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Tesis por compendio / [ES] La presente tesis doctoral analiza cuatro procesos de coproducción de conocimiento entre universidad y sociedad, facilitados a partir de metodologías participativas, así como sus contribuciones a la expansión de cuatro capacidades para la liberación epistémica en las personas que participan. Los principales fundamentos teóricos que orientan este estudio son el Enfoque de Capacidades para el Desarrollo Humano, la Justicia Epistémica y la Educación Liberadora. Esta tesis se realizó en la modalidad de compendio de publicaciones científicas, recogiendo tres artículos y un capítulo de libro publicado en una editorial de prestigio. La estrategia metodológica es de tipo cualitativo y se realiza a partir de la observación participante, entrevistas, talleres participativos y análisis del discurso (capítulo 1). A partir de una perspectiva crítica de las injusticias epistémicas propuestas por Miranda Fricker (2015), me posiciono desde las personas oprimidas a nivel histórico en los procesos de producción de conocimiento entre universidad y sociedad. Desde tal posicionamiento teórico y práctico en torno a la educación liberadora propuesta por el pedagogo brasileño Paulo Freire (1970;1978) identifico, formulo y analizo cuatro capacidades para la liberación epistémica que se alinean con los valores y principios del desarrollo humano. Estas capacidades se han visto potenciadas en las personas que participaron en los cuatro casos de estudios que serán explorados en esta tesis: la experiencia de investigación-acción participativa con cartografía social con niñas y niños de 4º Primaria del CEIP Vicente Gaos (capítulo 2); el proceso de Aprendizaje en Acción con alumnado del Máster en Cooperación al Desarrollo de la Universitat Politècnica de València y actores del barrio Na Rovella (capítulo 3); el subproceso de Fotovoz con las y los jóvenes de secundaria del IES Jordi de Sant Jordi (capítulo 4); y la iniciativa de la Red de Investigadores Comunitarios (RIC) en Medellín, Colombia (capítulo 5). Estas capacidades para la liberación epistémica son: la capacidad de ser reconocida como sujeta productora de conocimiento válido, la capacidad de hacer desde la apertura comunicativa, la capacidad de aprender del saber colectivo para el bien común y la capacidad de transformar desde la acción colectiva. Por otro lado, también identifico cuatro opresiones que limitan y obstaculizan la expansión de estas capacidades en las interacciones educativas y en los procesos de producción de conocimiento. La opresión ontológica limita y obstaculiza la capacidad de ser, las opresiones de tipo epistémica - expresivas e interpretativas - limitan, respectivamente, la capacidad de hacer y aprender, y las opresiones epistemológicas limitan la capacidad de transformar. A partir de tales capacidades y opresiones, exploro el caso de resistencia e insurrección hermenéutica de las lideresas y líderes comunitarios que participan en la RIC. A continuación, realizo una discusión global de los principales resultados de la tesis (capítulo 6). Por último, recojo las principales contribuciones y conclusiones del presente estudio doctoral a los procesos de coproducción de conocimiento entre universidad y sociedad que pretendan contribuir a la liberación epistémica de las personas que participan (capitulo 7). / [CA] La present tesi doctoral analitza quatre processos de coproducció de coneixement entre universitat i societat, facilitats a partir de metodologies participatives, així com les seves contribucions a l'expansió de quatre capacitats per a l'alliberament epistèmica en les persones que participen. Els principals fonaments teòrics que orienten aquest estudi són l'Enfocament de Capacitats per al Desenvolupament Humà, la Justícia Epistèmica i l'Educació Alliberadora. Aquesta tesi es va realitzar en la modalitat de compendi de publicacions científiques, recollint tres articles i un capítol de llibre publicat en una editorial de prestigi. L'estratègia metodològica és de tipus qualitatiu i es realitza a partir de l'observació participant, entrevistes, tallers participatius i anàlisis del discurs (capítol 1). A partir d'una perspectiva crítica de les injustícies epistèmics propostes per Miranda Fricker (2015), em posiciono des de les persones oprimides a nivell històric en els processos de producció de coneixement entre universitat i societat. Des de tal posicionament teòric i pràctic entorn de l'educació alliberadora proposada pel pedagog brasiler Paulo Freire (1970;1978) identifico, formulo i analitzo quatre capacitats per a l'alliberament epistèmica que s'alineen amb els valors i principis del desenvolupament humà. Aquestes capacitats s'han vist potenciades en les persones que van participar en els quatre casos d'estudis que seran explorats en aquesta tesi: l'experiència de recerca-acció participativa amb cartografia social amb nenes i nens de 4t Primària del CEIP Vicente Gaos (capítol 2); el procés d'Aprenentatge en Acció amb alumnat del Màster en Cooperació al Desenvolupament de la Universitat Politècnica de València i actors del barri Na Rovella (capítol 3); el subproceso de Fotovoz amb les i els joves de secundària de l'IES Jordi de Sant Jordi (capítol 4); i la iniciativa de la Xarxa d'Investigadors Comunitaris (RIC) a Medellín, Colòmbia (capítol 5). Aquestes capacitats per a l'alliberament epistèmica són: la capacitat de ser reconeguda com a subjecta productora de coneixement vàlid, la capacitat de fer des de l'obertura comunicativa, la capacitat d'aprendre del saber col·lectiu per al bé comú i la capacitat de transformar des de l'acció col·lectiva. D'altra banda, també identifico quatre opressions que limiten i obstaculitzen l'expansió d'aquestes capacitats en les interaccions educatives i en els processos de producció de coneixement. L'opressió ontològica limita i obstaculitza la capacitat de ser, les opressions de tipus epistèmics - expressives i interpretatives - limiten, respectivament, la capacitat de fer i aprendre, i les opressions epistemològiques limiten la capacitat de transformar. A partir de tals capacitats i opressions, exploro el cas de resistència i insurrecció hermenèutica de les lideressis i líders comunitaris que participen en la RIC. A continuació, realitzo una discussió global dels principals resultats de la tesi (capítol 6). Finalment, recullo les principals contribucions i conclusions del present estudi doctoral als processos de coproducció de coneixement entre universitat i societat que pretenguin contribuir a l'alliberament epistèmica de les persones que participen (capitulo 7). / [EN] This doctoral thesis analyses four processes of co-production of knowledge between university and society, facilitated from participatory methodologies, as well as their contributions to the expansion of four capabilities for epistemic liberation in the people who participate. The main theoretical foundations that guide this study are the Capability Approach for Human Development, Epistemic Justice and Liberating Education. This thesis was carried out in the form of compendium of scientific publications, collecting three articles and a book chapter published in a prestigious publisher. The methodological strategy is qualitative and is carried out based on participant observation, interviews, participatory workshops and discourse analysis (chapter 1). From a critical perspective of the epistemic injustices proposed by Miranda Fricker (2015), I position myself from the historically oppressed people in the knowledge production processes between university and society. From such a theoretical and practical position around the liberating education proposed by the Brazilian pedagogue Paulo Freire (1970; 1978), I identify, formulate and analyse four capabilities for epistemic liberation that are aligned with the values and principles of human development. These capabilities have been enhanced in the people who participated in the four case studies that will be explored in this thesis: the participatory action-research experience with social mapping with 4th grade boys and girls from CEIP Vicente Gaos (chapter 2); the Learning in Action process with students of the Master's Degree in Development Cooperation at the Polytechnic University of Valencia and actors from the Na Rovella neighborhood (chapter 3); the Photovoice thread with secondary school youth from the IES Jordi de Sant Jordi (chapter 4); and the initiative of the Network of Community Researchers (RIC) in Medellín, Colombia (chapter 5). These capabilities for epistemic liberation are the capability to be recognized as a producer of valid knowledge, the capability to do things from communicative openness, the capability to learn from collective knowledge for the common good, and the capability to transform from collective action. On the other hand, I also identify four oppressions that limit and hinder the expansion of these capabilities in educational interactions and in knowledge production processes. Ontological oppression limits and hinders the capability to be, epistemic type oppressions - expressive and interpretive - limit, respectively, the ability to do and learn, and epistemological oppressions limit the ability to transform. From such capabilities and oppressions, I explore the case of resistance and hermeneutical insurrection of the community leaders who participate in the RIC. Next, I make a global discussion of the main results of the thesis (chapter 6). Finally, he collected the main contributions and conclusions of this doctoral study to the processes of co-production of knowledge between university and society that seek to contribute to the epistemic liberation of the people who participate (chapter 7). / Leivas Vargas, M. (2022). Capacidades para la liberación epistémica en los procesos de coproducción de conocimiento entre universidad y sociedad a partir de metodologías participativas transformadoras [Tesis doctoral]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/190625 / Compendio

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L’invalidation de leur expérience par les professionnel·le·s de la santé est partagée par un grand nombre de personnes vivant avec de la douleur chronique. Elle correspond au fait de ne pas prendre au sérieux ce que l’autre personne communique ou de discréditer ses émotions. Le témoignage des personnes qui vivent de la douleur n’est donc pas perçu comme égal et compétent. Les injustices épistémiques, soit la disqualification d’une personne comme agente de savoir, sont une forme d’invalidation. Ce cadre théorique a été mobilisé dans la littérature dans le contexte de la relation médicale afin de comprendre l’invalidation de la douleur chronique. Cependant, ces études, très théoriques, tendent elles-mêmes à reproduire des injustices épistémiques en ne donnant pas la voix aux personnes directement concernées par ces injustices. Les mécanismes ciblés comme favorisant les injustices épistémiques et les conséquences découlant de celles-ci sont donc identifiés de façon théorique, sans égard au vécu réel des patient·e·s. Similairement, les avenues proposées pour favoriser la justice épistémique ne tiennent pas compte des besoins et préférences de réel·le·s patient·e·s. Ce projet de recherche vise à mieux comprendre les injustices épistémiques de façon globale et intégrative dans la relation médicale au moyen d’entretiens qualitatifs narratifs conduits auprès de dix-sept personnes vivant avec de la douleur chronique. Il vise à identifier les mécanismes sous-jacents aux injustices épistémiques et leurs conséquences individuelles, politiques et structurelles. Les avenues pour favoriser la justice épistémique sont également recensées dans la littérature, comparées et analysées à la lumière du témoignage de réel·le·s patient·e·s. Une avenue intégrative, le partenariat patient, est identifiée. / Experiences of chronic pain invalidation by healthcare practitioners are shared by many people living with chronic pain. Invalidation can include not taking seriously someone’s testimony, imposing one's thoughts, or discrediting someone’s emotions. In those cases, the testimony is not perceived as equal and competent. Epistemic injustices, that is, the disqualification of a person as a knower, are a form of invalidation. This theoretical framework has been used in the context of the medical relationship, and to understand the invalidation of chronic pain. However, these studies are theoretical, and tend to reproduce epistemic injustices by not giving a voice to the people directly impacted by these injustices. The mechanisms underlying epistemic injustices and the consequences resulting from them are therefore identified theoretically, without regard to the actual experience of patients. Similarly, the avenues proposed to promote epistemic justice do not consider the needs and preferences of real patients. This research project aims at better understanding epistemic injustices in a global and integrative way in the medical relationship by means of qualitative narrative interviews conducted with seventeen people living with chronic pain. It aims at identifying the mechanisms underlying the epistemic injustices and their individual, political and structural consequences. Avenues for promoting epistemic justice are also identified in the literature, compared, and analyzed though patients’ testimonies. An integrative avenue, patient partnership, is identified.

In December 2015, the world leaders gathered in Paris trying to address the urging challenges with climate change. The product of this meeting is called the Paris Agreement. Beforehand, many argued that another failure could not be accepted and the policymakers must let science influence the policy process. The aim of this study was to explore, through the epistemic community approach, in what way IPCC where able to influence the Paris Agreement. The results shows that the Paris Agreement was highly influenced under the topic sustainable development, while IPCCs assessments for mitigation and adaption was partly implemented.

I develop a novel semantic theory for modals that has important consequences for contemporary work in epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. My theory replaces the dominant view about semantics--that our best theory of meaning should ascribe truth-conditions to modalized sentences--with a non-truth-conditional yet fully compositional semantics for modals. Its contributions to current debates in analytic philosophy include an explanation of the possibility of modal disagreement that avoids relativism, a solution to the paradoxes about conditional obligations (including the gentle murder paradox), and new impulses for a generalized solution to the Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivism. / text

<p>Heightened awareness of the evolutionary, socio-cultural, and psychological origins of our moral judgments pushes many of us in the direction of moral skepticism, in the direction of doubting the objective truth of our moral judgments. But should awareness of the origins of our moral judgments shake our confidence in them? Are there good moral debunking challenges or debunking arguments from premises concerning the accessible origins of our moral judgments to skeptical conclusions regarding them? In vigorous pursuit of these questions, this dissertation sifts three promising moral debunking challenges to moral realism, namely Richard Joyce's (2001) evolutionary debunking argument from epistemic insensitivity, Sharon Street's (2006) "Darwinian Dilemma," and David Enoch's (2010) "Epistemological Challenge." It is argued that each challenge faces cogent objections that not only demonstrate the inadequacy of the best debunking challenges available but also instructively guide us to the development of new and more forceful debunking challenges to moral realism. This dissertation develops two new and forceful debunking challenges, both of which target the epistemic reliability and justification of our moral judgments on realist views of the moral facts. The first new debunking challenge starts from the premise that the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth and invokes a new species of epistemic insensitivity to secure the conclusion that our moral belief-forming processes are epistemically unreliable. The second new debunking challenge reasons that the best explanation of the fact that moral realists have no good explanation of the reliability of our moral belief-forming processes is that there is no such reliability.</p> / Dissertation

The central concern of this thesis is to discuss interpretations of learning in educational research. A point of departure is taken in core epistemological and ontological assumptions informing three major approaches to learning: behaviourism, cognitive constructivism and socioculturalism. It is argued that all three perspectives provide important insights into research on learning, but each alone runs the risk of reducing learning and interpretations of learning to single aspects. Specific attention is therefore given to Intentional Analysis, as it has been developed to account for sociocultural aspects that influence learning and individual cognition. It is argued that interpretations of learning processes face challenges, different kinds of holism, underdetermination and the complexity of intentionality, that need to be accounted for in order to make valid interpretations. Interpretation is therefore also discussed in light of philosopher Donald Davidson’s theories of knowledge and interpretation. It is suggested that his theories may provide aspects of an ontological and epistemological stance that can form the basis for interpretations of learning in educational research. A first brief sketch, referred to as ‘epistemic holism’, is thus drawn. The thesis also exemplifies how such a stance can inform empirical research. It provides a first formulation of research strategies – a so-called ‘interpretative holism’. The thesis discusses what such a stance may imply with regard to the nature and location of knowledge and the status of the learning situation. Ascribing meaning to observed behaviour, as it is described in this thesis, implies that an action is always an action under a specific description. Different descriptions may not be contradictory, but if we do not know the learner’s language use, we cannot know whether there is a difference in language or in beliefs. It is argued that the principle of charity and reference to saliency, that is, what appears as the figure for the learner, may help us decide. However, saliency does not only appear as a phenomenon in relation to physical objects and events, but also in the symbolic world, thus requires that the analysis extend beyond the mere transcription of an interview or the description of an observation. Hence, a conclusion to be drawn from this thesis is that the very question of what counts as data in the interpretation of complex learning processes is up for discussion. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following paper was unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 4: Manuscript.</p>

There have been many studies on media (mis)representations of the Middle East and Iran. However, the experts and analysts who serve as major sources for those representations (and for government policy making) have not been systematically studied. This project studies discourses and networks of widely published Iran experts during the first year of the presidency of Iran’s Hassan Rouhani (2013-2014), the period during which unprecedented direct U.S.-Iran diplomacy paved the way for the historic nuclear agreement with Iran. Norman Fairclough’s three dimensional critical discourse analysis method and Peter Haas’s Epistemic Community approach are employed to study discursive as well as non-discursive (networked) characteristics of the most widely published U.S. Iran experts during this time period. Results identify five major epistemic communities that, altogether, represent the spectrum of U.S. Iran experts: neoconservatism, liberal interventionism, containment (tactical engagement), strategic engagement, and rapprochement. These five epistemic communities are described in detail throughout the five results chapters. Findings show that these experts influence the terms of media representations as well as the foreign policy making process. Findings also show that experts operate in a web of discursive as well as networked affiliations (i.e., epistemic communities) in order to be able to develop and circulate their discourses. It is however important to recognize that epistemic communities are not uniform in terms of formation stage, cohesion and level.

Measures of epistemic utility are used by formal epistemologists to make determinations of epistemic betterness among cognitive states. The Brier rule is the most popular choice (by far) among formal epistemologists for such a measure. In this paper, however, we show that the Brier rule is sometimes seriously wrong about whether one cognitive state is epistemically better than another. In particular, there are cases where an agent gets evidence that definitively eliminates a false hypothesis (and the probabilities assigned to the other hypotheses stay in the same ratios), but where the Brier rule says that things have become epistemically worse. Along the way to this 'elimination experiment' counter-example to the Brier rule as a measure of epistemic utility, we identify several useful monotonicity principles for epistemic betterness. We also reply to several potential objections to this counter-example.