Uncorrupted political system is the basic criterion for the government policy. It affects the development of the whole country from political, economical and social perspectives. If the policy systems and the governors are corrupted, the credibility of the government will be decreased. Therefore, the whole country¡¦s administration and regulation will be in serious danger. Today, fighting for corruption is in the reforming stage, and every party in Taiwan all supports this policy. However, due to different political concerns, during the process of implementing the Sunshine Act, the original idea of fighting corruption has been contorted. Under this circumstance and in order to satisfy people¡¦s expectation, it is necessary to seriously concentrate on the problems of establishing an uncorrupted political system. In the nations with honest government systems, administrative supervision system is a very important segment. The system places administrative power under supervision and inspection controls. Within their independent and detached status and fair operation, administrative supervisory organs can have influential and powerful controls over the administrative departments and staff. Under this mechanism, a completely anti-corruption system and a reputation of honor government can be successfully established. This research made an in-depth study of the Control Yuan and the government employee ethics units as the major study subjects and combined with the supplementary administrative law materials to further examine the administrative supervision system in Taiwan. This research was mainly prepared with the use of literature analysis, comparative analysis and inductive analysis and has employed the basic theories of Administration Act, i.e. the five major structures of administrative principles, administrative organization, limit of administrative rights, administrative relief and administrative surveillance, as the research approaches of the study to examine the law of the administrative supervision system thoroughly. It is hoped that through the analysis of the Control Yuan and the government employee ethics units from the jural, institutional, and functional perspectives, this study would be able to provide the government an effective and practicable administrative supervision system.

Abstract To build the clean government has become a new trend of the political reforms all over the world, and an important symbol of high national competitiveness. In order to establish people¡¦s trust to the government and ensure public servants done their duty justice, Act on Recusal of Public Servants Due to Conflicts of Interest (ARPSCI) is enacted to protect the value of democracy and the foundation of ethics and also implement the accountability. With the social changes and the evolution of democracy, ARPSCI has been implemented during the past decade since July 12, 2000, and there are a lot of issues waiting for solutions. This paper studies on ARPSCI by five major principles of administrative law, and collects data from newspapers and literatures. It reveals the policy-making background of ARPSCI through prospects of society, economy, politics, and legislation. Furthermore, the author compares Taiwan¡¦s legislation with the other countries¡¦ conflict of interest systems, and reviews ARPSCI by the three principles of rule by law, the seven principles of due process; identifies the purpose and value of ARPSCI by the viewpoints of the local self-governing and the individual¡¦s participation. As mentioned above, this paper clarifies the orientation and value of ARPSCI; then discusses about the design of administrative organizations, staff, and budget to support ARPSCI. It also researches whether ARPSCI was designed properly for good performance under the review of nine kinds of administrative authority. Moreover, it discusses whether ARPSCI¡¦s remedy procedure is proper, and advice to improve self-control function of the act. In short, after analyzing completely, it finds that ARPSCI has lots of institutional problems in the dimensions of basic principle, administrative organization, restriction of administrative power, administrative remedy, and administrative supervision. Therefore, in order to meet people's expectations and construct a fair conflict of interest system, the author proposes personal suggestions.

本文的研究範圍，主要是民國三十六年行憲後第一屆監察院（包括資深監察委員、增額監察委員）與憲政改革後第二屆監察院（至民國八十四年底的運作為止）的比較研究。探討的主要項目包括如下： 　　（一）監察院改制之探討：監察院之改制在憲政改革之過程中，是變化最大、爭議最多的課題之一。首先，討論的重點在於探討監察權在政治制度中的重要性及功能，並剖析行憲後監察院在組織上及職權運作上所產生的缺失，最後則就各界對監察院改制之各種方案加以分析。 　　（二）監察院的性質、定位之演變與分析：一般外界皆認為監察院之改制，使監察院之性質與地位產生重大的改變。因此，為求正本清源之目的，首先將我國古代監察制度之性質，做一歷史性的略述。其次，探討中山先生之監察權主張與設計，以窺探中山先生之原意。最後，就行憲後之監察院性質與監察院改制後之定位，予以比較探討，以對改制後之監察院的性質與定位，進一步的加以釐清，以正本清源，解決不必要的爭議。 　　（三）監察委員產生方式之演變：監察院乃以監察委員為主要的組成分子，監察委員的優勝劣敗將對整個監察愈產生重大的影響，其關乎整個監察制度的成功與否。在憲改過程中，監察委員應如何產生，一直是大眾所關注的焦點。因此，對於整個的監察委員產生方式的歷史眼進，實有探究之必要。 　　（四）監察權靜態設計分析與動態運作檢視：首先，對監察權之靜態設計予以概述，其次就監察院改制前後監察權行使之成效，進行比較分析，以對監察院改制後之動態運作加以檢視。 　　（五）監察院改制後之檢討：檢討重點包括監察委員產生方式改變後，所產生的問題，進而就現行監察權運作上優缺點，加以檢討並提出建議。

監察院為我國五院之一，根據其角色與職權，理應具有人民普遍信賴和維繫規範之功能。但自2005年開始，監察院停擺三年有餘，政府運作似未受影響，民眾之生活亦未遭逢重大變動，是其與民眾距離太遠，還是角色和功能仍有待進一步釐清？本研究欲以社會資本理論來對監察院的憲法地位、監察委員的身分、監察權運作之相關案文進行分析。 本研究透過文獻檢閱建構社會資本概念架構，以正式網絡與非正式網絡分類，提出信任、規範與公民精神三項內涵。同時從監察院的憲法地位、組織法規、監察權行使案文與監察院內部人員之觀點，綜整監察院之角色與功能。盼藉所建立之社會資本概念架構發現監察院與社會資本的關聯，並檢視其是否足以解釋現下監察權與民眾的互動關係。 本研究發現，監察權的角色與職權與正式網絡的關係相當密切，而與非正式網絡的關聯性較為疏遠，但所謂「密切」或「疏遠」所代表者並非監察院角色和職權對正式網絡將產生正面效益，或對非正式網絡產生負面影響，其所欲表達者為監察院表現之優劣將直接且強烈的影響正式網絡，反之，監察院角色、功能之優劣則無法對公眾彼此的互動造成太大的影響。以上結果皆有助於解釋何以監察院與公眾信任如此相關，又在其停擺時，卻無法激起社會更多共鳴的現象。 在非正式網絡中，監察院對公眾互動所造成的直接影響，或藉由監督各機關造成的間接影響，相關法律、職權行使案文與訪談過程中雖皆缺乏相關證據，本研究認為此現象並不能單以監察權設計非以公眾為行使目標解釋，因實際上監察院促成諸多立法與行政上的法令更動，這些更動對公眾生活實影響至鉅。

監察制度（control system）是民主體制中重要的監督機制，主要的功能是監督行政和保障人權，隨著第三波民主化的發展，從一九八０年代開始，監察使制度（ombudsman system）快速擴散至全世界，形成一股「監察風潮」（Ombudsmania）。在民主國家中，我國與芬蘭都是實施監察制度較悠久的國家，僅次於瑞典。無獨有偶，兩國都在一九九０年至二０００年進行一連串的憲政改革，修憲後我國政府體制從修正式的內閣制（Parliamentarism）轉變為半總統制（Semi-Presidentialism），而芬蘭則從典型的半總統制傾向議會內閣制。同時在憲政改革的過程中，兩國的監察制度也都有許多的變革。 本文是從權力分立原則（Doctrine of Separation of Powers）、有限政府（Limited Government）和第四權（The Fourth Branch of Power）概念等監察理論作為法理基礎，並以法制研究途徑（Legal-Institutional Approach）和新制度主義（New Institutionalism）作為分析架構，從靜態的法制層面和動態的運作層面，探討我國的監察制度和芬蘭的國會監察使制度，以及兩國在二０００年憲政改革之後的運作情況，以瞭解兩國制度之特色及優劣，並且針對中、芬兩國基本國情、監察制度的基本差異、制度與制度變遷、實務運作與案件、實施成效等幾個面向來作分析比較，剖析其間之異同及其原因。 再者，本文也根據國際性比較與芬蘭國會監察使制度之優點和成功經驗，歸納出監察制度實施成功之條件，包括：（一）監察使「權威」（authority）的建立。（二）具備獨立性、中立性和專業性的特性。（三）健全的國家廉政體系。（四）國會的支持與配合。（五）政治人物對監察使和監察制度的尊重。（六）監察使與外界建立良好的互動關係。並進一步評估我國現行監察制度之問題，主要有下列幾項：（一）形式獨立但實質獨立性不足。（二）監察院的權威未建立。（三）部分監委人選不適任。（四）監察院的功能有待提升。（五）缺乏行銷以及與外界互動不足。 最後，筆者針對以上缺失，分別從監察院的定位、組織規模、監委選任、特殊監察使的設立、監察院的職權、監察院的預算、人權保障、與外界互動、對監委的監督等幾個面向，提出具體改革之建議。 / The control system is an important mechanism in democracy to supervise administration and to protect human rights. Since 1980, with the development of the third wave democratization, the ombudsman system rapidly disseminate to all parts of world, forming the phenomenon of “Ombudsmania”. Among the democratic countries, the control system has been carried out for long in both ROC and Finland, only shorter than Sweden Coincidently, both countries underwent a series of constitutional reform during 1990 to 2000. Thereafter, ROC transformed from the revised Parliamentarism to the Semi-Presidentialism, while Finland turned from the classical Semi-Presidentialism to the parliamentarism. The control systems of both countries have also changed a lot during the constitutional reform. Based on the control theories including concepts of Doctrine of Separation of Powers, Limited Government, and The Fourth Branch of Power as the legal basis, this article utilized the Legal-Institutional Approach and the analysis constructs of New Institutionalism to explore the ROC’s control system and parliamentary ombudsman system of Finland, as well as their operation after the post-constitutional reform in 2000, from the static legislative level and the dynamic operational level. This provided understanding of the characteristics and evaluations of the systems in both countries. Moreover, we focused on the aspects of the essential differences in cultures and in the control systems, the evolution of the systems, the functioning, the cases, and their outcomes to analyze the reasons for the differences between the two systems. Furthermore, based on the international comparison and the success experience in parliamentary ombudsman of Finland, the conditions required for successful practice of the control system was involved: (1) establishment of the authority of the ombudsman, (2) the independent, neutral, and professional characteristics, (3) The national integrity system, (4) the support and cooperation of the parliament, (5) The respect of the politicians to the ombudsman and to the control system, and (6) The well-established interaction between the ombudsman and the outside. Further evaluation found the major problems in the present control system in ROC, including (1) lack of the substantial independence, (2) not established authority, (3) the incapability of some Control Yuan members, (4) the necessity to improve the functions of the Control Yuan, (5) the deficiency of marketing and of interaction with the outside. Finally, for the weakness mentioned above, I proposed the concrete recommendation for reformation, from the aspects of the position of the Control Yuan, the dimension of the organization, the election of the committee members, the establishment of specific Ombudsman, the powers and the budgets for the Control Yuan, the protection of human rights, the interactions with the outside, and the administrations of the committee members.