This thesis aims to analyze legislation of the Czech legal order concerning religious freedom. The work is divided in two parts. The first part of the thesis deals with the definition of religious freedom in the first place. Afterwards the thesis describes the Constitutional law relating to the religious freedom (especially the Article No. 15 and No. 16 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic), international conventions relating to the theme (e.g. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights etc.) and further statutory provisions and legislative rules guaranteeing religious freedom in the Czech Republic. Major part of the thesis relating to the statutory provisions and legislative rules deals with the act No. 3/2002 Coll., on Freedom of religion and the status of churches and religious societies, as amended. The act No. 3/2002 Coll. constitutes basis of regularization of the freedom of religion in the Czech Republic. Various provisions of the act No. 3/2002 Coll. were subject to review of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic due to their unconstitutionality. The second part of the thesis discusses various decisions of the...

« L'indépendance de la durée de vie d'un droit face à l'érosion qui touche inéluctablement un bien ou une valeur protégée », voilà quelle paraît être la définition la plus révélatrice des droits civils perpétuels en droit français contemporain. Cette dernière ressort d'une analyse au terme de laquelle il semble que le système normatif actuel est peu enclin à reconnaître des droits survivants à leurs titulaires. Pis, les instruments juridiques permettant de circonscrire leur domaine sont nombreux, à l'image du plus efficace d'entre eux : la prescription extinctive. Mais ces instruments restrictifs ne sont pas isolés. La nature même du droit peut porter en elle le germe de sa disparition. C'est alors que sont renversés de vieux préjugés. Les droits réels ne sont pas davantage voués à la perpétuité que ne le sont les droits de la personnalité. En outre, là où la prohibition devrait s'imposer aux droits personnels, certains s'en émancipent en fait. C'est alors que la perpétuité se dévoile dans trois droits civils en particulier : le droit de propriété, le droit moral de l'auteur et le droit au nom. Restreints dans leur nombre, ces droits sont cependant privilégiés dans leur régime. En effet, selon la qualité qu'ils revêtent, ils bénéficient de moyens de mise en œuvre et de protection supplémentaires, comme en témoignent la théorie des droits subjectifs ou la reconnaissance de droits fondamentaux. Selon qu'ils sont interprétés comme les premiers ou les seconds, ou voire même les deux simultanément, leur justiciabilité est clairement renforcée / « The independence of the life span of a right confronted to the erosion which unavoidably affects a belonging or a protected value », here is which seems to be the most revealing definition of perpetual civil rights in contemporary French Law. This definition springs from an analysis which leads us to think that today's normative system is reluctant to admit surviving rights to their holders. Even worse, there are numerous legal instruments which can be used to restrain their fields of activity, like the most efficient of all: negative prescription. However these restrictive instruments are not isolated. The very nature of a right can carry in itself the germ of its own disappearance. This is on these occasions that old prejudices are knocked over. Real rights are not more dedicated to perpetuity than individual rights. Moreover, if prohibition should be imposed on personal rights, in fact some of them manage to do without it. This is when perpetuity appears in three civil rights in particular: the right to property, the author's moral right and the right to the name. Limited in their numbers, these rights however are privileged in their schemes. Indeed, depending on their quality, they benefit from supplementary means of implementation and protection as the theory of subjective rights or the recognition of fundamental rights testify. Whether they are read as the former or the latter or even both simultaneously, their justiciability is clearly reinforced. However the conclusion of the study may be disappointing as, to tell the truth, perpetual rights are sometimes the victims of real incursions on behalf of the lawmaker or the co contracting party

La mondialisation de l’économie modifie les rapports sociaux. Face au poids grandissant des firmes multinationales, les organisations syndicales s’organisent au niveau international. De nouvelles stratégies de contre-pouvoir émergent dont les accords transnationaux d’entreprise ou de groupe sont le fruit. Résultats d’une négociation spontanée entre des acteurs dont la légitimité reste à prouver, ces accords aménagent les rapports sociaux dans les entreprises et les groupes à caractère transnational et édictent des règles de travail pour les salariés qui les composent, voire au-delà. D’abord envisagés comme de simples déclarations d’intention assurant, par-delà les frontières, la promotion des droits fondamentaux au travail, leur contenu se précise et engage plus fermement leurs signataires. Un cadre juridique propre s’impose. A défaut, ils seront régis selon le cadre national de réception. Malgré ces incertitudes, les signataires s’organisent conventionnellement pour donner effets aux accords. Des clauses spécifiques assurent leur mise en oeuvre et leur suivi. Pourtant le silence demeure sur les effets juridiques réellement produits. Dès lors, une certaine insécurité questionne les parties qui appellent parfois à la définition d’un cadre international de réception pour en définir les règles de conclusion, la portée et les recours envisageables en cas de violation. / The economic globalization changes the social relations. To face this growing importance of multinational firms, global unions get organized at international level. New strategies against this emerging power include the conclusion of international and European framework agreements. Result of a spontaneous negotiation between actors whose legitimacy remains to be seen, these agreements adjust any social relationships in transnational companies and groups and lay down rules for employees who work for the up, and beyond. First seen as mere declarations of intention promoting the Fundamental rights at work beyond borders, their content is taking shape and commitments are stronger for signatories. A legal framework is needed. Otherwise, agreements will be governed by the national legislations. Despite these uncertainties, signatories conventionally organize effects of their agreements. Specific provisions ensure their implementation and monitoring. Yet the silence remains on the legal effects actually occurred. Therefore, some insecurity questions the parties that sometimes ask for an international framework of reception to define the rules of conclusion, the scope of the agreement and possible remedies for violations.

La France est un acteur majeur de la société internationale dont l’attachement aux « droits de l’Homme » constitue un élément caractéristique de sa politique extérieure. Il est alors paradoxal de constater que si la signature de la Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme a été opérée dès 1950, ce n’est qu’en 1974 que celle-ci sera ratifiée et en 1981 que le droit de recours individuel sera reconnu. Il y a donc une ambivalence entre une ligne politique de respect des « droits de l’Homme » et l’acceptation pleine et entière des instruments internationaux correspondants lorsqu’ils instaurent des organes supranationaux de contrôle. Lorsque la France est mise en cause devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme, elle se doit de défendre, non seulement ses propres intérêts, mais également ceux du mécanisme objectif de garantie des droits instaurés par la Convention européenne. Il y a donc une pluralité de rôles qui s’offrent à la France en ce cas. Ensuite, la fonction première de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme consiste à vérifier que les organes internes ont bien appliqué et, le cas échéant, réparé les violations à la Convention européenne. Ce n’est qu’en cas de carence des organes de l’Etat que la France devrait être poursuivie devant la Cour. Enfin, l’incidence de la jurisprudence de la Cour sur l’organisation institutionnelle française est fondamentale et dépasse la stricte mise en œuvre de la Convention par les seules juridictions nationales / France is a major actor in the international society whose attachment to the "human rights" is a characteristic feature of its foreign policy. It is a paradox that if the signature of the European Convention on human rights was proceeded in 1950, it was ratified only in 1974, and the individual petition was recognized in 1981. There is an ambivalence between a policy of respect for the "human rights" and the acceptance of the relevant international instruments when it creates an international body to control its application.When France is sued in the European Court of human rights, it must defend, not only its own interests, but also those of the objective mechanism of the guarantee of the rights established by the European Convention. So there is a plurality of characters for France in this case. Thus, the primary function of the European Court of human rights is to verify that internal organs had properly applied the European Convention and, where appropriate, repaired the violations: is that in the case of deficiency of the State’s organs that France should be sued in the Court. Finally, the impact of the Court’s case-law on the French institutional organization is fundamental and exceed the strict implementation of the Convention by only national courts

Si l'histoire de la construction européenne a été marquée, à partir des années 1970, par les tensions entre la Communauté puis l'Union, d'une part, imposant la primauté absolue de son droit, et les États membres, d'autre part, revendiquant la suprématie de leur droit constitutionnel, cette problématique tend à se cristalliser depuis quelques années autour d'une notion : celle d'identité constitutionnelle de l'État membre. Pourtant la vertu fédératrice qu'on pourrait lui prêter contraste avec la polysémie de la notion. C'est précisément l'objet de cette étude de droit constitutionnel européen que de tenter de dégager des données du droit positif des États membres et de l'Union un concept empirique viable de la notion d'identité constitutionnelle de l'État membre, inspiré par une grille d'analyse issue des sciences sociales.La fondamentalité, dont l'objectivation passe par la référence à l'histoire de l'État, constitue un critère de définition nécessaire, quoiqu'insuffisant, de l'identité constitutionnelle, quelle que soit la façon dont celle-ci est conçue. Ecartées les formes contingentes de l'identité constitutionnelle qui conduisent à terme au dépérissement de la notion, selon des processus variables, que l'identité soit envisagée à partir de ce qu'il y a d'identique entre les États membres ou de spécifique à chaque État membre vis-à-vis de l'Union (et en dernière analyse vis-à-vis de ses pairs), c'est une conception de l'identité constitutionnelle inhérente à l'État membre qui s'imposera finalement. Ainsi conçue à partir de ce qui est ontologiquement commun aux États membres et irréductiblement spécifique vis-à-vis de l'Union, l'identité constitutionnelle assure en définitive la pérennité de l'étaticité des membres de l'Union et de l'origine stato-nationale de toute puissance publique, étatique ou européenne, en Europe. / If the history of European integration has been marked, from the 1970s, by the tensions between, on one hand, the Community and the Union, imposing the absolute primacy of its law and, on the other hand, the Member States, claiming the supremacy of their constitutional right, this problem aims to crystallize in recent years around the notion of the constitutional identity of the Member State. Yet, the unifying virtue which we could lend it contrasts with the polysemy of the notion. This is precisely the purpose of this study of European constitutional law to try to extract from the data of the positive law of the Member States and the Union an empirically viable concept of the notion of constitutional identity of the Member State, inspired by an analytical framework from the social sciences. The fundamentality, objectified by reference to the history of the state, is a necessary but insufficient defining criterion of constitutional identity, regardless of how it is conceived. Put apart the contingent forms of constitutional identity that lead ultimately to the decline of the notion, according to variable processes – that identity is seen as identical between Member States or as specific to each Member States towards the Union (and ultimately toward its peers) – it's a conception of inherent constitutional identity to the Member State which will finally be stand out. Based on what is ontologically common to the Member States and irreducibly specific towards the Union, the constitutional identity ultimately ensures the continuity of the statehood of the Members of the Union and the nation-state origin of any public authority, state or European, in Europe.

[pt] SOBERANIA PARLAMENTAR, JUDICIAL REVIEW E DIÁLOGOS INSTITUCIONAIS: do isolamento decisionista à atividade colaborativa entre os poderes na aplicação constitucional visa não só apresentar os três mais conhecidos instrumentos de solução de controvérsias entre Constituição e Lei apontados no título, como estudar o debate envolvendo a legitimidade do controle judicial de constitucionalidade perante a democracia e apontar a principal solução já colocada em prática em outros ordenamentos jurídicos: os diálogos institucionais. Demonstrar-se através de estudos doutrinários e análise de legislação estrangeira que os mesmos caracterizam-se como instrumentos que melhor conciliam democracia e proteção aos direitos fundamentais em detrimento de um isolacionismo decisionista por parte de um único poder estatal, o que é característico dos regimes de soberania parlamentar e judicial review. O trabalho demonstra que o modelo dialógico surgido no constitucionalismo contemporâneo, especificamente no seio da Comunidade Britânica, revela-se como uma espécie de mecanismo de resolução de controvérsias apoiado em um sistema controle de constitucionalidade fraco. Nele, não há identificação de um órgão supremo de interpretação constitucional, pois busca não incorrer no panorama de questionamentos de legitimidade democrática atualmente vivenciada pela jurisdição constitucional, principalmente em países como Brasil e Estados Unidos, onde predomina, sob questionamentos, o ativismo judicial. Conclui-se que empreitada dialógica visa dar ênfase na força dos direitos em si, e não no exercício da jurisdição, fazendo-o através da provedoria de uma atividade colaborativa entre poderes político e judiciário, postura que melhor se alinha a uma visão atual de democracia que supera o enfoque predominantemente político. / [en] PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND INSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: from the decisionist isolation to the collaborative activity between the powers in constitutional application aims not only to present the three best-known instruments for controversy’s solution between the Constitution and Law indicated in the title, such as studying the debate involving the legitimacy of judicial review of constitutionality up against the democracy and point the main solution has already put into practice in other jurisdictions: the institutional dialogues. Demonstrate by means of doctrinal studies and foreign law analysis which they characterized as tools that better reconcile democracy and protection of fundamental rights rather than an decisionist isolationist by a single state power, which is characteristic of social parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review. This work demonstrates that the dialogical model emerged in contemporary constitutionalism, specifically within the Commonwealth, it reveals as a kind of mechanism of controversy’s solution supported by a weak judicial review. In it, there is no identification of a supreme body of constitutional interpretation, but it seeks not to incur in the questions’ panorama of democratic legitimacy of currently experienced by the constitutional court, especially in countries like Brazil and the United States, dominated, under questioning, judicial activism. It is concluded that dialogic venture aims to emphasize the strength of the rights themselves, not the jurisdiction’s exercise, making it through the ombudsman for a collaborative activity between political and judicial powers, posture that better aligns with a current view of democracy that overcome the focus predominantly political.

O Direito do Trabalho no Brasil, assim entendido o conjunto de regras e princípios que regulam as relações de trabalho, atravessa uma grave crise que atinge as bases de sua formulação teórica e a efetividade de sua proteção. Neste panorama, os direitos trabalhistas, reconhecidos pela Constituição da República como fundamentais, são frequentemente violados no cotidiano das relações de trabalho. A Constituição brasileira claramente estruturou as bases de um Estado Social e Democrático de Direito, priorizando a dignidade da pessoa humana como fundamento e o primado do trabalho e da justiça social como princípios norteadores da ordem econômica e social. O presente trabalho identifica, analisa e correlaciona razões econômicas, políticas e jurídicas que neste momento conduzem e alimentam a mencionada crise. Também estuda formas e condições com que as grandes empresas adotam padrões de conduta que, desvirtuando o conteúdo valorativo das normas jurídicas trabalhistas de proteção, resultam em macrolesões aos direitos fundamentais de seus trabalhadores, com o único propósito de reduzir os custos do trabalho humano. Afirmando a centralidade do trabalho como fator de emancipação social do trabalhador brasileiro, bem como a imperatividade e a irreversibilidade da tutela estatal de seus direitos trabalhistas fundamentais, a presente dissertação propõe a adoção de medidas tendentes à superação da crise, seja por meio da resistência às proposições legislativas em discussão no Parlamento e que objetivam enfraquecer as bases teóricas do Direito do Trabalho, seja por meio da introdução no ordenamento de instrumentos legislativos que sejam capazes de lhe propiciar evolução científica, em conformidade com as diretrizes da Constituição da República e com vistas ao futuro das relações de trabalho no Brasil. / Brazilian Labor Law, defined as the set of rules and principles which regulate labor relations, is undergoing a great crisis that affects the very basis of its theoretical formulation and the effectiveness of its protection. In this context, labor rights, recognized as fundamental by the Federal Constitution, are often violated in the everyday of labor relations. The Brazilian Constitution has clearly structured the basis of a Social and Democratic Rule-of-Law State, prioritizing the principle of human dignity as its foundation and having work and social justice take precedence as the orienting principles of the economical and social orders. This study identifies, analyses, and correlates the economic, political and juridical reasons that lead and feed the aforementioned crisis. It also studies the manner and conditions through which big employers adopt patterns of conduct that misrepresent the evaluative content of protective labor norms and, with the sole purpose of reducing the costs of human labor, produce macrolesions to the fundamental rights of its workers. By reaffirming the centrality of labor as a factor of social emancipation for the Brazilian worker, as well as the irreversibility and imperative nature of the protection of the State over fundamental rights at work, this study proposes the adoption of measures that would favor the overcoming of the present crisis, be it by means of resistance to the legal propositions being discussed in Parliament - and which aim to weaken the theoretical basis of Labor Law -, be it by the introduction of new legal instruments in the legal order, ones which would allow it to evolve in its science - conforming to the directives of the Federal Constitution and with a view to the future of labor relations in Brazil.

Ancrée d’abord dans la charité, se métamorphosant dans la philanthropie libérale, dans la fraternité révolutionnaire, puis dans la solidarité républicaine, la fondamentalisation de l’accès aux soins des pauvres a finalement trouvé refuge dans les droits de l’Homme. Depuis la loi d’orientation relative à la lutte contre les exclusions du 29 juillet 1998, elle se traduit ainsi en France par l’affirmation d’un droit fondamental à la protection de la santé. Cette mutation est loin d’être anodine. L’action des pouvoirs publics et la responsabilité de la société dans la lutte contre l’exclusion sociale en santé s’en trouvent déportées du terrain économique et caritatif vers le terrain juridique. L’accès aux soins des pauvres ne relève plus seulement d’un devoir moral, mais aussi d’une obligation juridique en vertu du droit international des droits de l’Homme et des exigences constitutionnelles françaises. Mais quel est donc le contenu de cette obligation juridique ? Quelles sont la nature et la portée réelle de la notion juridique de droit fondamental à la protection de la santé, et de son emploi en lieu et place de celle de pauvreté ? Comment peut-elle s’inscrire dans un processus dynamique et pragmatique d’universalisation de l’accès aux soins ?C’est ainsi à une étude critique de la juridicisation contemporaine de l’accès aux soins des pauvres que la recherche s’attelle. Certes, la fondamentalisation de l’accès aux soins des pauvres se déploie désormais sur la base d’un droit fondamental à la protection de la santé. Mais le choix des moyens et des voies de réalisation de ce dernier ne fait pas consensus, et les juges hésitent toujours à sanctionner et contrôler pleinement le respect de son application. L’universalité de sa proclamation ne s’est pas encore muée en universalité de sa concrétisation. L’émergence d’un droit fondamental pour garantir l’accès aux soins des pauvres n’est en effet pas sans poser de difficultés. Ces dernières qui s’expriment de façon de plus en plus criante aujourd’hui tiennent à la tension irréductible entre son horizon d’universalité et sa pratique discriminatoire et ségrégative, mais aussi à son interactivité avec les autres droits jugés fondamentaux dans un monde où la santé est devenue un marché globalisé et la solidarité peut être assimilée à un délit.Malgré son inscription au sommet de la hiérarchie des normes, le droit à la santé reste en effet l’un des plus inégalement appliqués. S’il induit un principe d’égal accès aux soins, sa mise en œuvre catégorielle et différenciée pour les plus démunis entre en tension avec l’universalisme des droits de l’Homme. Aussi, l’effectivité des droits créances aux soins dépend fortement des finances publiques et donc des volontés politiques. Elle pose la question des devoirs de solidarité à imposer aux citoyens. Or, l’importance politique prise par l’économie dans le monde actuel vient particulièrement entraver les développements juridiques de la solidarité dans l’accès aux soins, en réduisant le rôle et les capacités de l’État providence. S’institue progressivement une forme de précarité sociale généralisée qui compromet l’accès aux soins de nombreuses personnes. En réintégrant les droits de l’Homme dans le débat, les nouvelles politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté tendent cependant à redonner sens au projet humaniste. L’éthique politique moderne en particulier, et la notion qui la traverse aujourd’hui, l’inclusion sociale, influencent les réflexions doctrinales, et avec elles les représentations du droit comme outils de la justice distributive. Désormais, les juristes se préoccupent des notions d’effectivité, de justiciabilité et d’exigibilité des droits sociaux aux soins. De nouvelles réponses sociales et juridiques émergent afin de donner aux personnes précaires et pauvres les capacités d’exercer pleinement leur droit fondamental à la protection de la santé. / Be in motivated by group or individual interest, the desire to help the poor appears as a constant around the world and throughout history. Originally anchored in charity, then reincarnated in liberal philanthropy, in the fraternity of the revolution, and in republican solidarity, the fundamentality of healthcare access for the poor finally found its home in Human Rights. Since the Framework Act on Measures to Combat Exclusion of 29 July 1998, the protection of health has been considered a fundamental right in France.This new incarnation is far from anodine. Government action and social responsibility in the fight against social exclusion in healthcare, have moved from an economic and charitable framework to a legal one. Healthcare access for the poor is no longer considered as just a moral duty, but also a legal obligation enshrined in international Human Rights law and the French Constitution. But what is the real content of this legal obligation? What is the nature and real application of the legal notion of a fundamental right to the protection of health, and how is this used to reduce poverty? How can we take poverty into account in the dynamic and pragmatic process of the universalisation of access to healthcare.This research thus attempts a critical study of contemporary legislation on healthcare access for the poor. Certainly, the fundamentality of healthcare access for the poor follows naturally from the fundamental right to the protection of health. But there is no consensus on the manner and means of its implementation, and the judiciary has hesitated to fully sanction and control its application. The universality of the proclamation has not yet been translated into universality of its realization. The emergence of a fundamental right guaranteeing access to healthcare for the poor is not without its difficulties. These difficulties, today more visible than ever, arise from the irreducible tension between the theoretical universality of this right and its discriminatory and segregative practice. Challenges also arise from the interaction of this and other rights considered fundamental in a world where health has become a globalized market and solidarity perhaps akin to a crime.Despite its place at the summit of the hierarchy of norms, the right to health remains one of the most unequally applied. If it demands a principle of equal access to healthcare, its discriminatory and segregational implementation among the poorest is at odds with the universalism of Human Rights. Moreover, the ability to claim the right to healthcare is highly dependent on public finances and political will. It requires that a duty of solidarity be imposed on citizens. However, the political importance given to the economy in the world today impedes on the legal development of solidarity in healthcare access, reducing the role and capacity of the welfare state. A generalized form of social precariousness is gradually being established, compromising access to healthcare for many people. By reintroducing Human Rights to the debate, new policies in the fight against poverty are beginning to bring meaning back to this humanist project. Modern political ethics in particular, and the current drive for social inclusion, are influencing doctrinal reflections, and with them the perception of the law as a tool for redistributive justice. Thus, lawyers now consider the notions of effectiveness, justiciability and accountability when addressing social rights to healthcare. New social and legal responses are emerging to empower people living in poverty or insecurity to fully exercise their fundamental right to the protection health.

[pt] Até os anos 1980, tratar de controle de constitucionalidade no âmbito do direito comparado significava ignorar a prática constitucional desenvolvida em boa parte dos países da família da common law. Isso porque o Reino Unido, juntamente com algumas de suas ex-colônias (como Canadá, Nova Zelândia e Austrália, além de Israel, cujo território fora um protetorado inglês antes de se tornar um Estado independente), apegados ao dogma da soberania do Parlamento, resistiam em reconhecer a juízes não eleitos competência para invalidar atos emanados dos legítimos representantes do povo. O cenário começa a mudar com a aprovação da Carta de Direitos e Liberdades canadense, em 1982. Nesta ocasião, os direitos fundamentais foram recolhidos em um documento jurídico dotado de supremacia e rigidez, tendo sido facultado a juízes e tribunais invalidar normas que não os respeitassem. Mas, para conciliar a nova prática com a tradição constitucional habituada à supremacia do Parlamento, alguns arranjos foram feitos, de forma a permitir que a última palavra em matéria de interpretação de direitos constitucionalmente protegidos permanecesse com o legislador. Surgiu, assim, um novo modelo de controle de constitucionalidade, no qual o judiciário possui um papel importante, mas não determinante, na proteção a direitos fundamentais. Este modelo, aqui chamado de controle fraco de constitucionalidade, serviu de inspiração para que o próprio Reino Unido e outras de suas ex-colônias adotassem alguma forma de judicial review entre os anos que marcaram a virada do século XX para o XXI. Nesta tese, pretende-se apresentar as características desse novo modelo, contrapondo-o ao modelo tradicional (forte) de controle de constitucionalidade e, ao final, fazer reflexões sobre a possível recepção do novo sistema em países integrantes da família romano-germânica. / [en] By the 1980s, to approach judicial review in the context of comparative law meant to ignore the constitutional practice developed in a number of members within the common-law family of nations. This happened because the United Kingdom, along with some of her former colonies (such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia, besides Israel, whose territory had been an English protectorate before becoming an independent state), attached to the principle of Parliament s sovereignty, resisted the endowment of unelected judges with the power to invalidate acts performed by the people s legitimate representatives. The scenario began to change with the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. On that occasion, fundamental rights were put into a legal document tagged with supremacy and rigidity; judges and courts having been authorized to invalidate norms that clearly did not respect such rights. However, to accommodate the new practice without sacrificing the constitutional tradition more accustomed to the sovereignty of Parliament, some arrangements were made in order to allow that the last word on the interpretation of constitutionallyprotected rights would remain with the legislator. Thus a new pattern of judicial review appeared in which the Judiciary plays a significant, but not decisive role in protecting fundamental rights. This pattern, herein called weak-form judicial review, inspired the UK herself and other former colonies to adopt some form of judicial review, in the years that marked the turn of the 20th century to the 21st. The present paper intends to present the characteristics of this new pattern, comparing it to the traditional (strong) judicial review pattern, and it eventually elaborates on the possible receptivity to the new system by member countries of the civil law family of nations.

Theoretical bases for the limitation 
 of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Czech Republic 
 In the Czech Republic, the conception of fundamental rights and the conditions for their limitations are the result of a specific interpretation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms by the Constitutional Court, which in turn reflects its own views on constitutional theory. Despite being presented almost dogmatically, the confrontation with foreign literature suggests that the so-called external theory of the Constitutional Court finds strong opponent in the so-called internal theory. Internal theory sheds doubts on such hallmarks of the Court's doctrine like the wide conception of fundamental rights, the principle of proportionality or the very existence of conflicts of constitutional values. In this thesis, it is argued that although the internal theory cannot substitute for the external theory at the moment, it represents an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to reassess its current position in order for it to better depict the aims of the constitution-maker, to respect the policies of the legislator and - above all - to take fundamental rights seriously. In particular, it is claimed that the optimal model of the limitation of fundamental rights dully distinguishes between definition and...