Durant la décennie écoulée, une série de scandales financiers impliquant des firmes d’envergure internationale (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) a secoué les places boursières en déclenchant une crise de la confiance chez les investisseurs. L’analyse des cas précités a révélé un recours massif à la fraude et aux manipulations comptables ce qui a relancé le débat autour de la question de la Qualité du Reporting Financier et de l’efficience des mécanismes de gouvernance.En effet, de récents constats révèlent que des problèmes d’agence générés par une structure de propriété complexe caractérisée par la concentration de la propriété familiale et le recours accru aux mécanismes de renforcement du contrôle vont favoriser l’extraction des bénéfices privés par les actionnaires de contrôle au détriment des minoritaires et par conséquent accroître leur l’incitation à la manipulation de l’information comptable et financière offerte et ce pour dissimuler leurs agissements opportunistes.Dans ce cadre, la présente thèse se propose d’étudier dans quelle mesure la structure de propriété complexe peut entrainer des conflits d’agence aggravant les problèmes d’incitation chez l’actionnaire contrôlant en favorisant l’extraction des bénéfices privés via les transactions avec les parties liées et d’analyser l’effet de cette expropriation sur la Qualité du Reporting Financier de l’entreprise.Nous poursuivons trois principaux objectifs. Le premier est de savoir comment les attributs de la structure de propriété complexe vont impacter la consommation des bénéfices privés faite via les transactions avec les parties liées. Le second est d’analyser comment la dissimulation de la consommation des bénéfices privés va impacter la qualité du reporting financier mesurée par la gestion des résultats comptable et réelle et le conservatisme conditionnel et inconditionnel tout en prenant en considération l’interaction entre la gestion des résultats et le conservatisme. Le troisième objectif est de tester, dans le cadre du conflit principal-principal, l’efficience du rôle du conseil d’administration dans la discipline des actionnaires contrôlants à travers la réduction des bénéfices privés ainsi que dans la garantie d’un reporting financier de qualité en s’opposant à la manipulation de l’information.C’est ainsi que sur un échantillon d’entreprises françaises cotées sur l’indice SBF 250 observées sur la période 2001 à 2009 notre étude a révélé que l’excès du contrôle de l’actionnaire ultime est associée à une plus grande consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous relevons également une relation en U inversé entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et les bénéfices privés. La présence de plusieurs détenteurs de blocs de contrôle entrainant une contestabilité du contrôle s’oppose à la consommation des bénéfices privés. Nous avons pu valider l’hypothèse de la dissimulation en confirmant l’effet médiateur des bénéfices privés du contrôle dans la relation entre la concentration de la propriété de l’actionnaire ultime et la concentration de la propriété institutionnelle d’une part et la gestion réelle des résultats de l’autre. Nos résultats empiriques confirment l’efficience de l’indépendance du conseil d’administration dans la réduction des bénéfices privés et la gestion des résultats.Mots clé : Bénéfices privés du contrôle, transactions avec les parties liées, structure de propriété complexe, conseil d’administration, gestion des résultats et conservatisme. / During the past decade, a series of financial scandals involving firms of international scope (Enron, Tyco, Parmalat, etc.) has shaken the stock exchanges in triggering a crisis of confidence among investors. The analysis of the aforementioned cases revealed a massive use of fraud and accounting manipulations which has relaunched the debate on the financial reporting quality and the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms.Recent findings reveal that of agency problems generated by a structure of complex ownership structure characterized by the concentration of the family ownership and the increased use of control-enhancing mechanisms will promote the extraction of private profits by the controlling shareholders to the detriment of the minority and therefore increase their incentives to the manipulation of earnings in order to conceal their opportunistic behavior.In this framework, this thesis proposes to study to what extent the structure of complex ownership may cause conflicts of agency aggravating the problems of incitement in the controlling shareholder in favoring the extraction of private profits via the conclusion of related party transactions and to analyze the effect of this expropriation on the financial reporting quality of the firm.We are pursuing three main objectives. The first is to understand how the attributes of the complex ownership structure can affect the private benefits consumption via the conclusion of related party transactions. The second objective is to analyze how the concealment of the consumption of private benefits will impact the financial reporting quality as proxied by the accounting and real earnings management and the conditional and unconditional conservatism. while taking into account the interaction between earnings management and the conservatism. The third objective is to test, in the context of the principal-principal agency conflict, the efficiency of the role of the board of directors in the discipline of the controlling shareholders through the reduction of private profit as well as in the guarantee of the financial reporting of quality.Our study focuses on a sample of 81 French companies listed on the SBF 250 index observed on the period 2001 to 2009. Our results reveal that the excess of the control of the ultimate shareholder is associated with greater private benefits consumption. We also note an inverted U-shaped relationship between the ultimate ownership concentration and private benefits. The presence of multiple large shareholders causing a contestability of control reduces the private benefits extraction. We validate the private benefits dissimulation hypothesis by confirming the mediating effect of the private benefits of control in the relationship between the ultimate shareholder ownership and the institutional ownership the real earnings management. Our empirical results confirm the efficiency of the independence of the board of directors in the reduction of private benefits and the earnings management. Against all expectation, we note a week effect of the Audit Committee on of financial reporting qualityKey words: Private benefits of control, related party transactions, ownership structure, board of directors, earnings management, conservatism.

我國關係人交易普遍且具重要性，而過去研究顯示關係人交易會對公司產生負面效果，且關係人交易之查核具有困難度，因此本研究以關係人交易較多且查核風險較高之高科技公司為研究對象，將關係人交易分為關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款與關係人應付款等四項類別，探討關係人交易與審計品質的關係。進一步探討當關係人交易分為發行公司與關係人皆受相同會計師查核與受不同會計師查核兩類型，對發行公司財務報表審計品質的影響。實證結果發現：關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與審計品質呈負向關係；關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易與關係人應收款兩造受不同會計師查核者，對其發行公司財務報表審計品質之負面影響較兩造受相同會計師查核者強。 / Related party transactions are common and important in Taiwan, and empirical studies in Taiwan show that related party transactions have negative impact on earnings management and company performance. Based on auditing standards and literature, related party transactions are difficult to audit, and high technology firms have more related party transactions which may result in higher audit risk than other industry. Therefore, we investigate the association between related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) and audit quality (proxied by accrual quality) in high technology firms, and find that sales to related parties and purchases from related parties have negative impact on audit quality. Next, we investigate the impact of related party transactions audited by the same auditor or different auditors. Empirical results show that sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties audited by different auditors show stronger negative impacts on audit quality than those audited by same auditors.

本研究係探討關係人交易雙方是否委任相同會計師進行查核，對企業負債資金成本之效果。本文以企業利息費用除以平均帶息負債衡量企業之負債資金成本，企業之關係人交易部分則分成關係人銷貨交易、關係人進貨交易、關係人應收款、關係人應付款等四類型交易，來討論關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯，接著將各類型關係人交易再細分成由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方與由不同會計師查核關係人交易雙方兩類，以檢驗相同會計師查核對於企業負債資金成本之影響。 研究結果發現關係人交易與企業負債資金成本之關聯並無統計上之顯著性。然將關係人交易進一步拆分為是否由相同會計師查核關係人交易雙方後，關係人進貨交易與關係人銷貨交易等兩類型交易若由相同會計師查核交易雙方，其相較於不同會計師查核能夠有效減緩企業負債資金成本增加之情形。 / This study examines the effect of same auditor auditing both sides of related party transactions (RPTs) on cost of debt. In this study, cost of debt is measured using interest expenses divided by average interest bearing debt and we hand collect from annual reports the data of the four common types of RPTs: sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and accounts payable to related parties. For the four types, we further split RPTs into RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor and RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. We do not find any evidence that RPTs are associated with cost of debt. However, we find that for sales to related parties and purchases from related parties, RPTs whose involved sides are audited by the same auditor are associated with cost of debt less strongly than RPTs whose involved sides are audited by different auditors. Our results suggest that same auditor auditing can mitigated the detrimental effect of RPTs on cost of debt.

近來陸續爆出的舞弊案件已連帶引起了社會大眾對關係人交易行為的注意。本文先探討審計品質與關係人交易之關聯性，而實證結果顯示關係人銷貨、進貨、應收款項與應付款項交易與審計品質皆呈負向關係，足見關係人交易之查核是困難的。因此本文期望透過外部審計人員的專業屬性來降低關係人交易對審計品質產生的不良影響，提升投資人對公司財務報導的信任。過去文獻針對會計師專業屬性部分，指出會計師事務所規模愈大以及產業專精程度愈高者，具備較佳的查核品質。研究結果顯示當關係人銷貨、進貨及應收款項交易係由四大會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所查核時，因大型會計師事務所或產業專家會計師事務所具備較佳會計師專業屬性，能抑制或減少關係人交易對審計品質之負面影響，而提升財務報表之審計品質。 / Numerous financial reporting frauds over recent years have made related party transactions the center of public attention. We first investigate the association between related party transactions and audit quality (proxied by discretionary accruals), and find that four kinds of related party transactions (including sales to related parties, purchases from related parties, accounts receivable from related parties and payable to related parties) all have negative impacts on audit quality. We posit that (1) external auditing is a monitoring mechanism to reduce audit quality decline caused by related party transactions, and (2) auditor attributes including big 4 audit firms and industry specialist audit firms can mitigate the audit quality decline thereof. Empirical results show that companies audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms, whose sales to related parties, purchases from related parties and accounts receivable from related parties show significantly smaller negative impacts on audit quality than companies not audited by big 4 or industry specialist audit firms.

Submitted by Nilo Almeida (naajrj@gmail.com) on 2018-08-15T16:34:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 The Related Party Transaction in Brazilian Infrastructure PPPs - Final Version.pdf: 1720313 bytes, checksum: 169661514312285f50c2683e8bb457ca (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2018-08-24T14:47:09Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 The Related Party Transaction in Brazilian Infrastructure PPPs - Final Version.pdf: 1720313 bytes, checksum: 169661514312285f50c2683e8bb457ca (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T14:37:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 The Related Party Transaction in Brazilian Infrastructure PPPs - Final Version.pdf: 1720313 bytes, checksum: 169661514312285f50c2683e8bb457ca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-11 / Transações com parte relacionadas (RPT) é um problema recorrente na maioria das empresas com propriedade compartilhada porque, ao mesmo tempo que pode trazer uma redução significante dos custos de transação, por outro lado apresenta o risco de ser abusada causando perdas para os acionistas minoritários e credores. A Parceria Público Privada (PPP) de infraestrutura, sendo um empreendimento em sociedade, está sujeito a este dilema e, devido à alavancagem proporcionada pelo Project Finance, há inclusive maiores incentivos ao comportamento oportunista. Um exemplo recente, motivando a discussão, é o case da usina hidroelétrica Santo Antônio, que, com um orçamento inicial de R$ 12 bilhões, acabou custando um total de R$ 20 bilhões. O potencial de retorno imediato por expropriação dos custos majoritários, tipo aquisição e construção para o projeto, na maioria das vezes é extremamente superior à exposição do agente oportunista às perdas durante a futura operação da infraestrutura. Neste trabalho é proposto um modelo microeconômico simples para explorar os incentivos subjacentes nos projetos de PPP com o objetivo de encontrar alternativas para mitigar o desalinhamento de incentivos causados por RPT’s nas PPPs. Finalmente, a literatura pesquisada, em conjunto com o modelo proposto, são usados na comparação com dados empíricos mostrando forte evidência de efeitos negativos das RPTs. Em muitas PPPs no Brasil, a presença de grandes construtoras nas holdings dos seus controladores, aliada à pouca experiência dos agentes governamentais e deficiência de recursos na utilização do modelo PPP, criou um ambiente muito desfavorável ao sucesso desses projetos. / The Related Party Transaction (RPT) is a recurring issue in most shared ownership companies because, at the same time, it has the potential to bring significant reduction of transaction costs, on the other hand, presents many pitfalls of being abused to the loss of the minority shareholders and creditors. The infrastructure Public Private Partnership (PPP), being a shared enterprise, is prone to this dilemma and, because project finance is extremely leveraged, there are even stronger incentives for opportunistic behavior. As a recent example to motivate the discussion there is the case of Santo Antonio hydroelectric power generation facility, which had an initial budget of R$ 12 billion and ended up costing a grand total of R$ 20 billion. The potential immediate returns of expropriation from major expenses, such as acquisition and construction for the project, most of the time, far outweighs the opportunist’s exposure to losses in the future operation of the infrastructure. It is proposed a simple microeconomic model for exploring the underlying incentives of PPP projects to help devise options for mitigating the incentive misalignment of RPTs in PPPs. Finally, the literature and the proposed model findings are used to compare with empirical data which has showed strong evidence of negative RPT effects. In many PPPs in Brazil, the presence of big construction firms in the controlling shareholders’ holdings, coupled with the government’s lack of experience and adequate resources to work with the PPP model, created a difficult environment for the financial success of those projects.

Submitted by Renato Vilela (renatovla@yahoo.com.br) on 2012-10-15T15:01:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 RENATO VILELA - Dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 2009901 bytes, checksum: c6531673d2170c86cb4edebfc889a91c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2012-10-15T15:12:12Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 RENATO VILELA - Dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 2009901 bytes, checksum: c6531673d2170c86cb4edebfc889a91c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-15T15:24:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 RENATO VILELA - Dissertação de Mestrado.pdf: 2009901 bytes, checksum: c6531673d2170c86cb4edebfc889a91c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-13 / The work is situated in the large area of corporate law, specifically under the subject of conflicts of interest in the deliberations of listed companies. The assumed objective was to critically explore theoretical interpretation of the legal problem resulting from these conflicts, and then perform an empirical study about a potentially contentious negotiating mode, the related party transactions. After studying the logic from these doctrinal proposals, the thesis maintains the hypothesis that the explanations of the Brazilian legal literature vary the ratio of the open concept of 'best interests of the company', according to articulate the position of the party represented by counsel. Arbitrarily designed as 'formal' or 'substantial', such interpretations cares about the time of infringement of the Company's best interest, respectively, to prohibit or guarantee the exercise of voting from the interested party, through suitable arrangements at the dispute. Due to this impairment of abstract reasoning to the practice of law, it is suggested to approach the subject by another theoretical proposal, linked to a specific notion of Law. Understood as a provider of relevant information to stakeholders of the companies, it acts in the regulation of data required from these corporations and in the information produced by them, individually. Such transparency, along with the rules that bind the market, form the conceptual content of the expression 'corporate governance', developed around the proposal called by 'corporate governance system'. The interpretation of information from the various possible systems must offer the decision maker a chance to meet their powers, prerogatives, incentives, skills, limitations and prohibitions in order to assess whether their choice is a good government practice for the business, according the system in which the company operates. For interested third parties, the system should serve to verify if the decision-making process follows the expectation of the business environment designed by the governance system. On the issue of conflicts of interest, the suggestion to think the problem through this notion of Law intended to support the creation and disclosure of rules conceived by the listed companies, which feed the alluded governance system and serve to guide the decision making oriented by the alignment of dissonant goals involved in the company, without the use of external arbitration. So, the empirical work focuses on studies of these particular rules applicable to related party transactions, such mechanisms were collected in the annual report of the 100 most liquid corporations listed at BM&FBovespa in 2011. The results show that only 6% of companies have procedures to identify conflicting relationships arising from related party transactions and 29% to address the problem. The figures relating to companies that establish rules for managing conflicts of interest in the deliberations of the general assembly and board of directors are also low, respectively, 7% and 13% present identification mechanisms, 4% and 11% for treatment. The low frequency showed by the results lighted with the built theoretical proposal identifies an opportunity, namely, to think of mitigating the problem using this private and extrajudicial route. / O trabalho está inserido na grande área do direito societário, especificamente sob a temática dos conflitos de interesses nas deliberações de S.A.´s listadas em Bolsa de Valores. O objetivo assumido foi o de percorrer criticamente as propostas teóricas empregadas na interpretação do problema jurídico resultante destes conflitos, para depois realizar um estudo empírico sobre uma modalidade negocial potencialmente conflitiva, as transações entre partes relacionadas. Após o estudo da lógica norteadora das propostas doutrinárias, sustenta-se a hipótese de que as explicações da literatura jurídica brasileira variam na razão do conceito aberto de 'interesse da companhia', articulado de acordo com a posição da parte representada pelo advogado. Arbitrariamente concebidas como formais ou substancias, tais interpretações cuidam do momento de violação do interesse da companhia, respectivamente, visando proibir ou garantir o exercício de voto do interessado por meio de entendimentos convenientes ao tempo do litígio. Diante deste comprometimento do raciocínio abstrato com a prática da advocacia, sugere-se a abordagem do tema por outra proposta teórica, vinculada a uma noção específica do Direito. Compreendido como um provedor de informações relevantes aos interessados nas operações das empresas, ele atua na regulação dos dados exigidos destas sociedades e na confecção das informações produzidas individualmente por elas. Tal transparência, junto das regras que vinculam o mercado, forma o conteúdo conceitual da expressão governança corporativa, desenvolvido em torno da proposta chamada de 'sistema de governança corporativa'. A interpretação das informações dos diversos possíveis sistemas deve oferecer ao tomador de decisão a chance de conhecer os seus poderes, prerrogativas, incentivos, competências, limitações e proibições, de modo a avaliar se a sua escolha é uma boa prática de governo da empresa, segundo o sistema no qual ela opera. Aos terceiros interessados, deve servir para verificar se o processo decisório segue o esperado pelo ambiente negocial que o sistema de governança delineia. No tema do conflito de interesses, a sugestão de pensar o problema por esta noção do Direito visa respaldar a criação e divulgação de regras próprias pelas empresas listadas, as quais alimentem o aludido sistema de governança e sirvam à tomada de decisões que orientem o alinhamento dos objetivos dissonantes envolvidos na companhia, sem que haja a necessidade de recorrer ao arbitramento externo. O trabalho empírico se debruça então nos estudos destas regras particulares aplicáveis às transações entre partes relacionadas, tais mecanismos são colhidos nos formulários de referência das 100 companhias mais líquidas da BM&FBovespa no ano de 2011. Os resultados mostram que apenas 6% das empresas possuem procedimentos para identificar as relações conflituosas decorrentes da modalidade negocial estudada e 29% para tratar o problema. Os números relativos às sociedades que estabelecem regras para a administração dos conflitos de interesses nas deliberações de assembleia geral e conselho de administração também são baixos, respectivamente, 7% e 13% apresentam mecanismos de identificação, 4% e 11% para o seu tratamento. A baixa frequência mostrada pelos resultados à luz da proposta teórica construída identifica uma oportunidade, qual seja, a de pensar a mitigação do problema por esta via particular e extrajudicial.

近年來我國屢次爆發掏空公司資產之弊案，而細究其掏空之方式，多係藉由公司之交易行為，將公司資產不法輸送予特定人士。我們不難發現這些特定人士時常某程度與公司之董事或控制股東，具有一定之利害關係，甚至這些特定人士即為董事或控制股東本身。正因如此，關係人交易在我國公司治理議題上逐漸受到重視，並引起廣泛之討論，尤其針對具有董事或控制股東身分之人。由於此兩類身分之人同時具有掌握公司資訊及影響公司經營決策之權力，更易藉此方式自公司謀取私利。 我國對於關係人交易下董事之義務，雖已有規範，然而自比較法之觀點，美國法對此部分顯然較我國完備，不僅對於關係人交易設有事前之董事行為標準，並且對於符合行為標準之關係人交易，給予董事安全港之保護。同時，配合司法實務上所發展之司法審查標準，採取寬嚴不一的審查模式，使董事得於關係人交易中合理預測訴訟風險。一方面可降低關係人交易中非常規交易發生之可能性，另一方面亦不至於全然扼殺關係人交易在現代經濟社會中產生之正面價值。我國法之董事義務既是繼受英美法上受任人義務之概念，因此本文嘗試分析美國法中關於關係人交易之相關規定，希冀做為我國修法之參考以求法制之完備。 又我國現行公司法在控制股東義務方面，似存在重大之法律漏洞。尤其在關係人交易下，有心人士為規避擔任董事可能帶來之相關義務，轉而選擇置身於幕後，成為不具董事身分卻實際掌握公司經營決策權之控制股東。此無疑對於欲利用關係人交易不法掏空公司之人，開啟方便之大門。事實上，在英國及美國法上對於控制股東在特定情況下課予如同公司董事一般之受任人義務，而本文則將其焦點限縮在關係人交易下控制股東之義務，經由整理分析英美兩國法制上之條文、學說及重要判決，以期建構出我國規範關係人交易下控制股東義務之依據。