Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2008.

Texte remanié de: Doct. diss.--Oxford, 1999. / Bibliogr. p. 261-274. Index.

De nombreuses obligations d'information sont édictées en droit des contrats de consommation sous l'impulsion du législateur de l'Union européenne et sont donc communes aux droits français et luxembourgeois. Dans ce contexte, l'obligation d'information possède un double objectif de protection du consommateur en éclairant son consentement, et de régulation du marché en favorisant une concurrence loyale. Le manquement par le professionnel à son obligation légale d'information doit être sanctionné afin d'en assurer l'effectivité. La sanction de l'obligation légale d'information en droit des contrats de consommation doit être analysée sous l'angle de son efficacité, autrement dit de la capacité des effets qu’elle produit à atteindre les objectifs qui lui ont été assignés. L'analyse des droits des contrats de consommation français et luxembourgeois, droits similaires mais qui présentent des spécificités, permet de mettre en perspective les choix effectués par chaque législateur en terme de sanction de l'obligation légale d'information, et d'en déduire les propositions visant à améliorer ces systèmes de sanction actuels / Numerous legal duties to disclose information are promulgated in consumer contract law by the legislational body of the European Union and are thus common to French and Luxembourgish laws. In this context, the legal duty to disclose information possesses a double objective to protect the consumer by enlightening their consent, and regulating the market by favoring loyal competition. A breach of obligatory information disclosures by a professional must be sanctioned to ensure the effectiveness of the obligation. The penalty for breaching the legal obligation to disclose information in consumer contract law must be analyzed using its angle of efficiency within the capacity of its effects to reach the assigned goals. Analyzing French and Luxembourgish consumer contract laws, both similar but with specificities, surmounts a perspective of legislatory choices in terms of sanctioning the legal duties to disclose information, and also aids by informing proposals to improve these current systems of sanction

La présente étude se propose de théoriser la pratique de l’entrée payante dans le contrat. Elle peut être envisagée comme l’obligation monétaire préalable et déterminante imposée à l’une des parties, conditionnant la conclusion d’un contrat. La réunion sous ce seul vocable d’un certain nombre d’obligations précontractuelles permet de dégager une vision unitaire de la question, avant de s’attacher à leurs particularités. L’entrée payante connaît, de fait, diverses manifestations et ses justifications le sont tout autant. « Engagement » ou « supplément », la validité de ces obligations interroge nécessairement au regard du principe de la liberté contractuelle. Si l’on ne peut nier l’existence d’instruments juridiques susceptibles d’en assurer le contrôle, ce dernier demeure néanmoins non efficient. Dès lors, doit être sérieusement envisagée la création d’une norme générale encadrant ces pratiques. / This study intends to theorize the application of admission charge into contracts. It can be regarded as a preliminary and decisive monetary obligation imposed upon one of the parties, determining the finalization of the contract. The union of several pre-contractual duties under this sole term allows to put forward a unified vision of the question before going into particularities. De facto, admission charge is subject to various manifestations and so are its justifications. «Engagement» or «supplementary» pre-contractual monetary obligation issues continue to arise regarding the validity of these obligations in accordance with the principle of freedom of contract. While there can be no denying the existence of legal instruments likely to ensure its regulation, it remains inefficient nonetheless. Henceforth, creating a general standard to regulate such practices ought to be seriously considered.

This thesis explores subjective and objective understandings of civic duty, obligation and good citizenship. Despite the importance of these drivers of behaviour, a lack of empirical understanding about what these drivers are and how they are understood has left a significant gap in our understanding of voting behaviour. My research contributes to the field by examining three central themes; Are duty, obligation and good citizenship understood the same? Are one or more of these traits suitable for cross-national research? Can a new conceptual model of civic duty help further the use of civic duty in studies of voting behaviour? In order to do this, this thesis analyses the following issues: (1) objectively exploring duty, obligation and good citizenship (2) analysing subjective understandings of these concepts (3) demonstrating individual level drivers of these concepts (4) demonstrating the impact of institutions, and cross-national differences have upon duty, obligation and good citizenship (5) showing how these concepts relate to voting behaviour (6) by testing and proving that a new approach to measuring civic duty can provide a model that explains not only long term immutable voting habits, but why individuals may vote out of duty sometimes, and abstain at others and (7) finally providing substantial evidence from what is an exploratory study to help in the formation of future representative research and to demonstrate the importance of taking civic duty seriously in forthcoming voting behaviour research. Using the theoretical and philosophical literature, I argue that despite the empirical literature treating obligation, good citizenship and civic duty as the same concept and driver of voting behaviour, that individuals understand these traits uniquely, and that they are all separate motivators, with duty being contingent on external forces (social capital) and obligation being contingent on personal or inward pressures. I argue that given the limited literature on good citizenship, there is no clear idea of what it means and that good citizenship will be contingent on what an individual deems to be "good". Finally, I argue that old models of civic duty are outdated, and that a new conceptual framework of duty needs to be introduced to accurately demonstrate how individuals understand it, and actually demonstrate its impact upon individual level voting behaviour. Using data from a pilot study, with an embedded survey experiment (N=735) collected in the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Australia and Ireland, I demonstrate that not only are duty, obligation and good citizenship understood differently, but the drivers of the concepts are significantly different. While obligation shows no relationship to voting behaviour within or across countries, good citizenship appears to be a good driver of second order elections while civic duty appears to drive first order and high saliency elections. Duty appears to be contingent upon external factors, while good citizenship appears to be contingent upon the behaviour of politicians, and citizenship education suggesting a social contract type relationship. Institutional factors appear to indirectly impact voting behaviour with a mediating effect on the strengths of duty and good citizenship. Finally, evidence suggests that previous notions of an "immutable" sense of duty are unfounded, and that an individuals’ sense of duty is contingent on a range of internal and external pressures. The first empirical chapter focuses on individual level understandings of duty, obligation and good citizenship, before the second empirical chapter expands this to look at cross-national differences in the understanding of, and drivers of duty obligation and good citizenship. Finally, the third empirical analyses a new model of civic duty and suggests that its previous use has been limited by ineffective measures. While the evidence presented in this thesis is exploratory and not generalisable or representative of any of the countries sampled, the evidence from the sample strongly suggests that future development of the study of civic duty, and further analysis of how duty, obligation and good citizenship are understood in representative samples are needed to confirm the findings presented in this thesis, and build upon what is a successful pilot study. This research finds its limitations in the number of survey items available to build a complete picture of all drivers of individual understandings of duty, obligation and good citizenship.

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo principal analisar o cabimento, no direito processual brasileiro, de uma distribuição dinâmica das regras do ônus da prova. Na primeira parte, são analisados o conceito, o objeto e a finalidade da prova, com apontamento da distinção entre fontes e meios. Após, são estudados o conceito de ônus da prova e sua distinção da obrigação, dando ênfase aos seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo e às principais teorias, antigas e modernas, que tratam dos critérios para a distribuição do ônus da prova. Estudou-se, em seguida, os principais fenômenos relacionados ao ônus da prova, quais sejam a distribuição, cuja regra geral está no art. 333 do CPC, e a redistribuição como gênero, tendo com espécies a redistribuição strictu sensu, cabível em casos de probatio diabolica e em excepcionais casos em que a prova se apresenta difícil por fatores externos ao processo, e a inversão, cujo exemplo, no direito pátrio, é o art. 6o, inc. VIII, do CDC. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são apresentadas duas novas teorias sobre a distribuição do ônus da prova: a visão solidarista do ônus da prova e a teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios. Por fim, ante a necessidade de flexibilização das atuais regras gerais de distribuição do ônus da prova e, ao mesmo tempo, controle do excessivo subjetivismo judicial, analisa-se o cabimento da aplicação da teoria dinâmica no direito brasileiro, apontando-se os parâmetros para a decisão judicial que a aplique. Do estudo, concluiu-se que o direito processual brasileiro admite a aplicação da teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios em face da incidência do princípio da igualdade, dos poderes instrutórios do juiz e do dever de lealdade, boa-fé e colaboração das partes. Concluiuse, ainda, que embora possa acontecer em momento diverso, o momento mais oportuno para a ocorrência da redistribuição do ônus da prova é a audiência preliminar, não podendo se verificar, em nenhuma hipótese, surpresa às partes, sob pena de ferimento ao princípio do contraditório. Quanto à decisão judicial que aplica a teoria dinâmica, deve esta levar em conta que tal aplicação é de caráter excepcionalíssimo, devendo ser bem fundamentada. / This study has the purpose of analyzing a dynamic employment of the burden of proof in the Brazilian Procedural Law. In the first part of this study, the concept and object and the evidence are analyzed through distinguishing sources and ways. Afterwards, the concept of burden of proof and its difference from obligation are studied based on subjective and objective aspects of dominant old and modern theories. We also examined the main phenomena relating to the burden of proof in general presented on the art. 333 Brazilian Procedural Code, the presentation of the burden of proof strict sensu in case of probatio diabolica and the shifting of burden of proof based on the art. 6, inc.VII, Brazilian Consumption Code. In the second part of the study, two theories related to the shifting of the burden of proof are presented. Based on those two theories, we came to the conclusion that a more dynamic way of applying the general rules for shifting the burden of proof and excessive control of judicial subjectivism is necessary to reach fairness. Finally, we concluded that the Brazilian Procedural Law allows the application of the dynamic theory of burden of proof based on the principle of equity, discretion, loyalty, good faith and the collaboration of the parties. Besides, the best moment to submit some evidence for the shifting of the burden of proof is over the course of a hearing. The decision shall be based on legal matters, facts and principles due to the fact that the dynamic theory to analyze evidence in case of shifting the burden of proof is used in special cases.

Au cours de ces dernières années, le processus de changement climatique et les phénomènes environnementaux qui se succèdent entraînent sans nul doute un mouvement migratoire massif à l'intérieur et parfois au-delà des frontières nationales. Une nouvelle catégorie de personnes, par conséquent, - eux-mêmes victimes de ces catastrophes qui provoquent des retombées redoutables sur l'exercice des droits de l'homme - regroupées souvent sous l'appellation « réfugiés écologiques », cherche à échapper à une situation chancelante susceptible d'être accentuée par l'incapacité, la disposition des faibles moyens ou, encore, l'abstention de l'État. Ce terme, principalement descriptif d'une situation, n'a aucune valeur juridique dans le droit international puisque le régime de protection internationale des réfugiés n'a pas été conçu pour faire face aux situations de perturbations de l'environnement. C'est dans ce contexte là que, compte tenu des besoins spécifiques des populations déplacées par les effets du changement climatique, apparaît la nécessité de mettre en place un statut juridique pour les réfugiés écologiques. Ce n'est pas seulement la responsabilité de l'État d'accueil qui doit être mise en examen, mais également celle de l'État d'origine. Nombreuses sont les questions qui se posent, dès lors, et qui exigent des réponses promptes et adéquates. Comment pourrions-nous protéger les populations touchées ? Serait-il pertinent de qualifier de réfugiés certaines catégories de personnes déplacées à cause d'un changement environnemental ? Quelle serait le statut des personnes déplacées en raison de la disparition d'un État submergé en dessous du niveau de la mer ? Si l'État omettait de protéger pertinemment ses nationaux lors d'une catastrophe naturelle, ne deviendrait-il pas responsable pour la création des flux migratoires ? Ou, encore, n'y aurait-t-il pas lieu de constater qu'il existe déjà des instruments internationaux relatifs à la protection et l'assistance en faveur des réfugiés écologiques? / In recent years, the process of climate change and environmental events trigger without any doubt a massive migration within and sometimes beyond national borders. A new category of people - victims themselves of these disasters that cause dangerous effects on the enjoyment of human rights - often grouped under the label «ecological refugees» flee a shaky situation likely to be exacerbated by the incapacity, the limited natural resources or, furthermore, the State's negligence. This term, mainly descriptive of a situation, has no legal value in international refugee law as long as the international refugee protection regime was not designed to deal with situations of environmental disruptions. In this context, in regard of the needs of people displaced by the effects of climate change, there is a necessity to establish a legal status for environmental refugees. It's not just the responsibility of the host State that must be analyzed, but also that of the State of origin. Several issues require prompt and adequate response. How can we protect the affected populations? Would it be appropriate to qualify as refugees certain categories of these displaced people by environmental change? What is the status of displaced persons due to the disappearance of a State submerged below sea level? If a State failed to effectively protect its citizens during a natural disaster, isn't it responsible for the mass migration? Or, can we consider that the existing international legal instruments can already protect and assist environmental refugees?

Traditionnellement, l’obligation se définit comme le lien de droit par lequel nous sommes astreints envers autrui à donner, faire ou ne pas faire quelque chose. Cette définition classique, admise par tous, ne serait juste que parce qu’elle nous vient directement du droit romain.L’argument historique ne résiste pas, cependant, à une étude attentive. L’obligation romaine n’est pas l’obligation que nous connaissons. Les romains ont vu dans l’obligation un pur lien de contrainte, centré sur la personne du débiteur, mais ils ont totalement ignoré l’aspect « droit personnel » de l’obligation moderne. La notion que nous employons aujourd’hui provient de la rencontre, contemporaine du XVIème siècle, entre la tradition romaine et l’idée de droit subjectif. Sauf que ces deux éléments historiques, l’un normatif, l’autre subjectif, ont été réduits à l’unité par la doctrine du XIXème siècle. Pour elle, la dette – le vinculum juris – et la créance – le droit subjectif – ne sont que deux angles différents sous lesquels observer le même objet :l’obligation. Dette et créance, séparées uniquement par une différence de point de vue, se présentent ainsi comme le revers et l’avers d’une même médaille.Cette présentation n’est pas tenable. Dette et créance présentent, plus qu’une simple différence de point de vue,une véritable différence de nature. La première est une norme, qui se situe en tant que telle sur le plan du droit objectif. La seconde est un droit personnel, qui appartient au monde des droits subjectifs. Autrement dit, la structure de l’obligation est binaire : elle se compose de deux éléments indissociables, dont la nature juridique ne peut être réduite à l’unité. En droit positif, cette approche néoclassique de la notion d’obligation permet de pacifier les rapports que l’obligation entretient avec sa sanction, et permet une simplification assez sensible de phénomènes juridique aussi divers que la date de naissance des créances contractuelles, la cession de créance, la cession de dette, la délégation, la compensation, la confusion, ou la remise de dette. / Traditionally, obligation is defined as the legal relationship whereby we are forced to others to give, to do or notto do something. This classical definition, conceded by everyone, would be right only because it directly comesfrom roman law.The historical argument doesn’t resist, yet, to a careful study. The roman obligation is not the obligation we areused to. Romans saw in the obligation a pure link of constraint, focused on the debtor, but they totally ignoredthe “personal right” aspect of the modern obligation. The notion we are using today proceeds from acontemporary meet (sixteenth century) between roman tradition and the subjective right idea. Excepted that, inthe nineteenth century, the doctrine decided to reduce these two historical elements, one normative, the othersubjective, to one thing. According to it, the debt (vinculum juris) and the claim (subjective right) are two sidesof the same object : the obligation.This presentation is not tenable. Debt and claim involve more than a difference of angle. There nature is deeplydifferent. The first one is a norm which belongs to objective right whereas the second one belongs to subjectiveright. In other words, the obligation is binary : it is made up of two indivisible elements and their nature cannotbe seen as one. In positive law, this neo-classic approach of obligation allows to ease the relationships betweenthe obligation and its sanction, and allows to simplify some juridical events such as assignment of claims,delegation, set-off, merger or remission of debt.

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo principal analisar o cabimento, no direito processual brasileiro, de uma distribuição dinâmica das regras do ônus da prova. Na primeira parte, são analisados o conceito, o objeto e a finalidade da prova, com apontamento da distinção entre fontes e meios. Após, são estudados o conceito de ônus da prova e sua distinção da obrigação, dando ênfase aos seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo e às principais teorias, antigas e modernas, que tratam dos critérios para a distribuição do ônus da prova. Estudou-se, em seguida, os principais fenômenos relacionados ao ônus da prova, quais sejam a distribuição, cuja regra geral está no art. 333 do CPC, e a redistribuição como gênero, tendo com espécies a redistribuição strictu sensu, cabível em casos de probatio diabolica e em excepcionais casos em que a prova se apresenta difícil por fatores externos ao processo, e a inversão, cujo exemplo, no direito pátrio, é o art. 6o, inc. VIII, do CDC. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são apresentadas duas novas teorias sobre a distribuição do ônus da prova: a visão solidarista do ônus da prova e a teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios. Por fim, ante a necessidade de flexibilização das atuais regras gerais de distribuição do ônus da prova e, ao mesmo tempo, controle do excessivo subjetivismo judicial, analisa-se o cabimento da aplicação da teoria dinâmica no direito brasileiro, apontando-se os parâmetros para a decisão judicial que a aplique. Do estudo, concluiu-se que o direito processual brasileiro admite a aplicação da teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios em face da incidência do princípio da igualdade, dos poderes instrutórios do juiz e do dever de lealdade, boa-fé e colaboração das partes. Concluiuse, ainda, que embora possa acontecer em momento diverso, o momento mais oportuno para a ocorrência da redistribuição do ônus da prova é a audiência preliminar, não podendo se verificar, em nenhuma hipótese, surpresa às partes, sob pena de ferimento ao princípio do contraditório. Quanto à decisão judicial que aplica a teoria dinâmica, deve esta levar em conta que tal aplicação é de caráter excepcionalíssimo, devendo ser bem fundamentada. / This study has the purpose of analyzing a dynamic employment of the burden of proof in the Brazilian Procedural Law. In the first part of this study, the concept and object and the evidence are analyzed through distinguishing sources and ways. Afterwards, the concept of burden of proof and its difference from obligation are studied based on subjective and objective aspects of dominant old and modern theories. We also examined the main phenomena relating to the burden of proof in general presented on the art. 333 Brazilian Procedural Code, the presentation of the burden of proof strict sensu in case of probatio diabolica and the shifting of burden of proof based on the art. 6, inc.VII, Brazilian Consumption Code. In the second part of the study, two theories related to the shifting of the burden of proof are presented. Based on those two theories, we came to the conclusion that a more dynamic way of applying the general rules for shifting the burden of proof and excessive control of judicial subjectivism is necessary to reach fairness. Finally, we concluded that the Brazilian Procedural Law allows the application of the dynamic theory of burden of proof based on the principle of equity, discretion, loyalty, good faith and the collaboration of the parties. Besides, the best moment to submit some evidence for the shifting of the burden of proof is over the course of a hearing. The decision shall be based on legal matters, facts and principles due to the fact that the dynamic theory to analyze evidence in case of shifting the burden of proof is used in special cases.

Esta dissertação tem como objetivo principal analisar o cabimento, no direito processual brasileiro, de uma distribuição dinâmica das regras do ônus da prova. Na primeira parte, são analisados o conceito, o objeto e a finalidade da prova, com apontamento da distinção entre fontes e meios. Após, são estudados o conceito de ônus da prova e sua distinção da obrigação, dando ênfase aos seus aspectos objetivo e subjetivo e às principais teorias, antigas e modernas, que tratam dos critérios para a distribuição do ônus da prova. Estudou-se, em seguida, os principais fenômenos relacionados ao ônus da prova, quais sejam a distribuição, cuja regra geral está no art. 333 do CPC, e a redistribuição como gênero, tendo com espécies a redistribuição strictu sensu, cabível em casos de probatio diabolica e em excepcionais casos em que a prova se apresenta difícil por fatores externos ao processo, e a inversão, cujo exemplo, no direito pátrio, é o art. 6o, inc. VIII, do CDC. Na segunda parte do trabalho, são apresentadas duas novas teorias sobre a distribuição do ônus da prova: a visão solidarista do ônus da prova e a teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios. Por fim, ante a necessidade de flexibilização das atuais regras gerais de distribuição do ônus da prova e, ao mesmo tempo, controle do excessivo subjetivismo judicial, analisa-se o cabimento da aplicação da teoria dinâmica no direito brasileiro, apontando-se os parâmetros para a decisão judicial que a aplique. Do estudo, concluiu-se que o direito processual brasileiro admite a aplicação da teoria dinâmica dos ônus probatórios em face da incidência do princípio da igualdade, dos poderes instrutórios do juiz e do dever de lealdade, boa-fé e colaboração das partes. Concluiuse, ainda, que embora possa acontecer em momento diverso, o momento mais oportuno para a ocorrência da redistribuição do ônus da prova é a audiência preliminar, não podendo se verificar, em nenhuma hipótese, surpresa às partes, sob pena de ferimento ao princípio do contraditório. Quanto à decisão judicial que aplica a teoria dinâmica, deve esta levar em conta que tal aplicação é de caráter excepcionalíssimo, devendo ser bem fundamentada. / This study has the purpose of analyzing a dynamic employment of the burden of proof in the Brazilian Procedural Law. In the first part of this study, the concept and object and the evidence are analyzed through distinguishing sources and ways. Afterwards, the concept of burden of proof and its difference from obligation are studied based on subjective and objective aspects of dominant old and modern theories. We also examined the main phenomena relating to the burden of proof in general presented on the art. 333 Brazilian Procedural Code, the presentation of the burden of proof strict sensu in case of probatio diabolica and the shifting of burden of proof based on the art. 6, inc.VII, Brazilian Consumption Code. In the second part of the study, two theories related to the shifting of the burden of proof are presented. Based on those two theories, we came to the conclusion that a more dynamic way of applying the general rules for shifting the burden of proof and excessive control of judicial subjectivism is necessary to reach fairness. Finally, we concluded that the Brazilian Procedural Law allows the application of the dynamic theory of burden of proof based on the principle of equity, discretion, loyalty, good faith and the collaboration of the parties. Besides, the best moment to submit some evidence for the shifting of the burden of proof is over the course of a hearing. The decision shall be based on legal matters, facts and principles due to the fact that the dynamic theory to analyze evidence in case of shifting the burden of proof is used in special cases.