本論文總共分為三部分，共八章。 第一部份是「分離命題綜論」，包含了第一、二章。在第一章當中，筆者從歷史及分析的路徑，對分離命題做了一個初步的介紹。歷史的部分，筆者選取邊沁與奧斯丁、美國法現實主義、德國自然法復興運動這三個對於英美法理學界來說較為重要的關於分離命題的討論。在分析的部分，筆者簡單地說明分離命題與法概念以及道德概念的關係。當然，筆者也介紹了本文所探討的主角—德沃京的生平、其學說的發展以及其學說與分離命題的關係。第二章則是特別針對德沃京最主要的理論對手哈特的法理論以及他對分離命題的主張。第一章與第二章一起，才算是完成本文的預備工作。 第二部分是德沃京前期對分離命題的批判。本文將德沃京前期與後期區分開來，是因為德沃京學說的前期與後期都有很大的影響力，可是他後期的理論所使用的語彙有經過相當的修正，因此不適合放在一起介紹。第二部分包括第三、四章，筆者分別名之為「原則論I」與「原則論II」。這是因為德沃京前期的法理論是以「原則」概念為主軸所發展出來的。第三章主要是對德沃京《認真看待權利》一書中《規則模式I》一章的介紹。第四章則是對《規則模式II》以及疑難案件這兩章的介紹。《規則模式I》是德沃京整個法理論的出發點。它本身構成一個完整的整體，儘管仍是一個有待發展的整體。《規則模式II》是對《規則模式I》的補充。疑難案件則是德沃京法理論的突破性發展，許多他在後期完整發展的觀念都可以在這篇文章中看到雛形。筆者將《規則模式II》及疑難案件中的重點一起放入第四章作為對於第三章的補充。這些一起構成了德沃京前期的完整面貌。當然，筆者用以貫穿其中的軸線，就是德沃京對分離命題的批判。 第三部份是德沃京後期對分離命題之批判。這一部份主要焦點是在德沃京集大成的系統著作法律帝國。這一部份包括第五、六、七章。第五章說明了德沃京後期修正過後的概念架構，以及在這個新的概念架構與分離命題的關係是什麼。處理的對象是法律帝國的第一章。第六章則是對德沃京「詮釋」概念的闡釋。「詮釋」概念是德沃京後期理論的核心，因此我們有必要對之清楚地說明。顯得比較突兀的是第六章的第一節。筆者從社會科學方法論的角度分析了哈特與德沃京法理論在方法上的意涵。這是因為，筆者認為分離命題的焦點乃是在於法理論家如何看待法概念，若要深入地評估法理論的意涵，勢必要探討其方法。這個部分處理的對象主要是法律帝國的第二、三章。第七章則介紹德沃京後期法理論的重點，也就是他認為的法概念的「構念」--作為整全性的法律。 最後，也就是第八章是結論。這是筆者對全篇論文的回顧，以及筆者對於分離命題這個主題的價值的看法。 第一部 分離命題綜論 第 一 章 緒 論 第一節 分離命題概論I—歷史的路徑 第一項 邊沁與奧斯丁 第二項 法現實主義者的挑戰 第三項 德國自然法復興運動 第二節 分離命題概論II—分析的路徑 第一項 法概念 第一款 規範取向的法概念與非規範取向的法概念 第二款 法概念的指涉與理論說明 第二項 道德概念 第三節 德沃京的法理論與分離命題 第一項 德沃京生平簡介 第二項 德沃京的法理論發展及其分期 第三項 本文問題意識：德沃京法理論與分離命題 第四節 本 論 文 架 構 第 二 章 哈特與分離命題 第一節 從定義到核心要素 第一項 定義 第二項 組織性原則與一組核心要素 第二節 哈特的法概念與分離命題 第一項 初級規則與次級規則的結合 第二項 個別法律的效力 第三項 法體系的存在 第四項 個案中的法律 第三節 哈 特 法 理 論 的 性 質 第一項 一般性 第二項 描述性 第三項 一般性、描述性與分離命題 第二部 德沃京前期對法實證主義分離命題之批判 第 三 章 原 則 論 ( I ) 第一節 德沃京的論證 第一項 原則是存在的 第二項 原則與規則邏輯性質的差異 第三項 原則也是法規範 第四項 原則無法被承認規則鑑別出來 第一款 妥當感 第二款 制度上的佐證 第三款 習慣法的問題 第五項 原則是某種道德 第二節 原則是什麼？ 第一項 原則的功能 第一款 原則的五種功能 第二款 原則之功能的省思 第二項 原則的來源 第三節 規則與原則的邏輯性質差異是否成立？ 第一項 如何判斷是規則或原則？ 第二項 規則衝突則失效？ 第三項 規則與原則之區分的理論意涵 第四節 原則是不是法規範 ？ 第五節 原則與道德的關係是什麼？ 第 四 章 原 則 論 （II） 第一節 對承認規則的批判 第一項 哈特的社會規則論 第二項 對社會規則論的批判 第一款 社會規則與規範規則 第二款 「自主而合意的道德」與「從眾而成習的道德」 第三款 疑難情況的出現 第三項 對作為社會規則之承認規則的批判 第 二 節 權 利 論 第一項 權利 第一款 權利與目標 第二款 幾種權利的分類 第二項 法律權利 第一款 規範與價值 第二款 作為權利執行者的司法部門 第三款 政治理論 第三項 權利與道德 第三節 對裁量論的批判 第一項 德沃京對司法裁量論的批判 第一款 弱意義與強意義的裁量 第二款 法實證主義者的裁量論 第二項 對司法裁量論之批判的理論意涵 第三部 德沃京後期對法實證主義分離命題之批判 第 五 章 新的起點：新的法概念 第一節 新的概念架構 第一項 關於法律的理論爭議 第二項 法律命題與法律根據 第三項 新的法概念 第二節 疑難案件的實例 第三節 單純事實觀點 第四節 語意學的刺 第一項 法的語義學理論 第二項 法實證主義 第三項 語義學的刺 第五節 小結：新的起點 第 六 章 詮釋性的法概念 第一節 社會科學方法論上的批判 第一項 法理論的自我理解 第二項 作為受制於規則之活動的法律言說 第一款 語言遊戲與說話行動 第二款 哈特的困境 第三項 一般性與描述性法理論之困難 第一款 一般性 第二款 描述性 第四項 詮釋性的法理論 第二節 建構詮釋論 第一項 建構性詮釋 第一款 一個虛構的例子 第二款 對話性詮釋、科學性詮釋與創造性詮釋 第三款 建構性詮釋 第二項 對社會實踐的建構性詮釋 第一款 詮釋的三個階段 第二款 概念、構念與典範 第三節 詮釋性的法概念 第 七 章 整全的法律 第一節 成規主義與法實用主義 第一項 成規主義 第二項 法實用主義 第二節 整 全 性 第一項 整全性符合嗎？ 第二項 整全性有吸引力嗎？ 第一款 真正的社群 第二款 政治社群 第三節 整全的法律 第一項 連環小說 第二項 海克力斯法官 第三項 法律與道德 第四節 懷疑論的挑戰 第八章 結 論 參 考 文 獻 / Abstract This master dissertation elaborates the leading anti-positivist Ronald Dworkin’s standing on critique of the separation thesis, the positivist doctrine that law and morality are separate, or ‘what law is’ is different from ‘what law ought to be’. The author firstly argues that although the dispute over the separation thesis in the old context, which mainly concerns with the relationship between legal validity and morality, no longer stands in the central spotlight, the recent heating concern with the role morality plays in legal reasoning is actually a continuance of the old-time concern. The overarching rationale behind these developments is a battle about where and how to base the objectivity of law in the modern world. Therefore, despite that Dworkin’s legal theory has focused on the part morality plays in legal reasoing, it could still be elaborated as a critique of separation thesis in a broader sense. This dissertation distinguishes ‘early Dworkin’ and ‘later Dworkin’s’ critique of the separation thesis. ‘Early Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Taking Right Seriously. ‘:Later Dworkin’ means Dworkin’s legal theory in Law’s Empire. While the author thinks the essence of Dworkin’s legal theory remained basically the same throughout his early and later thoughts, it is necessary to introduce his theory in two parts because the concepts he used were greatly changed and improved, and the arguments shifted. Dworkin’s early critique of separation thesis is organized around the concept of ‘principle’. The author argues that the most important argument Dworkin should be making is not that principles exist, but that principles are ‘law’ and that principles cannot be identified by the rule of recognition. And these two arguments are not to be cleared up only until Dworkin’s later argument using the concept of ‘interpretation’. The author also criticizes Hart’s claim that the nature of legal theory could fruitfully remain general and descriptive. By surveying the development of the methodology of social science, the author argues that Hart’s standing on the nature of legal theory reveals his ultimate philosophical foundation of empiricism and positivism. The author therefore argues that a fruitful gain a legal theory is to get, it has to be particular and ‘interpretive’, as Dworkin has claimed.

The purpose of this work is to detect a pattern: the concordance of Ethics and Aesthetics, Poetics and Politics in the most influential American thinker of the nineteenth century. It is an attempt to trace a basic concept of the Emersonian transcendentalist doctrine, its development, its philosophical meaning and practical implications. Emerson’s thought is analyzed genetically in search of the generating paradigm, or the set of axioms from which his aesthetic ideas as well as his political reasoning are derived. Such a basic structure, or point of convergence, is sought in the emergence of Emerson’s idea of universal laws that repeat themselves on all levels of reality. A general introduction is given in Part One, where the crisis in Emerson’s life is seen as representing and foreshadowing the deeper existential crisis of modern man. In Part 2 we follow the increasingly skeptical theologian’s turn to science, where he tries to secure a safe secular foundation for ethical good and right and to solve the problem of evil. Part 3 shows how Emerson’s conception of the laws of nature and ethics is applied in his political philosophy. In Part 4, Emerson’s ideas of the arts are seen as corresponding to his views of nature, morality, and individuality. Finally, in Part 5, the ancient and classical nature of Concord philosophy is brought into focus. The book concludes with a short summary.

Giovanni Boteros (1544-1617) treatise <i>The Reason of State</i> (1589) seemed somewhat uncharacteristic of sixteenth-century political thought, considering the pride of place given to economics in his text. The Age of Reformation constituted not only a period of new ideas on faith but also one of new political thinking, and as the research into the influences on Boteros economic thought progressed, I began to consider the period as one where economic thinking was becoming more common among theologians of the reforming churches and bureaucrats of the developing states. Having been trained in the schools of the Jesuits, Botero was exposed to one of the most potent and intellectually uniform of all the reforming movements of the period, and I argue it was here that he first considered economics as an aspect of moral philosophy. While it cannot be proven positively that Botero studied or even considered economics during his association with the Jesuits (roughly from 1559-1580), the fact that a number of those who shaped the Jesuit Order in its first few generations discussed economics in their own treatises leads one to a strong circumstantial conclusion that this is where the economic impulse first rose up in his thinking. Indeed, it was this background that readied Botero to consider economics as an important part of statecraft with his reading of Jean Bodins (1530-1596) <i>The Six Books of the Republic</i> (1576), in which economics is featured quite prominently. Bodins own economic theory was informed primarily by his experience as a bureaucrat in the Parlement of Paris, where questions on the value of the currency and on the kings ability to tax his subjects were in constant debate among the advocates. I argue further that, upon his reading of Bodins <i>Republic</i>, Botero saw how economics could be fused with politics, and he then set out to compose his own treatise on political economy (although he certainly would not have called it such). In <i>The Reason of State</i>, Botero brought his Jesuit conception of economic morality together with Bodins writings on political economy to create a work, neither wholly Jesuit nor wholly Bodinian, which in the end outlined an overall political and economic structure of society quite distinct from the sum of its parts.

Giovanni Boteros (1544-1617) treatise <i>The Reason of State</i> (1589) seemed somewhat uncharacteristic of sixteenth-century political thought, considering the pride of place given to economics in his text. The Age of Reformation constituted not only a period of new ideas on faith but also one of new political thinking, and as the research into the influences on Boteros economic thought progressed, I began to consider the period as one where economic thinking was becoming more common among theologians of the reforming churches and bureaucrats of the developing states. Having been trained in the schools of the Jesuits, Botero was exposed to one of the most potent and intellectually uniform of all the reforming movements of the period, and I argue it was here that he first considered economics as an aspect of moral philosophy. While it cannot be proven positively that Botero studied or even considered economics during his association with the Jesuits (roughly from 1559-1580), the fact that a number of those who shaped the Jesuit Order in its first few generations discussed economics in their own treatises leads one to a strong circumstantial conclusion that this is where the economic impulse first rose up in his thinking. Indeed, it was this background that readied Botero to consider economics as an important part of statecraft with his reading of Jean Bodins (1530-1596) <i>The Six Books of the Republic</i> (1576), in which economics is featured quite prominently. Bodins own economic theory was informed primarily by his experience as a bureaucrat in the Parlement of Paris, where questions on the value of the currency and on the kings ability to tax his subjects were in constant debate among the advocates. I argue further that, upon his reading of Bodins <i>Republic</i>, Botero saw how economics could be fused with politics, and he then set out to compose his own treatise on political economy (although he certainly would not have called it such). In <i>The Reason of State</i>, Botero brought his Jesuit conception of economic morality together with Bodins writings on political economy to create a work, neither wholly Jesuit nor wholly Bodinian, which in the end outlined an overall political and economic structure of society quite distinct from the sum of its parts.

Ce mémoire traite de la contribution du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ex-Yougoslavie (« TPIY ») au développement des sources formelles du droit international public. Il considère, plus précisément, le dilemme normatif entre le droit international classique, polarisé sur l'État et « résorbé» dans une juridicité formelle, et le «droit de l'unité substantiel », codifiant le mythe kantien de la paix par le droit et associant juridicité et légitimité par une intégration de l'éthique dans le droit. L'analyse postule la rétroaction du droit sur ses sources et étudie les courants idéologiques du droit international contemporain à partir de la jurisprudence du TPIY. Le mémoire conclut à une rupture entre le discours rhétorique du TPIY sur les sources, se réclamant du droit international classique, davantage compatible avec le principe de légalité, et les pratiques normatives effectives du Tribunal, ressemblant à un jusnaturalisme moderne, fondé sur des valeurs morales et éthiques. / This thesis studies the contribution by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former- Yugoslavia ("ICTY") to the development of Public International Law. Specifically, it analyses the normative dilemma between sources ofClassic International Law - correlated to the will ofStates, as wel/ as legal formalism - and the "International law ofsubstantial unity" - which codifies the Kantian myth of ''peace by law" and moves the classic idea of legality from formalism to legitimacy by using ethical references. The analysis assumes Law's retroactive effect on its sources and considers ideological movements of Contemporary International Law in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. The thesis concludes to a clash between ICTYabstractfindings related to sources ofInternationallaw and the actual "day-by-day" normative practices ofthe Tribunal. While the first brings into play Classic International Law and the rule of law, the second looks more like a neo-naturalism, fashioned by moral and ethical values. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit - option recherche(LL.M)"

In this dissertation I am analysing certain aspects of labour, especially the ones that are of significant interest to moral philosophy within the church and its catholic doctrine. In the same time I identify the foundation for freedom and dignity of labouring human being that are being degraded especially in the present time economisation process. Further, I outline the issues associated with the changes within the division of labour from industrial revolution to present day and in the same time I present issues connected with labouring human being vs. human capital. Because freedom is the foundation of humanity I also describe issues connected with human rights in the context of universal and natural law. In this way I analyse Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its defence in an intercultural environment. Lastly, besides those theoretical concepts, I evaluate an Amnesty International CR project called "Business That is Worth It" which aims at supporting companies to a responsible management of employees rights protection especially in developing countries.

This thesis is engaged in the theme of natural law, especially in sources of natural law - in theories, which are labelled as "classic". The thesis focuses on these theories (Aristotle, stoicism, Thomas Aquinas) and their common points, which are proper to these theories. That is the object of this thesis. These points present the essence of natural law. The first part explains problem of the term "natural law". The second part deals with the classic theories. The third chapter summarises findings of the second part. The fourth part is devoted to the similarity between the classic theories and the modern (enlightenment) theories. This chapter is devoted to the connection between natural law and positive law too.

The diploma thesis deals with the terrorism and war, their meaning in the globalised world and with the possibility of ethical justification of violence. Theoretical part delineates terrorism, its terminology and political and social environment. It describes kinds and methods of terrorism, its history and some of the terrorist organizations with their goals. The thesis also compares terrorism and war in the parts where they intersect. In the next chapters it presents original ethical theories which would be supported by the moral assessment of violent enforcing of interests. There is explained the term of just war, its basic principles and obligatory attributes. Practical part characterize three chosen actual conflicts: the Al- Qaeda attacks on the United States from 11th September, 2001, Chechnya war for its autonomy and current factual occupation of Iraq by allied forces. Legitimate setting in the sense of ius ad bellum, the right to defend by the use of violence, was not mostly deconstructed. In the area of ius in bello, the right in the war, the hypothesis was not verified and the particular violent action did not fulfill some of the basic principles of just war.

Joseph Butler's moral thought and the ethical rationalism of Samuel Clarke, and his followers, John Balguy and Richard Price, are frequently distinguished, as a result of: (a) Butler’s empirical method (e.g., Kydd, Sturgeon); (b) Butler's emphasis upon self-love in the 'cool hour passage' (e.g., Prichard, McPherson); (c) Butlerian conscience, where, on a neo-Kantian reading, Butler surpassed the Clarkeans by conveying a sense of Kantian 'reflective endorsement' (e.g., Korsgaard, Darwall). The neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans in (c) are consistent with (d) Francis Hutcheson's and David Hume's criticisms of the Clarkeans; (e) modern criticisms of rational intuitionism that follow Hutcheson and Hume (e.g., Mackie, Warnock); and (f) the contention that the Clarkeans occupied an uneasy position within 'post-restoration natural law theory' (e.g., Beiser, Finnis). (d)-(e) thus underpin the distinction between Butler and the Clarkeans in (a)-(c), where the Clarkeans, unlike Butler, are criticised for representing moral truth as the passive, and self-evident, perception of potentially uninteresting facts. This study responds to (a)-(f), by arguing that Butlerian and Clarkean conscience possessed more than one referent; so that conscience meant an individual's experience of his own judgement and God’s judgement and the rational moral order. As a result of their shared theory of conscience, Butler and the Clarkeans held the same theory of moral development: moral agents mature as they move from obeying conscience according to only one of conscience's referents, to obeying conscience because to do so is to satisfy each of conscience's referents. In response to (a)-(b), this study demonstrates that the Clarkeans agreed with Butler’s method and 'cool hour': natural considerations of individual judgement and self-interest were necessary aspects of the progress towards moral maturity in both Butler and the Clarkeans. With respect to (c), it is argued that Butler and the Clarkeans shared the same understanding of practical moral reasoning as part of their shared understanding of conscience and moral development. This study places limits upon proto-Kantian readings of Butler, and neo-Kantian criticisms of the Clarkeans, while making it inconsistent to divide Butler and the Clarkeans on the basis of Butlerian conscience. In answer to (c)-(f), Clarkean conscience shows that the Clarkeans were neither complacent nor ‘externalists’. Clarkean conscience highlights how the Clarkeans positioned themselves within the tradition of Ciceronian right reason and Thomistic natural law. Consequently, in both Butler and the Clarkeans, the intuition of moral truth was not the passive perception of an 'independent realm' of normative fact, but the active encounter, in conscience, with reason qua the law of God’s nature, human nature, and the created universe.

[pt] A presente pesquisa visa à fundamentação teórica do reconhecimento dos povos indígenas como verdadeiros sujeitos do Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos, através do resgate do pensamento jurídico e teológico dos autores da Escola Ibérica da Paz, cujos escritos, datados dos séculos XVI e XVII, colocaram em causa os fundamentos éticos, jurídicos e políticos do processo de conquista e colonização do Novo Mundo. Trata-se de um momento histórico particularmente privilegiado para esta análise, em primeiro lugar, pelo ineditismo do contato civilizacional proporcionado pela chegada das naus espanholas e portuguesas na América, sob os auspícios das Coroas ibéricas e do Papa, impulsionando os autores do Renascimento peninsular a adequar toda a tradição filosófica mediterrânea cristã a uma nova realidade, resultando na reinvenção do direito natural e das gentes no quadro de uma realidade cultural bastante distinta daquela do orbis christianus medieval. Em segundo lugar, este contexto histórico e geográfico permite uma análise do Direito Internacional, ainda como jus gentium, ou seja, antes do modelo westfaliano de repartição das soberanias estatais pós 1648. Para a compreensão do problema de pesquisa proposto em toda sua amplitude, o trabalho divide-se em três partes principais. A primeira dedica-se ao estudo do fenômeno da coletivização da proteção internacional dos direitos humanos, analisando de início as fontes de inspiração utilizadas para a redação da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos e o processo decisório que gerou a divisão dos Pactos Internacionais das Nações Unidas em dois instrumentos com a previsão de direitos civis e políticos separadamente dos direitos econômicos, sociais e culturais e com mecanismos de implementação distintos, o que resultou na proteção dos direitos humanos individuais mais amplamente desenvolvida que aquela em dimensão coletiva. Demonstra-se, ao final, que, apesar de resistências teóricas, as coletividades humanas possuem, contemporaneamente, um lócus standi nos sistemas de peticionamento internacional em casos de graves e sistemáticas violações de direitos humanos. A segunda parte destaca a trajetória dos povos indígenas de objetos a sujeitos do direito internacional, assim como examina o processo emancipatório dos povos indígenas no Novo Constitucionalismo Latino-Americano. Esta parte intermediária do trabalho demonstra ainda o reconhecimento da condição de sujeitos coletivos dos povos indígenas por meio do estudo da casuística indigenista da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, sobretudo após o caso paradigmático do povo Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Equador (2012). Entretanto, por este trabalho não objetivar uma análise apenas hermenêutica e normativista do Direito Internacional dos Povos Indígenas, a terceira parte revela o papel da Escola Ibérica da Paz, nos séculos XVI e XVII, na defesa dos direitos dos povos indígenas do Novo Mundo. Graças à perspectiva do direito natural e das gentes, os povos indígenas eram considerados pelos autores ibéricos como comunidades humanas livres e soberanas que, como qualquer outro reino cristão, tinham o direito de se autogovernar e dispor de suas terras. / [en] The aim of this thesis is to research the theoretical basis for the recognition of indigenous peoples as true subjects of the international law for human rights, by means of recovering the legal and theological thought of the authors of the Iberian School of Peace. Their written work which dates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries discuss the ethical, legal and political basis for the process of conquer and colonization of the New World. Their debates occurred in a privileged moment for the analysis, firstly because of the unprecedented contact of civilizations created by the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese caravels in America, under patronage of the Iberian kings and the Pope. This contact stimulated the authors of the Renascence in the Iberian Peninsula to adapt the Christian Mediterranean philosophy tradition to a new reality which resulted on reinvention of the natural law and the law of nations under the frame of a cultural reality very different from that of the medieval orbis christianus. Secondly, the historic and geographic context of the Iberian School of Peace allows an analysis of the International Law still as jus gentium, i.e. before the Westphalian model of state sovereignty established in 1648. For complete understanding the research problem, the thesis is divided in three parts. The first part is dedicated to the study of phenomenon of the collectivization of the international law of the human rights. It analyses the sources that provide inspiration for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the decision process that divided the International Pacts of the United Nations in two instruments, one for civil and political rights and other for economic, social and cultural rights. The fact that the two instruments have distinct implementation mechanisms resulted on the protection of individual human rights being more widely developed than the protection of the collective dimension of human rights. It is demonstrated that besides the resistance in the tradition of human rights theory, human collectivities currently have locus standi in the international petitioning systems for the systematic violation of human rights. The second part emphasizes the trajectory of indigenous peoples from objects to subjects of international law, and examines their emancipatory process under the New Latin American Constitutionalism. This intermediate part of the work demonstrates the recognition of the condition of collective subjects for the indigenous peoples by means of the study of indigenous case law brought to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, especially after the paradigmatic case of the people Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador (2012). As this thesis does not aim to analyze the international law of the indigenous peoples resorting only to legal hermeneutics and normative studies, the third part reveals the role of the Iberian School of Pace of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the protection of indigenous peoples rights in the new world. Due to the perspective of the natural law and the law of nations, the indigenous peoples were considered by the Iberian authors as free and sovereign human communities that, as any other Christian kingdom, had the right of self-government and control of their lands.