This study examines the translation of three forms of reader address from English to Swedish in a gardening guidebook – the pronoun you as a second person reference and generic reference, modal verbs, and imperatives. The translation was made by the author of this study. The aim of the study is to investigate how the three forms of reader address is translated. The quantitative analysis shows that the most used form of reader address out of the three investigated are imperatives, while the pronoun you followed closely behind. While modal verbs were used frequently in the ST, the modality was not translated in the TT. The qualitative analysis shows that the pronoun you was translated into second person du, third person generic man or was omitted in the translation in almost equal measure. How the pronoun you was translated in the TT depended on how the translator interpreted the author’s target audience. Only two modal verbs occurred frequently in the ST, and in the TT they were either translated as modal verbs or into present tense. Lastly, the imperative verbs were most commonly translated as imperatives in the TT. About 10% were translated into tensed verbs. Furthermore, half of that was translated to form suggestions.

This thesis investigated a rupture in the U. S. legal tradition of punishing sexual crime, initiatedby The Community Protection Act of 1990 and the Sexually Violent Predator Statute, that defined the criminal subject as a sexually violent predator. Thus, with this definition was initiated a new legislative innovation. Effectuated as the following Sexually Violent Predator laws, it allowed for the civil commitment of sex offenders post completed sentence. A commitment scheme that has been subject to a vast criticism qua its severe deprivation of basic human rights and dismissal of Constitutional provisions. The investigation was composed as a content analysis of the framing of the journalistic production responding to these laws. A selection of 35 news articles was appropriated as source material. The method of content analysis was accompanied by a theoretical framework, scrutinising normative orders and claims of disability and able-ism. The analysis of the source material resulted in the identification of eight repetitive thematics. Their framing was presented and analysed in order to critically discuss the composition and execution of the Sexually Violent Predator laws.

This dissertation comprises two parts: Part I, which discusses use of second person pronoun in contemporary American poetry; and Part II, The Museum of Coming Apart, which is a collection of poems. As confessional verse became a dominant mode in American poetry in the late 1950s and early 60s, so too did the use of the first-person pronoun. Due in part to the excesses of later confessionalism, however, many contemporary poets hesitate to use first person for fear that their work might be read as autobiography. The poetry of the 1990s and early 2000s has thus been characterized by distance, dissociation, and fracture as poets attempt to remove themselves from the overtly emotional and intimate style of the confessionals. However, other contemporary poets have sought to straddle the line between the earnestness and linearity of confessionalism and the intellectually playful yet emotionally detached poetry of the moment. One method for striking this balance is to employ the second person pronoun. Because "you" in English is ambiguous, it allows the poet to toy with the level of distance in a poem and create evolving relationships between the speaker and reader. Through the analysis of poems by C. Dale Young, Paul Guest, Richard Hugo, Nick Flynn, Carrie St. George Comer, and Moira Egan, this essay examines five common ways second person is employed in contemporary American poetry-the use of "you" in reference to a specific individual, the epistolary form, the direct address to the reader, the imperative voice, and the use of "you" as a substitute for "I"-and the ways that the second-person pronoun allows these poems to take the best of both the confessional and dissociative modes.

Dans Dialectique de la Raison, Adorno et Horkheimer tentent d’esquisser le pourquoi et le comment de ce retour à la barbarie qu’a connu la civilisation européenne, lors du troisième Reich. Quelles sont ces conditions qui ont rendu possibles les massacres administrés sous le régime nazi? La résolution de cette énigme qui se solde sur l’échec de l’Auflkärung nous dévoile une nécessité, celle d’une transformation radicale à la fois de l’éthique et de la métaphysique dans sa conception de la vérité. Celle-ci se présente à nous sous la forme d’une norme morale : « Dans leur état de non-liberté, Hitler a imposé aux hommes un nouvel impératif catégorique; penser et agir en sorte qu’Auschwitz ne se répète pas ». Quelles modalités de penser et d’agir nous exhortent ce nouvel impératif catégorique? La philosophie d’Adorno, critiqué pour n’avoir été que négative dans son entreprise, est-elle en mesure de nous fournir des prescriptions normatives capables de réorienter le penser théorétique et l’éthique? / In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer try to explain the reasons for why and how, European civilization committed barbaric crimes during the third Reich. What conditions that made possible the massacres administered under the Nazi regime? The failure of the Enlightenment is the answer to this question and requires a radical transformationof ethics and metaphysics. This necessity takes the form of a new categorical imperative: “A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon human beings in the state of their unfreedom: to arrange theirs thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen”. Is Adorno’s philosophy, often accused of being too negative, is it able to provide normative prescriptions able to give a new direction to the theoretical thinking and ethics?

Diploma thesis "Kant's Categorical Imperative and Its Critique by Nineteenth Century Philosophers" deals with a question of Kant's fundamental principle known as the Categorical Imperative or Moral Law. The aim of this work is at first to discuss two other moral principles because of their great impact on Kant seeking the moral principle. These are Hume's moral code called Moral sense and Rousseau' moral views relating to the freedom of individuals. Secondly, to find out how both moral theories did inspire Immanuel Kant. It is necessary to explain strengths of Kant's Formula of the Categorical Imperative especially to emphasise its objectivity and universality. Then the purpose is to show Kant's influence on moral thinking in the nineteenth century. It is necessary to mention philosophers such as Johan Gottlieb Fichte and Bernard Bolzano who focused on critique of the Categorical Imperative.

Submitted by Mariana Dornelles Vargas (marianadv) on 2015-04-01T17:55:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 imperativo_inclusao.pdf: 2645272 bytes, checksum: 7c86aea1dd8cf82cc494fa80743a7b70 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-01T17:55:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 imperativo_inclusao.pdf: 2645272 bytes, checksum: 7c86aea1dd8cf82cc494fa80743a7b70 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-02-28 / Nenhuma / Esta dissertação de mestrado analisa como o imperativo da inclusão na Contemporaneidade vem movimentando não somente a sociedade e as escolas, mas também as Universidades Comunitárias do Rio Grande do Sul. Como recorte metodológico, os sites das doze Universidades Comunitárias Gaúchas foram tomados como campo de visibilidade para a investigação, que teve como objetivo conhecer o que as universidades visibilizam sobre a inclusão no ensino superior, e qual(is) conceito(s) de inclusão baliza(m) o trabalho dessas instituições. A dissertação orientou-se pela perspectiva teórica da pós-metafísica, na qual tanto o conhecimento quanto os sujeitos são constituídos de acordo com o olhar que colocamos sobre eles e com a posição que ocupam na rede social. Para a realização das análises dos materiais que compõem o corpus desta pesquisa, foram utilizados os conceitos de in/exclusão, acessibilidade, imperativo e governamentalidade. As unidades de sentido que se constituíram a partir dos materiais visibilizados nos sites das universidades trataram sobre: o acesso e acessibilidade aliados à inclusão social; os programas e projetos de permanência no ensino superior; e a inclusão como estratégia de marketing nas Universidades Comunitárias Gaúchas. Como alguns resultados deste estudo foi possível apontar que: a inclusão social é o conceito inclusivo mais emergente nas instituições pesquisadas que se materializa, em grande parte, no acesso à universidade. Esse acesso, voltado para diferentes populações, mas principalmente para a população com menores condições econômicas, possibilita a entrada de muitas pessoas que em outros momentos não chegariam à universidade. Contudo, não basta somente permitir ou facilitar o ingresso, é necessário que as universidades criem estratégias para atender aos sujeitos e para mantê-los incluídos. Portanto, a pesquisa procurou investigar se as Universidades Comunitárias Gaúchas produzem “atitudes de inclusão”, com a criação de vários tipos de programas e projetos, buscando objetivar tanto o acesso quanto a permanência de vários grupos de sujeitos no ensino superior. Essas possíveis “atitudes de inclusão”, quando visibilizadas nos sites, podem se tornar estratégias de marketing dessas instituições, uma vez que mostram, de diferentes maneiras, como elas se preparam e tentam ser singulares no atendimento ao imperativo da inclusão. / This Master’s dissertation analyzes how the productivity of imperative inclusion in the Contemporary is moving not only the society and schools, but also the Community Universities of Rio Grande do Sul. For the methodological approach, the websites of the twelve Gaucho Community Universities (Southernmost Brazil Community Universities) were taken as a visibility field for the research, which aimed to find out what universities picture as inclusion in higher education, and which inclusion concept (s) lay (s) the work of those institutions. The dissertation was guided by the theoretical perspective of post-metaphysics, in which both the knowledge and the subjects are constituted according to the look we put on them, as well as the position they occupy in the social network. To carry out the analysis of the materials that make up the corpus of this study, the concepts of in/exclusion, accessibility, imperative, and governmentality were used. The meaningful units that were made up from the material available on the websites of universities dealt with: access and accessibility coupled with social inclusion; programs and projects for students to stay in higher education; and the inclusion as a marketing strategy in Gaucho Community Universities. Through the results of this study, it was possible to point out that: social inclusion is the most inclusive concept emerging in the institutions surveyed that is accomplished, mainly, when joining the university. Such access, aimed at different populations, but especially for people on lower economic scale, allows the entry of many people who at other instances would not make the university. However, it is not enough to grant or facilitate the entry, it is necessary that universities develop strategies to receive the subjects and keep them included. Thus, the research aimed to investigate if the Gaucho Community Universities produce “attitudes of inclusion”, with the creation of various types of programs and projects seeking both the access and the permanence of several groups of subjects in higher education. Such “attitudes of inclusion”, when visualized on the websites, may become marketing strategies of those institutions, since they show, in different ways, how they get prepared and try to be unique in meeting the requirement of inclusion.

Esta tese tem o objetivo de investigar o estatuto dos princípios fundamentais do direito, apresentados por Kant na Doutrina do direito, parte constitutiva da obra Metafísica dos costumes, a fim de mostrar como Kant fundamenta a sua teoria do direito racional. A questão fundamental no que concerne à teoria do direito de Kant, e que há muitos anos suscita o debate entre os intérpretes, diz respeito à possibilidade ou não do direito encontrar os fundamentos de seus conceitos e princípios fundamentais na teoria moral elaborada por ele na Fundamentação da metafísica dos costumes e na Crítica da razão prática. Recentemente pode-se observar um crescente número de estudiosos que afirmam a independência da Doutrina do direito da teoria moral kantiana e, consequentemente, a independência dos princípios a priori do direito do imperativo moral. Contrariamente a essa posição, esta tese procura mostrar que Kant fundamenta o direito em sua teoria moral - o direito pressupõe a teoria moral e seu princípio fundamental, o imperativo moral, - e que essa é a única maneira de interpretarmos a Doutrina do direito se não quisermos fazer afirmações que entrem em contradição com o pensamento do próprio autor. A tese que afirma a fundamentação moral do direito se baseia em duas afirmações, que encontram respaldo nos textos de Kant. São elas: a) as leis jurídicas são uma espécie de leis morais, cujo princípio último é o imperativo categórico – os princípios a priori do direito derivam do princípio supremo da moral; b) o uso da coerção externa para obrigar outrem a cumprir um dever jurídico é moralmente justificável, o que significa que esse tipo de constrangimento imposto ao arbítrio é autorizado por uma lei moral. A tese tem, enfim, o objetivo de reconstruir os argumentos de Kant para mostrar que buscar na sua filosofia moral os fundamentos da teoria do direito está totalmente de acordo com seus textos e com o seu pensamento sistemático. / This thesis aims to investigate the nature of fundamental principles of Right, presented by Kant in the Doctrine of Right, a constituent part of the work Metaphysic of Morals, in order to show how Kant grounded his theory of rational Right. The fundamental question regarding the Kant‟s theory of Right, and that for many years raises debate among interpreters, concerns the possibility or not of the Right to find the foundations of its concepts and principles in moral theory elaborated by him in the Groundwork the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason. Recently one can observe a growing number of scholars who assert the independence of the Doctrine of Right of Kantian moral theory and accordingly the independence of a priori principles of Right of moral imperative. Contrary to this position, this thesis aims to show that Kant bases the Right on his moral theory - the Right presuppose the moral theory and its fundamental principle, the moral imperative - and that is the only way to interpret the doctrine of Right if not want to make statements that come into conflict with the author's own thought. The thesis argues that the moral foundation of Right rests on two assertions that are supported in the writings of Kant. They are: a) juridical laws are a kind of moral law whose ultimate principle is the Categorical imperative - the a priori principles of Right derived from the supreme principle of morality; b) the use of external coercion to compel another to fulfill a duty legal is morally justifiable, meaning that this type of constraint imposed on the choice is authorized by a moral law. In short, the thesis has the objective of reconstructing Kant's arguments to show that find in his moral philosophy the foundations of the theory of Right is fully consistent with his writings and his systematic thinking.

This dissertation examines how contemporary Western ethical perspectives frame moral judgments about technologies intended to expand or enhance human abilities. Of particular interest are technological advances that involve nanotechnology, a realm of technoscience that seeks the precise control of matter through deliberately designing structures, devices, and processes with novel and useful properties at the molecular scale. In this thesis I analyze trends in the emerging dialogue about the social and ethical implications of nanotechnology. There is growing awareness that technological “progress” should not outpace critical reflection over the means and ends of those advances, but I argue that there is a tension between the role of ethics and the practice of technoscience. By ethics I mean ongoing public discussion that contemplates what it means to live a “good life” and that maintains limits to human actions. By contrast, the practice of technoscience appears to be guided by the “technological imperative” which holds that we can only know what is good by first figuring out what is possible. Despite concerted interdisciplinary efforts to address the broad range of ethical issues posed by nanotechnology’s proposed goals, the prevailing tone of the current discussion tends to reveal what I call a “technoprogressive” bias, or the belief that technological development is a primary way to improve the human estate and that it leads inevitably to cumulative progress. However, because technoprogressive commentary on nanotechnology focuses on concerns that are framed mainly in terms of risk assessment, cost-benefit analyses, and utilitarian principles, technoprogressive ethics overlooks crucial ethical questions of a different nature, questions that deal with the limits of human action, the nature of justice, and the meaning of being human. To analyze the implications of technoprogressive ethics, I employ the moral philosophy of Canadian thinker George Grant because he articulates an underrepresented yet valuable critique of Western society’s relationship with technology. Grant speaks for a type of transcendental moral realism that challenges the primacy of the technological imperative, insisting that justice ultimately must be grounded upon non-negotiable limits, and that there are objective norms to which human freedom and human self-assertion have to answer.

This dissertation examines how contemporary Western ethical perspectives frame moral judgments about technologies intended to expand or enhance human abilities. Of particular interest are technological advances that involve nanotechnology, a realm of technoscience that seeks the precise control of matter through deliberately designing structures, devices, and processes with novel and useful properties at the molecular scale. In this thesis I analyze trends in the emerging dialogue about the social and ethical implications of nanotechnology. There is growing awareness that technological “progress” should not outpace critical reflection over the means and ends of those advances, but I argue that there is a tension between the role of ethics and the practice of technoscience. By ethics I mean ongoing public discussion that contemplates what it means to live a “good life” and that maintains limits to human actions. By contrast, the practice of technoscience appears to be guided by the “technological imperative” which holds that we can only know what is good by first figuring out what is possible. Despite concerted interdisciplinary efforts to address the broad range of ethical issues posed by nanotechnology’s proposed goals, the prevailing tone of the current discussion tends to reveal what I call a “technoprogressive” bias, or the belief that technological development is a primary way to improve the human estate and that it leads inevitably to cumulative progress. However, because technoprogressive commentary on nanotechnology focuses on concerns that are framed mainly in terms of risk assessment, cost-benefit analyses, and utilitarian principles, technoprogressive ethics overlooks crucial ethical questions of a different nature, questions that deal with the limits of human action, the nature of justice, and the meaning of being human. To analyze the implications of technoprogressive ethics, I employ the moral philosophy of Canadian thinker George Grant because he articulates an underrepresented yet valuable critique of Western society’s relationship with technology. Grant speaks for a type of transcendental moral realism that challenges the primacy of the technological imperative, insisting that justice ultimately must be grounded upon non-negotiable limits, and that there are objective norms to which human freedom and human self-assertion have to answer.

La réflexion morale de Theodor Adorno est manifestement traversée par une tension : l’exigence paradoxale d’enraciner pleinement la morale à la fois dans les impulsions les plus vives et dans la raison la plus lucide. Plus qu’une excentricité parmi d’autres de la figure de proue de l’École de Francfort, le présent mémoire donne à penser que ce problème pourrait être une des principales charnières de son éthique. L’objectif de ma recherche est de dégager une voie pour articuler conjointement, «sans sacrifice aucun», ces deux exigences. Pour ce faire, je tenterai d’étayer l’hypothèse suivante : l’analyse du problème de la liberté et de la non-liberté que développe le premier des trois «modèles» de Dialectique négative permet de comprendre à la fois le lien et l’écart entre la dimension impulsive et rationnelle de l’éthique d’Adorno. L’argument qui sera déployé se penchera d’abord sur le problème de la non-liberté et son incarnation à travers le phénomène concret de l’antisémitisme ainsi que de la peur et de la rage animale dans lesquelles il s’enracine, pour ensuite examiner la conception adornienne de la liberté dans ses deux dimensions de «pleine conscience théorique» et «d’impulsion spontanée», et pour finalement tenter d’apprécier la portée plus générale pour la compréhension de l’éthique d’Adorno de cette interprétation du problème de la liberté en tentant de comprendre sur cette base son «nouvel impératif catégorique». / Throughout Theodor Adorno’s moral thought runs a paradoxical demand : that morality should be fully rooted in both the liveliest impulses and the keenest reasonings. More than a quirk among Adorno’s many, this essay suggests that this problem plays a pivotal role in his ethics. The current research seeks to develop a strategy to conjointly articulate these two demands. To this end, I will try to expound the following hypothesis : the analysis of the problem of freedom and unfreedom set forth by the first of the ‘models’ in Negative Dialectics enables making sense of both the bond and the disparity between the impulsive and rational constituents of adornian ethics. This study will first focus on the problem of unfreedom and its embodiment in the concrete phenomena of anti-Semitism as well as the animal fear and rage that it builds upon. It will then go on to examine Adorno’s conception of freedom in its two facets : «full theoretical consciousness» and «spontaneous impulse». It will finally try to ascertain the more general relevance of this interpretation of the problem of freedom for making sense of Adorno’s ethics, by trying to make sense on that basis of his «new categorical imperative».