Why has some cyber-attacks been more successful than others? There has been in the near past examples of cyber-attacks used with different purposes. How do we understand these chosen targets and what result the attack accomplished? Research has discussed similarities between aviation warfare and cyber warfare, and how the first could explain what is happening in cyber warfare now. There is also opposing opinions whether cyber warfare should be seen as a method to alone force a will on your opponent or if cyber warfare should mere be supporting other military means. The essay test Warden’s theory “The Enemy as a System” capacity to explain why the effect of cyber-attacks can differ. It will also compare the effect in different cases based on standalone and supporting cyber-attacks. The essay concludes that Warden’s theory does not have any explanatory value but the difference in effective and ineffective cases is whether the cyber-attack was supporting other military means or a standalone attack.

Johan A. Warden tog fram sin modell om motståndaren som ett system för att genom denna hitta dess svagheter. Modellen visade sig vara mycket användbar inom mellanstatliga konflikter och var mycket effektiv vid planerandet och genomförandet av USA:s offensiv mot Irak under inledningen av Gulfkriget. Men kopplat mot irreguljära konflikter har Wardens modell stött på mycket kritik då den anses spelat ut sin roll och därför inte längre kan anses applicerbar vid planerandet av luftoperationer inom denna typ av krigföring. Denna uppsats skall se om det är precisionsvapen och användandet av dessa som räddar kvar Warden inom planeringen av luftoperationer inom irreguljär krigföring. / John A. Warden developed the Five ring model and the enemy as a system. These models where used as a tool to find the enemies weak points. These models proved useful in a conventional conflict, and where very effective during the planning and execution of Operation Desert Storm. In recent times Wardens theories has been a subject of a debate, stating that they have played out there role as an effect of irregular warfare. This essay is going to try to see if it is precision-guided munitions that save Wardens theories in the fields of modern air-warfare planning in irregular warfare.

Den amerikanske luftmaktsteoretikern John A Warden III har skrivit ett flertal artiklar och böcker om vad han anser är det bästa sättet att använda luftmakt. Warden förordar luftmaktens offensiva natur och eftersträvar ett snabbt, för egen del, fördelaktigt slut på en konflikt. Warden har bl.a. liknat fienden vid ett system, där han menar att strävan skall ligga i att slå ut fiendens ledarskikt vilket får tillföljd att dess vilja till strid upphör. I detta arbete ges en sammanfattning av, enligt författaren, centrala delar av Wardens teorier. Sammanfattningen mynnar ut i tre stycken parametrar som kommer att utgöra Wardens teorier i detta arbete. De tre parametrarna är "enemy as a system", "center of gravity" samt "parallell attack". Dessa parametrar ligger sedan till grund för en analys av Israels luftkampanjer i dess krig mot Hizbollah 2006, Operation Change of Direction samt dess krig mot Hamas 2008-09, Operation Cast Lead. Syftet med detta är att ta reda på om Israel använde sig av Wardens teorier under dessa båda operationer. Anledningen till valet av dessa två konflikter är att Israel bl.a. sin doktrin slagit fast att de aldrig har råd att förlora ett krig. Detta tvingar Israel att optimera sin taktisering. Slutsatsen blev att det tydligt går att se att Wardens teorier genomsyrade Operation Change of Direction. Det var enbart "parallell attack" som inte tydligt efterföljdes genom hela operationen. Under Operation Cast Lead däremot så följde Israel Wardens teorier i mycket mindre utsträckning. Det var enbart "center of gravity" som följdes genom hela den operationen.

John A. Warden III is renowned as one of the theorists closest to devising a new paradigm in air power. His praised theory about the enemy as a system has showed applicable on terrorist organizations amongst other areas. The most recent developed domain for warfare is the so-called “cyberspace”. There is an on-going debate concerning the importance and definition of this domain and furthermore what potential and challenges it withholds as a future arena for warfare. Some claims that a cyberattack can’t be seen as an act of war due to its lack of physical violence. Previous research show however a lack in application of theories within this domain. This thesis therefore aims to examine to which extent Warden’s theory of the enemy as a system could be applied to the cyberattack known as Stuxnet. Results show that Warden’s theory have some applicatory power on the cyberattack Stuxnet, although primarily in an indirect aspect. This study therefore shows an ability concerning the theory’s applicatory power on other areas than air power. The findings of the research regarding previous arguments about cyberwar also states that a cyberattack now could be seen as physical violent. / <p><strong>Uppsatsen skriven VT 2017 under Termin 4 Officersprogrammet 15-18 med inriktning </strong><strong>mot flyg. Examen genomförs VT 2018.</strong></p>

According to NATO Review, in 2013 it was estimated that over 97% of the world's telecommunications were transmitted via the internet and that this was a growing trend. This essentiality for communication means that information systems have become a natural target and point of attack in military actions and planning. This thesis aims to test the possibility to apply the theory of The enemy as a system and the concentric five-ring modeldeveloped by air force theorist Jon A. Warden III, to the cyber arena. To achieve this aim, the thesis presents a qualitative text analysis of seven different sources describing NotPetya. The targets and effects of the cyber attack are evaluated based upon the concentric five-ring model and the concept of parallel attack. The results of the analysis shows that Warden's theory is highly applicable to the case of NotPetya. This in turn could point to the theory’s applicability to the cyber domain and to strategic operations in cyberspace. However no major conclusions of generalizability can be drawn.

Strategic bombing was introduced as an idea in the early 20th century and became debated in its first use during the first world war. John Warden, a modern proponent for strategic bombing, puts forth the idea that the introduction of precision-guided-munitions allows for strategic bombing to be a viable and more importantly the optimal use for airpower in armed conflicts today. Warden markets his theory, the enemy as a system, as a method that allows airpower to be deployed and alone be able to achieve strategic effects and win wars. Skeptics to this idea argue that empirical evidence shows that modern strategic bombing does not produce strategic effects that wins wars therefor making it inferior to other methods of employing airpower. Because the debate is heavily focused on the strategic level, the lower levels becomes neglected. This essay will test Wardens theory on the operational level of war with the purpose to examine what effects, if not strategic, are generated at the operational level and how it affects an offensive and defensive actor of a war. The results will aim to answer whether John Wardens theory of strategic bombing generates effect and is a viable method for airpower for the operational level of warfare.

John A. Warden III is one the most mentioned air power theoretic of his time.He has written a number of theories concerning air power and the best way to use this to win wars.The author of this paper gives a short resume of what he consider are the central thoughts in John Warden´s theories. These thoughts result in four factors; Enemy as a system, centre of gravity, parallel attack/concentration and finally air superiority. These factors are then being used to inves-tigate if NATO used Wardens theories during the Kosovo war in 1999.The reason for the author to choose the Kosovo war specifically is due to the fact that NATO during the war only used air power as an instrument to get Serbia´s president Milosevic to the negotiation table but also the fact that this would turn out to be quite a challenge for NATO.The conclusion is that out of the four factors only one is traceable throughout the entire operation, and that is air superiority. Regarding the other three factors they can only be found in parts of the operation. / John A. Warden III är en av de mest omskrivna luftmaktsteoretikerna under sin tid. Han har lagt fram ett antal teorier för vad han anser är bästa sättet att använda luftmakt för att vinna krig. I uppsatsen ges en sammanfattning av vad författaren anser vara de centrala tankarna i hans teorier. Dessa utmynnar i fyra begrepp; fienden som ett system, tyngdpunktsbegreppet,parallell attack och kraftsamling samt luftrumskontroll. Dessa begrepp står sedan somutgångspunkt för en fallstudie av NATO:s luftmaktsanvändning under Kosovokriget 1999.Undersökningen syftar till att undersöka om NATO använde sig av John Wardens luftmaktsteorier under kriget.Varför författaren har valt just Kosovokriget beror bland annat på att NATO under kriget enbart använde sig av luftmakt för att få Serbiens president Milosevic till förhandlingsbordet samt att det också visade sig bli en stor prövning för dem.Slutsatsen blev att av de fyra utvalda faktorerna så var det endast en som NATO visade sig foku-sera på under hela operationen, detta var luftrumskontroll. Vad gäller de övriga tre faktorerna finner författaren att NATO använt sig av dessa i stort sett bara under slutskedet av operationen.

Through several wars, Israel has proven itself capable of standing up against superior foes, and the Israeli Air Force has always played a significant role in these successes. During the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli forces faced a new threat in the form of superior anti-aircraft weaponry when Egypt and Syria launched an attack on October 6, 1973. The Israeli Air Force was forced to stray from its established doctrine, yet they still managed to once again achieve victory. The purpose of this case study was to gain an understanding of the factors that contributed to Israel achieving victory during the Yom Kippur War and how a small state can defeat a superior foe. The actions of the Israeli Air Force during the Yom Kippur War were analyzed through the theoretical perspectives of John A. Warden and Robert A. Pape. The analysis shows that neither theory can provide a clear-cut answer to why Israel ended up victorious, but several aspects of them are prominent enough to help explain how Israel managed to get into an advantageous situation. A more extensive study that looks into factors such as the combined effort of the Israeli Air Force and the Israeli Army would be required to reach a more definitive conclusion.