The principles of war have been around for a long time. The principles have been discussed among military theorists and they have come to include just one to over twenty. Sun Tzus wrote in 490 b.c about the importance of using concentration of force when attacking an enemy. Officers are today trained in the principles of war even though the principles hasn´t been systematically tested. The problem that occur is that every theorist has its own principles and definition of the same. Marco Smedberg claims that the air force has its own principles and that they are apart from the army and the navy. The principles have been around a long time, and today theorists Clausewitz an Jomini have found their way into Armed Forces doctrines. But are their theories still valid today. To answer that question this essay will analyse known military theorists Clausewitz and Jomini and find variables in their theories about the principle concentration of force, and seek thus variables in a modern naval war such as the battle of the Falklands.

Uppsatsen syfte är att undersöka det kausala sambandet mellan lokal överlägsenhet och seger på taktisk nivå inom markarenan. Detta sker genom att begreppen lokal överlägsenhet och seger på taktisk nivå analyseras och diskuteras. Uppsatsen har som ambition att även göra dessa begrepp mätbara för att testa det kausala sambandet i en fallstudie bestående av två fall; slaget vid Suomussalmi och slaget vid Golanhöjderna.  Uppsatsen visar att det i de valda fallen föreligger ett samband mellan lokal överlägsenhet och seger på taktisk nivå inom ramen för de definitioner som är gjorda i uppsatsen. Vidare redovisas den problematik som normativ forskning inom krigsvetenskapen är behäftad med. Uppsatsen resultat kan m.h.t. detta ej anses påvisa ett generellt kausalt samband.

<p>Idag är krigföringens principer en vedertagen del av svensk doktrin. Så har det inte alltid varit. För ungefär ett sekel sedan tvistade militära tänkare i väst om det överhuvudtaget fanns något som kunde kallas för krigföringens principer. Det finns än idag de som hävdar att det inte finns några principer, eller att krigföring är en konst och inte en vetenskap. I Försvarsmaktens doktriner är dessa principer dock en väsentlig komponent. Detta arbete skildrar hur principerna gradvis tog sig in i Försvarsmaktens reglementen och doktriner för armén samt belyser hur de olika principerna dök upp, byttes ut och fick olika innebörd sedan de först implementerats i ett svenskt reglemente 1924.</p> / <p>The aim of this essay is to outline how the principles of war were implemented in Swedish army regulations and doctrines. The essay attempts to answer the following questions: What trends can be identified with regards to the importance of different principles? How have the principles been understood historically? The material used consists mainly of regulations and doctrine for the Swedish army from different parts of the 20th century. The method of the author is to analyze and compare the different regulations to come to conclusions about the importance of the principles of war in Swedish military history. The results of the essay indicate that surprise is the principle that has been a part of Swedish regulations the longest. This in turn could indicate that surprise is the principle that is the least susceptible to change in tactics and modernization.</p>

Idag är krigföringens principer en vedertagen del av svensk doktrin. Så har det inte alltid varit. För ungefär ett sekel sedan tvistade militära tänkare i väst om det överhuvudtaget fanns något som kunde kallas för krigföringens principer. Det finns än idag de som hävdar att det inte finns några principer, eller att krigföring är en konst och inte en vetenskap. I Försvarsmaktens doktriner är dessa principer dock en väsentlig komponent. Detta arbete skildrar hur principerna gradvis tog sig in i Försvarsmaktens reglementen och doktriner för armén samt belyser hur de olika principerna dök upp, byttes ut och fick olika innebörd sedan de först implementerats i ett svenskt reglemente 1924. / The aim of this essay is to outline how the principles of war were implemented in Swedish army regulations and doctrines. The essay attempts to answer the following questions: What trends can be identified with regards to the importance of different principles? How have the principles been understood historically? The material used consists mainly of regulations and doctrine for the Swedish army from different parts of the 20th century. The method of the author is to analyze and compare the different regulations to come to conclusions about the importance of the principles of war in Swedish military history. The results of the essay indicate that surprise is the principle that has been a part of Swedish regulations the longest. This in turn could indicate that surprise is the principle that is the least susceptible to change in tactics and modernization.

ABSTRACT: The aim of this essay is to analyze whether the development of the Principles of War in small states´ doctrine has been influenced by the doctrinal development of alliances after the start of an international cooperation. The author suggests that the development of the Principles of War can be understood through theories of doctrinal development. The theory used for this analysis states that small states depend on alliances, such as NATO, and therefore adapt their doctrine to better match the doctrine of the alliance. Since the Principles of War are the foundation of doctrine, such an adaption should lead to an adaption of the Principles of War as well. The analysis will be made using Swedish Army field manuals as a basis. These will be compared to NATO´s, in order to see whether or not Sweden has adapted its Principles of War following its membership of the Partnership for Peace. The results show that today the Swedish Principles of War are more similar to NATO´s than they were in 1982, which suggests that they have been adapted to better match those used by NATO. Although this essay does not analyze the reasons why, the results imply that theories of doctrinal development also include the development of principles of war. Analysis of the reasons why could be used as a basis for further research. / SAMMANFATTNING: Syftet med denna uppsats är att analysera huruvida utvecklingen av krigföringens principer i småstaters doktriner har influerats av den doktrinära utvecklingen i allianser efter ett påbörjat internationellt samarbete.   Författaren föreslår att utvecklingen av krigföringens principer kan förstås genom teorier avseende doktrinutveckling. Teorin som används för uppsatsens analys anger att små stater är beroende av allianser med exempelvis NATO, och därför måste anpassa sina doktriner så att de bättre matchar alliansens doktriner. Eftersom krigföringsprinciperna är en stor del av doktriner, bör en sådan doktrinanpassning leda till en anpassning av krigföringens principer också.   Analysen kommer att göras utifrån svenska arméreglementen, vilka kommer att jämföras med NATOs, för att undersöka huruvida Sverige har anpassat sina krigföringsprinciper till att bättre matcha NATOs efter dess medlemskap i Partnership for Peace.   Resultaten visar att de svenska krigföringsprinciperna är mer lika NATOs idag än vad de var 1982, vilket tyder på att de har anpassats för att bättre matcha de som används av Nato. Även då denna uppsats inte analyserar orsakerna till varför, så indikerar resultaten att teorier om doktrinutveckling även omfattar utvecklingen av krigföringens principer. Analys av anledningar till varför skulle kunna användas som en grund för vidare forskning.

Den svenska något begränsade artilleri-förmågan skall kunna verka effektivt i alla konfliktnivåer och detta skapar behov av erfarenhetsinhämtning av tidigare konflikter. Finska vinterkriget har i denna uppsats behandlats för att utvärdera en konflikt av nationell karaktär liknande den svenska försvarsmakten skulle kunna ställas inför. Undersökningen behandlade två områden; ”Mannerheim-linjen” och ”Norr om Ladoga” på grund av dess olika karaktär och på så sätt behov av finsk taktikanpassning. Analysen genom kvalitativ litteraturstudie genomfördes med utgångspunkt i teorin krigföringens principer. Analysen skulle sedan mynna ut i ett antal principer som verkade framgångsfrämjande för artilleriets användande. En jämförelse gjordes senare mellan resultatet av studien och svenska artilleriets tänkta principfokus idag. Resultatet av undersökningen visar att principerna måste vägas mot varandra för att vara framgångsfrämjande, dock framträdde principer som stridsekonomi, samordning, mål och målsättningar samt god anda som viktiga dels som enskilda principer men även för att kunna möjliggöra andra principers uppfyllande.

Since the dawn of military thinking, theorists have been trying to find the key to victory in armed conflict. theories of classic thinkers like Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz represented two positions in the debate regarding the principles of war as universally applicable rules for battle, or as a tool for planning not capable of fully overcoming the complex reality of war. In the wake of the first world war the principles of war as formulated by Fuller following his experiences of the war, found its way into doctrine. Naval theory on the principles of war developed under the influence of these thinkers through Alfred Mahan and Julian Corbett and is still found in naval doctrine.  The debate of the validity of the principles however, is still enduring. In a world of constant technological innovation and increasing complexity their relevance is questioned. Despite of this, modern theories on principles for warfare are still emerging from theorists like Geoffrey Till. The purpose of this study is to test the applicability of Till´s modern naval principles of war against historical battles, and thus, the timeless claim of the theory.  The study examines the theoretical reach of Till´stheory regarding principles of war, intended for naval warfare. This theory, much like its precursors, have adopted the Jominian school of thought, sharing the ambition of universal applicability. Geoffrey Tills Creating Decisive Victorywas tested against three historical cases of naval warfare.  The results of the study partially support the universal and timeless claim of Till´s theory by being represented, though not wholly, in every case. Additionally, the result indicates that the theory partially suffers from its modern design, impeding its timeless applicability. This claim, however, must be supported by further research.

An amphibious assault can open new fronts and totally change the operational and strategic situation. Amphibious assault often depends on the principles of surprise and tempo.   The principles of war, surprise and tempo are the main focus in this thesis. The context consists of the operational type, amphibious assault. The main problem that the study will try to answer is the paradox that theorists highlight these principles as essential conditions for amphibious operations, but they have not developed specifically why and how. In this context it is interesting because there are a number of paradoxes between the type of operation and the principles.   To be able to examine the principles a higher degree of concreteness has to be applied. This is done by examining what other modern theorists has developed on the principles. The most prominent factors then become the thesis operationalized indicators that provides the analysis tool for the thesis. The theory will then be tested by analysing two case studies, Operation Shingle in Anzio and Operation Chromite in Inchon.   The result shows that the indicators of surprise consists of unexpected acting, diversion and operations security. The results of the case study regarding this comes to the conclusions that unexpected acting and operation security are key factors. The indicators of tempo are rapid decision-making and quick physical movement. The case study result indicates that both are criterias for success and are based on a mutual relationship between the indicators.

The principle of the offensive in naval warfare has long been studied by scholars of military science. Studies suggest that in order for the principles of war to be practically useful for professionals, they need to be described concretely. The principle of the offensive as described in the Swedish Doctrine for Naval Tactics however, is not. This thesis aims to identify different success factors for naval offensive operations by using a qualitative analysis of Castex’s, Hughes’, and Vego’s naval theories, which when combined may form the principles for a successful offensive. A qualitative case study has been utilised, with literature from the successful Israeli naval offensive in the Yom Kippur-war, and the failed Argentinian naval offensive in the Falklands war; in order to identify which factors are practicable in a modern context. All factors, intelligence, manoeuvre, concentration of force, numerical superiority, qualitative superiority, adaptation to capabilities differences, and command and control, were identified in the Israeli offensive. In the Argentinian offensive, only the manoeuvre factor was identified, due to a lack of sufficient intelligence and command and control. The conclusions are that all factors were useful for a successive offensive action, however, more research is necessary for further generalization.

The principles of war are often used to describe the essential parts of warfare. There is however a discussion regarding what purpose they are supposed to have, what role they shall play or even how many principles there are. The military theorist Antoine-Henri Jomini stated that there was one fundamental principle: the principle of concentration of forces. Is this however true, and is Jomini’s theory still valid? The purpose of the thesis is to examine whether his theory is valid on cases from after Jomini’s career and to examine whether the principle of concentration of forces should be considered as one of the principles of war. The theory is tested on the Ardennes offensive in 1940, and Operation Overlord in 1944. The result of the examination shows that concentration of forces was one of the reasons that the examined cases were successful, but not the only one. As a result of this the theory that Jomini stated may be regarded as partly, but not fully valid. It also indicates that the principle of concentration of forces very well could qualify to be considered as one of the principles of war.