A presente pesquisa tem como objeto de estudo a obra literária O Mulato (1881) de Aluísio Azevedo. Através da análise do enredo do romance, serão realizadas as aproximações entre a literatura naturalista e a moda, com o intuito de mostrar as relações existentes entre a moda e a sociedade, assim como a indumentária; esta por sua vez é utilizada pelo autor como suporte narrativo para a caracterização de seus personagens. O romance será analisado internamente sob o prisma da moda: será apreciada a moda do período e o local no qual a obra foi concebida. Desse modo, me aprofundarei nas questões estéticas relacionadas à moda, utilizando recursos iconográficos como a fotografia, a ilustração e as notícias e imagens de jornais de época. Apresentarei as questões econômicas, sociais e culturais que abrangem a contextualização do final do século dezenove em contrapartida com a obra ficcional apresentada por Aluísio Azevedo. Nesse sentido, a obra O Mulato será utilizada como um dos recursos para traçar a trama da moda oitocentista brasileira no período de 1880/1881, época carente de registros e estudos referentes à moda concebida e utilizada no Brasil e em seus diversos Estados. / This research aims to study the literary work called O Mulato (1881) written by Aluísio Azevedo. By analyzing its plot we intend to approximate naturalist literature and fashion in order to show the relations between fashion and society. Our study also considers the garments, which are used by the author as a narrative support to compose his characters. The novel will be analyzed internally under the point of view of fashion, considering the fashion of that period and the place where the novel was written. For this purpose, we will focus our investigation on aesthetic issues related to fashion by using iconographic resources such as photography, illustration, and news and images from newspapers of that time. We will also present economical, social, and cultural issues that contextualize the end of nineteenth century as a background to study the fictional work presented by Aluísio Azevedo. In this sense, the work O Mulato will be used as a resource to delineate Brazilian fashion in the nineteenth century in 1880/1881, considering there is a lack of records and studies regarding the fashion conceived and worn in different states of Brazil in that period.

[pt] Ao sugerir o naturalismo como método filosófico, Quine propõe uma mudança na epistemologia tradicional: a filosofia deve ser considerada em continuidade com a ciência natural sendo preciso, portanto, abandonar o projeto de uma filosofia primeira dependente de investigações a priori. Para Quine, a metafísica não garante nenhuma segurança e a ciência com seu método de hipóteses verificáveis é o único e o melhor meio para o conhecimento. Segundo o naturalismo de Quine, não há diferença de natureza entre a ciência e filosofia, pois ambas relacionam teoria e experiência através da linguagem. Nesta dissertação, procuro mostrar por meio de um questionamento acerca da metodologia utilizada por Quine, algumas fragilidades presentes na sua perspectiva sobre o conhecimento filosófico. Minha estratégia consiste em mostrar como Quine rejeita os conceitos de a priori e analítico e procura, por meio do naturalismo e da concepção comportamentalista da linguagem, manter as teorias e seu aspecto abstrato no nível da experiência. Contudo, investigo a hipótese de que a tese da subdeterminação das teorias pela experiência fragiliza seu empirismo, pois ao ser aceita, impediria um naturalismo forte onde as teorias seriam produtos que dependeriam exclusivamente da experiência. / [en] By embracing naturalism as a philosophical method of investigation, Quine proposes a change in traditional epistemology: philosophy must be continuous with natural science, and, therefore, not based on a first philosophy dependent on a priori investigations. For Quine, metaphysics does not guarantee anything, and due to its method of verifiable hypotheses, science is the only and the best instrument of knowledge. In naturalism there is no difference of nature between science and philosophy because both relate experience and theory through language. In this dissertation, I argue that there are some weaknesses in this perspective on philosophical methodology and knowledge. My strategy is to analyze Quine s rejection of the notions of a priori and analytic and his claim that theories and their abstract aspects can be kept at the level of experience by combining naturalism with a behaviorist conception of language. I argue that the thesis of the underdetermination of theories by experience poses a problem for Quine s empiricism, and undermines a strong naturalism according to which theories depend exclusively on experience.

Dans ce travail, nous analysons les contes d’Emilia Pardo Bazán parus dans le journal, d’obédience monarchique, Blanco y Negro entre 1895 et 1910. Femme de Lettres très féconde, elle n’en demeure pas moins une journaliste très engagée dans un siècle finissant et en pleine mutation. Ainsi, nous étudions ses activités journalistiques et littéraires en relation avec ses engagements socio- politiques et décortiquons sa collaboration avec le journal. Nous examinons aussi comment son statut de femme journaliste influence son œuvre littéraire. L’interférence entre les deux modes d’écriture est analysée à partir de l’édition de texte et de la structuration du récit. Nous déterminons les relations entre les deux discours étant donné qu’ils s’abreuvent des deux modalités d’écriture. / In this essay, we have analysed the tales of Emilia Pardo Bazán published in the newspaper, of monarchical obedience, Blanco y Negro between 1895 and 1910. A very fertile woman of letters, she is nonetheless a journalist very committed to a century ending and changing. Thus, we have studied her journalistic and literary activities in relation to her socio-political commitments and let's dissect her collaboration with the newspaper. We have also examined how her status as a female journalist has influenced her literary work. The interference between the two writing modes is analysed from the text editing and structuring of the story. We have determined the relationship between the two discourses as they have drunk from both writing methods.

Ao longo de toda sua obra, Freud não abandona a proposta de que a psicanálise é uma ciência da natureza. Com isso, além de gerar um extenso debate sobre a legitimidade dessa proposta, ele evidencia que o horizonte filosófico mais condizente com suas hipóteses é o naturalismo. Certas ressonâncias desse horizonte aparecem em argumentos de teor epistemológico, metodológico e ontológico, revelando que o aparelho psíquico por ele formulado não pretende exceder o território dos fenômenos naturais e de caráter empirista. O objetivo principal desta pesquisa é investigar esses argumentos para oferecer uma compreensão sobre a concepção freudiana de ciências da natureza e o que ela pode oferecer em termos de sua versão de naturalismo. Para tanto, tomamos o critério elaborado por determinadas filosofias contemporâneas que dividem o naturalismo em um componente metodológico e outro ontológico. Critério este que permite levantar a hipótese de que, sem desconsiderar o naturalismo metodológico, Freud não pode renunciar ao naturalismo ontológico. Ele precisa se comprometer com a hipótese metafísica de que todos os fenômenos são naturais, e a razão para isso encontra-se em outra caracterização que atribuímos à sua atitude epistemológica: a de ser fenômenoorientado. Entre permanecer em concordância com teorias científicas predominantes ou se deixar guiar por aquilo que legitima como fenômeno, Freud escolhe sempre a segunda opção. Essa atitude implica a necessidade de expressar quais devem ser os modos de naturalização apropriados para fenômenos que não condizem com o modelo oferecido por outras ciências da natureza. A pesquisa busca então circunscrever três momentos decisivos da obra freudiana que nos permitem discutir e analisar esses modos de naturalização. Esses momentos agrupam conceitos e concepções concentradas principalmente nos textos Projeto para uma psicologia (1895), A interpretação dos sonhos (1900), Três ensaios sobre a teoria sexual (1905) e Pulsões e destinos das pulsões (1915). Por meio de um estudo sobre temas diversos relacionados à natureza do conhecimento científico, decorre de nossa análise a proposta de que um compromisso ontológico se manifesta em todas as concepções de mente que Freud elabora. Presente, inclusive, desde Sobre a concepção das afasias (1891), este compromisso faz que os termos ontológicos dos fenômenos psíquicos sejam mais bem compreendidos com base no que Freud designa como processo. Ao final, sugerimos que, por causa do estabelecimento desse compromisso, torna-se possível compreender a metapsicologia freudiana por meio de um caráter de indispensabilidade / Throughout his work, Freud never abandons the proposal that Psychoanalysis is a Natural science. As a result, in addition to generating an extensive debate on the legitimacy of this proposal, he shows that the philosophical horizon best suitable to his hypothesis is naturalism. Certain resonances of this horizon appear in arguments of epistemological, methodological and ontological content, revealing that the psychic apparatus formulated by Freud does not intend to surpass the territory of natural phenomena and of empiricist character. The main objective of this research is to investigate these arguments to provide an understanding about the Freudian conception of Natural sciences and what it can offer in terms of his version of naturalism. To this end, we borrow the criteria elaborated by certain contemporary philosophers that divide naturalism into one methodological and other ontological component. This criterion allows us to present the hypothesis that, without disregarding the methodological naturalism, Freud cannot renounce the ontological naturalism. He needs to commit to the metaphysical hypothesis that all phenomena are natural, and the reason for this lies in another characterization that we attribute to his epistemological attitude: the fact of being phenomenon-oriented. Between remaining in accordance with prevailing scientific theories or allowing himself to be guided by what he legitimizes as phenomenon, Freud always chooses the second option. This attitude implies the need to express which should be the appropriate naturalization modes for phenomena that do not match with the model offered by other natural sciences. Thus, this research aims to circumscribe three decisive moments of the Freudian work that allow us to discuss and analyze these modes of naturalization. These moments bring together concepts and conceptions concentrated mainly in the texts Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) and Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915). Based on a study on several themes related to the nature of the scientific knowledge, the proposal that a ontological commitment is manifested in every conceptions of mind that Freud elaborates results from our analysis. Being present since On Aphasia (1891), this commitment causes the ontological terms of psychic phenomena to be better understood, based on what Freud names as process. In the end, we suggest that, because of the establishment of this commitment, it is possible to understand the Freudian metapsychology through a character of indispensability

It has often been argued that John Searle’s theory of mind, biological naturalism, due to its commitment to mental irreducibility amounts to no more than disguised property dualism. I suggest that a thorough analysis of Searle’s somewhat unusual views on the nature of reduction reveals this irreducibility to be not a metaphysical relation between mental properties and physical but one concerned only with the semantics of the respective terms used to refer to these. As a result, I argue, irreducibility in his sense is insufficient to support a metaphysical conclusion like property dualism. Finally, to reinforce this point I give a concrete example of a potential physicalist view which is compatible with the analysis of irreducibility as semantic but not as metaphysical and hence on my reasoning remains open to Searle.

The thesis focuses on J. K. Šlejhar's literary work from two points of view. The first part introduces Šlejhar's work in the contemporary literary context as a result of a synthesis of new literary styles. In the second part the thesis concentrates on a textual analysis and reconstruction of the author's "artistic world". The first part of the thesis gives insight into the contemporary discussions aimed at revising and redefining the function of art with respect to the new development in society and new human needs. The critical reception of realism and naturalism and the reflection of the then wide-spread adoption of new influences from foreign literatures are also dicussed. To draw a comparison, we quote both period and current studies dealing with J. K. Šlejhar's work. Thereby we want to demonstrate the changing requirements of literature and art and the changing perception of a literary work throughout time. The second part of the thesis comprises the textual analysis of Šlejhar's selected writings from the point of view of semiotic literary theory and the reconstruction of the author's "artistic world". Such approach enables us to draw comparisons to Russian literature of the 19th century, primarily with the works of N. V. Gogol and F. M. Dostoyevsky, and to discover a common basis for both...

Ao longo de toda sua obra, Freud não abandona a proposta de que a psicanálise é uma ciência da natureza. Com isso, além de gerar um extenso debate sobre a legitimidade dessa proposta, ele evidencia que o horizonte filosófico mais condizente com suas hipóteses é o naturalismo. Certas ressonâncias desse horizonte aparecem em argumentos de teor epistemológico, metodológico e ontológico, revelando que o aparelho psíquico por ele formulado não pretende exceder o território dos fenômenos naturais e de caráter empirista. O objetivo principal desta pesquisa é investigar esses argumentos para oferecer uma compreensão sobre a concepção freudiana de ciências da natureza e o que ela pode oferecer em termos de sua versão de naturalismo. Para tanto, tomamos o critério elaborado por determinadas filosofias contemporâneas que dividem o naturalismo em um componente metodológico e outro ontológico. Critério este que permite levantar a hipótese de que, sem desconsiderar o naturalismo metodológico, Freud não pode renunciar ao naturalismo ontológico. Ele precisa se comprometer com a hipótese metafísica de que todos os fenômenos são naturais, e a razão para isso encontra-se em outra caracterização que atribuímos à sua atitude epistemológica: a de ser fenômenoorientado. Entre permanecer em concordância com teorias científicas predominantes ou se deixar guiar por aquilo que legitima como fenômeno, Freud escolhe sempre a segunda opção. Essa atitude implica a necessidade de expressar quais devem ser os modos de naturalização apropriados para fenômenos que não condizem com o modelo oferecido por outras ciências da natureza. A pesquisa busca então circunscrever três momentos decisivos da obra freudiana que nos permitem discutir e analisar esses modos de naturalização. Esses momentos agrupam conceitos e concepções concentradas principalmente nos textos Projeto para uma psicologia (1895), A interpretação dos sonhos (1900), Três ensaios sobre a teoria sexual (1905) e Pulsões e destinos das pulsões (1915). Por meio de um estudo sobre temas diversos relacionados à natureza do conhecimento científico, decorre de nossa análise a proposta de que um compromisso ontológico se manifesta em todas as concepções de mente que Freud elabora. Presente, inclusive, desde Sobre a concepção das afasias (1891), este compromisso faz que os termos ontológicos dos fenômenos psíquicos sejam mais bem compreendidos com base no que Freud designa como processo. Ao final, sugerimos que, por causa do estabelecimento desse compromisso, torna-se possível compreender a metapsicologia freudiana por meio de um caráter de indispensabilidade / Throughout his work, Freud never abandons the proposal that Psychoanalysis is a Natural science. As a result, in addition to generating an extensive debate on the legitimacy of this proposal, he shows that the philosophical horizon best suitable to his hypothesis is naturalism. Certain resonances of this horizon appear in arguments of epistemological, methodological and ontological content, revealing that the psychic apparatus formulated by Freud does not intend to surpass the territory of natural phenomena and of empiricist character. The main objective of this research is to investigate these arguments to provide an understanding about the Freudian conception of Natural sciences and what it can offer in terms of his version of naturalism. To this end, we borrow the criteria elaborated by certain contemporary philosophers that divide naturalism into one methodological and other ontological component. This criterion allows us to present the hypothesis that, without disregarding the methodological naturalism, Freud cannot renounce the ontological naturalism. He needs to commit to the metaphysical hypothesis that all phenomena are natural, and the reason for this lies in another characterization that we attribute to his epistemological attitude: the fact of being phenomenon-oriented. Between remaining in accordance with prevailing scientific theories or allowing himself to be guided by what he legitimizes as phenomenon, Freud always chooses the second option. This attitude implies the need to express which should be the appropriate naturalization modes for phenomena that do not match with the model offered by other natural sciences. Thus, this research aims to circumscribe three decisive moments of the Freudian work that allow us to discuss and analyze these modes of naturalization. These moments bring together concepts and conceptions concentrated mainly in the texts Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) and Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915). Based on a study on several themes related to the nature of the scientific knowledge, the proposal that a ontological commitment is manifested in every conceptions of mind that Freud elaborates results from our analysis. Being present since On Aphasia (1891), this commitment causes the ontological terms of psychic phenomena to be better understood, based on what Freud names as process. In the end, we suggest that, because of the establishment of this commitment, it is possible to understand the Freudian metapsychology through a character of indispensability

Thema der Arbeit sind die Konzepte von 'phänomenaler Erfahrung' und 'Bewußtsein' in verschiedenen empirischen und philosophischen Theorien über das Verhältnis von physiologischen und mentalen Prozessen. Der 1. Teil klärt das Umfeld des Problems: Kapitel 1 und 2 erläutern, warum die Diskussion phänomenaler Qualitäten oder Qualia zum Lackmustest der neuen Theorien des Bewußtseins geworden ist. Kapitel 3 und 4 zeigen, inwiefern ein Großteil der Verwirrung bezüglich von Qualia auf den impliziten Annahmen bestimmter Wahrnehmungstheorien beruhen. Sinnesepisoden (und damit zumindest eine wichtige Klasse phänomenaler Episoden) können nur auf der Ebene von Systemen erklärt werden, die in angemessener Weise auf Eigenschaften ihrer Umgebung reagieren können. Von dieser Einsicht ausgehend, verhandelt der 2. Teil mit verschiedenen konkreten Versuchen, Qualia innerhalb empirischer Kontexte zu erklären. Kapitel 5 untersucht konnektionistische Modelle, die sich einer Vektorkodierungsstrategie bedienen (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) und sich an die Theorie der Selektion neuronaler Gruppen (Edelman) anzubinden. Wenn aber das Qualia-Problem nicht so einfach neurophilosophisch gelöst werden kann, so fährt Kapitel 6 fort, ist es verlockend, mentale Zustände als informationstragende neurophysiologische Zustände zu betrachten. Das ist der sogenannte Repräsentationalismus oder Intentionalismus (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Kapitel 7 behauptet, daß diese Versuche, Bewußtsein im direkten Verweis auf die empirische Forschung zu erklären, philosophisch nicht befriedigend sind, weil Bewußtsein keine 'natürliche Art' ist, d.h. kein einheitliches Phänomen, das isoliert durch eine Einzeldisziplin (einschließlich des Funktionalismus) untersucht werden könnte. In Kapitel 8 analysiere ich Damasios Theorie somatischer Marker als Versuch, Searles Intuition bezüglich der phänomenalen Grundierung aller bewußter Prozesse empirisch zu plausibilisieren. Nicht Gehirne (also sub-personale Systeme) sind Träger bewußter Zustände, sondern potentielle Handlungssubjekte. Alle empirischen Theorien etablieren höchstens eine gutbestätigte Kovarianz zwischen Gehirnzuständen und mentalen Zuständen. Im abschließenden Kapitel 9 verteitige ich demgemäß einen nicht-puritanischen, eklektischen Naturalismus, der sich dem Bewußtseinsproblem unter Aufbietung aller theoretischen Paradigmata nähert, die sich als heuristisch produktiv erwiesen haben. Fragen des Bewußtseins involvieren immer auch eine Selbstinterpretation des Fragenden. Das allein ist schon Grund genug zu der Vermutung, keine naturwissenschaftliche Einzeldisziplin werde je für sich allein alle dieser Fragen klären können. / "Qualia - Phenomenal states as a problem for philosophical and empirical theories of consciousness" In this essay, I examine the concepts of 'phenomenal experience' and 'consciousness' in several empirical and philosophical theories about the relation between physiological and mental processes. Part I sets the stage for the problem: Chapters 1 and 2 establish why the discussion of phenomenal qualities or qualia has become a litmus test for current theories of consciousness. Chapters 3 and 4 show how large parts of the confusion about qualia rest on implicit assumptions that characterize certain theories of perception. Against mainstream inferentialist theories, I defend a vaguly Gibsonian direct theory. Sensory episodes (and thus at least one important class of phenomenal episodes) can be explained only on the level of systems that have the ability to usefully react to features of their environment. Using this insight as its point of departure, Part II deals with several concrete attempts to explain qualia in an empirical context. Chapter 5 examines connectionist models using vector coding strategies (Churchland, Clark, Flanagan) and tries to connect them to the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection (Edelman). If the qualia-problem cannot be simply solved by means of neurophilosophy, I go on to argue in Chapter 6, it is tempting to regard mental states as information-bearing neurophysiological states. This is the position taken by Representationalism or Intentionalism (Dretske, Beckermann, Tye). Chapter 7 claims that these attempts to explain consciousness with direct reference to empirical research are not philosophically satisfactory because consciousness is no 'natural kind', no unified phenomenon that lends itself to examination in any single scientific discipline (including all kinds of functionalims). In Chapter 8, I analyze Damasio's Theory of Somatic Markers as an attempt to empirically support Searle's intuition concerning the necessary phenomenal grounding of all conscious processes. Bearers of conscious states are not brains (sub-personal systems), but subjects with the potential to act; consciousness is embodied consciousness. All of these theories establish at most a good covariance between brain states and mental states. In the concluding Chapter 9, I defend a non-puritan, eclectic naturalism which approaches consciousness using all theoretical paradigms that have proved themselves to be heuristically productive. Questions about consciousness always involve questions of self-interpretation. This alone is reason enough to suspect that no single scientific discipline will be in a position to solve them all.

The claim that a principle known as Irreducible Complexity (IC) is empirically discoverable is investigated successively from the perspective of engineering, then molecular biology and finally theology, with the aim of evaluating the utility of IC for an interdisciplinary dialogue between all three. In the process, IC is subjected to the principle objections presented against it in the literature, leading to the conclusion that IC is sufficiently resistant to scientific criticism to be accepted as a true property of certain living systems. The ubiquity of machine descriptors in the professional literature of molecular biology is scrutinised in the context of the role of metaphor in science, as well as in the context of entailment models. A Biblical Theological approach to the Bible is harnessed to establish a framework for estimating the extent to which the story of Christ warrants expectation of first order design formalisms in nature, and whether that story within itself provides any homomorphic exemplification of IC. Additionally, key theological criticisms of IC are evaluated as well as criticisms of the Neo Darwinian revisioning of the Biblical account. The overall conclusion is that a true interdisciplinary dialogue where IC is the nexus holds theoretical as well as experimental promise. / Thesis (M.A. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalism – that non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory – can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim that moral kinds are natural kinds, and that the causal theory, as interpreted by leading naturalist defenders, actually underscores this conclusion. Essay III utilizes the interpretation of the Open Question Argument argued for in the previous essay in order to argue against naturalistic reduction of risk, i.e. reduction of risk into natural concepts such as probability and harm. Three different normative aspects of risk and safety are put forward – epistemic uncertainty, distributive normativity and border normativity – and it is argued that these normative aspects cannot be reduced to a natural measure. Essay IV provides a conceptual analysis of safety in the context of societal decision-making, and argues for a notion that explicitly includes epistemic uncertainty, the degree to which we are uncertain of our knowledge of the situation at hand. Some formal versions of a comparative safety concept are also proposed. Essay V puts forward a normative critique against a common argument, viz. the claim that the public should follow the experts’ advice in recommending an activity whenever the experts have the best knowledge of the risk involved. The importance of safety in risk acceptance together with considerations from epistemic uncertainty makes the claim incorrect even after including plausible limitations to exclude ‘external’ considerations. Furthermore, it is shown that the scope of the objection covers risk assessment as well as risk management. Essay VI provides a systematized account of safety engineering practices that clarifies their relation to the goal of safety engineering, namely to increase safety. A list of 24 principles referred to in the literature of safety engineering is provided, divided into four major categories. It is argued that important aspects of these methods can be better understood with the help of the distinction between risk and uncertainty, in addition to the common distinction between risk and probability. / QC 20100803