John A. Warden III is renowned as one of the theorists closest to devising a new paradigm in air power. His praised theory about the enemy as a system has showed applicable on terrorist organizations amongst other areas. The most recent developed domain for warfare is the so-called “cyberspace”. There is an on-going debate concerning the importance and definition of this domain and furthermore what potential and challenges it withholds as a future arena for warfare. Some claims that a cyberattack can’t be seen as an act of war due to its lack of physical violence. Previous research show however a lack in application of theories within this domain. This thesis therefore aims to examine to which extent Warden’s theory of the enemy as a system could be applied to the cyberattack known as Stuxnet. Results show that Warden’s theory have some applicatory power on the cyberattack Stuxnet, although primarily in an indirect aspect. This study therefore shows an ability concerning the theory’s applicatory power on other areas than air power. The findings of the research regarding previous arguments about cyberwar also states that a cyberattack now could be seen as physical violent. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning </strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

Swedish air doctrine does not present the origin of its concepts, nor does it support these with theoretical claims. In addition to this, the Swedish air doctrine has not been tested in a real life conflict. Therefore, it is considered unverified. The aim of this paper is to ascertain the theoretical support for the doctrine. Using two contemporary theorists, namely John Warden and Shaun Clarke, the theoretical support for the doctrine is analyzed. This is achieved by studying two of the doctrine’s principal documents, Operativ Doktrin 14 and Reglemente: Taktik för luftoperationer, while applying a qualitative method. The thesis finds that the Swedish air doctrine has convincing theoretical support, without any evident difference in support between the two theories. Furthermore, none of the studied aspects of the doctrine are questioned by the theories. Although the study presented rather conclusive results, further research should be conducted in order to find support amongst other theories. The purpose would be to widen the theoretical scope as well as to further strengthen or question the support.

During the last decades, air defense has been the core mission of the Swedish Air Force. This has come at the expense of offensive strike capability. However, this may be about to change. In the coming defense bill it is proposed that the Swedish Air Force will acquire cruise missiles during the 2020´s. With the aim of ensuring that this new capability will generate the maximal operational effect for the Air Force, this essay has examined how the current Swedish air doctrine,TR LuftOp 2017, views offensive strike operations today and how this possibly may change with the new capabilities offered by cruise missiles.  This has been done through a qualitative text research method where John A. Warden´s and Robert A. Pape´s theories of offensive air power have been used as the theoretical framework. The result shows that the Swedish air doctrine today closely resembles Robert A. Papes theory, with the exception of some signs of Warden´s thoughts. However, most signs suggest, and it is this essays conclusion, that the acquisition of cruise missiles probably will result in the Swedish air doctrine adopting more of Warden´s theory at the expense of Pape´s theory.

This study examines how Argentina’s failure to obtain control of the air during the Falklands war can be explained based on the theories of John A. Warden and Philip S. Meilinger. The failure is problematic due to the numerical superiority and geographical advantage of the Argentinian Air Force. Previous studies have focused on the absence of airborne early warning, air-to-sea warfare and the perspective of Clausewitz theories. The purpose of this study is therefore the to develop a theory-based explanation of the Argentinian failure from the perspective of two air-warfare theories. The first day of the war (May 1) and the landing on the shores of San Carlos constitute crucial parts of the air war. The paper utilizes a theory consuming approach to explain the two cases and then comparing them to develop an aggregated explanation of the Argentinian failure. The result of the analysis is that Argentinian failure to identify and attack Britain’s aircraft carriers/landing ships, failure to concentrate the offensive operations and selective British air defence are key parts of the explanation. The results contributes to a deeper understanding of a perspective of the Falklands air war that has not been analysed in previously analysed in earlier academic studies.

According to NATO Review, in 2013 it was estimated that over 97% of the world's telecommunications were transmitted via the internet and that this was a growing trend. This essentiality for communication means that information systems have become a natural target and point of attack in military actions and planning. This thesis aims to test the possibility to apply the theory of The enemy as a system and the concentric five-ring modeldeveloped by air force theorist Jon A. Warden III, to the cyber arena. To achieve this aim, the thesis presents a qualitative text analysis of seven different sources describing NotPetya. The targets and effects of the cyber attack are evaluated based upon the concentric five-ring model and the concept of parallel attack. The results of the analysis shows that Warden's theory is highly applicable to the case of NotPetya. This in turn could point to the theory’s applicability to the cyber domain and to strategic operations in cyberspace. However no major conclusions of generalizability can be drawn.

The use of drones in conflicts is under development and is increasing rapidly. The first real drone warfare was seen in Pakistan in the War on Terrorism in 2004. Between officials and scientists, there are divided opinions about whether the drone strikes can increase terrorism or cause the collapse of organizations. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the effectiveness of drones, in terms of precision and lethality, can be seen to escalate or de-escalate a conflict. The aim is to explore whether two existing theories about air power can explain the case of killing the Iranian general, Qasem Soleimani, in 2020. As a qualitative case study, the approach results in favor of Pape´s theory over Warden´s. Pape says that decapitation is more likely to escalate a conflict, which confirms this case. Other explanations in his theory are the absence of unexpected political effects and the overthrow of government. Though Wardens theory shows some aspects of de-escalation, the conclusion is that Soleimani was not the center of gravity that was meant to cause system collapse. Further research is required since the findings cannot identify any escalating or de-escalating effects within the Quds Force.

Strategic bombing was introduced as an idea in the early 20th century and became debated in its first use during the first world war. John Warden, a modern proponent for strategic bombing, puts forth the idea that the introduction of precision-guided-munitions allows for strategic bombing to be a viable and more importantly the optimal use for airpower in armed conflicts today. Warden markets his theory, the enemy as a system, as a method that allows airpower to be deployed and alone be able to achieve strategic effects and win wars. Skeptics to this idea argue that empirical evidence shows that modern strategic bombing does not produce strategic effects that wins wars therefor making it inferior to other methods of employing airpower. Because the debate is heavily focused on the strategic level, the lower levels becomes neglected. This essay will test Wardens theory on the operational level of war with the purpose to examine what effects, if not strategic, are generated at the operational level and how it affects an offensive and defensive actor of a war. The results will aim to answer whether John Wardens theory of strategic bombing generates effect and is a viable method for airpower for the operational level of warfare.

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This study examines poor travellers who were on the move during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The focus is the County of Devon, with Exeter dealt with only briefly as it was a separate county. It is shown that the travellers, including numbers of Irish in the seventeenth century and foreign-born, particularly in the eighteenth century, were affected by a number of factors, but that the most important influence on their numbers and types was the incidence of wars. Economic factors, such as food supply, were of some importance, but the economy too was influenced by the effects of wars. Legislation also was found to have had less influence than expected. However, the legislation effective from 1700 did have a marked impact on the documentation available. The main sources used for this study are the parochial documents provided by churchwardens’ accounts of payments made to travellers in need and some of those of the parish overseers. These are supplemented by the records of Devon’s County Quarter Sessions. A combination of Devon’s geography, its strong international maritime connections and the influence of wars and their locations combined to affect the chronological and spatial variations in the numbers and types of travellers through the two centuries.

In this thesis, I present analysis of security incident reports in IDEA format from Mentat and their aggregation and correlation methods design and implementation. In data analysis, I show huge security reports diversity. Next, I show design of simple framework and system of templates. This framework and system of templates simplify aggregation and correlation methods design and implementation. Finally, I evaluate designed methods using Mentat database dumps. The results showed that designed methods can reduce the number of security reports up to 90% without loss of any significant information.