Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniela Jorge Milani.pdf: 1520868 bytes, checksum: c0a968beaa186ad6ff2ddc803fb24700 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-08-19 / O presente trabalho pretende elucidar as origens das relações entre o poder temporal e o espiritual, assim entendidos como Estado e Igreja genericamente. Deste modo, faz-se uma retrospectiva dessas relações, desde a época primitiva em que as sociedades eram clãs familiares nas quais a posição de chefe supremo se confundia com a de líder religioso, até os tempos modernos, passando pelas correntes racionalistas naturalistas até a situação atual, buscando esclarecer o real sentido do fenômeno da secularização e a consequente laicidade do Estado, que não deve ser confundida com laicismo ou antirreligiosidade. Deve ser entendida, na verdade, como pressuposto de uma relação de autonomia, independência e cooperação entre as instâncias administrativa e religiosa. Nota-se que, do ponto de vista da Igreja Católica, ao contrário do que se poderia pensar, o Estado deve ser laico, visto que, invariavelmente, as relações de interdependência acarretaram desmandos de parte a parte, desvirtuando o verdadeiro escopo de cada esfera de atuação. E mais, demonstra-se que, não obstante a promessa de irrestrita independência e autossuficiência da razão e a previsão de decadência e até de aniquilamento da fé, das mais radicais correntes iluministas do século XVIII, a pós-secularização se caracterizou pela persistência da religiosidade na sociedade, seja nas formas mais tradicionais ou de modo mais individualista. Neste cenário de laicidade e pós-secularização se questiona se haveria lugar para a religião no espaço público ou lhes caberia somente a atuação em seu mundo interior, privado, restrita aos seus templos e cultos? Haveria uma posição a assumir perante a sociedade e especialmente no debate político necessário ao jogo da democracia? Juntamente de Habermas, o filósofo alemão agnóstico, se conclui pela participação das religiões e suas cosmovisões particulares, não apenas para a necessária legitimidade do processo político democrático, que deve incluir a todos, mas pela abertura ao diálogo entre fé e saber, que são complementares um à outra, levando a sociedade a um progresso científico e tecnológico, sem abrir mão da ética e da moral, onde o ser humano é compreendido como a razão de ser do mundo e não como mero objeto de estudo e manipulação / O presente trabalho pretende elucidar as origens das relações entre o poder temporal e o espiritual, assim entendidos como Estado e Igreja genericamente. Deste modo, faz-se uma retrospectiva dessas relações, desde a época primitiva em que as sociedades eram clãs familiares nas quais a posição de chefe supremo se confundia com a de líder religioso, até os tempos modernos, passando pelas correntes racionalistas naturalistas até a situação atual, buscando esclarecer o real sentido do fenômeno da secularização e a consequente laicidade do Estado, que não deve ser confundida com laicismo ou antirreligiosidade. Deve ser entendida, na verdade, como pressuposto de uma relação de autonomia, independência e cooperação entre as instâncias administrativa e religiosa. Nota-se que, do ponto de vista da Igreja Católica, ao contrário do que se poderia pensar, o Estado deve ser laico, visto que, invariavelmente, as relações de interdependência acarretaram desmandos de parte a parte, desvirtuando o verdadeiro escopo de cada esfera de atuação. E mais, demonstra-se que, não obstante a promessa de irrestrita independência e autossuficiência da razão e a previsão de decadência e até de aniquilamento da fé, das mais radicais correntes iluministas do século XVIII, a pós-secularização se caracterizou pela persistência da religiosidade na sociedade, seja nas formas mais tradicionais ou de modo mais individualista. Neste cenário de laicidade e pós-secularização se questiona se haveria lugar para a religião no espaço público ou lhes caberia somente a atuação em seu mundo interior, privado, restrita aos seus templos e cultos? Haveria uma posição a assumir perante a sociedade e especialmente no debate político necessário ao jogo da democracia? Juntamente de Habermas, o filósofo alemão agnóstico, se conclui pela participação das religiões e suas cosmovisões particulares, não apenas para a necessária legitimidade do processo político democrático, que deve incluir a todos, mas pela abertura ao diálogo entre fé e saber, que são complementares um à outra, levando a sociedade a um progresso científico e tecnológico, sem abrir mão da ética e da moral, onde o ser humano é compreendido como a razão de ser do mundo e não como mero objeto de estudo e manipulação

本論文之研究目的在於解析奧登三首詩作 (“Spain,” “Memorial for the City” and “In Praise of Limestone”) 及麥卡錫小說 (The Road) 中的語言特質與象徵元素，以進一步釐清其作品中自然、歷史，和宗教的位階關係。針對奧登的詩作，前人已多有研究。除了學術著述之外，本論文亦援用1) 當時評論家在作品初版時對奧登的批評，以究探其語言特性對於讀者的第一手效應；2) 奧登本人在各時期對於宗教、歷史，和自然的論著，試圖追溯其思考軌跡。而就麥卡錫而言，文獻上與奧登相同處在於使用了許多當代評論；不同處在於麥卡錫本人幾乎不撰寫論述性文章或接受訪談。在麥卡錫本人不願多談其創作哲學的情況下，批評家與學者們普遍認為：麥卡錫的語言特性致使他的作品具備高度的不定性 (第一章中將有討論)。本論文企圖以比較的方式，提供麥卡錫作品研究一個有力的支點，並也希望提供奧登詩作一個略新的檢視面向。 論文研究的主要背景為兩位作者對「毀滅」場景的刻畫，分析兩者在「毀滅」之中如何構築人類對於文明、外在環境，乃至於自身的認知。論文第一章在文獻回顧的同時也論及了奧登的宗教觀，並略微闡述為何麥卡錫有被如是考量的可能。第二章著重在作品中自然與人的關係；以石灰石 (limestone) 為代表，端看兩者作品中 (主要為 “In Praise of Limestone” 與 The Road) 人類如何賦予自然定義。的三章討論時間，以奧登在論述宗教時所謂的 “Natural time” 與 “Historical time” 看其作品中時間在毀滅之時的潛在壓力與崩解，並進而以此切入點閱讀 The Road 中的毀滅時態。第四章探究在 “Historical time” 的框架下，兩者作品中是否有意圖追尋「救贖」之可能；或說，何故「救贖」在他們的語境下成為一個強烈的考量。 / This thesis aims to analyze the three poems of Auden (“Spain,” “Memorial for the City” and “In Praise of Limestone”) and Cormac McCarthy’s novel The Road. It pays attention to both authors’ language and image which construct the hierarchy of nature, history and religion in their works. As many analyses have been made on Auden, besides scholarly literature, the thesis also draws the reviews upon some poems’ first publication in order to see the first-hand effect of the poem’s language on its reader. Auden’s discourses upon nature, history and religion are also applied for seeking after the trace of his thinking. As to McCarthy, many book reviews are applied because the 2006 novel is still too young to yield a great amount of scholarly discourse. Different from Auden, McCarthy does not write discourse at all and rarely grants interview so his own artistic dogma is very little known. All is agreed by scholars and reviewers is that his language causes great instability, in term of the work’s theme and philosophy, which will be discussed in chapter one. By a comparison, this thesis hopes to provide a fulcrum upon which further analyses upon McCarthy can be made and a new aspect in reading some of Auden’s works. The background of this analysis is the scene of destruction in both authors’ works. It intends to see, in these works, how man’s perception towards civilization, the physical circumstance and himself is constructed during the time of destruction. Chapter one centers on literature review, along with which Auden’s religious viewpoints are discussed. The same chapter also justifies why such religious viewpoints can be helpful in reading The Road. Chapter two emphasizes mankind’s relationship with nature. With limestone as a representative object, chapter two sees how nature is loaded with mankind’s will. Chapter three applies Auden’s “Nature time” and “Historical time” in his discussion of religion, in order to see the frame and the stress of time during the time of destruction. Further in chapter three, the frame of time that Auden argues is applied to read McCarthy’s concept of time in The Road’s destruction. With “Historical time” as the premise, chapter four seeks for the possibility of redemption in both authors’ works and the reason why a redemptive choice is so plausible with their language.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

This dissertation aims to develop an ethical system that can properly frame such questions as the morality of large-scale efforts to transform inanimate parts of nature, for example, proposals to terraform Mars. Such an ethics diverges from traditional approaches to ethics because it expands the class of entities regarded as morally considerable to include inanimate entities. I approach the task by building on the environmental ethical theory of Paul W. Taylor, as developed in his 1986 book Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. I discuss various criticisms of Taylor and propose two extensions to his theory: an expansion of the scope of moral considerability to include all concrete material objects and the introduction of the concept of variable moral significance (the notion that all entities have inherent worth but some have more than others). Using Taylor’s modified and extended theory as a foundation, I develop something I call universal ethics. This is an ethical framework whose key elements are a fundamental ethical attitude of respect for the world and a principle of minimal harm. Universal ethics regards all concrete material entities, whether living or not, and whether natural or artefactual, as inherently valuable, and therefore as entitled to the respect of moral agents. I offer a defence of this ethical framework and discuss a number of practical applications, including criticism of proposals for the terraforming of Mars. I conclude that terraforming Mars or any other celestial body at this point in our history would be morally wrong. I also suggest that universal ethics provides an ethical foundation for efforts to protect Antarctica, and that it has implications for our relations to other inanimate parts of our world, including artefacts.

[pt] O avanço da modernidade é um marco na história da teologia. Pois, com ele, também se acentua o caráter antropocêntrico moderno. O ser humano, com suas criações e descobertas, caminha para tomar o lugar de Deus e da cosmovisão cristã clássica, caracterizando um giro antropológico moderno. Naturalmente, esta situação de dualismo moderno envolvendo o ser humano e Deus acaba por exigir alguma reação por parte das teologias cristãs. Algumas acham a saída para tal problema na própria figura humana, fazendo dela um novo caminho através do qual é possível falar de Deus. Tal atitude caracteriza um giro antropológico, na teologia. Nessa dissertação, serão apontadas as atitudes básicas de uma teologia que se propõe a realizar tal giro antropológica, cujo teórico principal é o teólogo jesuíta Karl Rahner, enfatizando alguns de seus desdobramentos acerca da questão de Deus. Este caminho será feito para que, ao fim, seja possível expor a construção teológica de Paul Tillich acerca da questão de Deus em sua Teologia Sistemática, levantando a hipótese de que, nela, ele realiza o giro antropológico necessário a toda teologia que pretende reagir ao antropocentrismo moderno. Isto mostra que a possibilidade de Deus não recai, necessariamente, no desprezo ao ser humano e seus avanços. / [en] The modernity advance is a mark in the history of Theology. And because of this progress, the anthropocentric character of modernity is also accentuated. The human being, with his creations and discoveries, walks to take the place of God and the classical Christian worldview, which characterizes a modern anthropological twist. Naturally, this situation of modern dualism involving human being and God asks for some reaction of the Christian theologies. Some of them find the solution for this problem at the human figure itself, making of it a new way through what is possible to talk about god. Such attitude characterizes an anthropological twist in the theology. This dissertation will show the basic attitudes of a theology that propose itself on realizing such anthropological twist, whose the main theorist is the Jesuit theologian Karl Rahner, emphasizing some of its developments about the question of God. This way will be done in order to make the exposition of Paul Tillich s theological construction about the question of God on his Systematic Theology possible, raising the hypothesis that he realizes the anthropological twist in his work, which is necessary to any theology that aims to react to the modern anthropocentrism. Thus, it shows that the possibility of God does not necessarily end in contempt for human being and his advances.

The planet is in a dismal environmental state. This state may be remedied by way of an integrated approach based on a holistic vision. This research examines which ecological ideology best suits current conditions for humans to re-examine their metaphysical understanding of nature; how we can better motivate people to embrace a more intrinsic ecological ideology; and finally, how we can motivate people to be active participants in their chosen ideology. I will attempt to show that Deep Ecology is the most suitable ecosophy (ecological philosophy) to embrace; in doing so I will look at how Oriental and occidental religion and philosophy altered (and continues to alter) the way we perceive nature. I will show how destructive, but also caring and constructive, humanity can be when interacting with the environment. The Deep Ecological and Shallow Ecological principles will be look at, as well as criticism and counter-criticism of these ecosophies. KEY TERMS: Deep Ecology, Shallow Ecology, anthropocentrism, ecocentrism, extrinsic values, intrinsic values, motivational drive, ecosophy © University / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

Environmental justice, a new but rapidly developing concept in international environmental law, arose in the United States of America during the Environmental Justice Movement of the late 1970s and 1980s. It starkly highlighted injustices faced by people of colour and low-income communities as regards racially skewed environmental legal protection and allocation of environmental risks. The movement radically changed the meaning of ‘environment’ from its conventional green overtones to include issues of social justice at the core of environmental thinking. I critically examine the concept of environmental justice in the Kenyan context by highlighting the injustices, and the formulation and application of laws and policies that significantly impact on environmental regulation and equitable distribution of social services. / Private Law / LL. M.

Cette thèse présente une analyse comparée des œuvres de deux écrivains contemporains, John Maxwell Coetzee (1940-), originaire d’Afrique du Sud, et Wu Ming-yi (1971-), de Taïwan, que l’on associe au genre de la « littérature écologique postcoloniale ». À partir de leurs travaux, cette thèse propose une étude interdisciplinaire couvrant trois dimensions de leurs travaux : la théorie, la politique et le littéraire. Les textes choisis pour l’analyse sont ceux qui cherchent à la fois à fournir une image dystopique de l’exploitation des environnements naturels et des êtres non-humains et à représenter l’oppression coloniale des peuples colonisés et de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles dans différentes parties du monde. En ce qui concerne la dimension théorique, la thèse aborde le questionnement suivant : comment la philosophie occidentale contemporaine prend en compte les animaux et les êtres écologiques (êtres non-humains et non-animaux), afin de reconsidérer la question plus générale de l’altérité. Quant à la dimension politique, la thèse adopte une posture philosophique afin de questionner les contextes historiques des pays postcoloniaux, notamment ceux de l’Afrique du Sud et de Taïwan. Enfin, la dimension littéraire examine les écrits de Coetzee et de Wu afin de montrer comment leurs textes décrivent l’« autre écologique » (ecological other) en tant que moyen pour lutter contre l’identité politique postcoloniale. / This thesis presents the literary works of two contemporary writers—John Maxwell Coetzee (1940-), originally from South Africa, and Wu Ming-yi (1971-) from Taiwan—whom it analyses as key exponents of postcolonial eco-literature. The thesis offers an interdisciplinary study of their works in their theoretical, political and literary aspects. The texts selected for analysis are those that seek to present a dystopian image of the exploited natural environment or nonhuman entities, while, at the same time, associating and articulating these representations with the suppressions and exploitations carried out within colonial frameworks in different parts of the world. As regards the theoretical perspective of the thesis, it addresses the subject of how contemporary continental philosophy takes nonhuman animals and other kinds of ecological beings into account and rethinks the philosophical question of the other. With respect to politics, it contextualises this philosophical questioning by looking at the history of various postcolonial countries, notably South Africa and Taiwan. Lastly, as far as literature is concerned, it examines the writings of Coetzee and Wu in order to show how their texts depict the ecological other as a way of contesting postcolonial identity politics.