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Submitted by Elesbão Santiago Neto (neto10uepb@cche.uepb.edu.br) on 2018-04-05T19:02:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Valter Angelo da Silva Junior.pdf: 36791695 bytes, checksum: 273ed695189827b6fb638d73013560f2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-05T19:02:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PDF - Valter Angelo da Silva Junior.pdf: 36791695 bytes, checksum: 273ed695189827b6fb638d73013560f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-06-05 / CAPES / This thesis addresses the topic of geopolitical power calculations from the Chinese perspective. A unique aspect of China's assessment of this subject is the use of an analytical tool called "Comprehensive National Power" (CNP) which aims to measure the power of countries and to rank them according to the results found. This Chinese method evaluation, in most of its variations, emphasizes political power as the basis of state power, as well as considering that these units are responsible for the configuration and definition of the International System, not the opposite the other way around. By doing so, it visualizes international relations from a different parameter of Western mainstream approaches, which are mostly based on material power and the power of structure constraint. This dissertation deals with this matter by contextualizing the reader from the initial theoretical foundations on state power and power in the Chinese context, in the presentation of the various CNP versions in China, and, finally, using the analysis method of Yan Xuetong (2008;2011) to evaluate the evolution of China's CNP in the Hu Jintao period (2003-2013). In this way, the thesis presents the relations between China's action - in the established time interval - and the CNP, aiming to identify how the country uses this in the assessment of the International System. / Esta dissertação aborda o tema de cálculos de poder geopolítico a partir da perspectiva chinesa. Um aspecto singular da avaliação da China a respeito deste tema é a utilização de uma ferramenta analítica chamada “Comprehensive National Power” (CNP) que objetiva mensurar o poder dos países e hierarquizá-los a partir dos resultados encontrados. Este método de avaliação chinês, na maioria de suas variações, enfatiza o poder político como a base do poder de um Estado, além de considerar os que estas unidades são responsáveis pela configuração e definição do Sistema Internacional, não o movimento contrário. Desta maneira visualiza as relações internacionais a partir de um parâmetro diferente das abordagens ocidentais de mainstream, baseadas no poder material e no poder do constrangimento da estrutura. A presente dissertação aborda esta matéria contextualizando o leitor desde os fundamentos teóricos iniciais sobre poder e poder estatal no contexto chinês, na apresentação das diferentes versões do CNP da China, e, por fim, utilizando o método de análise de Yan Xuetong (2008; 2011) para avaliar a evolução do CNP da China no período Hu Jintao (2003-2013). Desse modo, o trabalho apresenta as relações entre a ação da China no interregno temporal estabelecido e o CNP, objetivando identificar de que maneira o país utiliza desta ferramenta em sua avaliação do Sistema Internacional.

Having conducted a successful long range ballistic missile test in December 2012 and a third nuclear test in February 2013, North Korea increasingly poses a security threat to Northeast Asia. Given these heightened escalations, the international community has come to depend more and more on China’s potential to influence North Korean behavior. Beijing’s unique leverage is based on the historical bilateral relations between the two countries in addition to China’s sole willingness to support the North Korean regime. Therefore, the following paper seeks to determine whether China’s North Korea policy shifted during the consecutive Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations in response to North Korean provocations. Ascertaining China’s North Korean paradigm is constructive and worthwhile in order to understand the future development and hopeful resolution of the North Korean security dilemma. In order to better examine the two administrations, the paper first defines China’s strategic interests regarding the Korean peninsula. Song Jooyoung’s dual threats model and Taewan Kim’s politico-economic linkage model are then used to assess the different factors that influenced China’s decision-making process when deciding whether to maintain its support after each North Korean provocation. Analysis of the two administrations reveals that Beijing’s underlying foreign policy objective of stability remains unchanged. On the other hand, unyielding North Korean provocations have forced Beijing to reassess its current policy of bolstering the North Korean regime toward the end of the Hu administration and even more so during the current Xi administration. In addition, North Korean actions in defiance of China’s public warnings illustrate a North Korea diverging from its usual subservience to Chinese influence. More importantly, the defining reason for the shift in China’s policy is the fact that North Korean behavior undermines Beijing attempts to posture itself as a responsible global power in addition to fulfilling its own strategic interests. Assessing China’s North Korean paradigm is meaningful due to Beijing’s capacity to resolve the North Korean security dilemma. Although skeptics question whether China will ultimately break from its customary support for North Korea due to fears of damaging instability, increasingly public statements rejecting North Korean provocations signal the Xi administration’s recalibration.

胡錦濤在二○一一年訪問美國是極其重要的中美外交事件，作為世界上兩個最大的經濟體，尤其在國際社會的共同命運和國家和國際經濟動盪的時刻，中美關係發揮顯著作用。 / 本論文特別側重說明美國政府和新聞媒介如何建構胡錦濤訪問美國，並塑造為一個慶祝國際政治媒介事件，說明政府在建構新聞語霸權，且取得美國新聞媒體的合作。它最終引發了媒體社會學的問題，媒體民主問題和人文與經濟價值之間的鬥爭。 / 這兩個國家之間日益增長的戰略和務實的關係，是突顯社會的政治背景，導致胡錦濤訪問美國作為一個媒介事件，形成一個變贏的和平競賽，以及慶祝和友好熱惰的表現。 / 胡錦濤訪問美國以及美國電視新聞作為本研究的主要焦點，說明媒體往往採取在媒介事件中互相尊重，雙羸 ，和平和樂觀的態度。美國的電視新聞媒體會在臨鍵的時刻偏向政府。 / Hu Jin Tao’s U.S. visit in 2011 is an extremely important diplomatic event in U.S.-China relations in the past thirty years or so, which calls for bilateral and international attention, as the relations between the world’s two biggest economies play a significant role in the common fate of the global community, at a time of national and international economic turmoil. / This thesis specifically focusing on explicating the journalistic construction of Hu’s U.S. visit as a historical and celebrative international political media event, a news discourse constructed out of hegemonic governmental influences and the cooperation of U.S. news media. It eventually raised media sociological questions upon the professionalism of U.S. news media in relations to U.S. foreign policy, media democracy and humanistic question over the struggle between economic pragmatism and individual freedom, especially in international integration. / The growing strategic and pragmatic relationship between the two nations is the foregrounding social-political context that leads to the journalistic framing of the visit as a media event, a win-win peaceful contest, and an celebrative and friendly welcoming performance. And that the American TV news media tend to pay more reverence towards the government during critical historic political moment, in this case the U.S. visit by Hu. The U.S news media, with TV news as the main focus in this study, tend to adopt the ritualistic media event script in framing the visit in an respectful, peaceful and optimistic manner. There is a discursive news storyline of Hu’s state visit as a win-win media event starts from the tension between the two states and then a progressive change in the middle of the coverage to focus on mutual benefits, converting from enemies to partners. And that the differences and conflicts can be worked out from common fate or can even put aside. The discursive journalistic tone of the coverage was from abrasive in the very beginning and progressively changes to a peaceful celebrative tone. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Ng, Oi Yan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-136). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract / Chapter Ch.1 --- Introduction and Background of Study --- p.5-22 / Chapter Ch.2 --- Hu Jintao’s State Visit Arrival Ceremony as a Ritualistic Showcase --- p.23-46 / Chapter Ch.3 --- Obama and Hu’s Joint- Press Conference as a Contest --- p.47-75 / Chapter Ch.4 --- The Splendid State Dinner as a Celebrative End of the Win-Win Contest --- p.76-100 / Chapter Ch.5 --- Closure of Hu Jintao’s U.S. State Visit as an International Political Media Event --- p.101-117 / Chapter Ch.6 --- Conclusion --- p.118-130 / References

This work concerns with legislative changes which had direct influence on guarantee of human rights in PRC in the period of Hu Jintao's party chairmanship. Firstly the theoretic base of conception of human rights in PRC and in the world, which has been already compiled by specialists of humanrights and sinologists, is outlined. The specifics of humanright conception in dependency of historical conditions are explained. Then the method of research is introduced and concrete historical connections in given period, which is the basis for evaluation of legislative changes, are explained. These legal changes are analyzed in following chapter. Final summary sums up results, confronts them with initial expectations and presents general principles which are asserted during the formation of a new humanright legislative nowadays.

中共沿襲馬、列主義的宗教觀點，將宗教界定為替共產社會服務的工具，並認為宗教的本質是歷史過程的產物，其作用主要在於統戰或鬥爭的需要，最終將因社會主義的發展而消失，因此建政以來極力打壓、約制大陸境內的宗教及其團體。雖然中共的宗教政策隨著中國大陸社會的變化與全球化的影響，在胡錦濤時期有逐步開放的趨向，惟觀察中共建政以來的宗教政策脈絡，始終維持「開展統戰」和「防範滲透」基調，對臺灣宗教交流政策亦然。 2008年馬政府執政後，兩岸關係逐漸和緩，中共追求兩岸統一的意圖更為明顯，在胡錦濤「對內構建和諧社會、對外共建和諧世界」政策方針下，賦予宗教對臺統戰更大空間，兩岸宗教亦呈現交流活動趨增、境外教派參與增加、交流態樣多元且多為大陸發起等特點，另外中共以兩岸最普遍之媽祖文化做為對臺宗教統戰主軸，逐漸提升交流層級與規模，冀擴大對臺民間統戰成效。綜析胡錦濤近年兩岸宗教交流政策作為，預判中共未來對臺宗教工作，將朝全面爭取臺灣宗教界統一共識；透過宗教交流吸引臺商、信徒赴陸；加強基督教徒等外來宗教交流；以多元管道強化宗教工作成效；聯合抵制境外宗教勢力等面向發展。 綜合各方對兩岸宗教交流的影響評估，臺灣宗教團體能彰顯文化軟實力，在交流中對大陸社會擁有較強的影響力；大陸宗教自由度低度，惟管制宗教已有鬆動，後者跡象應與兩岸宗教交流具有關聯性；未來宗教慈善公益將為兩岸交流重點項目。據此，臺灣方面可在兼顧安全與發展的原則下，積極與大陸進行全面宗教交流，並以拓展宗教信徒、擴大宗教交流範圍，提高宗教自主運作能力，降低中共宗教統戰攻勢；此外，臺灣可以更主動出擊，以大甲鎮瀾宮、湄洲媽祖廟共同以媽祖繞境向聯合國申請非物質文化遺產為例，尋找與大陸更多的宗教合作機會，將兩岸儒、佛、道等傳統宗教，逐漸帶往國際社會，使兩岸共同擔起宗教全球化、中華文化全球化的角色，並藉以消彌兩岸政治、地域區隔的意識籓籬。 / Inheriting the Marxist-Leninist point of view on religion, the Chinese Communist authorities define religion as an instrument that serves the Socialist society. For them, religion is in essence a product of the historical process that serves the needs of the united front or struggles and is destined to fade out as Socialism marches on to the global stage. Therefore, since its establishment, the Chinese Communist regime has spared no effort in cracking down and suppressing religion and religious groups in mainland China. During Hu Jintao’s rule, the Chinese government has eased its stringent policy on religion in response to a changing Chinese society and international trends. But a closer look at the evolution of China’s religious policy reveals that its keynote has remained the same: conducting united front work on religious groups while preventing them from converging or colluding with dissident. This also goes for the Hu Jintao regime’s dealings with Taiwanese religious groups. Since President Ma Ying-jeou to power in 2008, ties between the two sides of Taiwan Straits have gradually thawed and Beijing is have increasing difficulty hiding its ambition for Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. Moreover, Hu Jintao’s policy to build a harmonious society in China and jointly shape a harmonious world has given religion a renewed role in Beijing’s united front against Taiwan. Religious exchanges between the two sides of Taiwan Straits have been warming and increasingly involve overseas groups. The forms of these exchanges are diverse and many of them are launched by the Chinese side. For instance, Beijing’s religious united front campaign targets believers of Goddess Matsu, the worship of which being common on both sides of the Taiwan Straits. Beijing is pushing for upgrading the level and scale of such exchanges in hopes of producing more results of the united front against Taiwan . An overview of Hu Jintao’s policy on cross-Strait religious exchanges in recent years suggests that Beijing will seek to build consensus on reunification among Taiwan’s religious community, lure Taiwanese businessmen and believers to visit China, step up religious exchanges with Christians and believers of other religions, making progress on religious work through different means and keeping overseas religious forces at bay. Assessments of the implications of cross-Strait religious exchanges indicate that Taiwanese religious groups possess considerable cultural soft power and will be able to exert stronger influence on mainland Chinese society . China accords very limited freedom to local religious groups but is loosening its reins, which can possibly be connected to cross-Straits religious exchanges in recent years . In the future , religious charity events are expected to be the main theme of cross-Strait religious exchanges. Taiwan should actively engage in across-the-board religious exchanges with mainland China as long as it does not present problems for its security and development. Taiwan should focus on recruiting more believers, enlarging the scope of religious exchanges, increasing autonomy of religious groups and fending off mainland Chinese religious united front. In addition, Taiwan can also take the initiative to seek opportunities to cooperate with China to promote Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism on the international stage, e.g. applying for UN recognition of the pilgrimage of China and Taiwan’s Matsu believers to Da-Jia Chen-Lan Temple(Taiwan)and Meizhou Matsu Temple(China) as world cultural heritage. This way, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits will jointly assume the responsibility of promoting Chinese culture and religions in the international community and narrow their political and geographical gaps.

Denna undersökning kommer analysera Kinas handelspolitiska strategier med finanskrisen och handelskriget som tidpunkt samt även påpeka hur dess strategier förändrades underrespektive tillfälle. Undersökningen redogör för vilka likheter och skillnader det finns i handelspolitiken mellan perioderna med syfte att förklara förändringen i handelspolitiska preferenser. Den handelspolitiska förändringen som Kina genomgick mellan perioderna är viktig att undersöka då Kina fortsatt växer sig starka på den globala marknaden. Metoden i studien utgörs av en teorikonsumerande fallstudie där rational actor model används för att undersöka och förklara den rationella aktörens beslutsfattande i respektive situation. Spelteori används som en komplimenterande teori för att förklara Kinas vägval under handelskriget. Slutsatsen i undersökningen är att Kinas främsta mål och rationella val i krissituationer är att främja sin egen ekonomiska tillväxt oavsett vilka långsiktiga konsekvenserna detta kan innebära. Mot den bakgrunden återfinns även den främsta skillnaden mellan kriserna som var hanteringen av protektionism. Kina förebyggde mycket protektionism under finanskrisen men utövade det själva under handelskriget. Förändringen av agerandet mellan kriserna berodde likaväl på USA som på Kina och kan förklaras som det mest rationella valet för Kina för att främja sitt främsta mål med handelspolitiken, ekonomisk tillväxt. Förändringen förklaras som en tillfällig avvikelse från deras handelspolitik givet att det var det mest rationella beslutet givet omständigheterna och rådande situation.

共黨國家雖為一黨專政，但在最高領導層常形成具有二元領導的意涵的集體領導。二元領導體制是有兩位行政領導人的體制；由於二元領導體制符合許多政治狀況的需要，全世界有四分之一以上的國家採取二元領導體制，其中多為半總統制。本文認為東歐後共國家普遍形成半總統制的原因，在於共黨統治時期採取二元領導，以使統治菁英的集體領導得以鞏固。在此二元領導體制下，黨書記通常主管黨務、軍事，總理主管行政、經濟。 本文的重點在於第三章第二、三節的分析。第二節首先從黨內權力制衡的需要分析，指出共黨國家在初期的強人政治或單一領導之後，制度的要求與交易上的精英集體的利益極大化，共同促成一種展現為國家與黨的領導人和行政領導人的分立的二元領導體制。其後從權力繼承制度化與幹部年輕化的重要性進行分析，指出共黨國家二元領導體制要走向成熟，必須破除領導職務終身制。 在第三章第三節，本文引入國際政治學結構現實主義的觀點，強調權力結構的「二元」穩定性，同時分析共黨國家領導層的職務分配可能性，將之區分為單一領導、典型二元領導、非典型二元領導、多元領導等類型，並以蘇聯與中國大陸的政治菁英的職務分配作為範例加以介紹，說明典型二元領導是共黨國家領導體制的趨勢。 在此分析之後，本文在第四章分析蘇聯的領導體制變化，在第五章分析中共的職務分配趨勢。本文結論認為，中共幹部年輕化的制度壓力，使中共現任軍委主席江澤民必須盡快退休，而依據本文對典型二元領導體制的建構與利弊分析，中共政治菁英的共識將是讓胡錦濤接任中央軍委主席職務。倘若中共政局果真如此發展，則中共的典型二元領導將進一步強化。此種趨勢的進一步發展，將使中共民主化後傾向於採取半總統制。

This thesis examines the geopolitical consequences of China's search for energy resources on the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. It provides a brief outline of the energy situation of the world as a whole, specifically how it is becoming a more globalized and singular market. This change is occurring at the same time as a pronounced shift away from the traditional measurements of 'power' towards 'softer' more subtle definitions. There is a brief section outlining the geopolitical teachings of Alfred T. Mahan, specifically how he advocated seapower primarily for the purpose of providing the stability and security necessary for trade. Chinese analysts have been embracing the teachings of Mahan, but also interpreting them in a way that justifies the naval buildup Beijing has been embarking on in recent years. The paper briefly looks at the potential sources that China could turn to meet its energy needs, but concludes that it will have to rely on oil for the foreseeable future. It then attempts to define overall Chinese interests, specifically how nearly all of these relate somehow to energy security, thus underlining the importance of this topic to leaders in Beijing. The last half of the work delves into a geopolitical analysis of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, and how militarization in the...

This thesis examines the deep bilateral tensions surrounding the East China Sea (ECS) disagreements between Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the period from August 19th 2003 to June 18th 2008 from an actor-centred constructivist liberal viewpoint. The East China Sea disputes could be described as a conflicting difference of opinion over a) the demarcation of maritime territory and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in which potentially significant energy deposits exist and b) the ownership of the strategically important and historically sensitive Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands. This research addresses the question of why, given the fact that China and Japan have a strong interest in co-operation and stable relations with each other, small incidents in the ECS blow up into larger problems, cause approaches to the East China Sea to wax and wane, and move the relationship in a direction that goes against preferred national objectives? In attempting to unravel this puzzle, this work argues that domestic politics and popular negative sentiment have been the major issues that have greatly amplified and politicised the ECS problems and have significantly affected positive progress in negotiations aimed at managing and stabilising these disputes. By examining these, the thesis addresses the question of why China and Japan have been so constrained in their attempts to find a workable bilateral agreement over disputed energy resources and demarcation in the East China Sea. It also indirectly deals with the question of why the conflicting legal complexities surrounding these disagreements contributed to both states so fervently maintaining and defending their claims.