<p>Sveriges Försvarsmakt har innan 2000-talet inte haft något formellt fastställt dokument som beskriver hur verksamheten skall utövas såväl i krig som i fred.  I och med 2002-års utgåva av militärstrategisk doktrin fastställdes att grunden för Försvarsmaktens agerande skall vara <em>manövertänkande</em>. 2004 drabbades Kosovo av upplopp runt om i provinsen, varav den svenska bataljonen SWEBAT, var inblandade i strider kring byn Caglavica. Vid tillfället var flera svenska chefer upp till brigadnivå, involverade i beslutsprocesserna som skedde under incidenten.</p><p>Huvudsyftet med denna uppsats är att söka svar på huruvida den svenska officerskåren faktiskt tillämpar våra doktriner under insats. Frågeställningen är framtagen att utröna i hur stor utsträckning manövertänkande existerade och nyttjades på de olika ledningsnivåerna vid kravallerna i Caglavica 2004, likväl i hur stor grad det inte nyttjades.</p><p>Med utgångspunkt i <em>militärstrategisk doktrin</em> har ett antal indikatorer på manövertänkande valts ut för att appliceras på framtagen fallstudie, vilken grundas på FHS rapport <em>Caglavica 17 mars 2004</em>.</p><p>Resultatet av uppsatsen visar på ett assimilerat manövertänkande inom den svenska officerskåren under insats i Kosovo.</p> / <p>Before the 21^th century the Swedish Armed Forces has been without any formally established document that describes how its activities should be practiced in peace as well as in war. In 2002 the Military Strategic Doctrine was published and it stated that all activity by the Armed Forces was to be based by the concept of maneuver thinking. In 2004 Kosovo was hit by riots all over the province, in which the Swedish battalion SWEBAT, was mixed up in combat around the village of Caglvica. At the moment several Swedish commanders, up to brigade level, were involved in the decision-making process that took place during the incident.</p><p>The main object with this essay is to find out whether the Swedish officers actually put the doctrine into practice during their mission. The question at issue is to answer in how great extent maneuver thinking existed and was practiced by the different levels of command, during the riots of Caglavica 2004, but also in how great extent it was not applied.</p><p>With starting-point in the <em>Military Strategic Doctrine</em>, several indicators representing the concept of maneuver thinking, has been chosen to be applied to a case study, which is based on a rapport by FHS; <em>Caglavica 17 mars 2004</em>.</p><p>The results of the essay shows upon a assimilated maneuver thinking within the Swedish officer corps during mission in Kosovo.</p>

<p>Doktriner utgör väpnade styrkors viktigaste beskrivning avseende hur man avser använda militära medel för att uppnå politiska mål. För att tjäna sitt syfte bör doktriner utvecklas med rationella utgångspunkter som omvärldens utveckling och senaste forskning. Dock menar många att andra faktorer sprungna ur kulturella traditioner och organisationers särintressen påverkar tillkomsten av doktriner.</p><p>Civil-militärt samarbete har i moderna konflikter blivit allt mer betydelsefullt. Strategier för fredsfrämjande insatser i dagens komplexa konflikter bygger i allt högre grad på integrerade insatser mellan flera olika funktioner och aktörer. Civil-militärt samarbete har dock traditionellt haft en underordnad, stödjande roll i militära organisationer.</p><p>I denna uppsats undersöks forskningens roll i doktrinutveckling. Mer specifikt undersöks om doktriner inom det högaktuella området, civil-militärt samarbete, tagit till sig och omfattar den aktuella forskningen inom ämnesområdet. Storbritanniens och USA:s doktriner för civil-militärt samarbete har jämförts med aktuell forskning. Resultatet visar att dessa doktriner på ett bra sätt tillvaratagit forskningens uppfattningar. </p> / <p>Doctrines constitute armed forces most important guidelines on how to achieve political objectives with military means. To serve its purpose doctrines should be developed on rational grounds based on current world situation and most recent research. However many thinks that other factors such as organisations cultures and special interests influence doctrinal development.</p><p>Civil-military cooperation has in contemporary conflicts gained in importance. Strategies in complex peace support operations are increasingly based on integrated approaches between various functions and actors. Civil-military operations have traditionally played a secondary and supportive role in military organisations.</p><p>This paper will study the role of scientific research in doctrinal development. More to the point, doctrines within the highly topical field of civil-military cooperation are tested regarding coherence with recent research. Doctrines concerning civil-military cooperation in Great Britain and United States have been compared to recent research. The result shows that these doctrines have taken care of relevant opinions within recent scientific research.</p>

Sveriges Försvarsmakt har innan 2000-talet inte haft något formellt fastställt dokument som beskriver hur verksamheten skall utövas såväl i krig som i fred.  I och med 2002-års utgåva av militärstrategisk doktrin fastställdes att grunden för Försvarsmaktens agerande skall vara manövertänkande. 2004 drabbades Kosovo av upplopp runt om i provinsen, varav den svenska bataljonen SWEBAT, var inblandade i strider kring byn Caglavica. Vid tillfället var flera svenska chefer upp till brigadnivå, involverade i beslutsprocesserna som skedde under incidenten. Huvudsyftet med denna uppsats är att söka svar på huruvida den svenska officerskåren faktiskt tillämpar våra doktriner under insats. Frågeställningen är framtagen att utröna i hur stor utsträckning manövertänkande existerade och nyttjades på de olika ledningsnivåerna vid kravallerna i Caglavica 2004, likväl i hur stor grad det inte nyttjades. Med utgångspunkt i militärstrategisk doktrin har ett antal indikatorer på manövertänkande valts ut för att appliceras på framtagen fallstudie, vilken grundas på FHS rapport Caglavica 17 mars 2004. Resultatet av uppsatsen visar på ett assimilerat manövertänkande inom den svenska officerskåren under insats i Kosovo. / Before the 21th century the Swedish Armed Forces has been without any formally established document that describes how its activities should be practiced in peace as well as in war. In 2002 the Military Strategic Doctrine was published and it stated that all activity by the Armed Forces was to be based by the concept of maneuver thinking. In 2004 Kosovo was hit by riots all over the province, in which the Swedish battalion SWEBAT, was mixed up in combat around the village of Caglvica. At the moment several Swedish commanders, up to brigade level, were involved in the decision-making process that took place during the incident. The main object with this essay is to find out whether the Swedish officers actually put the doctrine into practice during their mission. The question at issue is to answer in how great extent maneuver thinking existed and was practiced by the different levels of command, during the riots of Caglavica 2004, but also in how great extent it was not applied. With starting-point in the Military Strategic Doctrine, several indicators representing the concept of maneuver thinking, has been chosen to be applied to a case study, which is based on a rapport by FHS; Caglavica 17 mars 2004. The results of the essay shows upon a assimilated maneuver thinking within the Swedish officer corps during mission in Kosovo.

Doktriner utgör väpnade styrkors viktigaste beskrivning avseende hur man avser använda militära medel för att uppnå politiska mål. För att tjäna sitt syfte bör doktriner utvecklas med rationella utgångspunkter som omvärldens utveckling och senaste forskning. Dock menar många att andra faktorer sprungna ur kulturella traditioner och organisationers särintressen påverkar tillkomsten av doktriner. Civil-militärt samarbete har i moderna konflikter blivit allt mer betydelsefullt. Strategier för fredsfrämjande insatser i dagens komplexa konflikter bygger i allt högre grad på integrerade insatser mellan flera olika funktioner och aktörer. Civil-militärt samarbete har dock traditionellt haft en underordnad, stödjande roll i militära organisationer. I denna uppsats undersöks forskningens roll i doktrinutveckling. Mer specifikt undersöks om doktriner inom det högaktuella området, civil-militärt samarbete, tagit till sig och omfattar den aktuella forskningen inom ämnesområdet. Storbritanniens och USA:s doktriner för civil-militärt samarbete har jämförts med aktuell forskning. Resultatet visar att dessa doktriner på ett bra sätt tillvaratagit forskningens uppfattningar. / Doctrines constitute armed forces most important guidelines on how to achieve political objectives with military means. To serve its purpose doctrines should be developed on rational grounds based on current world situation and most recent research. However many thinks that other factors such as organisations cultures and special interests influence doctrinal development. Civil-military cooperation has in contemporary conflicts gained in importance. Strategies in complex peace support operations are increasingly based on integrated approaches between various functions and actors. Civil-military operations have traditionally played a secondary and supportive role in military organisations. This paper will study the role of scientific research in doctrinal development. More to the point, doctrines within the highly topical field of civil-military cooperation are tested regarding coherence with recent research. Doctrines concerning civil-military cooperation in Great Britain and United States have been compared to recent research. The result shows that these doctrines have taken care of relevant opinions within recent scientific research.

The 21st century has brought on a lot of changes in the security politics in Northern Europe. Some reports have described it as a change from sunshine to storm. In correlation with these changes, there will also be changes in strategy and in culture. Strategy can be explained through ends, means, and methods. While ends are mainly expressed in the arena of security politics, means and methods are generally formulated by the military in its doctrines. A country’s strategic culture can also be interpreted through its doctrines. This essay studied the described means and methods in military doctrines through realism and liberalism, in order to establish if the expressed means and methods had changed alongside the changing security politics in Northern Europe. Through this analysis, conclusions could also be made concerning the described strategic culture in the doctrines. The result showed that the described means and methods, as well as the expressed culture had gone through a change and become more influenced by realistic tendencies. This shows that the Swedish Armed Forces has adapted its description of strategy and strategic culture in its doctrines in coherence with the changing politics.

Cyber is a multifaceted concept that is a relatively new area of research in war studies. When a con-cept contains several underlying attributes without a clear presentation, it can create ambiguities which attributes that explain what in a joint operation. It is important to have a similar understand-ing of how concepts are used to promote the ability to cooperate and enable the exchange of infor-mation and the implementation of activities in a similar way. A challenge in cyber operations is that the domain does not follow the natural boundaries that exist in the traditional domains, air, land and maritime. This argues that a cyber operation places greater demands on collaboration among the nations who´s going to conduct the operation. The purpose of this essay is that through John Gerring's concept theory "what makes a concept good?" analyze the concepts of cyber and how they are presented in Sweden's and NATO's doc-trines in joint operations, DGO and AJP-3. The result is then compared and presents an understand-ing of how it should be perceived in a joint operation. The results of this study show that the conceptual definitions of cyber differs between the doctrines to that extent that the definitions themselves are not comparable. But at the same time, there are similarities in several aspects such as within domain operations and risk/opportunity valuation.

Future warfare will require military forces to cope with uncertainties by employing Finkel´s optimal flexibility and adaption if forces are to succeed. While flexibility is already crucial component of the Swedish warfare concept, the extent of implementation is unknown. This study investigates how flexibility is described and applied within the Swedish Armed Forces at an operational level, specifically within the Air Force and Navy. Using systematic text analysis this study shows that the theory is implemented at the operational level and partly in the Air Force and Navy. Specifically, and for both services in the conceptual and doctrinal flexibility stratum deficiencies are explained by using mission command. Regarding the lessons learning stratum, the services partially utilize rapid dissemination to compensate for the lack of mechanisms that encourage learning from mistakes. This research indicates the need for a comprehensive understanding of the theory at all levels to ensure successful implementation.

Vår uppsats beskriver hur de tre aktörerna Försvarsmakten, Trafikverket och Green Cargo AB har påverkats av totalförsvarets nedläggning under 90-talet fram till idag, samt det återtagande och nyskapande som dessa tre aktörer står inför.  Empirin bygger på data som har framkommit under intervjuer med de tre aktörernas respondenter, med detta som underlag har vi sökt i propositioner, motioner, regeringsbeslut och litteratur. Som avslutning i vår uppsats påvisar vi de olika kategorierna och deras likheter och motsatser, samt de frågeställningar som lever kvar utifrån denna uppsats till vidare arbete eller forskning.

This study aims to give an alternative understanding of why military doctrines could be rejected by its organization. Previous researcher has explained doctrinal rejection and reluctance to change mainly through organizational and cultural theories. This study takes its point of departure in theresearch of doctrinal implementation. A doctrine can be perfectly writtenbut if the organization does not understand it, the doctrine will fail its purpose. Education is considered a vital part of implementation and doctrinalunderstanding, but the subject is underexplored. The study therefore examines military teachers understanding of military doctrines. With an ideal typology the study presents three types of understandings and revenue of doctrine and then draws the conclusion that doctrinal implementation needs toaddress a variation of ides to be properly incorporated in the education ofofficers to avoid a contradictory dynamic.

Military theorists believes that morale is a crucial contributor to influence the military effectiveness. Therefore, one can assume that there should be a clear doctrinal guidance to military leaders on specific characteristics or behaviours which develops morale in units. Swedish doctrines can be perceived to have insufficient doctrinal guidance to aid military leaders influence morale. Hence, why military leaders may depend on their acquired experience to influence the development. Through an organisational perspective, this can cause perceptions to differ between branches on the meaning and development of morale. The aim of the study is to contribute to the previous research on the development of morale in a military context. Through insights of Swedish military leaders, the study also aims to get a better understanding of how military leadership can be seen as a main contributor to development of morale within units. Swedish military leader’s perceptions on the meaning of morale can be seen as a willingness to fight, which is believed to evolve when right prerequisite and shared experiences exist. The prerequisites were described as leadership which can tutor, guide, and create trust within the unit’s members. Leadership with interaction between the units shared experiences contribute to the development of willingness, which is described as a major contributor to military effectiveness.