This thesis explores how people struggle to make livable lives in the conditions of existence of seeking asylum in the UK. The study is based on ethnographic research, conversations and participant observation, with people seeking asylum in Manchester. Grounding the research in their narratives is a contribution to decolonizing knowledge and doing justice to the sentience of people who are marginalized and pathologized. The narratives are brought into dialogue with feminist and decolonial philosophy and political theory, and with empirical studies of 'refugeedom' from a number of disciplines, to produce a new field of connection from which to map the terrain involved in theorizing livability. While the whole thesis seeks to respond to the narratives, there is a detailed focus on three dimensions which participants emphasize as crucial to livability: settlement in Manchester; the prohibition of employment; the asylum application procedures. These are moments in which livability is claimed as both ethics and practice. From the perspective of the narratives and the ethics which permeate them, livability opens up into questions of recognition, social justice and care. People claim commonality: recognition as human, equality and inclusion in social goods, and care in public settings. These are the practical and ethical supports of livability. The narratives point also towards critiques of 'refugeedom', the policies and practices that form the discursive and material conditions within which people seeking asylum attempt to make livable lives.

This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable when the pregnancy is a result of rape (but only during the first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of acquiring any human characteristics other than basic biological properties. Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belief and sentiments. It is argued that all living beings have some right to life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the suitable comparison criterion when comparing beings of different species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same species. The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more precise. / Philosophy, Practical and Systemic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

Dans cette thèse, nous partons des grands principes de justice pour démontrer la nécessité d’octroyer aux êtres sensibles nonhumains les droits moraux et légaux les plus fondamentaux. Dans un premier temps, nous nous penchons sur les principes sous-jacents aux droits fondamentaux de la personne : le principe d’égalité voulant que les cas similaires soient traités de manière similaire; la notion de droit fondamental, qui repose sur celle d’intérêt; le principe de l’égale considération des intérêts auquel mène le principe d’égalité; et, enfin, le concept d’intérêt, qui s’applique à tous les êtres sensibles. Cette première partie établit l’exigence d’accorder les droits les plus fondamentaux à tous les êtres possédant les intérêts que ces droits visent à protéger. Cela permet d’étudier trois droits particuliers et les intérêts qui les sous-tendent en examinant d’abord le droit à l'intégrité physique. Nous montrons que de nombreux animaux nonhumains sont des êtres sensibles, que tous les êtres sensibles ont, par définition, intérêt à ne pas souffrir et que, pour cette raison, ils devraient jouir du droit à l’intégrité physique. Le troisième chapitre est consacré au droit à la vie. Nous soutenons qu’il est raisonnable de supposer que tous les êtres sensibles, parce qu’ils peuvent jouir des bonnes choses de la vie, ont un certain intérêt à persévérer dans leur existence, intérêt qui, peu importe son intensité ou sa nature, doit être protégé par l’égal droit de vivre. Notre dernier chapitre se concentre sur le droit à la liberté. Nous montrons que cet intérêt est généralement interprété négativement et ne consiste qu’à pouvoir agir sans subir d’interférence. Nous soutenons que cette acception du concept de liberté nous force à reconnaître l’intérêt à être libre de tous les êtres sensibles et notre devoir de leur accorder un droit à la liberté. Nous ajoutons finalement que l’interprétation républicaine de la liberté nous incite à reconnaître à tous ces animaux un statut égal à celui des humains. Nous terminons cette réflexion en concluant que l'octroi des droits fondamentaux aux animaux sensibles implique que l’exploitation animale institutionalisée soit abandonnée et que les animaux conscients jouissent du statut de personne. / In this thesis, I use well-established principles of justice to demonstrate that there exists no valid moral reason to deny nonhuman sentient beings the most fundamental moral and legal rights. I begin by going over the principles that will inform my discussion of these basic rights. I examine the principle of equality, which requires that similar cases be treated similarly; the notion of fundamental right, which is based on the concept of interest; the principle of equal consideration of interests, which the principle of equality entails; and, finally, the concept of interest, which is applicable to all sentient beings. This first section establishes the necessity of attributing the most fundamental rights to all beings who possess the basic interests these rights are designed to protect. I then delve into an examination of the three most fundamental rights and the interests underlying these. First, I discuss the right to physical integrity, demonstrating that numerous nonhuman animals are sentient beings, and that all sentient beings, by definition, have an interest in not suffering. Second, I examine the right to life. I argue that it is reasonable to assume that every sentient being, because he or she can benefit from the good things in life, has a certain interest in his or her continued existence. This interest, regardless of its intensity or nature, deserves to be protected by an equal right to life. Third, I establish that the interest in being free is generally interpreted negatively; it simply consists of having the ability to act without interference. I argue that based on this conceptualization of liberty, all sentient beings have an interest in being free. I go on to explore the republican interpretation of freedom, suggesting that it provides further grounds for the recognition that nonuhuman sentient beings also have an interest in benefiting from the same moral and legal status as human beings. I conclude that granting the right to physical integrity, life and freedom to all sentient beings implies that we abandon all forms of institutionalized animal exploitation and that we give to all conscious beings the equal status of person.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Sandro Cavalcanti Rollo.pdf: 1748974 bytes, checksum: 1aae6dc120b3930557bc1edfe1d86d22 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-07 / In the last ten years some writs of habeas corpus have been filed, in Brazil and in other countries, on behalf of great primates. It is a matter of constitutional order and one more instrument utilized for activists for the recognition of the Animal s Rights. This slope, even if generates many controversies, is coming neatly bigger in the past few years, as we can verify throughout the doctrinal and jurisprudential production. The sentience always have been the central element inside the debates evolving the rela-tionship between humans and other animals. Scientific progress that have finding the impressive genetic closeness among us and the great primates, boosted the requests of habeas corpus on behalf of the latter. The grant of the order and, consequently, the admission of rights to the animals generates countless questionings. If the humankind proceeds in the path of the emancipatory trajectory and after receiving all human be-ings in their moral community, could receive , what seems to be the last frontier, the animals, many questionings should be subject of analysis, that already derives from the own grant of the writ to the anthropoids. So, what animals, which rights, what cri-teria to concede them, what judicial instruments must be used to protect them, what is the consequence for humans of the acknowledgment of the Animals Rights and what criteria should be utilized in a conflict of interests between human animals and nonhu-man animals, are some of the largely complex questionings that will be subject of re-flection in the present work / Nos últimos 10 anos vem sendo impetrados, no Brasil e em outros países, habeas corpus em favor de grandes primatas. Trata-se a ação constitucional de mais um ins-trumento utilizado por ativistas para o reconhecimento dos Direitos Animais. Esta ver-tente, ainda que geradora de polêmicas, vem nitidamente crescendo ao longo dos últimos anos, como se verifica através da produção doutrinaria, legislativa e jurispru-dencial. A senciência sempre foi elemento central dentro dos debates envolvendo a relação humanos e demais animais. Os avanços científicos que constataram a im-pressionante proximidade genética entre os nós e os grandes primatas impulsionaram as demandas de habeas corpus em favor deles. A concessão da ordem e a conse-quente admissão de direitos aos animais geram inúmeros questionamentos. Caso a humanidade continue na sua trajetória emancipatória e, depois de acolher todos os seres humanos em sua comunidade moral, acolha, o que parece ser a última fronteira, os animais, várias questões deverão ser objeto de análise, que já derivam da própria concessão do writ aos antropoides. Assim, quais animais, quais direitos, qual critério para concedê-los, quais instrumentos jurídicos para protegê-los, qual a consequência para os humanos do reconhecimento dos Direitos Animais e qual critério a ser utilizado em conflito de interesses entre animais humanos e animais não humanos, são algu-mas das altamente complexas questões que serão objeto de reflexão no presente trabalho

Dans cette thèse, nous partons des grands principes de justice pour démontrer la nécessité d’octroyer aux êtres sensibles nonhumains les droits moraux et légaux les plus fondamentaux. Dans un premier temps, nous nous penchons sur les principes sous-jacents aux droits fondamentaux de la personne : le principe d’égalité voulant que les cas similaires soient traités de manière similaire; la notion de droit fondamental, qui repose sur celle d’intérêt; le principe de l’égale considération des intérêts auquel mène le principe d’égalité; et, enfin, le concept d’intérêt, qui s’applique à tous les êtres sensibles. Cette première partie établit l’exigence d’accorder les droits les plus fondamentaux à tous les êtres possédant les intérêts que ces droits visent à protéger. Cela permet d’étudier trois droits particuliers et les intérêts qui les sous-tendent en examinant d’abord le droit à l'intégrité physique. Nous montrons que de nombreux animaux nonhumains sont des êtres sensibles, que tous les êtres sensibles ont, par définition, intérêt à ne pas souffrir et que, pour cette raison, ils devraient jouir du droit à l’intégrité physique. Le troisième chapitre est consacré au droit à la vie. Nous soutenons qu’il est raisonnable de supposer que tous les êtres sensibles, parce qu’ils peuvent jouir des bonnes choses de la vie, ont un certain intérêt à persévérer dans leur existence, intérêt qui, peu importe son intensité ou sa nature, doit être protégé par l’égal droit de vivre. Notre dernier chapitre se concentre sur le droit à la liberté. Nous montrons que cet intérêt est généralement interprété négativement et ne consiste qu’à pouvoir agir sans subir d’interférence. Nous soutenons que cette acception du concept de liberté nous force à reconnaître l’intérêt à être libre de tous les êtres sensibles et notre devoir de leur accorder un droit à la liberté. Nous ajoutons finalement que l’interprétation républicaine de la liberté nous incite à reconnaître à tous ces animaux un statut égal à celui des humains. Nous terminons cette réflexion en concluant que l'octroi des droits fondamentaux aux animaux sensibles implique que l’exploitation animale institutionalisée soit abandonnée et que les animaux conscients jouissent du statut de personne. / In this thesis, I use well-established principles of justice to demonstrate that there exists no valid moral reason to deny nonhuman sentient beings the most fundamental moral and legal rights. I begin by going over the principles that will inform my discussion of these basic rights. I examine the principle of equality, which requires that similar cases be treated similarly; the notion of fundamental right, which is based on the concept of interest; the principle of equal consideration of interests, which the principle of equality entails; and, finally, the concept of interest, which is applicable to all sentient beings. This first section establishes the necessity of attributing the most fundamental rights to all beings who possess the basic interests these rights are designed to protect. I then delve into an examination of the three most fundamental rights and the interests underlying these. First, I discuss the right to physical integrity, demonstrating that numerous nonhuman animals are sentient beings, and that all sentient beings, by definition, have an interest in not suffering. Second, I examine the right to life. I argue that it is reasonable to assume that every sentient being, because he or she can benefit from the good things in life, has a certain interest in his or her continued existence. This interest, regardless of its intensity or nature, deserves to be protected by an equal right to life. Third, I establish that the interest in being free is generally interpreted negatively; it simply consists of having the ability to act without interference. I argue that based on this conceptualization of liberty, all sentient beings have an interest in being free. I go on to explore the republican interpretation of freedom, suggesting that it provides further grounds for the recognition that nonuhuman sentient beings also have an interest in benefiting from the same moral and legal status as human beings. I conclude that granting the right to physical integrity, life and freedom to all sentient beings implies that we abandon all forms of institutionalized animal exploitation and that we give to all conscious beings the equal status of person.

This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable when the pregnancy is a result of rape (but only during the first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of acquiring any human characteristics other than basic biological properties. Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belief and sentiments. It is argued that all living beings have some right to life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the suitable comparison criterion when comparing beings of different species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same species. The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more precise. / Philosophy, Practical and Systemic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

Given the state of the planet at present —specifically, the linked global ecological and economic crises that conjure dark imaginings and nihilistic actualities of increasing resource depletion, poisonings, and wide-scale sufferings and extinctions—I ask What might we hope now? What points of intervention offer possibility for transformation? At best, the response can only be partial. The approach this thesis takes initiates from specific pre-discursive assumptions. The first understands current conditions as having been produced, and continuing to be so, through practices that enact and sustain neoliberal relations. Secondly, these practices are expressive of a subjectivity tied to a Cartesian worldview, which, therefore, needs to be interrupted at its foundational roots. Thirdly, the scaffolding that supports this subjectivity draws on Newtonian science and neo-Darwinian narratives deemed to be natural law and, therefore, ontological, immutable reality. Contrary to modernist thinking, I premise that these two strains, subjectivity and science, are neither autonomous nor ontological, but that they are materially and contingently integral. Finally, this thesis presumes that different and life-affirming trajectories are, in fact, desired. An integral framing of science and subjectivity provides a productive method of feminist science studies analysis and theorization. Observing the capitalist Western social imaginary through this lens reveals its philosophical and scientific infrastructures to be outdated and crumbling. Observing how emerging scientific narratives in quantum physics and systems-biology intersect with marginalized theories in process-philosophy and subjectivity reveals a life-affirming imaginary of difference, one that arrests nihilism and sets ethical trajectories in motion. Certain, though not all, percepts of feminist new materialism engage twentieth and twenty-first century sciences successfully to show that ethicality matters. Though many questions remain, this points auspiciously towards the possibility for a transformed politics of justice.

No description available.

Les animaux, longtemps considérés comme des êtres appartenant au régime juridique des biens, tendent aujourd’hui à s’éloigner de cette catégorie. Si en France le droit leur refuse le statut de personne non-humaine, la qualification d’être sensible leur est toutefois attribuée et reconnue. Cette singularité juridique – où l’animal est à la fois un être vivant et appartient à la catégorie juridique des biens – a fait l’objet de nombreux travaux, et certains chercheurs sont parvenus à résoudre ces paradoxes. Toutefois, si l’animal a été abondamment abordé sous le prisme du droit privé, peu de travaux spécialisés ou d’ensemble ont été menés en droit public. Pourtant, il semble que l’étude de l’animal en droit public apporte des questionnements et des réponses tout aussi intéressantes. C’est ainsi que la présente thèse, « L’animal en droit public », a suivi deux choix principaux et complémentaires : celui de l’inventaire, puis celui de la théorisation. Enfin, le droit public offre de nouvelles perspectives dans la réalisation d’un véritable droit de l’animal. Cette construction, qui a pour principal résultat d’apporter de nouveaux éléments de déréification, et d’éviter certaines incohérences, permettrait une mise en avant des intérêts animaliers, notamment en les assimilant à un nouvel ordre sociétal à protéger ou en apportant une nouvelle approche dans la personnification des animaux. En outre, l’étude du droit public comparé nous offre des perspectives différentes dans la défense de la cause animale, notamment par le biais de la constitution / Animals, which for a long time were legally classified as property, are nowadays beginning to be recategorised. Even if French law denies them the status of non-human persons, they are nonetheless recognized as being sentient. This legal oddity, in which animals are at one and the same time both living beings and property, has been the subject of numerous studies, and certain researchers have succeeded in resolving these paradoxes. However, if the status of animals has been frequently examined from a legal angle, little specific or overall research has been undertaken in the domain of public law. And yet, it appears that the study of animals in public law raises questions and answers that are equally interesting. That is why the present thesis, « Animals in public law », follows two main, complementary choices: that of being an inventory, and that of theorizing. Charting, first of all, the reality of the situation seems essential in order to facilitate doctrinal or jurisprudential interpretation. Secondly, this study has made possible the theorizing of certain judicial questions. Finally, public law offers new perspectives for the creating of a true system of laws concerning animals. This work, whose main outcome is to contribute new elements to dereification and to avoid certain inconsistences, would foreground animal interests – notably by placing animals in a new societal order to be protected, or by setting forth a new approach to the personification of animals. Moreover, the study of comparative public law offers us different perspectives in the defence of animal rights – notably through the constitution

This thesis examines nonhuman phenomenological experiences, communication, and sensory perception in Barbara Gowdy’s The White Bone. Drawing on literary and pedagogical theories by Roman Bartosch, Monika Fludernik, Marco Caracciolo, David Herman, and Judith Langer, the thesis argues that Gowdy’s novel employs narrative strategies and devices that involve nonhuman experientiality evoked from sensorial configurations, narration, and textual cognitive and embodied experiences. These represented experiences disrupt human primacy by establishing a disorientation that challenges the anthropocentric bias in the novel and decenters the human reader. Moreover, the thesis offers suggestions for using the novel in conjunction with envisionment building to discuss animal alterity and anthropocentrism in the Swedish EFL classroom.