Dans toutes les étapes d'un procès pénal, dès son ouverture jusqu'à sa clôture et le prononcé du verdict, le juge dispose d'un pouvoir particulier, dit "discrétionnaire", qui n'est pas soumis à un contrôle par une cour supérieure. La latitude du pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge pénal a suscité plusieurs enjeux afin de déterminer sa nature juridique et son étendue. À plusieurs reprises, l'ampleur de ce pouvoir a aussi conduit à l'enchevêtrer avec certaines notions voisines, telles que le pouvoir arbitraire, pouvoir souverain et l'intime conviction du juge. En outre, dans le but de prévenir tout risque de pouvoir arbitraire, le législateur a imposé à la Cour d'assises, sous la loi n° 939-2011 du 10 août 2011, de motiver sa décision. Nonobstant, le pouvoir discrétionnaire demeure toujours pourvu d'une portée large durant le déroulement du procès. En conséquence, ce pouvoir produit des effets contestables sur le principe de l'impartialité du juge et celui de l'égalité des citoyens devant la loi. Dans cette optique, on estime opportun de traiter, d'une part, la concordance entre le pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge et le concept de la justice, et d'autre part, l'impact de son opinion subjective sur la mise en œuvre de la justice. Cette étude souligne aussi l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire par le juge notamment en relation avec la prise en considération des preuves et le choix de la peine. À cet égard, cette étude a été mise en lumière sous certains systèmes juridiques arabes et étrangers. / At the various stages of the proceedings, from the start of the trial until its closure and the pronunciation of the verdict, the judge has a specific power called "discretionary". Such power is not subject to the control of a supreme court. The latitude of discretion of the judge raises several issues to determine its legal nature and essence. At several occasions, the extent of this power has also created a confusion with some related concepts, such as arbitrary power, sovereign power and the intimate conviction of the judge. In addition, to prevent any risk of arbitrary power, the legislator has imposed the Criminal Court, under Law No. 939-2011 of 10 August 2011, to provide a motivation of its sentence. Notwithstanding this obligation, the scope of such discretion remains wide during the trial. Consequently, it greatly affects the principle of impartiality of the judge and the principle of equality of citizens before the law. In this light, we consider appropriate to study, firstly, the extent of compatibility between this power and the ideological concept of justice, and the impact of his personal view to implement the justice. Secondly, we emphasize the exercise of the discretionary power by the judge with regard to the rules of evidence and the choice of sentence. The study also highlighted some foreign and Arab legal systems.

O estudo Os Planos de Saúde nos Tribunais trata das ações judiciais relacionadas à cobertura assistencial de planos de saúde julgadas em segunda instância pelo Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo entre janeiro de 1999 e dezembro de 2004. São descritas e analisadas as demandas levadas ao Poder Judiciário por usuários de planos de saúde que reclamam negação de assistência ou restrição de atendimento. Também é avaliado o comportamento e as argumentações da Justiça nas decisões, assim como as possíveis implicações da exclusão de coberturas praticadas pelos planos de saúde para o sistema de saúde brasileiro / This paper is about lawsuits filed against HMOs over coverage issues and ruled on by the São Paulo State the implications that HMO exclusions and limitations may have for the Brazilian health care system Court of Appeals between January 1999 and December 2004. Enrollees' legal claims against HMOs for denial of medical care or restrictions on services are described and analyzed here. Also assessed are the attitudes and arguments behind court decisions, as well as the implications tha HMO exclusions and limitations may have for the Brazilian health care system.

Submitted by Rosivalda Pereira (mrs.pereira@ufma.br) on 2017-10-31T20:37:56Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Karen Karolyna Silva Rocha.pdf: 691396 bytes, checksum: 5073d2e32e4238c97340781aefd86750 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-31T20:37:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Karen Karolyna Silva Rocha.pdf: 691396 bytes, checksum: 5073d2e32e4238c97340781aefd86750 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-07-21 / The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze to what extent decisions of the Judiciary that condition typical Public Administration attributions related to the right of education may be considered judicial activism. In order to do so, we analyzed the doctrinal concept of judicial activism under the bias of the implementation of public policies, distinguishing it from the judicialization of politics and judicial control of public policies, having as focus of analysis the performance of the Brazilian Judicial Power. We intend to demonstrate that judicial control over administrative acts has limits, notably with regard to acts denominated discretionary, and when the Judiciary overcomes these limits to implement public policies, that implies in judicial activism, a phenomenon that can be verified by analyzing decisions of federal judges in Maranhão and judgments of the 1 st Region Federal Court that deal with the system of quotas in federal universities and federal institutes for students coming from public schools. The research approach is qualitative, dialectical-critical and uses the analysis of content for judicial decisions as a strategy. / A dissertação tem por objetivo analisar em que medida as decisões do Poder Judiciário que condicionem atribuições típicas da Administração Pública relativas ao direito à educação podem ser consideradas ativismo judicial. Para tanto, será analisado o conceito doutrinário de ativismo judicial sob o viés da implementação de políticas públicas, distinguindo-o da judicialização da política e do controle judicial de políticas públicas, tendo como foco de análise a atuação do Poder Judiciário brasileiro. Pretende-se demonstrar que o controle jurisdicional sobre os atos administrativos possui limites, notadamente quanto aos atos denominados discricionários, e que a ultrapassem desses limites pelo Poder Judiciário para a implementação de políticas públicas implica ativismo judicial, fenômeno este que pode ser verificado pela análise de decisões de juízes federais no Maranhão e acórdãos do Tribunal Regional Federal da 1ª Região que versam sobre o sistema de cotas nas universidades federais e institutos federais para alunos oriundos de escolas públicas. A abordagem da pesquisa é qualitativa, dialética-crítica e emprega como estratégia a análise de conteúdo para as decisões judiciais.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-07T11:14:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael da Cruz Gouveia Linardi.pdf: 1538183 bytes, checksum: 77dd40ae9abacc65fa27facf855253bc (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-07T11:14:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rafael da Cruz Gouveia Linardi.pdf: 1538183 bytes, checksum: 77dd40ae9abacc65fa27facf855253bc (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-11-21 / This dissertation examines law from an essentially cultural perspective, that is, as a phenomenon arising from the gradual construction of values in the course of history. Among the sources of law, the study focuses on the so-called judicial source, that is, the right that arises from decisions handed down by judges and courts. It seeks to comprehend the ideologies that serve as a framework for decisions made by judges, within the contemporary panorama. It is assumed that the judicial activity is predominantly interpretative, requires a position, and, consequently, a choice of values. As a starting point, the study shows opinion poll results in which judges were able to voice their considerations on the most relevant aspects. It also reveals that, in general, judges take into consideration in their decisions both the paradigm of legality and concomitantly the social consequences that their sentences may lead to. Considering those paradigms as simultaneously embedded, the study analyzes in greater depth, the foundations of both stances: on one hand the "legalist" and on the other the "social" one. Through a historical approach, it identifies that "legalism" is the result of constant and permanent search of the human being for security and stability. Moreover, it reveals that legalism can also relate to an "ideological legal positivism" Otherwise, the concern with "social consequences of judicial decisions" gains ground, at a time when the rapprochement of law with ethics is sought. Besides, judicial positions strengthen elements of the Marxist critique, unleashing the so-called "judicial activism”. Finally, the study examines recent jurisprudential cases in which it is possible to confirm this ideological dichotomy that is present in the intricacies of the Judicial Power / Esta dissertação de mestrado examina o direito sob uma perspectiva essencialmente cultural, o que significa dizer, como um fenômeno decorrente da construção gradual de valores no curso da história. Dentre as fontes do direito, o estudo toma por destaque a denominada fonte judicial, ou seja, o direito que nasce a partir das decisões proferidas por juízes e tribunais. Busca compreender as ideologias que servem de referência para a tomada de decisões pelos magistrados no panorama contemporâneo, partindo-se do pressuposto de que a atividade judicial é preponderantemente interpretativa, a exigir a adoção de posicionamentos, e, por consequência, a escolha de valores. Como ponto de partida para o estudo, aponta resultados de pesquisas de opinião onde os próprios juízes foram ouvidos e puderam se manifestar acerca de assuntos pertinentes. Permite constatar que os juízes levam preponderantemente em consideração, no momento de decidir, o paradigma da legalidade, mas também, de maneira concomitante, as consequências sociais que as suas sentenças podem vir a causar. Considerando-se esta dualidade de paradigmas simultaneamente incorporados, analisa com maior profundidade os fundamentos de ambas as posturas, de um lado a “legalista”, e de outro a “social”. Numa abordagem histórica, detecta que o “legalismo” é fruto da constante e permanente busca do ser humano por segurança e estabilidade. Identifica o legalismo com o que se pode denominar de “positivismo jurídico ideológico”. De outra sorte, a preocupação com as “consequências sociais das decisões judiciais” ganha espaço em um momento em que se busca a reaproximação do direito com a ética, oportunidade em que as posturas judiciais incrementam elementos da crítica marxista, desencadeando o denominado “ativismo judicial”. Por fim, aprecia casos jurisprudenciais recentes onde é possível verificar esta dicotomia ideológica verificada nos meandros do Poder Judiciário

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-21T11:26:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Beatriz Meneghel Chagas Camargo.pdf: 1131638 bytes, checksum: 901a754fca66a7e2d1aaf9c639a3132b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-21T11:26:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Beatriz Meneghel Chagas Camargo.pdf: 1131638 bytes, checksum: 901a754fca66a7e2d1aaf9c639a3132b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-11 / The present study aimed to analyze whether the checks and balances in the Federal Constitution of 1988 ensure the balance between the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Powers. The separation of powers and the mechanisms of checks and balances were conceived with the intention of, in containing the abuse of the holders of the powers, to guarantee the fundamental rights of the individuals. The question that arises in this study is whether the way in which such instruments of mutual control are distributed among the three Powers, in the Federal Constitution of 1988, responds to the current Brazilian reality, in which the Judiciary has been gaining a prominent position / O presente estudo tem como objetivo analisar se os freios e contrapesos na Constituição Federal de 1988 asseguram o equilíbrio entre os Poderes Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário. A separação dos poderes e os mecanismos de freios e contrapesos foram concebidos com o intuito de, ao conter o abuso dos titulares dos poderes, assegurar os direitos fundamentais dos indivíduos. Questão que se coloca neste estudo é se a forma como distribuídos tais instrumentos de controle recíproco entre os três Poderes, na Constituição Federal de 1988, atende à atual realidade brasileira, em que o Poder Judiciário vem ganhando posição de preeminência

[pt] O poder judiciário é o principal agente da censura, atualmente, no direito brasileiro. Apesar de a Constituição e a Convenção Americana sobre Direitos Humanos reconhecerem a liberdade de expressão como direito fundamental e a proibição da censura como garantia absoluta desse direito, a jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal vem admitindo e chancelando a imposição deste grave meio de restrição à manifestação do pensamento por juízes e tribunais. Nesta dissertação, procurou-se verificar se é legítima a possibilidade de o poder judiciário proibir a manifestação do pensamento em caso de violações à honra ou à privacidade. Estudou-se a jurisprudência da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, da Corte Suprema da Nação e do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre o tema da censura judicial a fim de verificar o que esses tribunais efetivamente entendem por censura e, ainda, se consideram legítima a sua imposição pelo poder judiciário. Considerando que a censura caracteriza a completa supressão da liberdade de expressão, foram identificados e comparados os standards normativos e padrões argumentativos adotados pelas referidas cortes nos julgamentos de casos que envolviam a proibição da livre manifestação do pensamento. Promoveu-se também um estudo dos fundamentos da liberdade de expressão e uma crítica à jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal a respeito da possibilidade de imposição de censura por meio de decisão do poder judiciário. / [en] Nowadays, the judicial branch is, in the Brazilian legal system, the most important source of censorship. Despite the recognition of freedom of expression as a fundamental right by the Brazilian Constitution and the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights and the complete prohibition of imposing censorship as a way to enforce freedom of expression, the Brazilian Supreme Court (Federal Supreme Court) has been ruling as according to the law the decisions made by inferior courts imposing censorship. One of the aims of this dissertation is to verify if it is legitimate that judges impose censorship in case expressions violate the honor or the privacy of others. The decisions taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of the Argentinian Nation and the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court about judicial censorship were studied and described to check how they interpret the norms about it, what exactly they consider censorship and if they agree with it when imposed by judges as according to the law. Considering that censorship means the complete suppression of freedom of expression, the dissertation identified and compared the normative standards and the legal argument patterns adopted by these courts when ruling about cases involving the prohibition of free speech. In addition, the dissertation went through a study of the ground and philosophical foundations of the freedom of expression and a critical analysis of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court rulings regarding censorship decisions taken by judicial branch members.

The introduction of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has affected many elements of the constitutional system in Canada. This dissertation explores the Charter's relationship with liberal constitutionalism and Canadian federalism, and considers whether judicial review on Charter grounds has seen a progression, or a regression, from parliamentary to constitutional to judicial supremacy. Further, this dissertation considers whether Charter review has reduced provincial autonomy by imposing national values in provincial areas of jurisdiction when Charter review nullifies provincial statutes. Through a complex process referred to as the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism, this study argues that a changed Charter jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Canada and a changed policy process within the administrative state at the federal level have reduced the negative implications of Charter review for liberal constitutionalism and Canadian federalism. To advance this argument, the concept of Charter activism is introduced to demonstrate that the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism is the product of the shifting equilibrium within two distinct elements that comprise Charter activism---judicial activism and bureaucratic activism. This study pursues three themes to demonstrate that the decline of judicial activism and the emergence of bureaucratic activism now converge at a point within Charter politics that facilitate the rebalancing of liberal constitutionalism and ensure that Charter review advances constitutional and not judicial supremacy. The first theme investigates the Supreme Court of Canada as a policy actor during Charter review, and analyzes Charter decisions between 1982 and 1997. The second theme considers the impact of Charter review on Canadian federalism and whether the Charter has centralized Canadian federalism and reduced provincial autonomy. The final theme investigates bureaucratic activism and the changes within the policy process at the fe

There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the lawmaking process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that. to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. • Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law. they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt. precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be. and often are, the judges. because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract. property, vested rights, due process of the law. liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental. they give direction to all lawmaking. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. 1 Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that Ihe judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to 1 PresidenlTheodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21 . accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as seoaration of DOwers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Futhermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / Thesis (LLM)--North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006.

There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the law-making process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. "Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law, they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt, precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the judges, because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of the law, liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental, they give direction to all law-making. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that the judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to "President Theodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21" accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Furthermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / (LLM) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 100-103)