"Thèse en cotutelle" / Si certains héritiers de la phénoménologie ont cherché à libérer l’apparaître des normes qui lui étaient imposées, il en allait autrement chez Husserl. Les normes étaient d’abord appliquées aux visées de sens elles-mêmes, lesquelles étaient dites « correctes » ou « incorrectes ». Autre façon de dire que la phénoménologie ne pouvait faire l’économie des normes : point de description sans prescription, et sans prescription à la description. Dire que le projet phénoménologique est essentiellement descriptif, c’est cependant admettre que les normes s’y tiennent en retrait. Le premier défi d’une phénoménologie des normes est donc de les mettre au jour. De plus, en son versant critique, la phénoménologie des normes doit justifier notre droit de les poser et de les appliquer normativement. À ce titre, elle sera une phénoménologie du caractère normatif des normes. Suivant les traces de Husserl, nous considèrerons d’abord les enjeux normatifs liés à la logique, puis les autres normes reconnues par lui. Ces normes étant assimilées à l’obtention d’une évidence ou d’un certain type d’évidence, elles avaient toutes un usage théorique. Nous ferons cependant l’hypothèse que certaines normes peuvent avoir un usage pratique. Cette hypothèse se heurtera à un obstacle de taille chez Husserl, qui proposait de justifier les devoirs pratiques grâce aux valeurs et non par les normes. Déconstruisant chacun des présupposés normatifs ayant conduit Husserl à recourir aux valeurs en éthique, nous paverons la voie à une éthique phénoménologique, normative et suspensive. Mots-clés : phénoménologie, Edmund Husserl, normativité, normes, logique normative, éthique, valeurs, volonté, action, devoir. / If some of phenomenology’s heirs sought to free that which appears from the norms imposed upon it, it was not Husserl’s main concern. He applied norms foremost to sense itself, which was then said to be « correct » or « incorrect ». This was another way of saying that phenomenology could not avoid norms : no description without prescription, and without prescription to description. To say that the phenomenological project is essentially descriptive is to admit that norms keep out of the limelight in phenomenology. The first challenge of a phenomenology of norms is therefore to shine a spot upon them. Moreover, in its critical orientation, a phenomenology of norms must justify our right to posit and apply them normatively. As such, it is a phenomenology of the normative character of norms. Following Husserl’s reflection, I will first consider the normative stakes linked to logic and then the other norms he recognized. As norms were assimilated to evidence or to some type of evidence, they all had a theoretical use. I will assume, however, that some norms may have a practical function. This hypothesis will encounter a major obstacle, as Husserl proposed to justify practical ougths by means of values instead of norms. By deconstructing each of the normative presuppositions that led Husserl to rely on values in ethics, I will pave the way for a phenomenological, normative and suspensive ethic. Keywords : phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, normativity, norms, normativ logic, ethic, values, will, action, ought.

Tableau d'honneur de la Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, 2016-2017 / Ce mémoire se donne pour objectif d'expliciter et d'interroger les dimensions phénoménologique et éthique de la question animale à partir des écrits de Jacques Derrida. Pour ce faire, en prenant pour fil directeur les intrications entre la subjectivité et l'animalité, nous tenterons d'exhumer les moments dogmatiques au sein de la phénoménologie de Husserl et de Heidegger quant à leur conception des animaux. Dans un premier temps, nous expliciterons la position de Derrida à l'égard de la thèse heideggérienne qui oppose le Dasein et ce qui ne serait que « seulement vivant ». Dans un second temps, nous nous intéresserons aux écrits de Derrida sur la phénoménologie de Husserl afin de comprendre pour quelles raisons Derrida n'adhère pas non plus à un continuisme entre les hommes et les animaux. Enfin, ne souscrivant ni à la thèse discontinuiste de Heidegger, ni celle continuiste de Husserl, nous aborderons les conséquences éthiques que Derrida dégage à partir de l'impossibilité de penser autant le propre de l'homme que le tout autre qu'est l'animal, nous engageant par là dans sa pensée de l'hospitalité et de la responsabilité au-delà de toute subjectivité.

L'amour de la sagesse impose à la connaissance rationnelle de trouver ses propres assises et celles-ci, depuis l'oracle delphique, ne peuvent émerger clairement que d'un repli radical et critique du je sur lui-même, hors de la turbulance du Monde. À ce titre, l'intentionnalité réflexive dans la phénoménologie de Husserl se dévoile comme fondation possible, à la fois originaire et ultime, de toute connaissance pouvant être jugée certaine. Cependant, l'Homme vit dans le monde, il ne se réduit pas en la sublimation d'un pur ego. Comment pourra-t-il espérer connaître le Monde s'il en est partie prenante? Comment pourra-t-il espérer connaître Autrui si ce dernier peut aussi se mettre en marge du Monde? Et Soi-même? Il nous semble que seul l'Amour bien compris nous permette d'unir réellement tant l'immanence que la transcendance, au sein de la subjectivité connaissante. Tout notre présent effort tend à l'harmonisation concrète de la subjectivité et de la connaissance véritable.

Même si sa temporalité implique une diversité de ses expériences, le sujet admet aussi une unité temporelle de ses expériences dispersées. Comment se donne en propre cette unité temporelle? Edmund Husserl a surtout décrit la constitution unitaire du cours des vécus par le simple écoulement continu et en recouvrement du flux de la conscience. En plus de souligner l'aspect aporétique de cette constitution par et dans la seule conscience, Paul Ricoeur a aussi cherché à constituer la temporalité unitaire du sujet en montrant comment cette unification devait se faire par sa saisie médiatisée et reflexive dans l'histoire d'une vie. Cette solution indique un renouvellement possible de cette question dans la phénoménologie husserlienne, puisque Husserl qualifie d'« histoire d'une vie » l'unité temporelle de l'ego personnel ressaisie dans la réflexion. Cette histoire redouble cependant une unité de l'ego personnel déjà constituée par l'association et dans ses motivations et ses habitudes.

<p>The essay seeks to clarify some of the decisive but often obscured issues in the famous debate between Jacques Derrida and Jonn F. Searle. The debate commenced in 1977 with the publication in <em>Glyph</em> of Derrida’s lecture <em>Signature Event Context</em> from -71, followed by Searle’s <em>Reiterating the Differences</em>. A Reply to Derrida and subsequently Derrida’s reply <em>Limited Inc a b c …</em> which encouraged Searle to renew his criticism. I situate the debate within a philosophical context where questions of the aim of philosophy and the nature of philosophical writing cannot be excluded from the specific topics that are being discussed. Starting from Derrida’s controversial reading of Austin, where a few key points of criticism are placed under scrutiny, I proceed to problems of writing and communication where special attention is paid to the concept of iterability and Searle’s remark that this has been confounded with permanence in Derrida’s exposition. The concept of ”writing” is examined as a crux in the understanding of the two philosophers. And iterability is then found to be derieved from the theorization of absence in relation to that very concept. Iterability designates an essential possibility of absence and implies the possibility of every mark to be grafted onto new contexts of significance. Thus it draws the consequences of a general repeatability, within which difference is underscored as the inevitable outcome. The last section of the essay relates to the phenomenological project of investigating the genesis of idealization and traces the emergence of iterability in Derrida’s further writings on Husserl, where repetition can be perceived of as constitutive for ideality and thus for identity. Bearing on this observation, the type/token-distinction, proposed by Searle to undo the problem of iterability, is subjected to further inquiry and linked to the process of idealization, within which iterability is revealed to have a temporal relevance that also affects the notion of permanence. The claim is then made that iterability should be understood as a fundamentally ambiguous phenomenon through its dual relation to identity and difference. Its utility is found to be hinged upon the status of the possible. Finally, the question of iterability as concept is posed, which entails its interdependence upon notions of dissemination and différance.</p>

The essay seeks to clarify some of the decisive but often obscured issues in the famous debate between Jacques Derrida and Jonn F. Searle. The debate commenced in 1977 with the publication in Glyph of Derrida’s lecture Signature Event Context from -71, followed by Searle’s Reiterating the Differences. A Reply to Derrida and subsequently Derrida’s reply Limited Inc a b c … which encouraged Searle to renew his criticism. I situate the debate within a philosophical context where questions of the aim of philosophy and the nature of philosophical writing cannot be excluded from the specific topics that are being discussed. Starting from Derrida’s controversial reading of Austin, where a few key points of criticism are placed under scrutiny, I proceed to problems of writing and communication where special attention is paid to the concept of iterability and Searle’s remark that this has been confounded with permanence in Derrida’s exposition. The concept of ”writing” is examined as a crux in the understanding of the two philosophers. And iterability is then found to be derieved from the theorization of absence in relation to that very concept. Iterability designates an essential possibility of absence and implies the possibility of every mark to be grafted onto new contexts of significance. Thus it draws the consequences of a general repeatability, within which difference is underscored as the inevitable outcome. The last section of the essay relates to the phenomenological project of investigating the genesis of idealization and traces the emergence of iterability in Derrida’s further writings on Husserl, where repetition can be perceived of as constitutive for ideality and thus for identity. Bearing on this observation, the type/token-distinction, proposed by Searle to undo the problem of iterability, is subjected to further inquiry and linked to the process of idealization, within which iterability is revealed to have a temporal relevance that also affects the notion of permanence. The claim is then made that iterability should be understood as a fundamentally ambiguous phenomenon through its dual relation to identity and difference. Its utility is found to be hinged upon the status of the possible. Finally, the question of iterability as concept is posed, which entails its interdependence upon notions of dissemination and différance.

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The limit between the proper and the foreign – how this limit is established, but also crossed and dissolved – has remained a crucial issue in phenomenology. Setting these questions in the context of the phenomenology of religion, this thesis develops an analysis of the relation between transcendence and body understood in terms of a certain limit. The introductory part is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s discussions of the concept of transcendence, which is shown to have an essential connection to the analysis of inner time-consciousness. Here we encounter a decisive limit to objectifying knowledge, which also comes across in his investigations of the body and its spatiality. The second part discusses Max Scheler’s critique of Husserl’s excessively objectifying view of knowledge, with a particular focus on Scheler’s understanding of love as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. Scheler is shown to have developed a new concept of transcendence that avoids the pitfalls of objectivism, although in his philosophy of religion he tends to downplay the importance of the body. The third part undertakes a reading of Edith Stein, who develops ideas similar to Scheler’s, though in a phenomenologically more nuanced fashion. Although her philosophy of religion also bypasses the body, Stein provides a more genuine access to the writings of the mystics, the analysis of which forms the core of the fourth and concluding part. Drawing on the work of the 13th century Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, this concluding chapter develops a phenomenological understanding of religion with an emphasis on transcendence and limit, while also retaining the centrality of our experience of the body. This means: a phenomenology of the limit is investigated, rather than a limit of phenomenology. / Hur gränsen mellan det egna och det främmande ska dras är en central fråga inom den fenomenologiska traditionen, en fråga som här undersöks i ett religionsfilosofiskt sammanhang. På vilket sätt kan vi överskrida oss själva mot det främmande och ogripbara, och på vilket sätt är denna möjlighet förbunden med vår egen kroppslighet? Dessa teman utvecklas i en serie diskussioner av filosofer som Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler och Edith Stein. Redan i Husserls analyser av transcendensen, tidsmedvetandet och kroppsligheten framträder en bestämd gräns för den objektiverande kunskapen, även om han i sista hand alltid uppfattade den som ett ideal. I Schelers och Steins religionsfilosofier utvecklas därefter en kritik av denna kunskapssyn, bland annat i form av en analys av kärleken (Scheler) och mystiken (Stein), men hos ingen av dem får kroppsligheten en central ställning. I den avslutande delen, som analyserar den mystika erfarenhetens uttryck hos den medetida beginen Mechthild von Magdeburg, utvecklas en fenomenologi som förbinder transcendens med kroppslighet och sinnlighet. Därmed undersöks en gränsens fenomenologi snarare än fenomenologins gräns. Jonna Bornemark är forskare och lärare på Södertörns högskola. Boken är hennes doktorsavhandling.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 459289.pdf: 904643 bytes, checksum: 494bba68668b2082672ac959477f8cff (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-26 / The text of the Phenomenology of inclusiveness characterizes itself as a new work in the area of phenomenology. Seeking phenomenological sources in Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Waldenfels, the text attempts to develop inclusiveness in order to contemplate the inclusive/exclusive paradox and, moreover, to show its efficacy in measuring the inclusive scope of any ethical theory ever developed. From Husserl, we find the basis for a phenomenology of inclusiveness, which was put forth in his Krisis. In order to solve the constitutive paradoxes, Husserl nurtures the idea of an inclusive basis. Such inclusiveness is characterized by a latent reflective attitude, an attitude of inclusion in the lifeworld, an attitude of not closing our thesis, and, finally, an attitude that avoids the reductionism of the subjective and objective poles. With the radicality of thought from Merleau-Ponty, the text presents support for a complicity of meaning. Now, the subject sees his/herself as complicit in his/her relationship with the liveworld thus withdrawing the heavy burden that previously was placed solely on the subject as the ultimate endower of all meaning. The constitutive process entails a radical attitude that enables an incarnate inclusiveness, conveying the inclusive scope to the horizontality of life. However, as Waldenfels investigated the progress of ethical theory, he added an ethical-practical character to the constitutive dimension. Waldenfels emphasized an inevitable response before any thesis, due to our being in the world, as an event that just happens, regardless of our will or objectivications. Such responsiveness promotes the threshold of the senses as a responsive ethical possibility. In response itself, we find a responsive content that is not objectified, guiding us to the thresholds, considering them as possibilities and not as threats. For Waldenfels, what was previously excluded from the established order appears at the threshold, providing inclusive opportunities. After these considerations, the text reveals an inclusiveness which is open, latent, included in the lifeworld, non-reductionist, complicit in the constitutive process, and has an ethically responsive character. Although the studied authors do not work directly with the theme of inclusiveness, we examine sufficient sources to propose a method of phenomenology that demonstrates inclusivity, i.e., that is phenomenologically inclusive. Although the method is neither a measure nor a foundation, nevertheless it provides a base that serves as the measure and foundation of all morality ever built. Thus, we can measure the inclusive scope of all ethics and see how far the inclusivity extends, but yet not present inclusivity as the determinative basis. The foundation of the base is phenomenological, i.e., predicted within the latency and horizontality of the lifeworld / O texto Fenomenologia da inclusividade se caracteriza por ser um novo trabalho na ?rea da fenomenologia. Buscando fontes fenomenol?gicas em Husserl, Merleau-Ponty e Waldenfels, o texto procura desenvolver uma inclusividade capaz de contemplar o paradoxo inclusivo/exclusivo e, indo al?m, mostrando-se eficaz para medir o escopo inclusivo de qualquer tese ?tica j? elaborada. A partir de Husserl, encontramos as bases para uma fenomenologia da inclusividade, que fora trabalhada em sua obra Krisis. Buscando resolver os paradoxos constitutivos, Husserl nutre a ideia de um fundamento inclusivo. Tal inclusividade se caracteriza por uma atitude reflexiva latente, uma atitude de inclus?o no mundo-da-vida, uma atitude de n?o fechamento de nossas teses e, por fim, uma atitude que evite o reducionismo dos polos subjetivo e objetivo. Com a radicalidade do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty, o texto encontra subs?dios para uma cumplicidade de sentido. Agora, o sujeito se v? c?mplice de toda significa??o em sua rela??o com o mundo-da-vida. Retira-se o pesado fardo que antes era concedido t?o somente ao sujeito como doador ?ltimo de todo o significado. O processo constitutivo enseja uma atitude radical que habilita uma inclusividade encarnada, avultando o escopo inclusivo ? horizontalidade da vida. Todavia, investigando os avan?os da teoria ?tica de Waldenfels, acresce-se, ? dimens?o constitutiva, um car?ter ?tico-pr?tico. Waldenfels enfatiza uma inevit?vel resposta dada antes de qualquer tese decorrente de nosso estar no mundo como um evento que simplesmente acontece, independente de nossa vontade ou objetifica??es. Tal responsividade promove a fronteiriza??o dos sentidos como possibilidade ?tico-responsiva. Na pr?pria resposta encontramos um teor responsivo n?o objetivado, guiando-nos ?s fronteiras, considerando-as como possibilidade e n?o como amea?as. Para Waldenfels, o que antes era exclu?do da ordem estabelecida aparece junto ao limiar, facultando possibilidades inclusivas. Feitas estas considera??es, o texto revela uma inclusividade aberta, latente, inclu?da no mundo-da-vida, n?o reducionista, c?mplice nos processos constitutivos e possuindo um car?ter ?tico-responsivo. Embora os autores estudados n?o trabalhem diretamente com o tema da inclusividade, obt?m-se fontes suficientes para elaborarmos uma fenomenologia com uma proposta inclusiva. O m?todo proposto ? fenomenol?gico inclusivo. Entretanto, apresenta-se como uma medida, como um fundamento que n?o ? nem uma medida nem um fundamento. Mas, mesmo assim, serve como medida e fundamento de toda a eticidade j? constru?da. Dessa forma, podemos medir o escopo inclusivo de toda eticidade, ver at? onde se estende sua inclusividade, mas sem se apresentar como um fundamento determinativo. O fundamento ao qual nos pautamos ? fenomenol?gico, ou seja, previsto dentro da lat?ncia e horizontalidade do mundo-da-vida

La présente étude se donne pour objectif principal de reconstruire les diverses (re-)mises en question de la notion de donné sensible dans le néokantisme et la phénoménologie sur la scène philosophique allemande au tournant du XXème siècle. À la question cruciale de savoir quel est l’intérêt d’ouvrir en 2013 un tel dossier vieux déjà de plus d’un siècle, nous répondons qu’il est au moins double : d’abord, nous voulons montrer que les critiques du donné ont joué un rôle capital dans la genèse des trois principaux mouvements présents sur la scène philosophique austro-allemande à la fin du XIXème siècle, à savoir le positivisme, la phénoménologie et le néokantisme. Ensuite, ce travail présente un intérêt tout à fait actuel, puisqu’il se conçoit comme une exploration de l’arrière-plan historique et continental de la controverse autour du « mythe du donné » (the Myth of the Given) initiée par Wilfrid Sellars en 1956, controverse qui continue à occuper une place de choix aujourd’hui, notamment dans les débats sur la perception dans la Philosophy of Mind. / This study is a reconstruction of the different ways neo-kantians and phenomenologists have questioned the notion of the sensory given. Why is it interesting to open—in 2013—this old dossier of criticisms of the given in german philosophy at the turn of the XXth. Century? First, it is shown that critiques of the given have played an essential role in the genesis of the three most important movements of german and austrian philosophy at the end of the XIXth century, namely, positivism, phenomenology, and neo-kantianism. Century. Second, this work contributes to live discussion because it is an exploration of the historical background in continental philosophy of the « Myth of the Given » introduced by Wilfrid Sellars in 1956, which still occupies a central place in contemporary debates about perception in philosophy of mind.