Recent German literature and film reflect (on) the loss of promise for both self and societal realization under not one but two ideological regimes: socialism and capitalism. The socialist utopia never arrived; was the capitalist meritocracy ever there? The guarantee of some kind of telos—an endpoint, a ‘good life,’ towards which everyday life was supposed to be going—has thus been frustrated on two historical fronts. I take this parallel as grounds for juxtaposition across historical, affective and aesthetic lines, investigating the waning of teleological promise in the final two decades of the GDR and the last twenty years of 21st century Germany. I present the ‘post-teleological’ as a concept for trans-ideological and cross-temporal comparison, offering a new lens through which to draw texts into unconventional comparative constellations. The questions that this concept raises are the following: how do literature and film translate the affective experience of ideology’s failing persuasive power as aesthetic experiences? How does a juxtaposition of disparate contexts further our understanding of individual works’ break with hegemonic conventions to deliver critique? And how do discrete formal strategies pass comment on the movement (or non-movement) of history? I interrogate literary works by Brigitte Reimann, Irmtraud Morgner, Kathrin Röggla and Shida Bazyar, and films by Konrad Wolf, Evelyn Schmidt, Christian Petzold and Valeska Grisebach, to track the arc of ideological promise’s decline across both periods. I query what affective and aesthetic practices may follow the sense of stasis which accompanies the disappearance of an alternative to neoliberal capitalism.

El propósito de esta tesina consiste en realizar un análisis literario y filosófico de la novela La familia de Pascual Duarte, escrita por Camilo José Cela. En esta investigación se busca explorar los principios éticos y morales presentes en la ética nicomáquea de Aristóteles, destacando conceptos fundamentales como la felicidad, la virtud, la justicia y la prudencia. Posteriormente, se analizará la conexión entre estos principios filosóficos y las acciones y decisiones del protagonista de la novela, Pascual Duarte. / The purpose of this essay is to conduct a literary and philosophical analysis of the novel La familia de Pascual Duarte, written by Camilo José Cela. This research aims to explore the ethical and moral principles found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, emphasizing fundamental concepts such as happiness, virtue, justice and prudence. Subsequently, the connection between these philosophical principles and the actions and decisions of the novel's protagonist, Pascual Duarte, will be analysed.

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C’est au tournant des années 1990 que Paul Ricœur s’est intéressé à Théorie de la justice de John Rawls. Tout en étant fondamentalement en accord avec la valeur morale, déontologique et politique des principes de justice de Rawls, Ricœur s’oppose à l’approche « purement procédurale » de la justice pour les institutions telle qu’elle se développe à l’aide de l’interprétation rawlsienne de la théorie du contrat social. Si l’approche déontologique de la justice comme équité priorise une conception formelle de la justice pour les institutions, elle ne peut toutefois pas, selon Ricœur, s’affranchir des fondements téléologiques qui justifient la formulation et le choix rationnel des principes rawlsiens. En reprenant l’argumentaire de Théorie de la justice, Ricœur relève la dépendance de la procédure formelle de Rawls à une série de présupposés éthiques fondamentaux qui justifient téléologiquement la rationalité des principes. Ces présuppositions ne mettent pas en ruine la position de Rawls, au contraire, ils relèvent d’une circularité « naturelle » propre à la problématique de la distribution des biens sociaux (justice distributive), indispensable à l’élaboration d’une conception politique de la justice et à l’intelligence démocratique du contrat social. Contre la démonstration empirique de la procédure formelle de la « position originelle » sous le « voile d’ignorance » à partir de laquelle devrait résulter le choix rationnel et unanime des principes de justice, Ricœur propose de rétablir la primauté du sens de la justice pour le sujet de droit/contractant. Sans réfuter la priorité déontologique des principes de justice pour les institutions, Ricœur veut rétablir la valeur éthique de la justice pour les individus à partir d’une herméneutique du soi et d’une anthropologie philosophique qui posent le besoin de l’institution au sein même de la constitution du sujet à « vivre une vie bonne, avec et pour autrui, dans des institutions justes ». / At the turn of the 1990s, Paul Ricœur became interested in John Rawls' Theory of Justice. While fundamentally agreeing with the moral, deontological, and political value of Rawls' principles of justice, Ricœur opposes the "purely procedural" approach to justice for institutions as developed through Rawls' interpretation of social contract theory. If the deontological approach to justice as equity prioritizes a formal conception of justice for institutions, it cannot, however, according to Ricœur, break free from the teleological foundations that justify the formulation and rational choice of Rawlsian principles. Returning to the argument of Theory of Justice, Ricœur identifies the dependence of Rawls' formal procedure based on a series of fundamental ethical presuppositions that teleologically justify the rationality of the principles. These presuppositions do not undermine Rawls' position; on the contrary, they are part of a "natural" circularity specific to the issue of the distribution of social goods (distributive justice), a process which is indispensable in the elaboration of a political conception of justice and in the democratic understanding of the social contract. Against the empirical demonstration of the formal procedure of the "original position" under the "veil of ignorance" from which the rational and unanimous choice of the principles of justice should result, Ricœur proposes to re-establish the primacy of the sense of justice for those subjected to law/contractors. Without refuting the deontological priority of principles of justice for institutions, Ricœur aspires to restore the ethical value of justice for individuals from a hermeneutic of the self and a philosophical anthropology that posits the need for the institution within the very constitution of the subject to "live a good life, with and for others, in just institutions”.

Modern humour appears to initiate the deconstruction of modern correspondence thinking. A close examination shows the opposite, namely that modern humour forms part of correspondence thought in a complicated reciprocal relationship of disruption and support. Ironically, humour is particularly suited to explicating the deconstruction of correspondence thinking in poststructuralist language theories by being prone to refute cornerstone principles of modernism such as truth, rationality, reliability and permanence. This dissertation focuses on the exceptional suitability of humour to adapt to the loss of the centre and to demonstrate the shift from the modernist ontological approach to the postmodernist creative metaphorical approach to art. Humour, like metaphor, reinvents meaning rather than discovers it; it remains open-ended instead of offering closure. It becomes a valid creative option and enters a new dynamic into a postmodern culture of play where truth and meaning remain infinitely suspended in an ungrounded state of possibility. / Art History, Visual Arts & Music / M.A. (Visual Arts)

Over the past thirty years, academic dialogues on the relationships between the sciences and religions have flourished, albeit primarily within Judeo-Christian historical, theological and philosophical contexts. Can a Hindu tradition be brought into this dialogue? The Bhagavata Purana is one of the most well-known sacred texts of India, and biology, Darwinism in particular, has become one of the most spirited areas of the science and religion dialogue in academia, as well as in the popular media. This thesis examines the possibility, scope and foundational topics involved in a dialogue between Vaisnava-Hindu theology as found in the Bhāgavata, and the theoretical, philosophical and theological issues surrounding contemporary biology. To examine the possibility and scope of a Bhāgavata-science dialogue, I focus on the theological, ontological, epistemological and teleological presuppositions that each tradition bring to the study of nature, outlining the similarities and differences in their approaches. I establish the grounds for further discussion through a comparative analysis of terms such as "consciousness," "knowledge" and "goal of knowledge" as they appear in the Bhagavata and noteworthy Darwinian texts. My argument is that although prima facie the two traditions appear different in their philosophical, scientific and theological approaches, there are a number of areas of common interest and parallels, especially in their epistemologies and teleologies. In the case of genuine differences, such as their views on the ontology of consciousness, I demonstrate the possibility of reconciliation. Clarifying the conceptual differences, establishing parallels and demonstrating areas of common interests opens the possibility and widens the scope for further dialogue.

L’objectif de cette thèse est de proposer une caractérisation du bien propre des touts écologiques, comme les communautés biotiques et les écosystèmes, dont peut être dérivée une notion de ce qui est bon pour eux. Ceci vise à défendre les deux principales approches holistes en éthique de l’environnement, c’est-à-dire l’approche pragmatiste défendue par Bryan G. Norton et l’approche écocentriste défendue par J. Baird Callicott, contre certaines objections ayant été soulevées contre elles, faisant valoir l’impossibilité pour les écosystèmes d’avoir un bien propre. Cette thèse répond à ces objections en mobilisant plusieurs ressources théoriques issues de la philosophie de la biologie et de la méta-éthique. Ces ressources sont notamment celles fournies par les discussions sur les notions de fonction et de santé en philosophie de la biologie, celles fournies par les conceptions néo-aristotéliciennes de la normativité en méta-éthique, et celles offertes par les discussions de philosophie de l’écologie sur le holisme et le réductionnisme, sur l’idée d’équilibre de la nature, et sur le concept de santé écosystémique. Cette thèse mobilise ces ressources afin d’élaborer les fondements philosophiques des notions de fonction écologique et de santé écosystémique, desquelles est dérivée une caractérisation du bien propre des écosystèmes. / The goal of this dissertation is to defend the view that ecological wholes, such as biotic communities and ecosystems, have a good of their own, from which an idea of what is good for them can be derived. This aims to respond to the common criticism addressed to the two main holistic approaches to environmental ethics, namely Bryan G. Norton’s pragmatist approach and John Baird Callicott’s ecocentrist approach, which argues that biotic communities and ecosystems have no such good. This dissertation addresses those objections by mobilizing theoretical resources taken from the philosophy of biology and metaethics. In particular, those theoretical resources come from studies about the notions of function and health in the philosophy of biology, from neo-aristotelian accounts of normativity in metaethics, and from discussions in the philosophy of ecology on holism and reductionism, the balance of nature idea, and the concept of ecosystem health. Those resources are mobilized to elaborate some philosophical foundations for the notions of ecological function and ecosystem health, from which an account of the good of ecosystems is derived.

In dieser Arbeit werden verschiedene Entwicklungsmodelle des Menschen vorgestellt und in ihrem Gebrauch in und für die Pädagogik kritisch reflektiert. Zunächst werden Vorüberlegungen zur Etymologie und Systematik der Begriffe Entwicklung (zwischen Natur und Kultur) und Modell (gegenüber Theorie, Simulation und Schema) angestellt. Anhand des Gangs von Beispiel zu Beispiel (Günther Buck) werden jeweils die Entwicklungsmodelle des Menschen von Rudolf Steiner, Maria Montessori, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Erik Erikson und Werner Loch kritisch dargestellt und problematisiert. Es schließen sich bildungs- und erziehungstheoretische Überlegungen an, wie das Phänomen der Entwicklung heute in angemessener Weise behandelt werden kann. Anhand der dargestellten Modelle zeigt sich, dass nur ein von absoluter Teleologie und Linearität befreiter Entwicklungsbegriff mit modernen Vorstellungen pädagogischer Anthropologie und Ethik kompatibel sein kann. Deswegen können Entwicklungsmodelle lediglich eine veranschaulichende oder regulierende Funktion ausüben. Sie stehen jedoch so zumeist im Widerspruch zu den grundlegenden Momenten der freien Bildsamkeit und Mitbestimmung des Einzelnen im Erziehungsprozess. Eine Rehabilitation des Entwicklungsdenkens erweist sich dennoch als sinnvoll, da dieser in der Lage ist, auf die komplexe Genealogie menschlichen Lebens und die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen pädagogischer Einsätze zu verweisen. / The issue of developmental models of human beings and their implementation in both pedagogical practice and theory are critically reflected within this thesis. In the beginning, preliminary considerations of the etymology and systematization of development (between nature and nurture) and model (as opposed to theory, simulation, scheme) are framed. Based on Günther Bucks''s approach (from „Beispiel“ to „Beispiel“) several developmental models by Rudolf Steiner, Maria Montessori, Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Erik Erikson and Werner Loch are critically examined. Subsequently, considerations on addressing the phenomenon of development from the perspective of education theory and „Bildung“ in an appropriate contemporary way are given expression. On the basis of the outlined models it is depicted that only a concept of development that is exempt from absolute teleology and linearity can be compatible with modern ideas of educational anthropology and ethics. Hence, developmental models may only serve visualizing and regulating purposes. They often contradict fundamental principles such as „Bildsamkeit“ (the ability and necessity of self-forming) and participation within the process of education. Nevertheless, the rehabilitation of development thinking proves beneficial due to its ability to indicate the complex genealogy of human life and the opportunities as well as limitations of pedagogical actions.

Modern humour appears to initiate the deconstruction of modern correspondence thinking. A close examination shows the opposite, namely that modern humour forms part of correspondence thought in a complicated reciprocal relationship of disruption and support. Ironically, humour is particularly suited to explicating the deconstruction of correspondence thinking in poststructuralist language theories by being prone to refute cornerstone principles of modernism such as truth, rationality, reliability and permanence. This dissertation focuses on the exceptional suitability of humour to adapt to the loss of the centre and to demonstrate the shift from the modernist ontological approach to the postmodernist creative metaphorical approach to art. Humour, like metaphor, reinvents meaning rather than discovers it; it remains open-ended instead of offering closure. It becomes a valid creative option and enters a new dynamic into a postmodern culture of play where truth and meaning remain infinitely suspended in an ungrounded state of possibility. / Art History, Visual Arts and Music / M.A. (Visual Arts)