This study attempts to impart such facts as will enable the reader to select his own alternative as to the feasibility of monopoly or free competition within the aluminum industry. In order to assist the reader in making decisions the evolution of the supply and price structure of aluminum and its effects on demand are submitted.

Le phénomène du commerce parallèle repose sur un constat de base à la fois simple et évident: le niveau des prix d’un même produit « créé et fabriqué » par le même titulaire peut souvent varier de manière importante d’un pays à l’autre, en raison notamment des disparités dans le revenu moyen des consommateurs, des règlementations nationales entravant les échanges, ou encore du niveau de concurrence qui peut être affecté par des restrictions d’ordre privé, telles que des conventions de partage de marchés ou des contrats de distribution. Les commerçants que l’on appelle « importateurs parallèles » achèteront le produit là où il est le moins cher, qu’il provienne directement du titulaire ou non, en vue de le revendre là où ils pourront faire le meilleur profit. Dans ce contexte, des problèmes apparaîtront dans le pays d’importation dans la mesure où les commerçants parallèles vendront, bien évidemment, moins cher que les distributeurs désignés par le titulaire. Le titulaire en sa qualité de « créateur » de produits, est souvent titulaire de droits de propriété intellectuelle qu’il désirera, non sans une certaine légitimité, « monnayer », tentant ainsi de cloisonner les marchés en vue d’obtenir le prix le plus élevé qu’un consommateur serait prêt à payer pour un produit « x » sur un marché « y ». Cet essai a pour mérite de mettre en tension, d'une part, la liberté des échanges et de la concurrence qui favorisent, notamment, l’obtention des produits au meilleur prix pour les acheteurs et les consommateurs et, d’autre part, la nécessité de protéger les efforts de création dans l’industrie afin que celle-ci continue à investir dans la recherche et le développement de nouveaux produits. / The phenomenon of parallel trade rests on a simple and obvious basic premise: the price levels of the same product “created and made” by the same manufacturer can often vary considerably from one country to another. This variation is notably due to disparities in the mean income of consumers, trade-prohibiting national regulations or the level of competition which may itself be affected by private restrictions such as market sharing agreements or distribution contracts. The merchants, termed “parallel importers” will buy the product where it is cheapest, whether or not it stems directly from the manufacturer, and resell it where they will obtain the best profits. Some problems will arise in the country of importation, insofar as parallel importers will sell at a lower price than the distributors designated by the manufacturer. The manufacturer, in his quality of “creator” of goods, is often the owner of intellectual property rights which it will understandably try to monetize, in an attempt to partition the markets in order to obtain the highest price that the consumer is willing to pay for product “x” on market “y”. This article, mainly jurisprudential, seeks to underline the tension between the free exchange of goods in open markets which notably allows consumers and buyers to obtain products at the best price, and the necessity of protecting the creation efforts of the industry in order to encourage investment in the research and development of new products.

La Convention régissant l’Union économique de l’Afrique centrale (UEAC) renferme les dispositions particulières dont l’objet est d’harmoniser les politiques de transports. Cela passe par l’ouverture des marchés nationaux des Etats membres aux opérateurs économiques, la suppression des restrictions à la libre prestation des services et d’établissement, l’interconnexion des infrastructures, etc. A partir des critères de validité formelle, factuelle et axiologique du droit, cette thèse a pour objet d’analyser les contraintes qui handicapent ces politiques. Après avoir fait le constat des difficultés liées au choix de la technique d’harmonisation des droits, l’étude se penche sur les limites dues à la non-observation des procédures d’admission des conventions dans les ordres juridiques internes, à la faiblesse des institutions, aux risques économiques, financiers et politiques. Elle suggère qu’il est nécessaire de remettre de l’ordre dans les systèmes juridiques, grâce à une politique de codification et, à terme, de rechercher la sécurité juridique, par l’uniformisation des règles en présence. Enfin, face à la corruption, elle prend position pour un devoir d’ingérence de la Communauté internationale pour sécuriser les ressources destinées à la modernisation des infrastructures routières. / Convention governing the economic Union of central Africa (UEAC) contains the specific measures whose object is to harmonize the policies of transport. That passes by the opening of the national markets of the Member States to the economic operators, the suppression of the restrictions on freedom to provide services and of establishment, the interconnection of the infrastructures, etc From the criteria of formal, factual and axiologic validity of the right, this thesis has the aim of analyzing the constraints which handicap these policies. After having made the report of the difficulties related to the choice of the technique of harmonization of laws, the study considers the limits due to the nonobservance of the procedures of admission of conventions in the internal legal orders, with the weakness of the institutions, with the economic risks, financial and political. It suggests that it is necessary to give of the order in the legal systems, thanks to a policy of coding and, in the long term, seeking the legal security, by the standardization of the involved rules. Lastly, vis-a-vis corruption, it gives an opinion for a duty of interference of the International community to make safe the resources intended for the modernization of the road infrastructures.

Cette thèse est composée de trois essais liés à la conception de mécanisme et aux enchères. Dans le premier essai j'étudie la conception de mécanismes bayésiens efficaces dans des environnements où les fonctions d'utilité des agents dépendent de l'alternative choisie même lorsque ceux-ci ne participent pas au mécanisme. En plus d'une règle d'attribution et d'une règle de paiement le planificateur peut proférer des menaces afin d'inciter les agents à participer au mécanisme et de maximiser son propre surplus; Le planificateur peut présumer du type d'un agent qui ne participe pas. Je prouve que la solution du problème de conception peut être trouvée par un choix max-min des types présumés et des menaces. J'applique ceci à la conception d'une enchère multiple efficace lorsque la possession du bien par un acheteur a des externalités négatives sur les autres acheteurs. Le deuxième essai considère la règle du juste retour employée par l'agence spatiale européenne (ESA). Elle assure à chaque état membre un retour proportionnel à sa contribution, sous forme de contrats attribués à des sociétés venant de cet état. La règle du juste retour est en conflit avec le principe de la libre concurrence puisque des contrats ne sont pas nécessairement attribués aux sociétés qui font les offres les plus basses. Ceci a soulevé des discussions sur l'utilisation de cette règle: les grands états ayant des programmes spatiaux nationaux forts, voient sa stricte utilisation comme un obstacle à la compétitivité et à la rentabilité. Apriori cette règle semble plus coûteuse à l'agence que les enchères traditionnelles. Nous prouvons au contraire qu'une implémentation appropriée de la règle du juste retour peut la rendre moins coûteuse que des enchères traditionnelles de libre concurrence. Nous considérons le cas de l'information complète où les niveaux de technologie des firmes sont de notoriété publique, et le cas de l'information incomplète où les sociétés observent en privée leurs coûts de production. Enfin, dans le troisième essai je dérive un mécanisme optimal d'appel d'offre dans un environnement où un acheteur d'articles hétérogènes fait face a de potentiels fournisseurs de différents groupes, et est contraint de choisir une liste de gagnants qui est compatible avec des quotas assignés aux différents groupes. La règle optimale d'attribution consiste à assigner des niveaux de priorité aux fournisseurs sur la base des coûts individuels qu'ils rapportent au décideur. La manière dont ces niveaux de priorité sont déterminés est subjective mais connue de tous avant le déroulement de l'appel d'offre. Les différents coûts rapportés induisent des scores pour chaque liste potentielle de gagnant. Les articles sont alors achetés à la liste ayant les meilleurs scores, s'il n'est pas plus grand que la valeur de l'acheteur. Je montre également qu'en général il n'est pas optimal d'acheter les articles par des enchères séparées. / This thesis is made of three essays related to mechanism design and auctions. In first essay I study Bayesian efficient mechanism design in environments where agents' utility functions depend on the chosen alternative even if they do not participate to the mechanism. In addition to an allocation rule and a payment rule the designer may choose appropriate threats in order to give agents the incentive to participate and maximize his own expected surplus; The planner may presume the type of an agent who does not participate. I show that the solution of the design problem can be found by a max - min choice of the presumed types and threats. I apply this to the design of an efficient multi-unit auction when a buyer in possession of the good causes negative externalities on other buyers.\\ The second essay considers the fair return rule used by the European Space Agency (ESA). It ensures each member state of ESA a return proportional to its contribution, in the form of contracts awarded to firms coming from that state. The fair return rule is in conflict with the principle of free competition since contracts are not necessarily awarded to firms with the lowest bids. This has raised debates on the use of this rule: it is well accepted by small states, but larger states with strong national space programs, see its strict use as an obstacle to competitiveness and cost effectiveness. It is easy to believe that this rule is more costly to the agency than traditional auctions. We show on the contrary that an adequate implementation of the fair return rule may cause it to be less expensive to the agency than the traditional auctions of free competition. We consider the case of complete information where firms' technology levels are common knowledge, and the case of incomplete information where firms observe privately their production costs. In both cases we show that adequate implementation of the fair return rule may help take advantage of asymmetries between countries in order to expect a lower cost than with traditional auctions.\\ Finally, in the third essay I derive an optimal procurement mechanism in an environment where a buyer of heterogeneous items faces potential suppliers from different groups, and is constrained to choose a winning list that is consistent with some exogenous quotas assigned to the different groups. The optimal allocation rule consists of assigning priority levels to suppliers on the basis of their cost reports. The way these priority levels are determined is subjective but known to all before the auction. The individual reports induce scores for each potential winning list. The items are then purchased from one of the lists with the best score, provided it is not greater than the buyer's valuation for the items. I also find that it is not optimal to purchase the items through separate auctions, unless the buyer's valuation is sufficiently high or low.

Le phénomène du commerce parallèle repose sur un constat de base à la fois simple et évident: le niveau des prix d’un même produit « créé et fabriqué » par le même titulaire peut souvent varier de manière importante d’un pays à l’autre, en raison notamment des disparités dans le revenu moyen des consommateurs, des règlementations nationales entravant les échanges, ou encore du niveau de concurrence qui peut être affecté par des restrictions d’ordre privé, telles que des conventions de partage de marchés ou des contrats de distribution. Les commerçants que l’on appelle « importateurs parallèles » achèteront le produit là où il est le moins cher, qu’il provienne directement du titulaire ou non, en vue de le revendre là où ils pourront faire le meilleur profit. Dans ce contexte, des problèmes apparaîtront dans le pays d’importation dans la mesure où les commerçants parallèles vendront, bien évidemment, moins cher que les distributeurs désignés par le titulaire. Le titulaire en sa qualité de « créateur » de produits, est souvent titulaire de droits de propriété intellectuelle qu’il désirera, non sans une certaine légitimité, « monnayer », tentant ainsi de cloisonner les marchés en vue d’obtenir le prix le plus élevé qu’un consommateur serait prêt à payer pour un produit « x » sur un marché « y ». Cet essai a pour mérite de mettre en tension, d'une part, la liberté des échanges et de la concurrence qui favorisent, notamment, l’obtention des produits au meilleur prix pour les acheteurs et les consommateurs et, d’autre part, la nécessité de protéger les efforts de création dans l’industrie afin que celle-ci continue à investir dans la recherche et le développement de nouveaux produits. / The phenomenon of parallel trade rests on a simple and obvious basic premise: the price levels of the same product “created and made” by the same manufacturer can often vary considerably from one country to another. This variation is notably due to disparities in the mean income of consumers, trade-prohibiting national regulations or the level of competition which may itself be affected by private restrictions such as market sharing agreements or distribution contracts. The merchants, termed “parallel importers” will buy the product where it is cheapest, whether or not it stems directly from the manufacturer, and resell it where they will obtain the best profits. Some problems will arise in the country of importation, insofar as parallel importers will sell at a lower price than the distributors designated by the manufacturer. The manufacturer, in his quality of “creator” of goods, is often the owner of intellectual property rights which it will understandably try to monetize, in an attempt to partition the markets in order to obtain the highest price that the consumer is willing to pay for product “x” on market “y”. This article, mainly jurisprudential, seeks to underline the tension between the free exchange of goods in open markets which notably allows consumers and buyers to obtain products at the best price, and the necessity of protecting the creation efforts of the industry in order to encourage investment in the research and development of new products.

O presente estudo tem como escopo examinar os limites constitucionais da influência da tributação nas atividades econômicas dos Contribuintes, à luz dos princípios e postulados da livre iniciativa, da livre concorrência, da igualdade, da proporcionalidade e da proibição do excesso. A indagação geral que impulsionará a pesquisa é a seguinte: pode a tributação, de forma indistinta, determinar como os Contribuintes devem agir ao plasmar suas atividades econômicas, ou há algum limite a partir do qual a influência da tributação sobre as livres escolhas dos Contribuintes não pode mais avançar? Quais as normas resultantes das interações entre direito tributário e direito econômico? Quais limites a igualdade impõe ao uso de medidas extrafiscais? De quais ferramentas dispõe o aplicador para realizar a liberdade econômica e a igualdade? Como a tese do legislador negativo representa um entrave para a realização dos princípios e postulados em questão? Quais paradigmas estão por trás de tal tese? Mais especificamente, examinaremos alguns casos concretos que ilustrem os problemas em questão e permitam um aprofundamento dos pontos discutidos na pesquisa. O primeiro caso será o das empresas excluídas do SIMPLES cuja exclusão esteja motivada pelo simples exercício de determinada atividade econômica, buscando elucidar se tal discriminação encontra suporte no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, considerando o seguinte: existindo um critério objetivo para definir quais empresas podem gozar dos benefícios do SIMPLES, qual seja, a receita bruta anual da empresa, pode o Poder Legislativo adotar critério distintivo diverso (a atividade econômica desenvolvida pela empresa) para fins de enquadramento no referido regime tributário? Tal discriminação em função da atividade econômica do Contribuinte encontra respaldo na Constituição Federal? Se a liberdade econômica é um limite à tal discriminação, quais são seus elementos e eficácia jurídica? O segundo caso, que impõe questionamentos semelhantes, é o da exclusão da possibilidade de creditamento da mão-de-obra de pessoas físicas utilizada como insumo por Contribuintes do PIS e da COFINS não-cumulativos. / This paper aims to verify which are the constitutional limitations to the influence of taxation over taxpayers’ economic activities, in the light of the principles and postulates of freedom of enterprise, free competition, equality, proportionality and the prohibition of excessive influence. The general enquiry that will guide this research is the following: can taxation, indistinctly, determine how taxpayers shall act when choosing and directing their economic activities, or are there some limitations that compel the government to not influence taxpayers' economic choices? What are the norms resulting from interactions between tax law and economic law? What limits does equality imposes to the use of behavior influent taxation? Which are the tools available to the judges to promote economic freedom and equality? How does the thesis of negative legislative power represents an obstacle to the achievement of such principles and postulates by the courts? What are the paradigms behind such thesis? More specifically, we are going to examine some cases that illustrate the problems abovementioned and allow us to go deeper in points discussed in this research. The first case is the exclusion of companies from tax benefit program called SIMPLES (for small business), whose exclusion is determined by the simple fact of exercise of a specific economic activity. We are going to exam it in order to elucidate if Brazilian law sustains such discrimination, considering the following: if the law choses one criteria to grant the tax benefits of SIMPLES (company's economic size measured by gross income), can the legislator choose another criteria (company's economic activity) to exclude it from the tax benefit program? Is it grounded in Brazilian Constitution the discrimination based upon the simple adoption of an economic activity? If freedom of enterprise is a limitation to such discrimination, which are its elements and legal effectiveness? The second case, which implies similar questions, is the exclusion of the possibility of crediting the labor of natural persons used as an input for taxpayers of non-cumulative PIS and COFINS (social contributions over gross income - VAT).

O presente estudo tem como escopo examinar os limites constitucionais da influência da tributação nas atividades econômicas dos Contribuintes, à luz dos princípios e postulados da livre iniciativa, da livre concorrência, da igualdade, da proporcionalidade e da proibição do excesso. A indagação geral que impulsionará a pesquisa é a seguinte: pode a tributação, de forma indistinta, determinar como os Contribuintes devem agir ao plasmar suas atividades econômicas, ou há algum limite a partir do qual a influência da tributação sobre as livres escolhas dos Contribuintes não pode mais avançar? Quais as normas resultantes das interações entre direito tributário e direito econômico? Quais limites a igualdade impõe ao uso de medidas extrafiscais? De quais ferramentas dispõe o aplicador para realizar a liberdade econômica e a igualdade? Como a tese do legislador negativo representa um entrave para a realização dos princípios e postulados em questão? Quais paradigmas estão por trás de tal tese? Mais especificamente, examinaremos alguns casos concretos que ilustrem os problemas em questão e permitam um aprofundamento dos pontos discutidos na pesquisa. O primeiro caso será o das empresas excluídas do SIMPLES cuja exclusão esteja motivada pelo simples exercício de determinada atividade econômica, buscando elucidar se tal discriminação encontra suporte no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, considerando o seguinte: existindo um critério objetivo para definir quais empresas podem gozar dos benefícios do SIMPLES, qual seja, a receita bruta anual da empresa, pode o Poder Legislativo adotar critério distintivo diverso (a atividade econômica desenvolvida pela empresa) para fins de enquadramento no referido regime tributário? Tal discriminação em função da atividade econômica do Contribuinte encontra respaldo na Constituição Federal? Se a liberdade econômica é um limite à tal discriminação, quais são seus elementos e eficácia jurídica? O segundo caso, que impõe questionamentos semelhantes, é o da exclusão da possibilidade de creditamento da mão-de-obra de pessoas físicas utilizada como insumo por Contribuintes do PIS e da COFINS não-cumulativos. / This paper aims to verify which are the constitutional limitations to the influence of taxation over taxpayers’ economic activities, in the light of the principles and postulates of freedom of enterprise, free competition, equality, proportionality and the prohibition of excessive influence. The general enquiry that will guide this research is the following: can taxation, indistinctly, determine how taxpayers shall act when choosing and directing their economic activities, or are there some limitations that compel the government to not influence taxpayers' economic choices? What are the norms resulting from interactions between tax law and economic law? What limits does equality imposes to the use of behavior influent taxation? Which are the tools available to the judges to promote economic freedom and equality? How does the thesis of negative legislative power represents an obstacle to the achievement of such principles and postulates by the courts? What are the paradigms behind such thesis? More specifically, we are going to examine some cases that illustrate the problems abovementioned and allow us to go deeper in points discussed in this research. The first case is the exclusion of companies from tax benefit program called SIMPLES (for small business), whose exclusion is determined by the simple fact of exercise of a specific economic activity. We are going to exam it in order to elucidate if Brazilian law sustains such discrimination, considering the following: if the law choses one criteria to grant the tax benefits of SIMPLES (company's economic size measured by gross income), can the legislator choose another criteria (company's economic activity) to exclude it from the tax benefit program? Is it grounded in Brazilian Constitution the discrimination based upon the simple adoption of an economic activity? If freedom of enterprise is a limitation to such discrimination, which are its elements and legal effectiveness? The second case, which implies similar questions, is the exclusion of the possibility of crediting the labor of natural persons used as an input for taxpayers of non-cumulative PIS and COFINS (social contributions over gross income - VAT).

The Constitution, being the Supreme Law of the Peruvian legal system, irradiates its normative force towards all the legal fields. For its part, Commercial Law is an area based on privatea utonomy; however, in our legal system a zone free of constitutional control does not exist.In this article, the author conducts a remarkable analysis about the constitutionalization of Commercial Law, making reference to the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence which, applying fundamental principles  and  rights,  has had an effect on the application of the commercial laws in our country. / La Constitución, al ser la Norma Suprema del sistema jurídico peruano, irradia su fuerza normativaa todos los ámbitos del Derecho. Por su parte, elDerecho Mercantil es una rama que se basa en laautonomía privada; sin embargo, en nuestro orde-namiento no existe zona que esté exenta de controlconstitucional.En este artículo, el autor realiza un notable análisis acerca de la constitucionalización del Derecho Mercantil, haciendo un recorrido por la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Constitucional que, aplicando principios y derechos fundamentales, ha influido en la aplicación de las normas mercantiles en nuestro país.

O presente estudo tem como escopo examinar os limites constitucionais da influência da tributação nas atividades econômicas dos Contribuintes, à luz dos princípios e postulados da livre iniciativa, da livre concorrência, da igualdade, da proporcionalidade e da proibição do excesso. A indagação geral que impulsionará a pesquisa é a seguinte: pode a tributação, de forma indistinta, determinar como os Contribuintes devem agir ao plasmar suas atividades econômicas, ou há algum limite a partir do qual a influência da tributação sobre as livres escolhas dos Contribuintes não pode mais avançar? Quais as normas resultantes das interações entre direito tributário e direito econômico? Quais limites a igualdade impõe ao uso de medidas extrafiscais? De quais ferramentas dispõe o aplicador para realizar a liberdade econômica e a igualdade? Como a tese do legislador negativo representa um entrave para a realização dos princípios e postulados em questão? Quais paradigmas estão por trás de tal tese? Mais especificamente, examinaremos alguns casos concretos que ilustrem os problemas em questão e permitam um aprofundamento dos pontos discutidos na pesquisa. O primeiro caso será o das empresas excluídas do SIMPLES cuja exclusão esteja motivada pelo simples exercício de determinada atividade econômica, buscando elucidar se tal discriminação encontra suporte no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, considerando o seguinte: existindo um critério objetivo para definir quais empresas podem gozar dos benefícios do SIMPLES, qual seja, a receita bruta anual da empresa, pode o Poder Legislativo adotar critério distintivo diverso (a atividade econômica desenvolvida pela empresa) para fins de enquadramento no referido regime tributário? Tal discriminação em função da atividade econômica do Contribuinte encontra respaldo na Constituição Federal? Se a liberdade econômica é um limite à tal discriminação, quais são seus elementos e eficácia jurídica? O segundo caso, que impõe questionamentos semelhantes, é o da exclusão da possibilidade de creditamento da mão-de-obra de pessoas físicas utilizada como insumo por Contribuintes do PIS e da COFINS não-cumulativos. / This paper aims to verify which are the constitutional limitations to the influence of taxation over taxpayers’ economic activities, in the light of the principles and postulates of freedom of enterprise, free competition, equality, proportionality and the prohibition of excessive influence. The general enquiry that will guide this research is the following: can taxation, indistinctly, determine how taxpayers shall act when choosing and directing their economic activities, or are there some limitations that compel the government to not influence taxpayers' economic choices? What are the norms resulting from interactions between tax law and economic law? What limits does equality imposes to the use of behavior influent taxation? Which are the tools available to the judges to promote economic freedom and equality? How does the thesis of negative legislative power represents an obstacle to the achievement of such principles and postulates by the courts? What are the paradigms behind such thesis? More specifically, we are going to examine some cases that illustrate the problems abovementioned and allow us to go deeper in points discussed in this research. The first case is the exclusion of companies from tax benefit program called SIMPLES (for small business), whose exclusion is determined by the simple fact of exercise of a specific economic activity. We are going to exam it in order to elucidate if Brazilian law sustains such discrimination, considering the following: if the law choses one criteria to grant the tax benefits of SIMPLES (company's economic size measured by gross income), can the legislator choose another criteria (company's economic activity) to exclude it from the tax benefit program? Is it grounded in Brazilian Constitution the discrimination based upon the simple adoption of an economic activity? If freedom of enterprise is a limitation to such discrimination, which are its elements and legal effectiveness? The second case, which implies similar questions, is the exclusion of the possibility of crediting the labor of natural persons used as an input for taxpayers of non-cumulative PIS and COFINS (social contributions over gross income - VAT).

La notion de « concurrence » est traditionnellement associée au droit de la concurrence, entendu, dans sa vocation restrictive et européenne, comme le corpus gouvernant ententes et abus de position dominante. Si le droit de la concurrence a vocation à saisir les marchés financiers en vertu du droit commun, force est toutefois d’observer que, animé par une spécificité concurrentielle, le droit financier s’est investi lui-même de la mission consistant à assurer ses propres intérêts concurrentiels : sur les marchés financiers, modèles archétypique de concurrence « pure et parfaite », la concurrence s’est développée non pas dans le cadre des règles communes de la concurrence, mais en dehors de ces dernières. C’est de cette « spécificité concurrentielle » du droit financier que la présente recherche, enrichie des apports notables du droit américain, se propose de rendre compte : bouleversant les monopoles traditionnels et favorisant une dynamique de compétition normative le droit financier organise la concurrence sur les marchés financiers d’abord. Sur le modèle du droit commun de la concurrence, le droit financier assure la protection de la compétition, ensuite, la transparence jouant à cet égard un rôle de premier plan. La confrontation du droit financier au principe de concurrence atteste d’une véritable « spécificité concurrentielle » en matière financière. De façon plus globale, l’analyse conduit à remettre en cause les ordres établis, suggérant une clé de compréhension renouvelée autour d’une nouvelle cohérence : le droit financier ne serait in fine pas réductible à une branche du droit de la régulation tourné par l’ouverture à la concurrence via la mise en œuvre de politiques dites de « libéralisation ». Corrélativement, le droit de la concurrence pourrait ne pas être que le droit de la protection de l’ordre concurrentiel sur le marché des biens et services, les « Grandes libertés » étant appelées à compléter un édifice commun voué non seulement à protéger la concurrence, mais également à l’organiser. Au final, et cela ne serait pas le moindre des paradoxes de souligner la spécificité du droit financier tout en relativisant la notion de « droit de la régulation », avec en point de mire un « droit de la régulation économique ». / The concept of « Competition » traditionally refers to Antitrust Law, heard in its restrictive and European meaning as governing both Trusts and abuse of dominant position. If Antitrust Law is intended to capture financial markets under common rules, however, it is observed that, animated by a competitive specificity, Financial Law has invested himself the task of ensuring its own competitive interest: financial market, competition archetypal models of « pure and perfect » competition, has not developed in the framework of common rules of competition, but outside them. It is precisely this kind of Financial Law’s « competitive specificity » that this research, enriched by notable contributions of US Law, proposes to report here : contesting classic monopolistic positions that have long characterized the financial infrastructures while sustaining a Law competition dynamic, Financial Law organizes competition in financial markets. More, not only does Financial Law organizes competition, it also protects competition, in the context of the influence of common Antitrust principles and market transparency.Financial Law and the competition principle comparison is rich teaching : it allows to demonstrate Financial Law’s competitive specificity. More broadly, the research led to challenge the « established order », suggesting a renewed key to understanding based on a new consistency: Financial Law would ultimately not be reduced to a branch of « Regulation Law », regulating the entire shot the opening to competition through the implementation of « Liberalization » policies. Correlatively, Antitrust Law may not be only confined in the protection of the competitive order on the goods and services market, « European freedoms of Mouvement » being then asked to complete a common building dedicated not only to protect the competition, but also to organize it. In the end, it would not be the least of paradoxes emphasizing the specificity of Financial Law while relativizing the notion of « Regulation Law », in focus with an « Economic Regulation Law ».