This dissertation takes an employee-centred approach to explore the power that employers have to regulate the physical appearance of their employees in the Canadian workplace. Specifically, it analyzes the limitations and potential of existing human rights instruments for protecting the appearance interests of employees in Canada, with primary focus on British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec. Appearance matters a great deal in the North American context. Scholars of sociology have established that as a social and identity marker, as well as a powerful means of expression, appearance should be considered as fundamental to an employee’s identity, sense of self, and personhood. In particular, these studies show that appearance choices (such as tattoos, piercings, grooming practices, and clothes) are important to an employee’s sense of self; they are therefore worthy of legal protections. Yet, under the current state of law in Canada, workplace appearance regulation is legal, with limits for the most part dependent on whether or not employees are unionized. This dissertation takes up the question of how to address employees’ appearance in the workplace as a human rights issue by offering two frameworks of analysis—the anti-discrimination approach and the fundamental rights at work approach. Physical appearance is not a protected ground of discrimination in Canada. As such, approaching the question of workplace appearance policies and practices through an anti-discrimination lens offers some considerable challenges for employees in a private employment relationship in most Canadian provinces. In Quebec, the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms protects a wide range of fundamental rights and freedoms applicable to private employment relationships, including the right to dignity, the right to privacy, and the right to freedom of expression. Quebec employees have successfully raised these rights in order to challenge workplace appearance regulation. Quebec employers are thus more limited regarding appearance policies than their counterparts in the rest of Canada, because of the fundamental rights at work framework, which offers a balanced approach to employers’ and employees’ competing interests. With a careful review of both frameworks, I argue that legislative changes could enable shifts in cultures of work, and I conclude with some modest proposals to achieve better protections for employees broadly, and more specifically with respect to the importance of appearance in the workplace. / Graduate / 2021-08-14

AI has become one of the most powerful drivers of social change, transforming economies, impacting politics and wars, and reshaping how citizens live and interact. Nevertheless, the implementation of AI can have adverse effects on peoples’ lives. This dissertation first examines the relationship between artificial intelligence and public law, mainly in two domains, administrative law and criminal law. It also provides a clear insight into the potential impact of AI applications on fundamental rights in the legal context of the European Union. Four selected fundamental rights, Human Dignity, Data Protection and Right to Privacy, Equality and Non-discrimination, and Access to Justice, are examined. The dissertation further explores the European Commission's new proposed AI regulation, which was proposed in April 2021. The proposal aims to put forward a risk- based approach for a harmonized EU legislation by considering the ethical and human sides and without unnecessarily restricting the development of AI technologies. The study focuses on examples from Sweden throughout the study and lastly, examines the Swedish approach in the context of the principles of good administration.

The cultivation of a culture of constitutionalism remains the greatest challenge to Nigeria’s constitutional democracy. Militarism affected in a very substantial way Africa’s efforts to develop a culture of constitutionalism in the continent. Nigeria typifies the failed African effort in trying to establish an enduring democracy and constitutionalism. After ten years of transition from militarism to constitutional democracy and the euphoria of the country’s return to democracy, the country is still on a slow march in the entrenchment of the practice of constitutionalism. This work primarily sets out to investigate the state of constitutionalism in Nigeria. Human rights and judiciary as constituents of constitutionalism are the main focus of that investigation. A crucial question that encapsulates the main objective of the study is how can Nigeria entrench a culture of constitutionalism? The study, therefore, investigates the question whether constitutional formalism or textualism without more can guarantee constitutionalism. It advocates that constitutionality does not necessarily lead to constitutionalism. The work further probes into the nature, extent and reasons for the past failure of constitutionalism in the country and its current state. The study also embarks on an exploration into the mechanisms for the protection of human rights, the problems and challenges in Nigeria. The challenges include the introduction of the “new Sharia” by some States in Nigeria; the failure to accord socio-economic rights due consideration in Nigerian jurisprudence and the poor pace of the domestication of human rights norms. The work demonstrates the relationship and linkage between human rights, democracy and judicialism in the study of constitutionalism. / Public Constitutional and International Law / LL.D.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / Die siviele lasterreg word gekenmerk deur verdeeldheid aangaande bewyspligtigheid. 'n Unieke situasie doen horn voor: weerlegbare regsvermoedens van onregmatigheid en animus iniuriandi word opgevolg deur verskeie regsverdigingsgronde. Bykomend hiertoe stel die Grondwet die vereiste van konstitusionele regverdiging vir beperkings op fundamentele regte. 'n Oorsig oor die regspraak in sowel die voorgrondwetlike - as na-grondwetlike bedeling, dui op 'n versuim deur die howe om behoorlik aandag te skenk aan die bewyspligtigheidsgevolge van die regverskynsels wat hulself in die lasterreg voordoen. In hierdie verhandeling word bewyspligtigheid in lastersake krities ondersoek om vas te stel of dit die reg korrek weerspieel en om 'n werkbare bewyslasformule vir lasteraksies in 'n konstitusionele litigasie te vind. Daar word voorgestel dat die probleem opgelos word deur 'n tweefase-benadering: Die eiser moet in die eerste fase die omvang van sy reg bewys en dat daarop inbreuk gemaak is. In die tweede fase moet die verweerder sy regverdigingsgronde bewys, asook dat dit konstitusioneel regverdigbaar is. / The civil law of defamation is marked by discord regarding onus of proof. A unique situation evidences itself: rebuttable presumptions of law concerning unlawfulness and animus iniuriandi are followed by various grounds of justification. In addition thereto the Constitution sets the requirement of constitutional justification for limitations on fundamental rights. An overview of case law in the pre-constitutional as well as the post-constitutional dispensation, indicates a failure by the courts to pay proper attention to the evidentiary consequences of the legal phenomena found in the law of defamation. In this dissertation onus of proof in defamation cases is critically examined to ascertain whether it reflects the law correctly and to find a workable "onus of proof" -formula for defamation cases in a constitutional dispensation. It is suggested that the problem be solved by a two stage approach: in the first phase, the plaintiff must prove the extent of his right and the encroachment thereof . In the second phase the defendant must prove his grounds of justification and show that they are constitutionally justifiable. / Constitutional, International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

La légitime répression de la fraude fiscale fait référence aux différentes prérogatives de l'administration fiscale mises en œuvre pour prévenir, détecter et sanctionner l'évitement de l'impôt.Elles s'inscrivent au sein des procédures d'imposition et se doivent d'être conciliées avec les droits fondamentaux du contribuable.Cette exigence, élevée au rang constitutionnel, postule pour un équilibre des relations difficile à établir.La lutte contre la fraude fiscale, cette fin légitime en soi qui préserve l'égalité fiscale, justifie la présence de moyens exorbitants du droit commun qui fragilise la sécurité juridique à laquelle le contribuable peut prétendre.Ses garanties sont confrontées au pouvoir de l'administration fiscale et à sa faculté d'apprécier les différents manquements qui se présentent à elle en dehors de toute contrainte.Le rôle du juge est alors fondamental car en s'employant à préserver les droits et les devoirs de chacun, il participe à conforter un socle d'obligations qui s'impose dans ces procédures et qui est repris a posteriori par le législateur. / The tax fraud repression legitimacy refers to the different prerogatives the fiscal administration implements to prevent, detect and sanction anyone trying to shirk its tax responsibilities. This process, that must be coordinated with the fundamental rights, is part of tax rules.This requirement, part of the Constitution, involves a balance between relations that is difficult to reach.This fight against tax fraud, lawful objective in the way it preserves tax equality, justifies the use of measures that infringes fundamental rights and weakens the legal security any taxpayer has the right to pretend.These guaranties opposed themselves to the tax administration and its ability to appreciate the different breaches it notices without any limitations.The judge role is then fundamental since he has to preserve anyone’s rights and duties, he participates to the creation of a basis of obligations that have to be followed for each procedure, and that are reused afterwards by the legislator.

This thesis is primarily concerned with the distribution of quotas in higher education and public employment within identified beneficiary groups. In a system of quotas based on preferential treatment of groups, the question about which members of the group must benefit over others is a crucial one. One of the main themes in the thesis is to critically analyse the judicial understanding about the nature of these groups. The homogeneity (in backwardness) that is attached to beneficiary groups in differing degrees is challenged in the thesis using the examples of Scheduled Castes and Muslims within the Other Backward Classes category. The differences within beneficiary groups have great significance for the fairness of India’s reservation policies. By ignoring internal differences, the most marginalised groups are left behind in terms of accessing the benefits of reservations. I have argued that any attempt to address the issue of sub-classification must begin by recognising multiple axis of marginalisation within the framework of intersectionality. This lack of sufficient engagement with the issue of sub-classification highlights the failure of the Supreme Court of India to develop a normative framework within which reservations might be viewed. This lack of normative clarity informs spheres of reservations like higher education and public employment along with according homogenous treatment to beneficiary groups internally. The Supreme Court has viewed reservations in higher education and public employment as essentially performing the same function. I have argued that reservations in these spheres perform different functions and the resulting obligations on the state in terms of constitutional justifications must also differ. While the demands for sub-classification present an opportunity to make distribution of reservations fairer, it also exposes the limitation of reservations as a tool of social transformation.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche (LL.M.)" / En imposant une obligation constitutionnelle de négocier aux autres parties de la fédération, les juges de la Cour suprême dans le Renvoi sur la sécession rendent légitimes les aspirations des souverainistes québécois. Le processus menant à l'obligation constitutionnelle de négocier souffre toutefois d'imprécision et est à l'origine de la situation juridique contradictoire actuelle. La doctrine est divisée sur la signification des expressions «acteurs politiques», «question claire» et «majorité claire» et l'ambiguïté de ces expressions a permis aux partis politiques au pouvoir de justifier leur loi respective portant sur la sécession du Québec. Les deux lois en vigueur, la Loi sur les droits fondamentaux et la Loi sur la clarté, sont à des pôles opposés sur des sujets aussi importants que la formulation de la question et la majorité requise. Chacune des législatures a procédé unilatéralement sans se soucier de créer un cadre juridique cohérent. Les représentants élus devraient envisager la constitutionnalisation des règles menant à la sécession d'une province comme voie de solution pour régler l'impasse juridique actuelle. Le Canada ne serait pas le premier pays à prévoir de telles règles dans sa Constitution. / By imposing a constitutional obligation to negotiate to aIl parties of the federation, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference legitimizes the aspirations of Quebec's sovereignist movement. However, the Supreme Court's ambiguity, in regards to the process leading up to the constitutional obligation to negotiate, is the cause of the current juridical debate. The doctrine is divided on the meaning of the expressions "political actors", "clear question" and "clear majority" and the lack of precision of these expressions allows the political parties in power to justify their respective laws on Quebec secession. The two laws in force, an Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Quebec people and the Quebec State and the Clarity Act, are at polar opposites on issues as important as the formulation of the question and the required majority. Both legislatures have proceeded unilaterally without any concem in creating a coherent juridical framework. Elected representatives should consider the constitutionalisation of the mIes leading to secession as a solution to solve the current juridical deadlock. Canada would not be the first country to provide such provisions in its Constitution.

L’accommodement raisonnable, perçu de manière erronée comme un outil octroyant des privilèges particuliers aux communautés ethno religieuses, fût la source d’une atmosphère de malaise social au sein de la communauté québécoise. Face à une immigration récente non occidentale, ayant fortement contribué à la modification du paysage sociétal québécois, un désarroi populaire transformé en « la crise des accommodements » (2006-2007), s’est emparée soudainement d’une partie de la population canadienne – française. Plusieurs questions fondamentales relatives au droit à l’égalité se posent : comment préserver l’identité québécoise si chacun veut faire valoir sa propre culture et religion ? Mais aussi, n’avons-nous pas lutté pour que les droits fondamentaux soient assurés pour tous ? Ce mémoire montre que l’accommodement raisonnable, loin de privilégier les minorités religieuses, est un moyen juridique permettant à tous les citoyens d’accéder à l’égalité et de vivre sans subir de discrimination. La liberté de religion faisant partie des droits fondamentaux garantis par les chartes canadienne et québécoise, doit être protégée en tant que telle. L’accommodement raisonnable révèle une autre dimension de sa fonction : une contribution fondamentale à la réflexion collective sur le vivre - ensemble social, vecteur de l’évolution sociétale. Un équilibre peut être atteint entre les exigences d’un État neutre et le respect des libertés individuelles fondamentales. Ainsi, les choix de la laïcité ouverte et de l’interculturalisme s’inscrivent harmonieusement dans l’esprit des autres valeurs de la société québécoise, laquelle est marquée de part son histoire par des valeurs laïques respectueuses de la diversité culturelle et religieuse. / The concept of reasonable accommodation, erroneously perceived as a means for ethnic and religious minorities to enjoy special privileges, has plunged Quebec society in social unrest. Indeed, recent years non-western-based immigration contributed to changing Quebec society ethnic mix, leading to important social concerns by Quebecers of French Canadian descent and ultimately to the “accommodations crisis” (2006-2007). Such social crisis raises numerous questions: How can we live together with a common identity when each one of us defends his/her religion? And also: have we not fought for those rights to be guaranteed for every person? Far from privileging minority groups, reasonable accommodations are a flexible judicial tool allowing all citizens access to equality and protection against discrimination. As religion is only one of several motives for discrimination, it is erroneous to believe that reasonable accommodations solely concern religious and cultural matter. Nonetheless, religious freedom, a fundamental right guaranteed by the Canada and Quebec charters, should be protected as such. Reasonable accommodations reveal another benefit: they are a key contribution to collective thinking regarding social coexistence and living together, a means to manage Quebec’s pluralism and to facilitate minority integration. But how to accommodate religious minorities while preserving Quebec’s identity, characterized by secular values? Our analysis shows that a balance between neutral state requirements and fundamental individual rights can be reached. Specifically, Quebec’s open secularity and interculturalism, are choices harmoniously blended in other social values: they call for the integration of cultural minorities into society through a common set of cultural values.

Dans cette thèse, nous partons des grands principes de justice pour démontrer la nécessité d’octroyer aux êtres sensibles nonhumains les droits moraux et légaux les plus fondamentaux. Dans un premier temps, nous nous penchons sur les principes sous-jacents aux droits fondamentaux de la personne : le principe d’égalité voulant que les cas similaires soient traités de manière similaire; la notion de droit fondamental, qui repose sur celle d’intérêt; le principe de l’égale considération des intérêts auquel mène le principe d’égalité; et, enfin, le concept d’intérêt, qui s’applique à tous les êtres sensibles. Cette première partie établit l’exigence d’accorder les droits les plus fondamentaux à tous les êtres possédant les intérêts que ces droits visent à protéger. Cela permet d’étudier trois droits particuliers et les intérêts qui les sous-tendent en examinant d’abord le droit à l'intégrité physique. Nous montrons que de nombreux animaux nonhumains sont des êtres sensibles, que tous les êtres sensibles ont, par définition, intérêt à ne pas souffrir et que, pour cette raison, ils devraient jouir du droit à l’intégrité physique. Le troisième chapitre est consacré au droit à la vie. Nous soutenons qu’il est raisonnable de supposer que tous les êtres sensibles, parce qu’ils peuvent jouir des bonnes choses de la vie, ont un certain intérêt à persévérer dans leur existence, intérêt qui, peu importe son intensité ou sa nature, doit être protégé par l’égal droit de vivre. Notre dernier chapitre se concentre sur le droit à la liberté. Nous montrons que cet intérêt est généralement interprété négativement et ne consiste qu’à pouvoir agir sans subir d’interférence. Nous soutenons que cette acception du concept de liberté nous force à reconnaître l’intérêt à être libre de tous les êtres sensibles et notre devoir de leur accorder un droit à la liberté. Nous ajoutons finalement que l’interprétation républicaine de la liberté nous incite à reconnaître à tous ces animaux un statut égal à celui des humains. Nous terminons cette réflexion en concluant que l'octroi des droits fondamentaux aux animaux sensibles implique que l’exploitation animale institutionalisée soit abandonnée et que les animaux conscients jouissent du statut de personne. / In this thesis, I use well-established principles of justice to demonstrate that there exists no valid moral reason to deny nonhuman sentient beings the most fundamental moral and legal rights. I begin by going over the principles that will inform my discussion of these basic rights. I examine the principle of equality, which requires that similar cases be treated similarly; the notion of fundamental right, which is based on the concept of interest; the principle of equal consideration of interests, which the principle of equality entails; and, finally, the concept of interest, which is applicable to all sentient beings. This first section establishes the necessity of attributing the most fundamental rights to all beings who possess the basic interests these rights are designed to protect. I then delve into an examination of the three most fundamental rights and the interests underlying these. First, I discuss the right to physical integrity, demonstrating that numerous nonhuman animals are sentient beings, and that all sentient beings, by definition, have an interest in not suffering. Second, I examine the right to life. I argue that it is reasonable to assume that every sentient being, because he or she can benefit from the good things in life, has a certain interest in his or her continued existence. This interest, regardless of its intensity or nature, deserves to be protected by an equal right to life. Third, I establish that the interest in being free is generally interpreted negatively; it simply consists of having the ability to act without interference. I argue that based on this conceptualization of liberty, all sentient beings have an interest in being free. I go on to explore the republican interpretation of freedom, suggesting that it provides further grounds for the recognition that nonuhuman sentient beings also have an interest in benefiting from the same moral and legal status as human beings. I conclude that granting the right to physical integrity, life and freedom to all sentient beings implies that we abandon all forms of institutionalized animal exploitation and that we give to all conscious beings the equal status of person.

La réflexion autour des droits fondamentaux des personnes morales n’est guère si nouvelle comme pourrions nous être tentés d’y croire ; elle interpelle toutefois par son caractère antithétique. La personne humaine apparaissant comme l'unique destinataire de ces droits, elle avait capté toutes les attentions doctrinales. L'intimité du lien entre l'Homme et le concept des droits de l'homme, d’où découlent les droits fondamentaux, justifiait aisément l'exclusion des personnes morales. L'idée d'inclusion des groupes et des organisations qui semblait impensable va in fine être admise, voire se rendre indispensable à la démocratie, chère au système européen de défense des droits de l’homme et cadre de notre étude. La personne morale joue indiscutablement sa partition à la réalisation de la société démocratique à travers notamment la presse ou le jeu des partis politiques. Elle contribue énormément à l’économie des États par l’action des sociétés commerciales ou autres entreprises, et même à l’épanouissement des individus par le biais des associations dont les missions sont diverses et variées. On ne saurait valablement refuser à un tel sujet de droit la protection de la Convention. D’ailleurs c'est avec la force de l'évidence que ces personnes morales ont pu bénéficier de diverses dispositions de cette dernière. Le groupement à but politique ou syndical ne pourrait paisiblement accomplir sa mission sans la couverture de l’article 11 de la convention consacrant la liberté d’association et de manifestation pacifique. Aussi l’entreprise dépourvue de l’exercice et de la jouissance du droit au respect des biens, tel que défini à l’article premier du Protocole additionnel n° 1, ne pourrait-elle prospérer dans un domaine où intervient régulièrement la puissance publique. La sauvegarde de ces droits, avec bien d’autres, est conséquemment vitale pour les personnes morales. Le décryptage des droits et libertés qui leur sont garantis par le texte européen appelle à observer méthodiquement les différents mouvements de la jurisprudence européenne. Pour ce faire, notre réflexion préfère à une approche dogmatique, s’appuyant sur le particularisme des personnes morales pour dégager leurs droits et libertés garantis, une méthode plutôt pragmatique. Cette approche se fonde uniquement sur la protection effective que le juge européen consent à l’organisation non gouvernementale aux prises à l’arbitraire des pouvoirs publics. Il convient d’analyser chacun de ces droits et libertés garantis, et d’en dégager un relief d’avec la nature et l’activité de la personne morale. L’interprétation prétorienne du texte et des notions, telles que la personne ou le domicile, se présente délibérément extensive, dans le but assumé de permettre aux groupements de prendre part aux bénéfices de la Convention. L’accès à la juridiction européenne est par ailleurs largement ouvert aux groupements : tout pour faire en effet de la personne morale un sujet à part entière apte à exercer et à jouir de droits fondamentaux dans la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. / The reflection about the fundamental rights of entities is not so new as we might be tempted to believe. However, the reflection raises the question by its antithetical. Natural persons appear to be the only beneficiaries of such rights. They were the centre of all doctrinal attention. The intimacy of the relationship between man and the concept of human rights, from which flows the fundamental rights, easily justified the exclusion of entities. The idea of including groups and organizations, which seemed unthinkable will be accepted in fine, indeed will become indispensable to an effective democracy, dear to the European system of human rights and our study. Entities undoubtedly play a vital role in the achievement of a democratic society, particularly through the press or the actions of political parties. They contribute enormously to a country's economy by the actions of commercial enterprises or other businesses, and even to the development and fufillment of individuals through associations whose missions are many and vary. We can not reasonably refuse such a subject of law the protection of the Convention. Beside, it is with the strength of the evidence that these entities have benefited from various provisions of the Convention. Groups for political purposes or unions cannot accomplish peacefully their mission without the protection of Article 11 of the convention enshrining the freedom of association and peaceful protest. Also, entities deprived of exercising the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, as defined in Article I of Additional Protocol No. 1, cannot thrive in an area where the public authority intervains regularly. Safeguarding these rights, with others, is therefore vital for corporations. Decryption of rights and freedoms guaranteed to them by the european legislation calls to observe systematically the different movements of European jurisprudence. To do this, our thinking prefers a dogmatic approach, based on the particularity of legal entities to the end of assertaining their rights and freedoms, to a more pragmatic approach. This approach is based solely on the effective protection that the european Court agrees to non-governmental organizations facing arbitrary actions of public authorities. It is necessary to analyse each of these rights and freedoms guaranteed, and to establish a link with the nature and activities of the entity. The Praetorian interpretation of the text and concepts such as individual or domicile is deliberately done in a broad sense in order to allow the groups to participate in the benefits of the Convention. Access to the European court is also provided for all groups: indeed, to the end of making the entities a full-fledged subject of human rights in the European Convention on Human Rights.