Cette thèse a pour objet l’énigme d’autrui. À cet égard, elle interroge l’opposition entre deux conceptions de l’altérité, celle de Husserl et celle de Levinas. Pour Husserl, autrui est envisagé du point de vue de la connaissance, connaissance d’autrui qui se fait à partir de moi. Autrui est pensé comme alter ego. Levinas, lui, fait éclater cette conception de l’autre : pour lui, autrui ne peut pas être pensé comme l’autre du même. Plutôt, c’est autrui qui, pensé à partir de sa vulnérabilité, oblige le soi à la responsabilité. La relation ne part plus du même mais de l’autre, de l’autre dont l’appel enjoint le soi à ne pas rester indifférent. L’énigme d’autrui semble donc se tenir dans la tension entre le lointain et le proche. Trop proche, son altérité est annihilée. Trop lointain, il devient presque inaccessible. Or, entre familiarité et étrangeté se situe le lieu propre de l’herméneutique, un lieu que tant Ricœur que Gadamer n’ont cessé d’explorer. Quelle(s) réponse(s) les herméneutiques de ces deux penseurs apportent-elles à l’énigme d’autrui ? De quel ordre relève d’abord la relation entre soi et autrui : épistémologique (Husserl) ou éthique (Levinas) ? Nous soutiendrons que c’est principalement la dimension éthique qui est en jeu. C’est par le biais d’un dialogue avec Levinas que nous chercherons à faire ressortir la dimension éthique de l’herméneutique. Ce faisant, nous nous trouverons face à une autre question, celle d’une conception commune de l’herméneutique. Nous serons par conséquent amenée à dégager les aspects sur lesquels les pensées de Ricœur et de Gadamer se rejoignent et ceux sur lesquels elles se différencient, construisant ainsi des ponts entre leurs herméneutiques et inscrivant par là même notre thèse dans la veine des travaux qui les mettent en dialogue.

Le rapport que l'être humain entretient avec son monde est modifié par l'apparition de nouveaux savoirs, la réalisation de nouveaux exploits ou l'utilisation de nouvelles techniques. Le cyberespace, cette hallucination consensuelle comme le définit le romancier américain William Gibson, et déjà maintenant l'Internet, mettent en jeu des bouleversements de ce genre. La notion philosophique d'espace, perçue à travers Descartes, Kant et Husserl, nous permettra de comprendre comment s'établit et se modifie pour une subjectivité la relation à une objectivité et une extériorité. Elle nous servira d'outil conceptuel pour envisager les conséquences de l'avènement du cyberespace sur notre incarnation dans le monde.

Es gibt Situationen, in denen das Leben seine Glaubwürdigkeit verliert. Lukian erfährt dies am eigenen Leib. Er kann nicht glauben, dass sein Großvater gestorben ist. Und dann liegt da auf einmal diese geheimnisvolle Papierrolle unter seinem Bett. Ihr Inhalt stellt all das in Frage, was Lukian bisher selbstverständlich erschien. Was ist der Mensch – nur eine Marionette in einem großen Theaterstück? Die Suche nach Antworten treibt ihn auf eine abenteuerliche Reise zu den Wurzeln unserer Kultur. Er trifft auf die großen Denker der Vergangenheit und diskutiert mit ihnen über die Freiheit des Willens und die Existenz des Ichs. Ein kleiner, unscheinbarer Spiegel begleitet ihn dabei. Zunächst erscheinen in ihm nur rätselhafte Umrisse. Doch nichts bleibt, wie es ist – auf dem Weg zum Ende der Welt.

This paper will raise issues concerning to a phenomenological ethics. For that, we will seek to find subsidies through the passage of the logos of the aesthetic world to the logos of the cultural world in Merleau-Ponty. One common thread will be determined by this philosopher, with the intent to understand the original nature in the life-world. This thread is called original presence which, in turn, can be identified in both the aesthetic logos as in cultural logos. Merleau-Ponty makes a profound analysis of the studies raised by Husserl, namely a later Husserl, where we find the discovery of a phenomenology of life. Through the discovery of reflexive-body, Merleau-Ponty celebrate the incarnation of the phenomenology of life raised by Husserl. These two philosophers give a strong emphasis facing our attitude toward the opening of the world, the other and the logical objectivity. To better understand this philosophical perspective, we have the contribution of Waldenfels that will extend the concept of attitude and will make, thus, a phenomenological ethic more evident, where this attitude needs to give an answer or rather can not not respond, as the opening of the world create in us a challenge of which I am led to a concrete attitude. This challenge is generated by claims that dialogue with the law (rule) and justice (ethics). This dialogue, in principle, generates a strangeness that drives us to a threshold, creating a gap, allowing a new constitution process. When Waldenfels says that the Ethos begins on the plain of the senses, wants to talk that what affects us depends on the body itself that is affected and that what affects expresses sense for us. In other words, what claims out to us as the possibility of meaning indeed passes through the plain of the senses, must be understood and lived by the own body. In Waldenfels we can find a clear responsive ethics and an ethics of the senses, allowing the construction of a phenomenological ethics. / Este trabalho levantará questões concernentes a uma ética fenomenológica. Para isto, procuraremos encontrar subsídios através da passagem do logos do mundo estético para o logos do mundo cultural, em Merleau-Ponty. Um fio condutor será determinado por este filósofo, com o intento de entender a natureza da vida no mundo. Este fio condutor é chamado de presença originária que, por sua vez, pode ser identificado tanto no logos estético como no logos cultural. Merleau-Ponty faz uma profunda análise dos estudos levantados por Husserl, especialmente o Husserl mais tardio, no qual encontramos a descoberta de uma fenomenologia da vida. Por meio da descoberta do corpo-reflexionante, Merleau-Ponty celebra a encarnação da fenomenologia da vida levantada por Husserl. Estes dois filósofos conferem uma profunda ênfase em relação a nossa atitude através da abertura do mundo, do outro e da objetividade lógica. Para melhor compreendermos esta perspectiva filosófica, teremos a contribuição de Waldenfels que estenderá o conceito de atitude e tornará, assim, uma ética fenomenológica mais evidente, na qual nossa atitude precisa dar uma resposta ética, ou melhor, não pode não responder, pois a abertura do mundo cria em nós um desafio que nos guiará a uma atitude concreta. Este desafio é gerado por clamores que dialogam com a lei (regra) e a justiça (ética). Este diálogo, em princípio, gera uma estranheza que nos leva a um limiar, criando uma fenda, permitindo um novo processo de constituição. Quando Waldenfels diz que o Ethos começa da planície dos sentidos, quer falar que o que nos afeta depende do corpo próprio que é afetado e que o que nos afeta exprime sentido para nós. Em outras palavras, o que clama a nós como possibilidade de sentido precisa realmente passar pela planície dos sentidos; deverá, portanto ser entendido e vivido pelo corpo próprio. Em Waldenfels, podemos encontrar claramente uma ética responsiva e uma ética dos sentidos, permitindo a construção de uma ética fenomenológica.

Es gibt Situationen, in denen das Leben seine Glaubwürdigkeit verliert. Lukian erfährt dies am eigenen Leib. Er kann nicht glauben, dass sein Großvater gestorben ist. Und dann liegt da auf einmal diese geheimnisvolle Papierrolle unter seinem Bett. Ihr Inhalt stellt all das in Frage, was Lukian bisher selbstverständlich erschien. Was ist der Mensch – nur eine Marionette in einem großen Theaterstück? Die Suche nach Antworten treibt ihn auf eine abenteuerliche Reise zu den Wurzeln unserer Kultur. Er trifft auf die großen Denker der Vergangenheit und diskutiert mit ihnen über die Freiheit des Willens und die Existenz des Ichs. Ein kleiner, unscheinbarer Spiegel begleitet ihn dabei. Zunächst erscheinen in ihm nur rätselhafte Umrisse. Doch nichts bleibt, wie es ist – auf dem Weg zum Ende der Welt.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study seeks to give a philosophical account of, and justification for the intuition that subjectivity is not a stable “Archimedean point” on the basis of which an intersubjective relation can be founded, but is instead profoundly affected by each different “Other” with which it enters into a relation. As a preliminary to the positive philosophical account of how this might work in Part II of the thesis, there is an attempt to critique certain of the classical accounts of intersubjectivity found in phenomenology, in order to show that these positions cannot give a satisfactory account of the type of intersubjective relation which gives rise to the abovementioned intuition. The thesis therefore starts off by examining the account of intersubjectivity in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (especially the Fifth Meditation). Husserl is there engaged in an attempt to overcome the charge of solipsism that might be levelled at phenomenology, since phenomenology is concerned with experience as, by definition, the experience of the subject. We try to show that Husserl cannot give a satisfactory account of the Other because he tries to derive it from the Subject, and hence reduces the Other to the Same. We then turn to two other phenomenological thinkers – Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, both of whom are themselves critical of Husserl – to examine whether they provide a better account, but conclude that (although each represents a certain advance over Husserl), neither are able to provide a decisively better account, since each is still too caught up in phenomenology and its focus on consciousness. In Part II of the thesis, we then turn to a non- (or even anti-) phenomenological thinker, namely Gilles Deleuze, to try and find an alternative theory that would be able to provide the account we seek. Our contention is that Deleuze, by seeking to give an account of the constitution of the subject itself, simultaneously provides an account of the constitution of the Other as arising at the same time as the Subject. Crucial to this account is the inversion of priority between the poles of a relation and the relation itself. Deleuze argues that a relation is “external to its terms”, and precedes these terms. Hence, by returning to a level which precedes consciousness and the order of knowledge – that is, by returning to the level of the virtual multiplicities and singular events that underlie and precede the actualization of these events and multiplicities in distinct subjects and objects – we argue that Deleuze shows that, contra phenomenology, there is in fact no primordial separation between subject and Other. The contention is therefore that the problem of intersubjectivity as posed by phenomenology is a false one that can be eluded by means of Deleuze’s philosophy. This philosophy is not based on the subject, but instead shows the subject to be the product of an underlying network of relations. Finally, we turn to Deleuze’s appropriation of Nietzsche to trace out the transformation of “ethics” that result from adopting a position like that of Deleuze.

The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the nature and of the development of Brentano's theory of judgment. This description is followed by an introduction to the further development of Brentano's theory in the work of Brentano's most distinguished students Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Anton Marty (1843-1914) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The thesis is divided into five parts: The first part is dedicated to the explanation of Brentano's theory of judgment and starts with an interpretation of Brentano's two early books on Aristotle - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) and The Psychology of Aristotle (1867). The thesis presents Brentano's understanding of "being" in the sense of truth, his interpretation of the Aristotelian categories, his theory of parts and wholes, and his theory of intentionality and self-consciousness. Our interpretation then proceeds to Brentano's most known work, i.e. to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), and presents the basic concept of this book, the concept of psychical phenomena. The resulting classification of psychical phenomena into three kinds introduces judgments as a kind of psychical phenomenon whose main feature consists in existential affirmation or rejection of an intentional object....

Made available in DSpace on 2017-07-10T18:26:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luis Felipe Netto Lauer.pdf: 575327 bytes, checksum: 6022e98d212cd348ccaf658ccf21811a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-07-03 / Fundação Araucária / The conductive thread of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger s phenomenological investigations is the concept of intentionality; his analysis has for purpose to solve the fundamental methodological problem concerning the scientific disclosure of the sphere of lived experience (Erlebnis). So that it becomes clear, it is necessary to consider him formally. In Husserl, the sphere of lived experience is the one of the pure ego or pure consciousness, and the intentionality is understood as intentionality of consciousness; in Heidegger, it is treated of what denominated factical life or existence of Dasein, in that the intentionality designates the type of comportment that the human existence maintains in relation to itself and to the world. This work seeks a critical confrontation among the two positions, pointing out the heideggerian concern with the inadequacies of the theoretical attitude and her form of conceiving the field of the formal, towards an investigation concerning the nature and the formation of the concepts and philosophical statements as formal indications. / O fio condutor das investigações fenomenológicas de Edmund Husserl e Martin Heidegger é o conceito de intencionalidade; sua análise tem por finalidade resolver o problema metodológico fundamental acerca do modo de abrir cientificamente a esfera dos vividos (Erlebnis). Para que se torne claro, é necessário considerá-lo formalmente. Em Husserl, a esfera dos vividos é a do ego puro ou consciência pura, e a intencionalidade é compreendida como intencionalidade da consciência; em Heidegger, trata-se do que denominou vida ou existência fáctica do Dasein, em que a intencionalidade designa o tipo de comportamento que a existência humana mantém em relação a si e para com o mundo. Este trabalho visa um confronto crítico entre as duas posições, salientando a preocupação heideggeriana com as insuficiências da atitude teorética e sua forma de conceber o campo do formal, em direção a uma investigação acerca da natureza e da formação dos conceitos e enunciados filosóficos como indicações formais.

萊維納斯是二十一世紀最重要的哲學家之一。他早期的哲學著作聚焦在現象學的知識論與方法論的問題上。由於曾師事海德格，所以他也展現了如何將胡賽爾的著作視為一種存有學。但這不意味著他的哲學是一種胡賽爾現象學或海德格存有學。如同海德格一般，他穿梭於現象學中，但以某種方式同時靠近、同時遠離海德格的學說。他堅持必須超克的不只是現象學，還有存有學，而這最徹底的層次便是倫理，或他所稱的 「異於存有」。但這種 「異於」如何可能？而萊維納斯的倫理與胡賽爾的現象學、海德格的存有學之間的關係又為何？意識概念便是其中的關鍵。而這也是這本博士論文的主要任務。 這份探詢分三個部分，第一部分帶出現象學對自然哲學的批判，並處理萊維納斯對胡賽爾的理解與批判，例如意識不再是一個封閉的、不變的實體，而是具有朝向外在世界的可能。這朝向外在的可能，作為ㄧ種超越，來自意識結構本身。 「意識總是某物的意識」說明了意識本身的結構，這結構以能思-所思 (noesis-noema) 這樣的方式呈現。在這種運作方式，解讀為將外在化為內在的過程，所有被納入意識的事物都變成一種以 「現在」為優位的表象(representation)。 第二部分說明何為萊維納斯所謂的 「意識」。而這個論述是從理論態度進入到實踐的態度開始，同時這也是萊維納斯與海德格的關係。在此我們將看到萊維納斯如何抗拒海德格的基礎存有學，並確立 「實顯」作為意識的定位。在定位之後才開始有欲望、營養與家園等將他者化為同一的活動。另在第二部分結尾說明萊維納斯將 「意識」一詞區分為兩的向度，意向性與非意向性，同時這也是存有學與倫理的的區別。 第三部分著重在非意向性，亦即倫理的層次。在這裡說明如何從存有學層次的欲望、營養與家園轉變為責任、鄰近性與替代。非意向性意識所能建構的不是以自我為核心的帝國，而是以他人為優先的整個宇宙。在這之中，問題不在是存有或非存有，而是我的存有是否正當？我們可以發現，非意向性意識的功能不在於對反、摧毀意向性意識的功能，而只是打斷其安於現狀的安全感。正因不斷擾動、不斷質問，意識總是可以活躍的運作，而不只是陷入某個固定的迴圈。這種非意向性意識是強烈的，但它不是一種貪婪，或許可以說它是一種獻身的大愛。 / Emmanuel Levians, internationally renowed as one of the gtreat philosophers in the twentith century. In his early philosophical writings he focused on the epistemological and methodological problems of phenomenology. Having studied with Heidegger, he also showed how Husserl's work can be read as an ontology. But that does not means that his Philosophy is a sort of Husserlian phenomonology or Heideggerian ontology. Like Heidegger, he passed through phenomenology, but in a way simultaneously close and very foreign to that of Heidegger. An insistence on the necessity of overcoming not noly phenomenology but also ontology, and this most radical sphere is ethic, or what Levinas calls "byomd Being". But how can this beyond be possible, and what is the relation between Levinas's ethic with Husserlian phenomenology or heideggerian ontology? The Key point is the concept of consciousness. And this is the central task of this dissertion. This inquiry is divided into three parts. The first part brings out the phenomenology of natural philosophy and handles Levinas' understanding and criticism of Hussail. For example, consciousness is no longer a closed and unchanged entity, It is possible toward the outside world. This possibility, as a transcendence, comes from the structure of consciousness itself. "Consciousness is always the consciousness of something" illustrates the structure of consciousness itself, which is presented in such a way as noesis-noema. In this mode of operation, interpreted as the process of externalization into an internal process, all things that are incorporated into consciousness become a representation of the present. The second part explains what Levinas called "consciousness." And this discourse begins with the theoretical attitude into practical attitude, and this is also the relationship between Levinas and Heidegger. Here we will see how Levinas resisted Heidegger's fundamental ontology and established the "hypostasis" as the location of consciousness. Only after the positioning of consciousness, then, it begin the the movement that absorb the other to the Same by desire, nutrition and at home. At the end of the second section, another chapter shows Levinas's division of the word "consciousness" into two dimensions, intentionality and non-intentionality. At the same time, this is the difference between ontology and ethics. The third part focuses on non-intentionality, that is, ethical level. Here we show how we can shift the desire, nutrition and at home from the ontology leve to responsibility, proximity and substitution. The non-intentional consciousness can construct not the self-centered empire, but the entire universe, which is prioritized by others. Among them, the question is not to be or not to be, but is my existence right to be? We can see that the function of non-intentional awareness lies not in the function of opposing and destroying intentional awareness, but only in disrupting the security of the status quo. It is precisely because of constant disturbance, constant questioning, consciousness can always be active operation, not just fall into a fixed loop. This non-intentional awareness is strong, but it is not a kind of greed, perhaps it can be said that it is a devoted love.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished