaborated in a \"historical vacuum\", in which Locke\'s ideas are taken as a static collection, such a conclusion expresses a perspective that does not consider the essentially discursive character of political philosophy and the \"problematic field\" in which some concepts were thought by the philosopher. On the other hand, if we take Locke\'s work from a broader field, made up of different \"acts of discourse,\" taking into account the conditions and contexts in which the textual elements were enunciated, and recovering the controversial aspect of the text, we can reveal a republican feature in the concept of liberty formulated by the author. Starting from John Pocock\'s perspective about the English republicanism, according to which republican matrices were received in England from the sixteenth century, triggering a long process of \"anglicization of the republic,\" in which different \"moments\" can be identified, and considering the idea of double affiliation of the modern concept of freedom, proposed by Jean-Fabien Spitz, the purpose of this work is to gather the elements that indicate to what extent the notion of freedom defended by Locke in his political work can be considered tributary of the arguments developed in the previous \"moments\" in which the republican thought in England was expressed, which would allow to include it as reference of an important \"act\" of the long discourse that culminated in the republican concept of liberty.

Este trabalho versa sobre o conceito de potência natural em Espinosa, sua amplitude e abrangência e seus reflexos no direito natural e na política. Procura revelar a originalidade do conceito de direito natural em Espinosa, muito diferente dos pontos de vista de Grotius, de Hobbes e de todos os demais filósofos e doutrinadores, levando-o, também, a uma visão diferente sobre a formação do Estado; e, finalmente, a sua doutrina sobre o Estado e suas diversas instituições políticas, enfatizando sempre a liberdade e a dignidade humanas como a razão de ser da criação desse mesmo Estado. Procuramos também revelar neste modesto trabalho o avanço, a novidade e a contribuição de Espinosa à ciência jurídica contemporânea. / This paper deals with the concept of natural power in Spinoza, its breadth and scope and its effects on natural law and politics. Seeks to reveal the originality of the concept of natural law in Spinoza, very different from the views of Grotius, Hobbes and all other philosophers and scholars, too, leading him to a different view of state formation; and finally, his teaching on the State and its various political institutions, always emphasizing freedom and human dignity as the reason for the creation of that State. We also seek to reveal in this modest work the advance, the novelty and contribution of Spinoza to contemporary legal science.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar a origem do conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural para Tomás de Aquino. Entre as hipóteses na literatura, encontram-se intepretações de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende das sensações de dor e prazer, de que os preceitos são valores autoevidentes e de que o conhecimento dos preceitos depende do conhecimento intelectual das inclinações naturais. Assim, serão analisadas algumas passagens do comentário da Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles e da Suma de Teologia em que Tomás desenvolve a noção de apetite natural ou inclinação natural. Além disso, será tratada a distinção entre diferentes tipos de conhecimento prático. A partir dessas noções, serão apontados alguns indícios para a hipótese de que o conhecimento dos preceitos da lei natural depende da apreensão intelectual das inclinações naturais. / The present dissertation aims to analyse the origin of knowledge of precepts of natural law for Thomas Aquinas. Between the hypotheses in literature, there are interpretations that knowledge of precepts depends on sensations of pain and pleasure, that precepts are self-evident values and that knowledge of precepts depends on intellectual knowledge of natural inclinations. Therefore, it will be analysed some passages of the commentary on Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics and of Summa Theologica were Thomas develops the notion of natural appetite or natural inclination. Further, it will be treated the distinction between different kinds of practical knowledge. Thereby, it will be pointed some indications for the hypothesis that knowledge of precepts of natural law depends on intellectual apprehension of natural inclinations.

L’Etat moderne qui articule le principe de souveraineté avec l’affirmation des droits subjectifs et qui rompt avec le modèle impérial du pouvoir, est contemporain de la découverte et de l’exploitation du Nouveau Monde. Il s’agit ici de montrer que les deux processus sont solidaires et qu’il est possible de reconsidérer les différentes élaborations théoriques justifiant la formation des souverainetés étatiques, à partir du rapport au Nouveau Monde traversé par la tension structurante entre cosmopolitisme et impérialisme. Une première partie examine la genèse du droit des gens moderne, et la question du cosmopolitisme, à partir de la réflexion de Vitoria sur les « titres » de la conquête et de la colonisation de l’Amérique par l’Espagne. Cette partie s’efforce également de restituer les enjeux liés à la pratique de la piraterie. Celle-ci ne saurait être réduite à sa dimension criminelle : elle correspond à cette époque à une lutte pour la liberté des mers ainsi qu’à l’expérimentation de nouvelles formes d’association et de liberté qui font écho à la pensée utopique. Une seconde partie met en lumière le rôle des enjeux coloniaux dans l’élaboration de la théorie du pouvoir souverain (sous la forme de la monarchie absolue). Les auteurs convoqués sont Bacon et Hobbes. Enfin une troisième partie prend en charge l’irruption du concept de peuple dans les théories de l’Etat et examine là encore la manière dont les expériences coloniales informent ce concept (les références sont alors Locke et Rousseau). La Révolution de Saint-Domingue est évoquée en toute fin pour son exemplarité dans la manière dont elle questionne tous les concepts constitutifs de l’Etat de droit moderne. / It is worth considering that when the modern State reconciles the principle of sovereignty with the assertion of subjective rights, and consequently breaks with the imperial government system, it is doing so at the very time when the New World is being discovered and exploited. The point here is to show that these two processes are interdependent, and that it is possible to reconsider the different theoretical elaborations which have so far accounted for the emergence of state sovereignty, by referring to the structuring tension between cosmopolitism and imperialism, which characterizes the New World. What is dealt with the first part is the birth of international law, and the issue of cosmopolitism, revisited in the light of Vitoria’s study about the titles of the Spanish conquest and colonization. It is also devoted to restoring the stakes of piracy practice. The later cannot be reduced to its criminal dimension: at the time it means a fight for freedom on sea, together with the experimentation of new forms of association and liberty, which echo the utopian way of thinking. The second part is devoted to emphasizing the role of colonial stakes in the construction of the theory of sovereign power (as Absolute Monarchy). The authors referred to are Bacon and Hobbes. A third part is devoted to the emergence of the concept of People in the State theories, together with a study of the way this concept feeds from the colonial experience (the authors referred to this time being Locke and Rousseau). The Revolution in Santo-Domingo is mentioned in the very end, due to its exemplarity in the way it questions all the concepts that make out the modern state under the rule of law.

La place assignée à Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-1785) au sein de l'historiographie contemporaine est ambigüe. Il a été longtemps considéré comme l'une des influences majeures de la Révolution française puis comme l'un des précurseurs de la doctrine communiste. Il a fallu attendre les travaux de l’École de Cambridge en particulier ceux de Pocock, pour qu'un consensus s'opère : Mably est devenu l'archétype du républicain classique en France au XVIIIe siècle. L'objectif de cette thèse est d'interroger l'inscription de Mably dans cette tradition républicaine, en prenant en compte deux éléments fondateurs de sa pensée : i) Sa vraisemblable proximité avec Jacques Vincent de Gournay et la « science du commerce », ii) les influences du droit naturel moderne et en particulier celle de John Locke. Ces éléments conduisent à réévaluer la controverse entre Mably et les physiocrates. Il est proche d'accepter une société fondée sur l'intérêt personnel et le calcul individuel, mais seule une solution républicaine : la participation à la vie collective de chaque citoyen, est en mesure de garantir la théorie, dite libérale, du droit naturel. Et si Mably s'oppose à la libéralisation du commerce des grains défendue par les physiocrates, c'est pour défendre les principes de la « science du commerce », c'est-à-dire un libre-échange encadré. Ainsi, en portant une attention particulière aux influences intellectuelles de Mably, en particulier celles de Locke et de Gournay, cette thèse met en lumière une nouvelle grille interprétative, une position médiane, dans laquelle le langage républicain de Mably est au service de sa théorie du droit naturel. / The place assigned to Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-1785) in contemporary historiography is ambiguous. He is portrayed as a main influence of the French Revolution then as a precursor to the communist doctrine. Recently, the Cambridge School works' and in particular Pocock's works led to a consensus: Mably was the archetype of classical republicanism in France in 18th century. The aim of this thesis is to examine the membership of Mably in this republican tradition taking into account two fundamental elements of his thought: i) his connection with Vincent de Gournay and the "science of commerce"; ii) the influences of modern natural law and in particular that of John Locke. This leads to reassess the controversy between Mably and Physiocrats. He seems close to accepting the Physiocratie argument for a society based on self-interest and individual calculation. But only a republican solution, the participation in the collective life of every citizen, is able to secure the theory, called liberal, of natural law. His opposition to the liberalization of grain tracte results from a defense of the "science of commerce" i.e. a framed free trade. Thus, paying particular attention to Mably's intellectual influences particularly those of Locke and Gournay, this thesis highlights a new interpretative grid, a rniddle position, in which the republican language of Mably secures his theory of natural law.