This thesis examines the role of the cultural discourse on the indigenous religious traditions of China and their place within an officially sanctioned construction of Chinese culture. It starts by examining the concept of culture as it developed in the modern era, its place within the construction of national identities, and the marginalizing effects this has on certain members of national populations. Next it turns to the development of the cultural discourse within China from the mid-1800s to the Cultural Revolution, highlighting the social and legal transformations as they restricted and reframed the practice and articulation of religious traditions in mainland China. Following these early articulations of a cultural discourse in China and the subjugation of religious traditions to secular standards of legitimation, it examines the official presentations and governmentally sanctioned forms of the Daoist tradition in post-Mao China during a “cultural revival,” through an analysis of official publications and online presentations. Finally, it examines the way teachers and administrators package Chinese culture for a foreign audience through the Confucius Institute. This thesis argues that, despite greater freedom to explore indigenous traditions previously written off as “superstitious” within the cultural revival of contemporary China, the official cultural discourse in China continues to operate within the parameters of a modern cultural identity that marginalizes ritualistic forms of religion, allowing these religious forms to survive in an official space only as exotic images, sanitized and secularized activities, or ethical ideals.

本文從中國所處「外環境」與「內環境」去了解中國建構軟權力政策動機與中國當前文化外交的運作模式與施行狀況並發現，中國在1978年走向經濟改革開放後，對內政權合法性遭質疑，對外則有中國威脅論當道；以馬列主義為思想主體的意識型態開始動搖，歐美挾著豐沛經濟實力，向中國大舉輸出資本文化產品，推動文化軟權力的確是中國不得不然，也是必走的道路。 本文同時發現，北京雖然想重塑文明古國和文化大國的形象，但中國國內普遍存在的信仰危機問題，執政當局卻仍無法克服。甚至，中國一方面要構築正面、開放的國家形象，一方面卻仍持續緊縮國內網際網路言論、打壓禁書，可以說，中共是「軟權力建設的主導者，同時也是破壞者」。 中國在推展文化外交忽略最重要的一點：文化外交的內在本質是「推銷真相」(sell the truth)，，中國用文化軟權力來包裝國家形象，但卻忽略了中國品牌背後的「國家信譽」，雖然中國頻頻強調和諧和平，國際社會猶有疑慮，無法百分之百認同中國，中國對內對外的作為出現嚴重落差。中國愈強調要施行文化軟權力，愈凸顯出中國文化軟權力的侷限，中國走向看似光明的大國崛起道路，卻隱隱浮現陰影。

Šiame darbe nagrinėjamos pagrindinės konfucianizmo – maoizmo moralinės padegogikos idėjos bei vertybės. Konfucianistinės – maoistinės pedagogikos idėjos Vakaruose yra klaidingai traktuojamos ir privalo būti išverstos / perkeltos į mūsų suvokimui artimesnes formas. Pirmojoje darbo dalyje nuodugniai aprašomas hermeneutinio rato metodas bei intersubjektyvumo teorija, leidžianti tyrimo metu įgyjamą asmeninį suvokimą perkelti kitiems ugdymo sistemos dalyviams. Antrojoje dalyje aprašomos Kinijos idėjinių lyderių pamatinės idėjos, stengiamasi išskirti pagrindines jų, pateikti asmeniniu sovokimu grindžiamą interpretaciją. Trečioji dalis skirta konfucianizmą – maoizmą nagrinėjusių Vakarų autorių idėjų nagrinėjimui, pasitelkiant darbo metu įgytą suvokimą. Šiame darbe paaiškėjo, kad Vakarų mokslininkai neretai klaidingai interpretuoja Kinijos pamatines ugdymo idėjas; kad Kinijos idėjinių lyderių idėjos gali būti traktuojamos kaip vientisa, vieninga sistema. / In this work is analyzed basic ideas and values of confucianistic – maoistic moral pedagogy. Confucianistic – maoistic moral pedagogy ideas is wrongly perceived in Western countries and demands peculiar translation / transfer to forms, appropriate to our perception. In the first part of work is described in detail method of hermeneutic circle and theory of intersubjectivity, which allows personal knowing transfer to other members or certain educational system. In second part are presented main Chinese principled leaders educational ideas. Efforts were made to exclude main ideas, give personal interpretation for them. Third part is intended to analize Western authors, who were writing about confucianistic – maoistic theories, by using new gained perception. This work showed that often Western scientists quite skin-deep assess Chinese main educational ideas; the ideas of Chinese leaders can be understood in a way of united, integral system.

Between 1919 and 1934, as members of China's Guomindang (Nationalist Party) struggled to take control of and transform the country, they increasingly appropriated language and symbols associated with the fallen Qing Dynasty. At the same time, these were accompanied in party discourse by radical appeals that included strong critiques of China's past. In this they were far from unique: studies of nationalisms around the world have found them to combine appeals to the new and the old. Yet in China this combination incited particular controversy, as Guomindang members and others, wrestling with the cultural legacy of the empire, put forward powerfully radical critiques not only of the culture of the past but also of traditionalist appeals to it. The result was distinctive textual practices I term 'revolutionary traditionalism', which appropriated cultural elements of the imperial orthodoxy while reconciling these appropriations with radical language. Yet this revolutionary traditionalism could not unproblematically form a unified modern nationalist orthodoxy. Radical and traditionalist positions in regard to culture recurred through power struggles within and beyond the party. Through these struggles, by the end of the 1920s revolutionary traditionalism came to characterise the new Nationalist Government formed by Guomindang members in Nanjing. While like other nationalists Guomindang members reinvented the language and symbols to which they appealed, however, the case of Confucius shows that they could not unilaterally control these reinterpretations. The central place of Confucius in national culture was established through a process of negotiation, as groups identifying themselves as 'Confucian' petitioned the state, appropriating its own traditionalist discourse, for recognition and commemoration. Yet these Confucians, pursuing their own often religious agendas, also cast doubt on the authenticity of the state's commitment. Revolutionary traditionalism thus remained unstable, repeatedly challenged both from radical and traditionalist positions.

This present thesis has been prudently undertaken how to approach practically and theologically the ethical issues for the effective preaching with Confucian filial piety which has challenged Korean churches. Serious conflicts are arising among Korean families because of Confucianism teachings that filial piety is the highest virtue of all ethical teachings and that ancestor worship is the continuation of filial piety to the dead parents. This issue creates a rigorous religious controversy for Korean Christians and places obstacles in the path of evangelism in Korean society. Chapter one reveals the research orientation which gives general information on how to approach and develop this issue. I approach this issue historically, theologically, practically, and/or biblically. I adopt fundamental practical theology as the main research positioning, which was suggested by Don Browning. I also make use of seven movements proposed by J C Müller in order to present the literary research and six fundamental steps proposed by Lewis and Demarest only for the theological foundation in chapter three. Chapter two reveals the effect of Confucian ancestor worship has on Asian countries and Christians, specifically in China, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea, which are under the influence of Confucianism, and how Confucian ancestor worship hinders people from receiving and following Jesus Christ and a common barrier to evangelism in these Eastern Asian countries. Chapter three reveals the theological foundations of Confucianism and Christianity. Confucianism has its own specific theologies of worship form, temple, canon, afterlife, and gods like those of Christianity. A comparison with the theological foundations of Confucianism and Christianity is made for a better understanding of Confucian ancestor worship and filial piety. Chapter four reveals the differences between Confucian and biblical teachings on filial piety. Confucian filial piety was taught by Confucius who is a founder of Confucianism, while the origins of biblical filial piety are rooted in the Old and New Testaments. The Bible teaches that filial piety is directed toward living parents, but Confucianism teaches that filial piety is to both living and dead parents; filial piety to the dead parents is ancestor worship. Chapter five reveals the distinctions between Confucian and biblical teachings on ancestor worship. Confucians believe that dead ancestors are able to protect their own families, bring fortunes to their descendants, watch over their own families, and to reward the right and punish the wrong, but the Bible ascribes to ancestor worship as idolatry as taught in the second commandment. Chapter six reveals the ways of practical theological applications of filial piety and ancestor worship. I propose the ways of practical theological applications without compromise in the circumstance of the acceptance of ancestor worship as a custom. Further, I challenge preachers as central to reconciliation how to make an effort to aid the rooting of biblical filial piety into Korean society as a traditional Korean heritage. I hope that this thesis will help non-Christians to understand the Christian perspective of filial piety and ancestor worship and why Christians reject Confucian ancestor worship, and how Christianity emphasizes filial piety. Further, my intent is to help Christians confirm their beliefs, challenge non- Christians by showing what Christians believe, and give wisdom on how to create harmony with non-Christian family members. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Practical Theology / unrestricted

No description available.

本文係研究左傳「君子曰」之各有關問題，共一冊，約八萬字，分六章三十二節。 第一章緒論，敘述本文之研究動機及方法，並考辨「君子曰」之真偽。 第二章「君子曰」之形成，則依其引用方式之不同分為「直接引述」、「間接稱引」 兩者，並分項舉例說明之。 第三章「君子曰」之內容，依評論之重點，分為解經、預言、為政之道、為君之道、 為臣之道、交鄰國之道及論禮、義、信、仁孝、自處之道等，以明其與左傳所論實無 不同也。 第四章「君子曰」之立場與精神，先就其評論之經學立場及其所涵之意義加以分析， 次則以之與左傳所引之「仲尼曰」及公羊、穀梁二傳比較，以明其間之異同，再次則 引述前人之論「君子曰」者，釋其疑難，以明君子之評論非泛泛為之也。 第五章君子之學養，係就其評論引經之情形加以敘述，並論其評論之特色，以明君子 之學養焉。 第六章結論，縷述本文研究之結果，以知左傳乃「事義兼傳」；而由其評論立場，或 可推定其戶書時期不在戰國後期；由其所論與孔子相合，可知其亦為解經之作；而由 其體例，可知左傳於孔子「寓經於史」之義，亦有所發揚也。

文化外交是近年來國際關係中的一項重要議題，各國皆對外輸出軟權力來增加該國在世界上的影響力，中國自改革開放後經濟與軍事能力大幅成長，因此近年來便開始加強對外文化輸出的工作，運用文化外交的力量以達到國家政策的目標。 本研究的目的在於對胡錦濤主政時期的文化外交政策做一全面性的認識，論文首先探討文化外交的理論淵源，進而建構出文化外交的意涵；其次從總體的角度來研究胡錦濤政府文化外交政策，包括其產生原因以及訴求，並對執行此政策的各相關機構與指導方針做分析。另外在具體實踐方面，論文從孔子學院及2008年北京奧運來探討中國文化外交政策的成效，最後針對這兩項實踐以及總體文化外交政策做深入的評估。 研究發現中國的文化外交政策之興起有其內、外在環境的影響，而執行的結果雖然有達到一定的成效，但受限於部份因素的制約，使得中國的文化外交政策仍有許多待改進之處。 / Cultural diplomacy is an important issue in international relations in recent years; many countries output their soft power to increase their influences in the world. Since the success of China’s reform and open policy, its economy and military power had a large growth. Therefore, China started to strengthen the policy of cultural output, using the power of cultural diplomacy to achieve its national goal. The purpose of this research is to have a comprehensive understanding on the cultural diplomacy during Hu Jintao’s administration. In the beginning of this research, we discuss the theories of cultural diplomacy, and then to describe it’s meaning. Secondly, we analyze this policy, including the background and purpose, from the overall viewpoint, and also study on the government departments and documents related to this policy. In addition, we take Confucius Institute and Beijing Olympic Games for examples to discuss the result of China’s cultural diplomacy. At last, this research has the analysis on these two practices and the policy. This research found that the appearance of China’s cultural diplomacy is influenced by the inner and outer environments. Although this policy has its result, it is still restricted by some factors. It means there are still many places of this policy need to be improved.

近年來，全球化的高度發展促使國際格局逐漸產生改變，中國作為一新興國家，已相當明白當前國際間的競合關係應以良性發展為導向，致力於改變過去給予國際社會過度擴張剛性權力的既定印象，方能提供其綜合國力穩定發展的平台。透過觀察中國一連串有計畫的國家文化行銷活動，可見中國過去數千年的溫和、中庸的文化印象遺產成了柔性權力發展的最佳載具，其中又以中國官辦官營的孔子學院在全球長期性、有組織且有計畫的設點最受到關注。 　　國家如同商品，需要量身打造最適的計畫及管道來定位及行銷，本文透過結合學者Kotler及Olins的行銷理論，使用文獻分析法、歷史比較研究法以及內容分析法，配合國內外主要報業對於孔子學院之報導及評論作次級資料分析，（資料蒐集區段自2004年孔子學院成立以至2010年7月）探討國家形象建構之重要性及中國選擇孔子學院為扭轉其國家形象之途徑因素及成效。 / In recent year, blooming of globalization catalyzed the change of international situation. As an up-and-coming country, China realized the competition and cooperation among the globe should have the common goal of working toward a healthier development. China also recognized that the need of transform its stereotype image of being the over expanded hard power would be the solution to create platform for steady growth of national power. As soft power becoming the trend of today, how to create a positive national image is one of top priority policies for China. By studying China’s stream of well-planned marketing events for its national culture, we could see how the mild and mean culture of China in the past thousand years materialized. Out of all the events, the government managed Confucius Institutes organized expansion globally is the most followed event. A nation is very similar to a product, which need customized plan and channel for marketing. By combining Kotler and Olins’s marketing theory, this research paper discuss about the importance of constructing a national image. This research also discusses in detail about the process and the result of China using Confucius Institutes to modify its national image.

孔子學院是中國軟實力政策的展現。它創設的是目的為了向世界推廣中國文化與漢語，增進世界各國對中國的瞭解，目前全球已設有443所孔子學院與648間孔子課堂。 俄羅斯是中國最友好的朋友之一，也是重要的政治、經濟、戰略夥伴。因為兩國的關係不斷地發展，俄羅斯人對漢語的興趣也越來越高。為滿足俄羅斯人的需要，中國遂把在俄羅斯設立孔子學院列為積極推動的項目。俄羅斯目前已經有18所孔子學院與5間孔子課堂。 本論文的題目是『孔子學院在莫斯科：國家的形象與在地認知』，旨在瞭解在俄羅斯漢語教師與學生對孔子學院的觀感為何。 本論文所採用用的研究方法為面對面訪問跟次級資料分析。 分析的結果顯示，大部分受訪者持正面的看法，並對孔子學院給予高度評價，以及認為孔子學院對中俄關係的發展產生很重要的作用。雖然有一些人認為，孔子學院是中國政府情報機關的部分，但是總的印象是正面的。中國在俄羅斯成功地建立其自身的良好形象，而孔子學院是它以達到其目的使用的工具之一。 / Abstract Confucius Institute (CI) is one of China's soft power policy initiatives. It aims to promote Chinese language and culture all over the globe, enhance the world's understanding of China. Today there are already 443 Confucius Institutes and 648 Confucius Classrooms in the world. Russia is one China’s closest friends and allies, as well as its important political, economic and strategic partner. Due to the continuous development of the bilateral relations, Russian people are more and more interested in Chinese language. To meet their need in studying Mandarin, China is actively promoting the establishment of the Confucius Institute there. Now there are already 18 Confucius Institutes and 5 Confucius Classroom 5 in Russia. The name of this thesis is: "Confucius Institutes in Moscow: national image and local perception." It aims at understanding what kind of attitude Russians, who teach or study Chinese either at the CI or somewhere else, have towards the Confucius Institute. Besides, it was also important to understand whether Sino-Russian relations play a crucial role in shaping people’s attitude towards the CI. Throughout the research the author used primary data sources (field work, interviews), as well as secondary data sources. Field research was conducted only in Moscow, the rest of the information about the development of the CIs in Russia is observed through the secondary data sources (reports, newspapers, journals). Results of the analysis indicate that the majority of Russian people, on the example of Moscow, have favorable attitude towards the Confucius Institute. Although in general there are also those who are skeptical about this initiative in Russia, stating that China is using the CIs as a part of its intelligence network, but the overall impression is positive. The PRC managed to create a favorable image of itself in Russia, and the Confucius Institute is one of the tools it uses in order to reach its aim.