Edmund Husserl tratta l’etica e l’intersoggettività separatamente e con scopi diversi. Allo stesso tempo, nei suoi testi sono presenti indizi di una mutua connessione tra tali ambiti. Nel mio lavoro intendo chiarire come sia interpretabile tale connessione. In particolare, considero che l’affermazione husserliana del valore della relazione e del dovere di promuoverla indica che il soggetto può realizzare attivamente la dimensione intersoggettiva in cui si trova solo attraverso una scelta a favore della relazione. Tale scelta presuppone l’esperienza del valore altrui. Mi chiedo quindi quali siano le condizioni dell’esperienza della rilevanza assiologica ed etica dell’altro e della relazione con lui. Per rispondere a questa domanda, mi rivolgo a due ambiti della fenomenologia trascendentale di Husserl: la teoria dell’intersoggettività e le analisi etiche. Attraverso la prima, valuto se gli strati costitutivi dell’esperienza intersoggettiva abbiano una rilevanza assiologica. Tuttavia, dati i limiti di una considerazione etica della teoria dell’intersoggettività, mi rivolgo alle analisi etiche per ulteriori approfondimenti. Esse mostrano che il valore dell’altro e il dovere nei suoi confronti sono colti dall’atto emotivo dell’amore e che l’amore a sua volta è fondato nel coglimento dell’altro come soggetto trascendentale. Così facendo chiarifico la mutua connessione tra etica e teoria dell’intersoggettività in Husserl. / Edmund Husserl treats ethics and intersubjectivity separately and with different purposes. At the same time, he disseminates clues of their interconnectedness throughout his works. In my dissertation, I aim to elucidate how to interpret their connection. In particular, I argue that Husserl’s insistence on the value of relationship and on the duty to promote it indicates that the subject can actively realize the intersubjective dimension in which it is situated only through a choice in favour of the relationship. This choice presupposes the experience of the value of the other. I thus ask which are the conditions of the experience of the axiological and ethical relevance of the other and of the relationship with it. To answer this question, I turn to two areas of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology: his theory of intersubjectivity and his ethical analyses. Through the first, I assess whether the constitutive levels of intersubjective experience have axiological relevance. However, given the limits pertaining to an ethical consideration of his theory of intersubjectivity, I move to Husserl’s ethical analyses for further insights. These analyses show that the value of the other and the duty towards it are captured by the emotional act of love, and that love is in turn grounded on grasping the other as a transcendental subject. I thereby shed light on the interconnectedness of Husserl’s ethics and theory of intersubjectivity.

The Function of Speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the development of the intentional function of speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The intentional function is defined as the change of expressed meaning that is engendered by the expression itself. We trace Husserl's position from the Logical Investigations and the first book of his Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, where he describes speech as the non- productive mirroring of other kinds of intentionality, to the late text The Origin of Geometry, where he discerns two functions of speech: it provides thought its ideality, which is different from the ideality of species; and it provides thought its objectivity, i.e. the form of object that lasts in history as identical. In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl's late position with several profound modifications. The starting-point ceases to be the linguistic sign, and speech becomes a kind of gesture. As a consequence, the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic ideality disappears. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty holds that the expression accomplishes the meaning of what it expresses. In this way, speech becomes creative and ceases to be just an empty intention of...

This thesis deals with the concept of modernity called "nadcivilizace" ("supercivilization") that was developed in the nineteen-fifties by Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (1907-1977) in his originally unpublished study Nadcivilizace a její vnitřní konflikt. The main goal of the thesis is to introduce this concept in the framework of the author's life and work, as well as in the context of current research in the field of historical sociology. This goal is fulfilled through three main steps, which are preceded by preliminary remarks about the issues of nowadays civilizational analysis. The first part is focused on the introduction of the author's concept of modernity as it was presented in the aforementioned study. Patočka's original term "nadcivilizace" is introduced and put into the context of civilizational analysis. At the same time, the circumstances of the genesis of the text, and the spiritual framework of the epoch in which Czech philosopher lived, are presented. Second part attempts to put the original concept into the author's lecture of philosophy of history, and to demonstrate the changes that occurred in Patočka's understanding of modernity in his work Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin (Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, 1975). Finally, the last part is dedicated to the problem...

Avec la phénoménologie, naît une nouvelle idée de la raison qui, au-delà de l’alternative du rationalisme et de l’irrationalisme et contre sa réduction kantienne à une faculté, est redéfinie à l’aune de l’expérience qu’elle permet de décrire. Mais la difficulté survient lorsqu’il s’agit d’atteindre la raison de l’expérience sensible elle-même, en son irréductibilité à toute exigence rationnelle - en son caractère particulier, complexe, lacunaire ou indéterminé. Dès lors, à quelles conditions peut-on penser une logique du sensible, sans aussitôt trahir le sensible ou perdre la raison ? Le projet husserlien d’une « logique-du-monde » exige en sa compréhension comme en son renouvellement, une réévaluation des concepts de « raison » et de « sensibilité ». Notre travail consiste donc en l’étude problématique et critique de ces concepts, depuis deux moments de leur déploiement :leur inauguration husserlienne et leur radicalisation lévinassienne. Le choix de ces deux oeuvres a pour intérêt historique de mesurer l’ampleur de l’élargissement phénoménologique de la raison – d’une conception« intellectualiste » de la sensibilité chez Husserl à sa profondeur lévinassienne ; et pour intérêt problématique de mener le problème à son terme et dans ses dernières contrées, là où le sensible n’apparaît plus comme pétri de sens mais dans son irrationalité même, là où la sensibilité n’est plus la saisie perceptive d’une identité mais l’expérience affective radicale d’une exposition à l’altérité. C’est donc en sa fondamentale équivocité que la sensibilité doit se faire le lieu d’une épreuve renouvelée de la raison, le principe critique de la rationalité mobilisée par sa description. / A new idea of reason was born with phenomenology. Beyond the opposition between rationalism andirrationalism, and against its Kantian reduction to a faculty, reason is redefined in the light of the experiencethat it enables to describe. But the difficulty arises when we attempt to reach the rationality of the sensibleexperience itself, in its own irreducibility to the demands of reason - in its irreducible peculiarity, complexity,lack and indetermination. Under which conditions can we think a logic of the sensible without betrayingsensibility or compromising reason? Husserl’s project of a “logic-of-the-world” requires, in its understandingas in its renewal, a reevaluation of the concepts of “reason” and “sensibility”. This dissertation consists in acritical study of these concepts, from these two main moments of their unfolding: their Husserlian inaugurationand their Levinassian radicalization. From a historical point of view, this choice enables us to assess thisphenomenological extension of reason - from an intellectual conception of sensibility in Husserl, to itsLevinassian depth. From a problematical point of view, this choice enables us to lead the problem to its finalterms, where the sensible is not made of meaning anymore, but appears in its very irrationality - whensensibility is not the perceptive grasp of an identity, but an affective exposure to otherness. Thought in itsfundamental equivocity, sensibility must be the place of a renewed challenge of reason, the critical principle ofthe rationality used by its description.

這篇論文的目的是為盧曼社會系統理論中的一個難題提供可能的解決之道。此難題即為：社會系統既是去主體化的，又是主體化的。這個難題的出現，乃肇因於盧曼認為系統既是自我透明的，也是自我不透明的，既是環境透明的，也是環境不透明的。這兩種弔詭就是盧曼社會系統理論的自我同一性弔詭與環境同一性弔詭。因此，為了解決社會系統理論的去主體化問題，首先就必須解決自我同一性弔詭與環境同一性弔詭。對此，我們建議從盧曼與胡塞爾的比較開始。藉由此種比較以及隨之而來的清洗與重組，我們可以從他們那裡擷取有利於解決上述弔詭的概念與命題。這些概念與命題是：一、存在著諸系統；二、新的觀察概念：構造；三、社會作為內在於意識系統中的社會行動秩序，而溝通系統則作為內在於理解系統中的社會溝通秩序。 / This thesis is aimed at solving a dilemma in Luhmann's theory of social systems.The delimma is: social systems are both desubjectized and subjectized. This is because in Luhmann's theory, they are both transparent and intransparent to itself, and the environments are both transparent and intransparent to systems. These two paradoxes are self-identity paradox and environment-identity paradox. Therefore, if we want to solve the problem of desubjectization in Luhmann's theory, we must solve the self-identity paradox and environment-identity paradox at first. We suggest that it can begin with the comparison between Luhmann and Husserl. Through this comparison, and correspondingly, cleaning and recombination, we can take concepts and propositions which can be used for resolving the above-mentioned paradoxes. The concepts and propositions are: 1. there are systems; 2. new concept of observation; and 3. society as the order of social actions in a consciousness system, and communication system as the order of social communications in a understanding system.

本文試圖討論的問題乃是在胡塞爾現象學中，「客觀世界」是如何構成的。其問題意識乃是來自於其自身現象學方法的操作後果。在其著作《笛卡爾式的沈思》中，表明了其現象學被批評為「獨我論」的可能，故進而在此《沈思》的第五章中，透過一系列在其現象學中對「他人」的討論，試圖突破自身陷入獨我論框架。其進行的方式主要有兩個步驟：「特殊的主題性懸擱」以及「移情」。而具有「客觀性」的世界便是在「移情」的諸階序上漸次構成的「主體際」世界。而在此諸步驟的討論中，我關注的是「現象學式的獨我自我」到「他人構成」的「初步」關係如何可能。 而對此步驟的可能性討論及解讀，在本文中以舒茲 (A. Schutz)、呂格爾 (P. Ricoeur) 以及李南麟 (Lee Nam-In) 的三篇文獻做為主要對談者。通過舒茲的強力批判、呂格爾往肉身存有的解讀方式，以及李南麟以靜態、發生現象學的途徑試圖解釋胡塞爾被批判的困境，我們可以發現，雖然胡塞爾通過上述兩個步驟所進行的客觀世界構成可能，是無法成功的，但一般稱為「意識哲學」的胡塞爾現象學，其哲學意圖、深度及可能的發展，即已有後續哲學家往「世俗 (mundane)」、「存有論」發展的走向，進而給予我們不管在對胡塞爾自身或後來的哲學發展有更深刻的理解。

Adoptant la langue des flux et des fluides, la théorie sociologique caractérisent aujourd’hui les acteurs sociaux comme des êtres composites, prédisposés à changer et capables d’agencements feuilletés. Alors que l’importance de la mobilité pour penser et analyser le social contemporain est généralement reconnue, rare sont les travaux qui se consacre à en développer les modalités fondamentales. L’objectif de cette thèse est de développer une approche plus différenciée et gradualiste des mobilités que celle proposée par les principales options théoriques en vigueur, sans pour autant abandonner la dimension fluctuante, non linéaire et imprévisible du mouvement sur laquelle elles attirent l’attention. Qu’est-ce qu’être mobile ?Une théorie de l’expérience, en l’occurrence celle proposée par la phénoménologie, offrirait-elle des ressources critiques susceptibles d’ouvrir à l’approfondissement des mobilités comme elles sont vécues ?À titre d’hypothèse, cette thèse pose qu’un ensemble de phénomènes demeurent énigmatiques à l’intérieur de la conception généralement admise du social contemporain et qu’une articulation plus explicite du thème de la mobilité à celui de l’action humaine permet d’approfondir les processus du déplacement dans l’espace des sociétés, du passage du temps impliqué par le déplacement et du changement social. Comment émerge du nouveau dans le cours d’actions ?Qu’est-ce que pouvoir agir ?Quelle est la source du changement ?À partir d’une enquête inédite sur des voyageurs se rendant quotidiennement à Bruxelles et des personnages de romans de route étatsuniens, l’auteur explore des questions de fond portant sur l’expérience du transport, autour de l’éloignement des choses et des personnes aimées, du vide du temps d’attente, des aléas aussi insignifiants qu’irritants, de l’étrangeté des rencontres, de la décision de prendre la route et de choisir une orientation nouvelle. Ces moments de vacillation sont importants, soutient l’auteur, car ils nous ramènent aux motivations fondamentales et aux buts ultimes de nos déplacements les plus quotidiens. À une époque marquée par un idéal de mouvement fluide et sans accrocs, cette thèse éclaire ce qui se passe dans l’expérience des mobilités. Elle incite à une réflexion sur ce que nous éprouvons sur la route et aux possibles que cette expérience fait émerger. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

A Sceptical Aesthetics of Existence: The Case of Michel Foucault Emmanouil Simos (Hughes Hall) Michel Foucault's genealogical investigations constitute a specific historical discourse that challenges the metaphysical hypostatisation of concepts and methodological approaches as unique devices for tracking metaphysically objective truths. Foucault's notion of aesthetics of existence, his elaboration of the ancient conceptualisation of ethics as an 'art of living' (a technē tou biou), along with a series of interconnected notions (such as the care of the self) that he developed in his later work, have a triple aspect. First, these notions are constitutive parts of his later genealogies of subjectivity. Second, they show that Foucault contemplates the possibility of understanding ethics differently, opposed to, for example, the traditional Kantian conceptualisation of morality: he envisages ethics in terms of self-fashioning, of aesthetic transformation, of turning one's life into a work of art. Third, Foucault employs these notions in self-referential way: they are considered to describe his own genealogical work. This thesis attempts to show two things. First, I defend the idea that the notion of aesthetics of existence was already present in a constitutive way from the beginning of his work, and, specifically, I argue that it can be traced in earlier moments of his work. Second, I defend the idea that this notion of aesthetics of existence is best understood in terms of the sceptical stance of Sextus Empiricus. It describes an ethics of critique of metaphysics that can be understood as a nominalist, contextualist, and particularist stance. The first chapter discusses Foucault's late genealogy of the subject. It formulates the interpretative framework within which Foucault's own conceptualisation of the aesthetics of existence can be understood as a sceptical stance, itself conceived as nominalist, contextualist and particularist. As the practice of an aesthetics of existence is not abstract and ahistorical but the engagement with the specific historical circumstances within which this practice is undertaken, the second chapter reconstructs the intellectual context from which Foucault's thought has emerged (Heidegger, Blanchot, and Nietzsche). The third chapter discusses representative examples of different periods of Foucault's thought -such as the "Introduction" to Binswanger's "Traum und Existenz" (1954), Histoire de la folie (1961), and Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir (1976)- and shows in which way they constitute concrete instantiations of his sceptical aesthetics of existence. The thesis concludes with responses to a number of objections to the sceptical stance here defended.

This study investigates movement as a phenomenon of constituting directedness in the Canadian writer Rudy Wiebe’s Mennonite novels. In Peace Shall Destroy Many (1962), in The Blue Mountains of China (1970), and in Sweeter Than All the World (2001), the phenomenon of movement is complexly at work as a decisive factor on numerous levels of constitution. Employing the concept of phenomenological directedness, the study elucidates phenomena central to the kinetic-kinaesthetic materiality of the three works. Focusing on textual nuances of kinaesthetic accentuation, the investigation highlights ways in which directedness shapes subjectivity rather than vice versa. Kinetic reality emerges as something torn between distance as a separating interval and distance as a remote intimacy manifesting an elision of the span between source-point and terminus. Such discrepancy shapes a sense of existential inconsecutiveness, in which an intriguing diminishment of feeling is a heightening of the affective life. This state of affairs is frequently aligned with faith as world-withdrawal. The wandering of persecuted believers is a theological process that at any given time can reduce itself to an external, purely geographic enterprise, thus becoming a substitute for faith. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of perpetual travel has the capacity to produce an overarching bonding-affect at the constituting heart of a community whose kinetic life is inseparable from the movement of regeneration.

The aim of the thesis is to examine both Husserl's and Kant's transcendentalism in a way that would avoid the tendency to put the main accent on Husserl, which is an approach common to almost all literature dealing with this topic so far. Since it is for the most part Husserl's own critique of Kant that inspires such ongoing underestimation of Kant in comparison to Husserl, this work focuss on the question of the legitimacy of this critique. The core of the thesis is an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental philosophy which, instead of taking for granted the phenomenological point of view, attempts to describe Kant's philosophical enterprise from its own perspective and in its own right. In its second part, the thesis provides a brief description of how Husserl, starting initially from the position of descriptive psychology, arrives at a transcendental dimension. When so put side by side, it becomes evident that the two transcendental positions are in fact very different. Husserl's critique of Kant then appears as unjustified, even though quite understandable as an attempt to draw back from certain immature motives of his own philosophy.