This paper aspires to answer the question of what mistakes the United States Air Force committed during operation rolling thunder in the Vietnam war. The purpose of this is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the operation and moreover to contextualise the mistakes that were made and that according to modern papers of military failures are continuing to be made. There have been studies that have sought to explain the operations failures but by using the framework of the prevalent theorists John A. Warden and Robert A. Papes theories i hope to shed new light on this topic. By using John A. Warden and Robert A. Papes theories concerning the use and implementation of airpower important factors missing from the planning or execution of this operation can be identified. One overarching problem with the operation is the continued meddling by politicians and civilian cabinet members in the planning and execution of the operation. A fear of Chinese involvement also lead to incredibly strict rules of engagements that forbade american pilots from even returning fire in some instances. A lack of commitment and constant ceasefires hindered the operation from succeeding in putting enough pressure on the north vietnamese and allowed them to rebuild what was destroyed. One last key factor was the lack of coordination between the aerial and ground forces, this deminitied the effectiveness of both.

John A. Warden III is one of the leading contemporary air force theorists in the modern era. Warden´s five ring model has proved the ability to explain other dimensions of warfare, as Warden himself claims. A topic that had been receiving much attention is the relatively new arena of warfare, the so-called 'cyberspace'. This dimension has enabled the dissemination of information at a significantly higher rate than before which results that the efficiency of information warfare have increased. Previous research in this complex area, where a combination of Warden's theories and information warfare have been used to analyze a case, is currently inadequate. Therefore, this case study intends to examine to which extent Warden's five ring model can be applied on information operations, in the context of the war in Ukraine. The result in this thesis will show that Warden's theory had a certain degree of explanatory power on the information operations, that were conducted in Ukraine during 2013-2014. The result will also indicate that the most significant direct impact from information operations was shown on the fourth ring, population. When the fourth ring was affected, the effect would spread and affect other rings indirectly. Attempts to affect multiple rings directly and simultaneously could not be identified except for the fourth and fifth rings, population and fielded military. However, no traceability of a direct impact on the fifth ring, fielded military, was identified.

John A. Warden's airpower theory, The Enemy as a System, has had a major influence on the strategic discourse ever since the foundation of this normative framework was presented in The Air Campaign in 1988. Warden’s theoretical impact was reinforced by the American successes during the Gulf War, but since then, little research has tested the theory outside the context of conventional wars of aggression. This study analyzes The Enemy as System against a peace enforcing context, characterized by multilateral cooperation. It also identifies intermediate variables that help explain why the theory is strengthened or weakened in relation to this particular context. Through qualitative methods, Operation Allied Force and Operation Unified Protector are analyzed against operational indicators within the central concepts of the five-ring model and parallel attacks. The results of the study show that NATO did not use airpower in accordance with Warden's normative theory in either of the examined operations. The absence of operational indicators could hypothetically explain why NATO failed to produce strategic effects within the operational time limits, although this remains a speculative conclusion. The result instead suggests a number of intermediate variables, such as political disagreement and strategic dissonance, which combined reduced the possibility of using airpower in accordance with Warden's theory. In addition, the fear of civilian casualties and the risk of exacerbating the post-war humanitarian situation, further reduced the possibility of attacking targets within certain subsystems of the five-ring model. The conclusion is therefore that Warden’s theoretical applicability, and thus universal validity, is weakened within the examined context.

John A. Warden III is one the most mentioned air power theoretic of his time.He has written a number of theories concerning air power and the best way to use this to win wars.The author of this paper gives a short resume of what he consider are the central thoughts in John Warden´s theories. These thoughts result in four factors; Enemy as a system, centre of gravity, parallel attack/concentration and finally air superiority. These factors are then being used to inves-tigate if NATO used Wardens theories during the Kosovo war in 1999.The reason for the author to choose the Kosovo war specifically is due to the fact that NATO during the war only used air power as an instrument to get Serbia´s president Milosevic to the negotiation table but also the fact that this would turn out to be quite a challenge for NATO.The conclusion is that out of the four factors only one is traceable throughout the entire operation, and that is air superiority. Regarding the other three factors they can only be found in parts of the operation. / John A. Warden III är en av de mest omskrivna luftmaktsteoretikerna under sin tid. Han har lagt fram ett antal teorier för vad han anser är bästa sättet att använda luftmakt för att vinna krig. I uppsatsen ges en sammanfattning av vad författaren anser vara de centrala tankarna i hans teorier. Dessa utmynnar i fyra begrepp; fienden som ett system, tyngdpunktsbegreppet,parallell attack och kraftsamling samt luftrumskontroll. Dessa begrepp står sedan somutgångspunkt för en fallstudie av NATO:s luftmaktsanvändning under Kosovokriget 1999.Undersökningen syftar till att undersöka om NATO använde sig av John Wardens luftmaktsteorier under kriget.Varför författaren har valt just Kosovokriget beror bland annat på att NATO under kriget enbart använde sig av luftmakt för att få Serbiens president Milosevic till förhandlingsbordet samt att det också visade sig bli en stor prövning för dem.Slutsatsen blev att av de fyra utvalda faktorerna så var det endast en som NATO visade sig foku-sera på under hela operationen, detta var luftrumskontroll. Vad gäller de övriga tre faktorerna finner författaren att NATO använt sig av dessa i stort sett bara under slutskedet av operationen.

<p>Den amerikanske flygvapenöversten John A Warden III har lagt fram en teori om att man kan se på fienden som ett system av system för att hitta hans svagheter. Teorin bygger på att skapa en bild av fienden genom en fördefinierad indelning i subsystem bestående av fem ringar. Denna bild skall därefter kunna brytas ner i ytterligare subsystem bestående av samma fem ringar som till slut avslöjar fiendens tyngdpunkter. Uppsatsen prövar om Wardens teori går att applicera på Al-Qaida.</p> / <p>The U.S. Air Force Colonel John A. Warden III, has presented a theory that one can see the enemy as a system of systems to find his weaknesses. The theory is based on creating an image of the enemy through a predefined subdivision into subsystems consisting of five rings. This image must then be broken down into further sub-system consisting of the same five rings that eventually reveals the enemy's centers of gravity. This essay examines whether the Warden theory can apply to Al Qaeda</p>

Den amerikanske flygvapenöversten John A Warden III har lagt fram en teori om att man kan se på fienden som ett system av system för att hitta hans svagheter. Teorin bygger på att skapa en bild av fienden genom en fördefinierad indelning i subsystem bestående av fem ringar. Denna bild skall därefter kunna brytas ner i ytterligare subsystem bestående av samma fem ringar som till slut avslöjar fiendens tyngdpunkter. Uppsatsen prövar om Wardens teori går att applicera på Al-Qaida. / The U.S. Air Force Colonel John A. Warden III, has presented a theory that one can see the enemy as a system of systems to find his weaknesses. The theory is based on creating an image of the enemy through a predefined subdivision into subsystems consisting of five rings. This image must then be broken down into further sub-system consisting of the same five rings that eventually reveals the enemy's centers of gravity. This essay examines whether the Warden theory can apply to Al Qaeda

The theories on how to use airpower as coercion are divided between those who advocate strategic bombing and those who advocate support for land operations. The purpose of this study is to analyze whether Pape and/or Warden´s airpower theories applied on Operation Allied Force can explain how NATO´s air force was used. The result shows that both the Warden´s Enemy as a system and Pape´s Denial strategy can partly explain the outcome. Warden´s 5-ring system is the only variable in the survey assigned with a high variable value; this is because the analysis shows that it is judged to influence the outcome extensively. Parallel attacks occurred at low frequency and have a low variable value. Pape´s theory occurred with high frequency in variable support for the ground forces, however, the analysis shows that no variable value from Pape´s theory received higher variables than the medium. The conclusion is that both theories can explain how NATO used airpower during the operation but to different degrees.

Although Anthony Trollope has traditionally been considered an anti-feminist author, studies within the past decade have shown that Trollope's later novels show support for female power and sympathy for Victorian women who were dissatisfied with their narrow roles in society. A feminist reading of two of his earliest novels, The Warden and Barchester Towers, shows that Trollope's feminism is not limited to his later works. In The Warden, Trollope acclaims female power and "woman's logic" through female characters and the womanly warden, Septimus Harding. In Barchester Towers, Trollope continues to support feminism through his positive portrayals of strong, independent women and the androgynous Harding. In Barchester Towers, the battle of the sexes ends in a balance of power.

On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Air Force launched a surprise attack against the Egyptian Air Force and started what was to be known as the Six Day War. The Six Day War is a good example of when a small nation manages to singlehandedly defeat a superior adversary. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the success of the Israeli Air Force and their contribution to the victory. The use of air power in the Six Day War will be analyzed, using John Warden’s Five Ring Model and Shaun Clarke’s theories about risk-based coercion and SPOT-bombing. Research findings indicate that Shaun Clarke’s theories about coercion may to some extent explain the success of the Israeli Air Force. Attacking the armed forces created the threat of further violence against more valuable and vulnerable targets causing the Arabic leaders to choose peaceful solutions instead of continued fighting. Furthermore, the SPOT-bombing analyzes show that the psychological effect that the Israeli Air Force had on their adversary played a significant role in the campaign against Egypt. However, Warden’s model could not explain the reasons behind the outcome of the war.

Air power alone cannot hold ground and secure the population. How then can air power contribute to irregular conflicts? Robert Johnson states in his article Predicting Future War that air power have the potential to determine the outcome of irregular operations. Even though air superiority was achieved during the two battles of Fallujah in Iraq 2004 there is a difference in the outcome of the two operations, Vigilant Resolve and Phantom Fury. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if Warden´s theory The Enemy as a System and his Five-Ring Model can explain the variation in the outcome of the two battles using a comparative case study. Research findings indicate that the Five-Ring Model cannot explain why the second operation, Phan-tom Fury was a victory. The findings indicate that striking the most critical ring, i.e. Leaders, did not contribute to victory. Instead, results indicate that the most critical ring leading to victory in the second operation were Infrastructure. The main conclusion of the thesis is that the theory cannot explain the variation in the outcomes and that Warden´s Five-Ring Model cannot be applied to an irregular enemy and therefore needs to be questioned and further researched. The findings further strengthen earlier research stating that the most critical part of an enemy may not always be represented by Leaders.