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企業在彼此競爭以爭食市場大餅時，除了須要持續監控外部商機，積極掌握市場脈動，並推出符合其需求的商品以滿足顧客需求之外、也須要有效率地運用有限資源，妥善處理如採購、資金規畫、廠房設置乃迄於人員調派等各類非屬核心的支援性創價活動，綜言之，即透過高效率的公司治理，才有可能達成永續經營的終極目標。本研究透過個案研究，利用個案公司– A公司各類資料，以公司治理之理論架構為基礎，據此深度觀察A公司所採取之各類關鍵策略、行動和結果，乃迄於最終的財務面經營績效，據此釐清決定個案公司經營績效的關鍵失敗因素，以及公司治理在其中發揮的功能，作為實務界的參考。 本研究針對A公司2003年至2008年發展及決策進行深入探討，據此瞭解A公司為何2006甫上櫃，2008年就因資金周轉不靈而跳票下櫃。經研析後，可得知A公司在2003年至2008年之間，遭遇以下各類關鍵經營問題： 1.本業經營績效逐年下滑 2.投資規劃過於樂觀，未考量當不如預期時對公司之可能影響。 3.對新產品營收過於樂觀，未考量由於新產品送樣期過長，產線建置過早，致使相關設備閒置。 由於A公司管理階層與外部股東之間存在「帝國建立」的代理矛盾，再加上A公司的董事長兼任總經理，因此具有「所有權與經營權重疊」現象。此時則A公司便極有可能因為負責人「帝國建立」的傾向，導致決策失誤，進而危害到公司所有利害關係人之利益。本研究利用中華公司治理協會所提出之公司治理實地評量表進行研析，亦得知造成A公司跳票下櫃之主要原因在於其未積極「強化董事會職能」，並未強化「管理階層的紀律與溝通」。 由於A公司管理階層具有「帝國建立」傾向，再加上A公司由於未能保持「經營權與所有權分離」，並「強化董事會職能」、「強化管理階層的紀律與溝通」，終而使得「本業經營績效逐年下滑」，但仍於短時間內進行大量投資，終而使得「投資過速且投資標的所產生之現金流量過少、速度過慢，投資效益未能顯現」等兩類原因，最終因跳票而黯然下櫃。 關鍵字：公司治理、董事會職能、被動元件產業 / Firms shall efficiently allocate limited internal resources, dealing with all kinds of activities including procurement, capital planning, etc. so as to raise up chances of effective competition against other competitors. In others words, firms must rely on effective company governance to assure sustainable development & profitability. Based on company governance related theory & structure, the paper pays attention to conducting cases study method on Company A. Via in-depth digging how Company A performed during the period of 2003 to 2008, why Company A over-invested during 2003 – 2008, why Board of Directors didn’t function well so as to correct the causing-disaster decision by kinds of analyses, this paper finds out below reasons to cause Company A to be delisted in 2008: 1.Performance of core business (manufacturing and sales of ferrite core) getting worse gradually. 2.Over-investment due to overconfidence regarding internal resources allocation. 3.Overconfidence regarding sales of new product. The root causes why Company made above mistakes could be generalized as below list: 1.“Empire Building” agency conflict existed between managers and stockholders. 2.The un-separation of Ownership and control. 3.Independent directors of Board of Directors don’t function well to provide insightful, effective-monitoring opinions. Managers are under loose monitoring of Board of Directors. 4.There is little discipline regarding how managers behave in daily operation and critical decision making. Keyword: Company governance, Board of Directors, Passive Component Industry

L’objectif de ce travail de recherche consiste à déterminer l’impact du comité d’audit sur la performance financière des PME libanaises. Ceci dit que l’objectif consiste aussi à étudier l’influence du système de gouvernance sur l’indépendance du comité d’audit. Les variables mobilisées sont relatives aux caractéristiques du conseil d’administration et du comité d’audit. A cela s’ajoute, trois déterminants qui sont relatifs à l’indépendance du comité d’audit, la structure du conseil d’administration et l’impact du système dual. A titre indicatif la rentabilité des PME est relatée notamment à partir des rapports annuels. L’échantillon comprend 58 PME libanaises et l’étude s’étale sur une période de 4 ans, à savoir entre 2011 et 2014. Les résultats font apparaître que le comité d’audit peine à avoir une indépendance totale. Cela peut être expliqué par l’apposement d’un système dual et aussi par le nombre limité au sein du comité. Dans ce sens, le comité d’audit dans les PME libanaises est réprimé notamment à travers le déploiement de ses responsabilités et de sa contribution au niveau de la revue des états financiers. Ce qui s’avère préjudiciable à une meilleure croissance de la performance financière pour les PME / The aim of this research study is to determine the impact of the audit committee on the financial performance of Lebanese SMEs. This research focuses also on the influence of the governance system on the independence of the audit committee. The variables used are related to the characteristics of the board and of the audit committee. Moreover, three other determinants are referred as the independence of the audit committee, the structure of the board and the impact of the dual system in order to bring some elements of answers to our main interrogation. As an indication, SMEs profitability is reported especially from annual reports. The sample includes 58 Lebanese SMEs and the study covers a period of 4 years, from 2011 till 2014. The results show that the audit committee hardly has a total independence. This can be explained by the appeasement of a dual system and also by the presence of a limited number within the committee. In this sense, the audit committee in Lebanese SMEs is repressed and cannot be clearly active through the deployment of its responsibilities and its contribution in reviewing the financial statements. This appears as detrimental to a better growth for the SMEs sector financial performance

Submitted by Marcia Regina Sá de Sousa Meirinho (meirinho.marcia@hotmail.com) on 2016-12-20T13:20:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação versão final 201216.pdf: 1729948 bytes, checksum: 955b08e81fd36b2999a858c9adb32606 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2016-12-21T18:51:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação versão final 201216.pdf: 1729948 bytes, checksum: 955b08e81fd36b2999a858c9adb32606 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-01-04T16:56:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertação versão final 201216.pdf: 1729948 bytes, checksum: 955b08e81fd36b2999a858c9adb32606 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-28 / This study aimed to identify the governance failures that allow the occurrence of fraud, embezzlement as well as financial and reputational losses in listed companies. Therefore, a study of multiple cases was conducted involving five public companies, from which four are traded on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). Data was obtained from interviews with experienced stock market professionals and other secondary sources that were confronted in the light of the Theory of Agency, which examined the relationship between owner and agent or managers. Two critical points were addressed in the interviews: primarily the work of the Board of Directors, which requires higher skills and willingness to deal with strategic issues relevant to the company. The second point was the motivation of agents who at times apply opportunistic practices to benefit themselves at the expense of the company's interests, which in turn creates the need for instruments and mechanisms for monitoring and control of the manager's performance. Corporate governance is not only related to the implementation of good practices and rules, but rather to the most efficient way to enhance decision making in business, so that managers, shareholders and Board of Directors have a voice and unify efforts to bring better results for the company. / Este estudo teve como objetivo identificar as falhas de Governança que possibilitam a ocorrência de fraudes, desvios e perdas financeiras e de reputação em empresas listadas. Para tanto, foi realizado um estudo de casos múltiplos envolvendo cinco empresas de capital aberto, sendo quatro com ações negociadas na Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (BOVESPA). Os dados foram obtidos a partir de entrevistas realizadas com experientes profissionais do mercado de capitais e outras fontes secundárias, que foram confrontados sob a luz da teoria da agência, que analisou a relação do proprietário e do agente ou gestores. Nas entrevistas, dois pontos críticos foram abordados, primeiramente a atuação do Conselho de Administração, que requer maior qualificação e disponibilidade para tratar dos assuntos estratégicos pertinentes à empresa. O segundo ponto foi a motivação dos agentes, que em alguns momentos se utilizam de práticas oportunistas para benefício próprio em detrimento dos interesses da empresa. Este fato, por sua vez, gera a necessidade de criar instrumentos e mecanismos de monitoramento e controle da atuação do gestor. A Governança Corporativa não está relacionada apenas à aplicação de boas práticas e regras, mas sim à maneira mais eficiente encontrada para a tomada de decisão nas empresas, de modo que gestores, acionistas e Conselho de Administração tenham voz e unifiquem os esforços para trazer melhores resultados para a empresa.

Submitted by Navjeet Singh Gill (navjeetgill7@gmail.com) on 2018-02-23T18:00:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2017-18_Navjeet_Gill v6.pdf: 1539898 bytes, checksum: c559bf4e5d8539b1b89e7d6f75555716 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Josineide da Silva Santos Locatelli (josineide.locatelli@fgv.br) on 2018-02-23T18:06:56Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2017-18_Navjeet_Gill v6.pdf: 1539898 bytes, checksum: c559bf4e5d8539b1b89e7d6f75555716 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-02-26T12:51:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2017-18_Navjeet_Gill v6.pdf: 1539898 bytes, checksum: c559bf4e5d8539b1b89e7d6f75555716 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-01-16 / This empirical research examines the relationship between board’s diversity and firm performance, providing a comprehensive quantitative analysis between diversity factors (demographic - gender and race, cognitive - age, education, role and network) and financial factors (ROA, ROE, ROIC, asset turnover and current ratio) in the component companies of the FTSE 100 index. The dataset also includes a wide array of information about 1053 board members. The results indicate that a diverse board positively impacts ROA, ROIC, asset turnover and current ratio but were insignificant for ROE. It proves that diversity leads to better social reputation, performance and financial performance. / Esta pesquisa empírica examina a relação entre a diversidade do conselho e o desempenho da empresa, fornecendo uma análise quantitativa significativa entre os fatores de diversidade (demográfico - gênero e raça, idade cognitiva, educação, papel e rede) e fatores financeiros (ROA, ROE, ROIC, rotatividade de ativos e liquidez geral) nas empresas que compõem o índice FTSE 100. O conjunto de dados também inclui uma ampla gama de informações sobre 1053 membros do conselho. Os resultados indicam que um conselho diversificado impacta positivamente no ROA, ROIC, rotatividade de ativos e liquidez geral, mas são insignificantes para ROE. Isto demonstra que a diversidade leva a uma melhor reputação social, performance e desempenho financeiro.

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas / Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:39:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:47:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:47:54Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-19T17:59:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-16 / The aim of this study is to map the main aspects of corporate governance in Brazil used by publicly traded companies and analyze them from a comparative perspective, contrasting companies that have suffered Private Equity and Venture Capital investment with the remaining public firms. The investigation is a result of the companies that in fact responded to the third version of the Survey on Corporate Governance in Brazil, previously conducted in 2005 and 2007. Analysis of adherence to BM&FBovespa’s corporate governance levels show a significantly greater adherence of the PE/VC backed companies in higher listing levels. Particular characteristics of the corporate governance of companies are detailed in an attempt to determine whether the clear advantage found in the comparison among the premium listing levels extends to other issues. The findings show significant differences in certain areas, i.e. processes of the board of directors, formation of committees, external auditor, shareholders rights, disclosure and compensation of officers and directors, which can be explained by the previous relationship of the backed enterprise, the PE/VC investor and the term sheet agreed upon between the parties.

Corporate governance and executive remuneration are not new phenomena, but have erupted to the forefront of corporate, academic and public attention as a result of a series of well publicized corporate collapses and scandals over the last decade, which have raised both a curiosity of executive remuneration levels, and an awareness of the potential impact of conflicts of interest between owners and executives in modern corporations. Although literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in general is plentiful, there is a lack of comment on the relationships between certain specific components of these two broad constructs. These specific components, such as disclosure, executive remuneration and governance needed to be analysed individually before they could be combined into a whole that explains both their interrelationships with each other and the larger corporate governance sub-system, and ultimately in the corporation, as an organisational system. In view of greater globalisation of the world economy, and the market for executive talent, the consequent reforms in the fields of corporate governance and executive remuneration, as well as the changing competitive dynamics of modern corporations, it was necessary to examine whether traditional theory and regulatory frameworks have kept pace with corporate development. A review of both classic and current literature show vastly different approaches to both executive remuneration and corporate governance mechanisms practiced around the world. There is however a noticeable trend towards convergence of these different sub-systems.The most prominent differences in respect of these sub-systems relate to the extent to which disclosures are made. Some of these issues relate to full or limited disclosure, internal or external corporate governance measures to regulate executive remuneration, and differences in respect of a narrow shareholder focus or broad stakeholder focus of different interests in an organisation. / Business Leadership / Ph.D. (Business Leadership)

Para melhor compreender a estrutura de governança corporativa das instituições financeiras brasileiras, a relação entre dois mecanismos de controle corporativo interno foram estudados: a estrutura de propriedade e o conselho de administração. A utilização destes mecanismos tem como objetivo harmonizar os interesses das partes envolvidas. Dado este objetivo comum, a relação de causalidade estabelecida na eleição dos conselheiros pela assembleia de acionistas origina o interesse em testar se o conselho de administração é uma função da estrutura de pro-priedade. Com este intuito, foram investigadas a concentração de propriedade, a concentração do capital votante, a presença de insider ownership, o tamanho do conselho de administração, o percentual de conselheiros independentes e a dualidade de presidência em 88 instituições financeiras brasileiras, entre 2001 e 2011. Os dados foram analisados com metodologia de dados em painel com efeitos fixos. Os resultados indicaram que algumas características da constituição do conselho de administração são função da estrutura de propriedade. Tanto para o tamanho do conselho de administração, quanto para a independência do conselho de admi-nistração as hipóteses nulas, de que as variáveis insider ownership, concentração de proprie-dade e concentração de capital votante não possuem poder explicativo sobre as variáveis de-pendentes puderam ser rejeitadas Contudo, a relação de causalidade testada não indica neces-sariamente uma relação de equilíbrio para boas práticas de governança corporativa. A escolha arbitrária do conselho de administração pelos acionistas/proprietários pode levar às constituições de conselhos que tragam às instituições financeiras uma imagem de boa governança, cercadas de interesses e delimitadas pelas regras dos órgãos reguladores. / To better understand the corporate governance structure of Brazilian financial institutions, the relationship between two internal corporate control mechanisms were studied: the owner-ship structure and the board. The use of these mechanisms aims to harmonize the interests of the parties involved. Given this common goal, the causal link established in the election of directors by the shareholders' meeting originates interest in testing whether the board is a function of the structure of ownership. To this end, we investigated the concentration of own-ership, the concentration of the voting capital, the presence of insider ownership, the size of the board, the percentage of independent directors and dual presidency in 88 Brazilian finan-cial institutions between 2001 and 2011. Data were analyzed using the methodology of panel data fixed effects. The results indicated that some features of the constitution of the board are a function of ownership structure. So much for the size of the board, and for the independence of the board of administration the null hypothesis, that the insider ownership variables, con-centration of ownership and voting concentration have no explanatory power variables-pending could be rejected, however, the causal tested does not indicate necessarily a bal-anced relation to good corporate governance practices. The arbitrary choice of the board of directors by the shareholders / owners can take to the constitutions of advice to financial in-stitutions to bring an image of good governance, surrounded interests and bounded by the rules of the regulatory bodies.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-23T13:42:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Talles Vianna Brugni.pdf: 721436 bytes, checksum: 6bd0ac2e99ae79537188486886dc8603 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-04 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O presente trabalho teve por objetivo identificar quais os principais atributos que caracterizam conselhos de administração no Brasil, permitindo assim uma melhor compreensão das suas influências no mercado de capitais. Identificou-se que existe um alto grau de correlação entre as 31 características analisadas, sugerindo que outras pesquisas sobre o tema podem ter evidenciado relações de certas variáveis que possivelmente estavam refletindo boa parte de outras características fortemente correlacionadas. Buscou-se, pois, compreender melhor o ambiente no qual se encontram os conselhos de administração para então definir, de fato, quais são suas principais características sob a ótica da variância de um conjunto maior de variáveis. A Análise Fatorial (AF) permitiu uma análise mais aprofundada das características sobre essa vertente, expurgando as correlações específicas entre elas e construindo fatores não correlacionados. A partir desse cenário, cinco índices foram construídos para refletir os fatores extraídos da AF, permitindo que estes fossem relacionados com o valor e desempenho das firmas por intermédio de regressões múltiplas, a citar: Remuneração variável, fixa, dedicação do membro ao conselho, formação básica do conselheiro e grau de instrução stricto sensu (mestrado e doutorado). Os resultados foram divididos em três seções: i) caracterização dos conselhos de administração no Brasil, para permitir uma melhor compreensão desse ambiente empresarial no país; ii) determinação das principais características desses conselhos, ou seja, quais características que mais explicam a variância dos dados, por intermédio da Análise Fatorial e; iii) relação entre os índices construídos com o retorno, retorno anormal, Q de Tobin, ROA e ROE, no sentido de verificar se as características que sintetizam o ambiente dos conselhos são enxergadas pelos investidores como importantes no momento do investimento. Os achados indicam que a remuneração dos conselheiros é responsável por explicar cerca de 40% da variância dos dados referentes aos conselhos, sugerindo que essa característica é de grande importância no espectro da governança corporativa, especialmente no que tange os conselhos de administração das empresas. Identificou-se também que o fator remuneração fixa influencia de forma negativa e significante no retorno anormal e no Q de Tobin. A relação entre os outros fatores e as variáveis dependentes também foram testadas e os resultados sugerem que a dedicação dos membros ao conselho é significante para explicar o Q de Tobin e o nível de instrução dos membros explicam significantemente o retorno, o retorno anormal e o Q de Tobin. / This study aimed to identify what are the key attributes that characterize the Boards of Directors (BoD) in Brazil, thus allowing for a better understanding of their influences on the capital market. I have been found that there is a high degree of correlation between the 31 analyzed characteristics, suggesting that other researches on the topic could have evidenced the relationships of some variables that probably were reflecting many other strongly correlated characteristics. The main target was to better understand the environment in which the Boards of Directors are situated in order to define, in fact, what are the key attributes of these Boards based on the variance of a larger set of characteristics. The factor analysis (FA) allowed a deeper analysis of these characteristics, getting rid of the specific correlations between them and then building non-correlated factors. From this scenario, five indexes were built to reflect the factors extracted from the FA, allowing them to be related to the value and performance of firms through multiple regressions; these factors are: variable and fixed remuneration, dedication of the members to the Board, basic training and degree of the BoD members (Master and PhD degree). The results were divided into three sections: i) characterization of the Boards of Directors in Brazil, to allow a better understanding of the BoD´s environment in the country; ii) determination of the key characteristics of these Boards, in other words, which are the characteristics that explain most of data variance, through factor analysis and; iii) the relationship between the constructed indexes and the return, abnormal return, Tobin´s Q, ROA e ROE, in order to verify if the features that summarize the environment of the BoD are perceived as important by investors at the time of the investment. In addition, I also found that the remuneration of the Directors is responsible for explaining about 40% of the data variance referring to the Boards of Directors, thus suggesting that this characteristic is of great importance in the spectrum of corporate governance, especially regarding the Boards of Directors of the firms. I also identified that the "fixed compensation" factor influences negatively and significantly both in abnormal return and Tobin´s Q. The relationship between dependent variables and other factors has also been tested and the results suggest that the dedication of the Board members is significant to explain Tobin´s Q and that the level of education of the members explains significantly the return, abnormal return and the Tobin´s Q.

Durant ces dernières années, le phénomène de l’implication du Conseil d’Administration (CA) dans le processus stratégique occupe une place importante dans les recherches académiques et dans l’actualité économique. L’objectif de ce travail est de comprendre ce phénomène dans le contexte des entreprises françaises. Pour ce faire, nous l’appréhendons comme un processus intermédiaire entre ses facteurs déterminants (le système de gouvernance de l’entreprise et les caractéristiques du CA) et ses facteurs d’évaluation (la performance de l’entreprise). Nous mobilisons ainsi une démarche méthodologique mixte qui combine une étude qualitative exploratoire et une étude par questionnaire de recherche adressé aux dirigeants et administrateurs des entreprises du SBF 250. Ce travail montre que la diversité de nationalité, les compétences générales et relationnelles des administrateurs ainsi que la présence d’un comité stratégique favorisent l’implication du CA dans le processus stratégique. En étudiant l’effet de cette dernière sur la performance de l’entreprise, les résultats montrent que l’implication du CA dans le processus d’établissement des choix stratégiques représente une source de création de valeur. Par ailleurs, une forte implication des administrateurs dans le processus de mise en œuvre stratégique et de contrôle influence négativement la performance de l’entreprise. Appuyés par une typologie des modes d’implication du CA (ou des « profils-types » des CA), ces résultats mettent en évidence l’importance du style d’intervention des administrateurs dans le processus stratégique afin d’expliquer son influence sur la performance de l’entreprise. / Over the past few years, research in corporate governance has devoted an increasing amount of attention to boards of directors’ involvement in the strategic decision making process. This doctoral study aims to understand this phenomenon in the French context. We apprehend it as an intermediate process between its determinant factors (corporate governance system and board characteristics) and its evaluation factors (corporate performance).Therefore, we mobilize a mixed methodological research approach that combines an exploratory qualitative study and a questionnaire survey addressed to managers and directors of the SBF 250 companies.This work shows positive and significant effect of the nationality diversity, the general and interpersonal skills of directors and the strategic committee on board members’ involvement in the strategic process. Moreover, empirical results highlight that board involvement in the process of establishing strategic choices makes an efficient contribution to the firm’s value creation. However, strong board involvement in the implementation and control process has a negative influence on corporate performance. Supported by a typology of board involvement’s forms (or "Boards’ Typical-Profiles"), these results emphasize the importance of directors’ forms of participation in different steps of the strategic process to explain its influence on corporate performance.