Sur le rapport de Hobbes au monarchisme, les études hobbesiennes font largement consensus : tout au long de sa vie, le théoricien du Léviathan aurait été, disent-elles, un monarchiste convaincu, fidèle à la dynastie anglaise des Stuart. Or le présent travail cherche à ébranler la rigueur de cette thèse traditionnelle. Acquis aux recherches contextualistes de J. Collins, qui ont déjà montré les affinités hobbesiennes à l’égard des politiques anticléricales de Cromwell, il souhaite montrer que de telles affinités dissimulent une intention politique beaucoup plus profonde, celle de la réalisation politique des principes moraux de la loi naturelle. Dans cette perspective, Hobbes serait, sous l’impulsion de la méthode résolutive-compositive, non seulement l’inventeur du premier droit naturel subjectif dans l’histoire de la philosophie politique, mais aussi le théoricien d’une loi naturelle inédite, édifiée sur la rationalité des volontés individuelles. Ainsi, par la publication du Léviathan en 1651, Hobbes n’aurait pas exprimé ses affinités politiques pour la monarchie anglaise renversée : il aurait plutôt dévoilé son projet politique d’instituer une souveraineté politique qui repose sur le consentement rationnel de tous les sujets. Monarchiste dans sa jeunesse, Hobbes serait alors devenu, en élaborant sa science politique, partisan d’un régime politique que l’on pourrait nommer démocratie de la raison positive. / On Hobbes’s relationship to the monarchy, Hobbes Studies make a general consensus: throughout his life, the theorist of the Leviathan would have been a convinced monarchist, faithful to the English dynasty of the Stuart. This work seeks to undermine the rigor of this traditional thesis. Inspired by the contextualist research of J. Collins, which have already shown the Hobbesian affinities towards the anticlerical policies of Cromwell, it wants to show that such affinities hide a much deeper political intention: the political realization of the moral principles of natural law. In this perspective, Hobbes would be, at the instigation of the resolutive-compositive method, not only the inventor of the first subjective natural right in the history of political philosophy, but also the theorist of a new natural law, built on the rationality of all individual wills. So, with the publication of the Leviathan in 1651, Hobbes would not have expressed his political affection for the overthrown English monarchy: he would rather have revealed his political project to establish a political sovereignty based on the rational consent of all subjects. Monarchist in his youth, Hobbes would then have become, with the elaboration of his political science, a supporter of a political system that could be named democracy of the positive rationality.

The thesis is concerned with theoretical work of the Russian legal philosopher P. I. Novgorodtsev, focusing on the concepts of natural law, social ideal, individualism, liberalism, rule of law and democracy. Novgorodtsev's interpretation of these concepts is embedded into broader contexts of both Russian and Western political philosophy and philosophy of law. Novgorodtsev's work is analysed with regards to Russian liberal doctrine transformations from classical liberalism towards liberal socialism. The thesis discloses progressive moments in the author's thought demonstrating ways as to develop them. Problems in question are inquired into through the prism of A. Honneth's critical theory of society which enables to approach the subject matter in its historical variability and conditionality and, at the same time, maintaining normativity. The aim of the thesis is not only to assess Novgorodtsev's work topicality and contribution but also critically research into relevant problems in terms of the chosen topic, primarily metaphysical roots of liberalism and its limits as to the notion of man, state and law. The thesis shows that the Russian philosopher offered reformulations of old concepts not being able, however, to go beyond the liberal paradigm. Hence his texts cannot be utilized for overcoming...

The thesis, which deals with the issue of human rights and animal rights, is divided into three basic chapters. The first chapter offers a summary of the historical development of human rights and seeks to highlight the coherence of this development with the current understanding of human rights. The second chapter focuses on the development of our relationship with animals. This chapter describes the historical, philosophical and religious aspects of the relationship. The final chapter focuses on the current arguments for animal rights. Part of this chapter is devoted to the animal rights opponent Tibor Machan, according to whom the animals do not need any rights.

La notion d’obligation naturelle passe assez inaperçue en doctrine. Cette discrétion est due à un courant doctrinal issu au XXe siècle du positivisme juridique, qui a estimé qu’il n’y a pas de système rationnel de l’obligation naturelle en droit français. Un tel système existe pourtant. L’heure est donc à la restauration de la notion d’obligation naturelle, et avec elle, de celle de droit naturel. La tradition juridique française est par essence jusnaturaliste, de type humaniste, et l’obligation de droit naturel apparait être le fruit de cette longue tradition. La technique juridique qui lui est afférente est un point de conjonction entre le droit positif et le droit naturel à travers la matière fondamentale qu’est le droit des obligations. En découvrant un véritable système du droit naturel, le système de l’obligation naturelle tel qu’il se présente en droit français apparait tout naturellement. Il permet alors de comprendre et donc de résoudre bien des difficultés pratiques qui émergent dans la jurisprudence très abondante en la matière. / The notion of natural obligation is often overlooked in France. This is the result of a doctrinal trend from the last century, which, nourished by legal positivism, has concluded that there is no rational system of natural obligations in French Law. Such a system does exist nonetheless.The time has come to restore the notion of natural obligations and with it the notion of natural law. The French legal tradition is by essence jusnaturalist, of humanist type, and the system of natural obligations appears to be the fruit of this long tradition. The rules pertaining to this notion are a confluence of positive law and natural law through the fundamental field which is the law of obligations. Through the discovery of a true system of natural law, the system of natural obligations as it manifests itself in French law appears quite naturally. It enables us then to understand and resolve many practical difficulties arising in court cases.

No presente trabalho, analisaremos as ideias jurídicas de José de Alencar (1829-1877), procurando demonstrar que este não foi somente um dos mais proeminentes vultos das letras pátrias e um dos mais destacados publicistas, políticos e oradores do Brasil de seu tempo, mas também um importante jurista. Embora o jurisconsulto José de Alencar seja inegavelmente menor do que o literato e mesmo que o homem de Estado, não deixa ele de ter sua relevância, merecendo, pois, ser mais conhecido e reconhecido do que tem sido. Em nossa exposição de suas ideias em diversos campos do Direito, nos concentramos mais naquelas que reputamos mais importantes social, política e historicamente, particularmente naquelas referentes à relação entre a Lei Natural e a Lei Positiva, à Constituição Imperial, ao Poder Moderador, à representação política, à abolição da escravatura, à codificação civil e à propriedade. / In this work we will analyse the juridical ideas of José de Alencar (1829-1877), seeking to demonstrate that he was not only one of the most prominent figures of the Brazilian literature and one of the most distinguished journalists, political writers, politicians and orators of the Brazil of his time but also an important jurist. Although the jurisconsult José de Alencar is unquestionably smaller in importance than the writer and even the man of State he does not lack relevance, thus deserving to be more known and recognised. In our exposition of his ideas in different fields of law we will concentrate more on those that we consider more important socially, politically and historically, particularly on the ones which refer to the relation between Natural Law and Positive Law, the Imperial Constitution, the Moderator Power, the political representation, the abolition of slavery, the civil codification and the property.

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Muller / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-08T02:41:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lima_ErickCalheirosde_D.pdf: 2308487 bytes, checksum: 6dfb3fccea5c3fb1cb1bf08e6d614a3b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Resumo: Este trabalho pretende desenvolver uma tese de leitura acerca das motivações e da consolidação da filosofia social de Hegel, qual seja: a importância da assimilação da teoria fichteana da intersubjetividade para a constituição do modelo hegeliano do desenvolvimento da eticidade. Na primeira parte, pretende-se mostrar que a teoria fichteana da intersubjetividade, desenvolvida no contexto da dedução da relação de direito, possui um potencial ético que parece cristalizar-se numa concepção não limitativa, não excludente e positiva da relação intersubjetiva. Na segunda parte, após investigar a contraposição, nos escritos de Hegel em Frankfurt, entre a intersubjetividade limitativa e potencialmente desagregadora, própria às relações contratuais do direito privado, e a harmonia intersubjetiva do amor, pretende-se mostrar que a derrocada da expectativa de Hegel com respeito ao ideal de integração social pela via de uma Volksreligion conduz a contraposição entre a intersubjetividade ¿solidária¿ e a ¿restritiva¿ ao projeto de uma ¿subjugação¿ da esfera econômica juridicamente regulada sob o âmbito político-público da eticidade absoluta. Em seguida, perseguindo a tese de que o problema do Einssein entre universal e singular pressupõe uma solução intersubjetivista, procura-se explorar as peculiaridades da ¿gênese intersubjetiva¿ do espírito do povo no System der Sittlichkeit e no Jenaer Systementwurf 1803/04, com especial ênfase na progressiva imbricação entre teoria da consciência, reconhecimento e desenvolvimento conceitual da eticidade, a qual interpretamos como uma articulação sócio-filosófica entre a intersubjetividade formadora e a intersubjetividade limitativa. Na terceira parte, pretende-se clarificar, a partir de uma análise comparativa do reconhecimento em suas versões ¿fenomenológicas¿, a conexão do mesmo com a efetivação da liberdade individual na eticidade. A intenção é mostrar que a ¿generalização¿ do movimento, pela sua inserção na ¿filosofia do espírito subjetivo¿, não conduz necessariamente ao seu desligamento dos estágios de efetivação intersubjetiva da liberdade, mas antes à sua pressuposição como forma normativa da relação social efetiva, de maneira que não apenas a relação intersubjetiva participativa e formadora da individualidade e a relação solidária, que constitui a gênese do estado ético, como também a relação de respeito recíproco à intangibilidade da pessoa, podem, enquanto ¿relações éticas¿, ser tematizadas no registro comum de um ¿ser-reconhecido¿. Finalmente, procura-se mostrar como Hegel insere, no Systementwurf 1805/06, a ¿luta por reconhecimento¿ em uma argumentação que articula a forma participativa de intersubjetividade com a gênese da solidariedade ética que tem de estar vinculada à efetividade social de uma vontade universal, a qual é, entretanto, compreendida pela primeira vez por Hegel, em sua imediatidade, como direito. O resultado mais amplo do trabalho é a tese de que tal interpretação poderia ser ¿aplicada¿ em uma leitura das Grundlinien, o que, entretanto, será apenas aqui indicado / Abstract: This work intends to delineate some motives underlying the development of Hegel's social philosophy. According to the interpretation we attempt to formulate, Fichte's view of intersubjectivity plays a decisive role in Hegel's comprehension of the conceptual unfolding of ¿ethical life¿ (Sittlichkeit). The first part focuses on Fichte's theory of intersubjectivity, particularly on its version presented in the Foundations of Natural Law, where it is deduced as a condition for the ¿juridical relation¿(Rechtsverhältnis). The main task is to show that Fichte's conception of the intersubjective mediation of individual conscience, when considered apart from its endurable form as a relation of reciprocally limited spheres of action, seems to contain the ethical potential for a ¿non-limited¿, ¿non-exclusive¿ and positive actualization of individual freedom. In the second part, after elucidating, in Hegel's early writings, the opposition between the ¿juridical¿, potentially disintegrative conception of intersubjectivity and the harmony of love, we intend to indicate how the frustration of Hegel's expectations, regarding social integration through a Volksreligion, conduces to the project of ¿subordination¿ (Bezwingung) of juridically regulated economics under the political realm of the abolute ethical life. Thus, after demonstrating that the problem of the Einssein of universal and individual pressuposes an intersubjective solution, the aim is to delineate the intersubjective genesis of the ¿Spirit of a People¿ in the System of Ethical Life and in the Philosophy of Spirit 1803/04, always emphazising the progressive articulation of theory of conscience, recognition and the conceptual unfolding of ethical life. The third part aims to elucidate, through a comparative investigation of the ¿phenomenological¿ versions of Hegel's theory of recognition, its connection with the actualization of individual freedom in the institutional framework of ethical life. In this context, it is aimed to show that the ¿generalization¿ of the process of recognition, due to its insertion into the ¿philosophy of subjective spirit¿, in despite of its immediate disconnection from the stages of intersubjective actualization of freedom, points toward the possibility of its pressuposition as the normative form of the actual social relation. According to this view, this ¿generalization¿ allows that not only the formative intersubjective ralation and the solidary connection among the individuals, that engenders the ¿ethical state¿, but also the interpersonal relations, based on reciprocal respect to the intangibility of individual freedom, could be reduced to the common denominator of a ¿being-recognized¿ (Anerkanntsein). Finally, the task is to consider how Hegel integrates, in the Philosophy of Spirit 1805/06, the ¿struggle for recognition¿ into an argumentation that articulates the participative form of intersubjectivity with the genesis of the ethical solidarity that is vinculated to the social actuality of the universal will, which is, for the first time in Hegel's philosophical development, understood in its immediacy as right (Recht). As a conclusion, we summarize some indications of a possible extension of this presented view to an interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

The purpose of this thesis was to analyze four of the most commonly applied theories in jurisprudence by means of using the philosophical framework of in-tegral theory. Natural law, legal positivism, legal realism and critical legal theory were analyzed to find out how they relate to each other and to see what their strengths and weaknesses are in an integral perspective. The integral theory was created by the American philosopher Ken Wilber (1949-). Two of the main com-ponents of the theory are the four quadrants and the levels of development. The quadrants describe dimensions and perspectives of reality, and consists of the inner individual (subjective) quadrant, the outer individual (objective) quadrant, the inner collective (intersubjective) quadrant and the outer collective (interob-jective) quadrant. Individual values develop through different levels in a specific order, as is described in the second component of the integral theory. Different adult individuals can therefore be on different levels of development. This devel-opment is not only seen in individuals, but is also seen in historical and collective development. The levels that both individuals and societies develop through in-cludes (but are not limited to): the absolutistic (traditional) level, the rational (modern) level and the relativistic (postmodern) level.When using the integral theory to analyze the four theories in jurisprudence it became apparent that they can be mapped onto the integral framework. Natural law, which focuses on morality, can be placed in the intersubjective quadrant, and is mostly associated with the traditional level of development. Legal positiv-ism stems mostly from the interobjective quadrant where law is first and fore-most a system of rules that are enforced by different societal institutions. Legal positivism is typically associated with the modern level of development. Legal realism is also typically associated with the modern level of development and focuses a lot on the objective quadrant: on empiricism and on what judges actu-ally do. Critical legal theory is strongly associated with the postmodern level of development. It emphasizes different kinds of oppression in the intersubjective and in the interobjective quadrant. This thesis presents further examples of how the integral theory can be applied in legal theory and practice.

Human rights are the pervasive practical and political concept, discussed in various branches: political and legal philosophy, political science or jurisprudence. In the diploma thesis, this concept is discussed in the framework of political philosophy. An author's basic question: Is the concept of human rights plausible (rationally valid) in the postmetaphysical situation as well, and if so, which rights are possible to specify as "human"? This question is asked in view of contemporary (content, spatial and symbolical) expansion of human rights and solved in light of Jürgen Habermas' conception of human rights. Habermas' conception of human rights represents probably the most significant rational attempt to reformulate this concept in the postmetaphysical situation. His foundation is apparently free from the burden of all anthropological presuppositions, connected with a pristine articulation of the rights of man. As we know, these presuppositions also resound in the legal concept of human dignity. After the problem definition, a historical excursus on the field of rational natural law and basic characterization of the postmetaphysical situation, an analysis and evaluation of presuppositions intrinsic to Habermas' "linguistificated" conception of human rights follow - i.e. universal pragmatics,...

Ce mémoire, qui se situe dans le champ de l’éthique de la doctrine des droits humains, cherche à expliquer le débat sur les fondements philosophiques des droits humains, sur leur justification et sur leur contenu. Plus précisément, de démontrer que ce débat n’est pas stérile malgré deux positions opposées et à première vue irréconciliables. Pour ce faire, une analyse des différentes interprétations du concept de dignité permet de sélectionner celle qui assure le mieux un soutien philosophique rigoureux de la doctrine des droits humains contemporain. Après la sélection de ce concept de dignité, une évaluation des conceptions naturalistes et politiques de droits humains est nécessaire en vue d’ancrer philosophiquement le concept de dignité humaine dans la doctrine des droits humains. Cette évaluation permet alors de rejeter le droit naturel et ainsi que les conceptions politiques des droits humains en tant que seule conception nécessaire à la fondation philosophique de la doctrine des droits humains. Chaque conception présente des problèmes importants à la justification du contenu des droits humains. Finalement, une piste de solution afin de mettre fin à ce débat est proposée. Il s’agit de la possibilité de comprendre les conceptions naturalistes et politiques des droits humains non comme étant opposés mais plutôt en tant que conceptions complémentaires permettant de justifier et de définir le contenu des droits humains. / This thesis, which is in the field of ethics of human rights doctrine, seeks to explain the debate on the philosophical foundations of human rights, on their justification and on their content. More precisely, to demonstrate that this debate is not sterile despite two opposing views and at first sight irreconcilable positions. To do this, an analysis of the different interpretations of the concept of dignity makes it possible to select the one that best ensures rigorous philosophical support for contemporary human rights doctrine. After the selection of this concept of dignity, an assessment of naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights is necessary in order to philosophically anchor the concept of human dignity in human rights doctrine. This assessment then makes it possible to reject natural law and as well as political conceptions of human rights as the only conception necessary for the philosophical foundation of the doctrine of human rights. Each conception presents significant problems to the justification of human rights content. Finally, a possible solution to end this debate is proposed. It is about the possibility of understanding naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights not as opposing views but rather as complementary conceptions making it possible to justify and define the content of human rights.

One of the central questions in political theory deals with the nature of rights. What sorts of rights do people possess? How are these rights justified? How ought these rights be reflected and related when seen in political, economic, and social institutions? Following the publication of John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971) and Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), rights have once again returned to dominate much of contemporary political theory. However, natural law, which was the historical basis of the early Enlightenment theories of rights, is no longer the primary system appealed to when discussing rights. In fact, classical natural law has been all but discarded in most of political theory today. There has also been renewed debate over the nature of public neutrality, and what the relationship ought to be between the public and private sphere. The mainstream view of how our liberties relate to our rights, as well as what kinds of rights we have over our private affairs, has come under fire from a newly emerging political philosophy known as communitarianism. This thesis will present a robust theory of rights that provides a new understanding of the relationship between positive and negative rights through a defense of classical natural law as an ethical foundation for political theory. It will side with the communitarian critics of public neutrality, and offer a practical method of determining when the state is justified in limiting private liberties due to public interest.