Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raquel Domingues do Amaral.pdf: 1299397 bytes, checksum: b28b4150c988ca0651c06f147655ac25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-18 / Based on the epistemological premise of the Logical Semantic Constructivism (CARVALHO, 2010), the present study proposes to reflect about the incidence of the constitutional rule which restrain the demarcation of indigenous lands. It seeks for the meaning of the signs: Indian, Indigenous Community and Indigenous Lands, in the statements of art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20, XI, from the Federal Constitution, considering the connotation of these signs in the social, cultural and historical context of Indians. The study also handles the matter of demarcation of indigenous lands in the current state of the art, being strongly influenced by the theory of John Mendes Jr. (1912) on indigenato, as well as making a counterpoint with Ferraz Jr. s (2007; 2012) discussion, which contemplates indigenato as a title that explains the Indians originating status of the right to permanent possession, although not limited to this. It discusses the relevance of the legal precedent of the Supreme Court, as a pragmatic dimension of linguistic semiosis on the fixed rules of the statements in art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20 XI, in the Federal Constitution, that is, as a text not written in the physical support of prescriptive statements, but that cannot have its meaning ignored as real technical legitimacy. From the perspective of the epistemology proposed by Paulo de Barros Carvalho (2010) on the incidence of general and abstract tax norm, it proposes a hermeneutics of the incidence of the rule, which is constructed through the interpretation of the statements of the art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20 XI, from the Federal Constitution. The demarcation of indigenous lands is denoted in the present research as a procedure and as a sole and specific rule that enables the incidence of general and abstract rule laid down in art. 231 caput, §§§ 1, 2 and 3 and art. 20 XI, from the Federal Constitution. One may conclude that the individual and solid rule that documents the demarcation has a legal effect on subjective and originating rights of the Indians of permanent possession of the lands they traditionally occupy. It has been defined The existence of two legal systems in relation to the land known as traditionally occupied by demarcation: the regulatory legal framework of the legal relationship between "non-Indians", which precedes the advent of sole and specific rule documented in the demarcation, and the legal regime subsequent to the formation of subjective originating rights of "Indians", in the subsequent individual and solid rule. Individual and solid rules that make up the property right of "non-Indians" are repealed before the advent of individual and solid rules documented in the demarcation, therefore, the extinction of these legal relations has ex nunc effects and shall be harmonized with the rules of items XXII, XXIV of art. 5 of the Federal Constitution. After the advent of individual and solid rule of demarcation, the legal framework is set out in § 6 of art. 231 of the Federal Constitution, as a means of protecting the Indians original right to possession / Propõe-se uma reflexão sobre a incidência da norma constitucional que disciplina a demarcação de terras indígenas, com base na premissa epistemológica do Constructivismo Lógico Semântico de Paulo de Barros Carvalho. Buscamos o sentido dos signos índio, comunidade indígena e terras indígenas nos enunciados do art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20, XI, da CF, levando em consideração o sentido destes signos no contexto social, cultural e histórico do índio. Abordamos a problemática da demarcação de terras indígenas no estado atual da arte, fortemente influenciado pela teoria do indigenato de João Mendes Jr., fazendo um contraponto com o entendimento esposado por Tércio Sampaio Ferraz Jr., que compreende o indigenato como um título que explica o caráter originário do direito à posse permanente dos índios, mas que não se reduz a este. Discorremos sobre a relevância do precedente jurisprudencial do Supremo Tribunal Federal, como dimensão pragmática da semiose linguística da norma construída a partir dos enunciados do art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20 XI da CF, ou seja, como texto não escrito no suporte físico dos enunciados prescritivos, mas que não pode ser ignorado, na busca de sentido, como verdadeira técnica de legitimação. Propomos uma hermenêutica sobre a incidência da norma, que se constrói pela interpretação dos enunciados do art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20 XI da CF, sob a perspectiva da epistemologia proposta por Paulo de Barros Carvalho para a incidência da norma geral e abstrata tributária. Abordamos a demarcação de terras indígenas, como procedimento e como norma individual e concreta que viabiliza a incidência da norma geral e abstrata prevista no art. 231 caput, §§§ 1º, 2º e 3º e art. 20 XI da CF. Concluímos que a norma individual e concreta que documenta a demarcação tem o efeito constitutivo do direito subjetivo originário dos índios à posse permanente das terras que tradicionalmente ocupam. Delimitamos a existência de dois regimes jurídicos em relação às terras que são reconhecidas como ocupação tradicional pela demarcação: o regime jurídico regulador das relações jurídicas, entre não índios , anteriores ao advento da norma individual e concreta documentada na demarcação e o regime jurídico posterior à constituição do direito subjetivo originário dos índios no consequente da norma individual e concreta. Anteriormente ao advento da norma individual e concreta documentada na demarcação, as normas individuais e concretas que constituem o direito de propriedade de não índios são revogadas, de modo que a extinção dessas relações jurídicas tem efeitos ex nunc e devem ser harmonizadas com as normas dos incisos XXII, XXIV do art. 5º, da CF.Após o advento da norma individual e concreta da demarcação, o regime jurídico a incidir é o previsto no § 6º, do art. 231, da CF, como um meio de proteger o direito originário à posse dos índios

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Ferreira Archanjo da Silva.pdf: 1923709 bytes, checksum: 72b4c9cc870e5eaa7c5ab269e40af19f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-09-14 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The criminal proceeding and the Criminal Procedural law had evolved through the conquests of the humanity. The first one, of mere half of application of the sanction to the offender of the criminal law, started to be an instrument of guardianship of the individual against possible state wills, crowned for the basic human rights and guided for the supply-principle of the dignity of the person human being, as reflected of the culture of the democratic societies. The Criminal Procedural law acquired scientific contours in the end of century XIX, due to the own elevation of the Jurisprudence to science. The called general theory of the process aims at in general systemize the studies on the process, without propitiating to the researcher the necessary knowledge for the accurate understanding of the analyzed institute. In Brazil, the process of democratization restored for the Constitution of the Republic of 1988 inspired the elaboration of works specialized for the scientists of the area of the Criminal Procedural law. The understanding of justinian codes, rules and proper principles of the criminal proceeding demands specialized knowledge. These works raise legal science to become efficient the criminal proceeding half to reach the common good, in order to protect the double society in sensible: against the possible current state excesses of power-having to punish in the search offender of the criminal law during criminal persecution e; against the violators of the social peace (the criminals). The meeting of these specialized works of the scientists makes possible the system organization of a proper theory of the Procedural law Criminal, capable to form a new school of criminal procedures. The organization of the legal system through the systematic thought allows the vision of, but without generalizations the all undesirable one, that depreciation the study object. The specialized knowledge can imply in the elaboration of a Code of criminal procedure democratic and efficient, capable to protect the accused and of punishing the criminal in a swift and safe way / O processo penal e o Direito Processual Penal evoluíram através das conquistas da humanidade. O primeiro, de mero meio de aplicação da sanção ao infrator da lei penal, passou a ser um instrumento de tutela do indivíduo contra possíveis arbítrios estatais, coroado pelos direitos humanos fundamentais e norteado pelo supra-princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, como reflexo da cultura das sociedades democráticas. O Direito Processual Penal adquiriu contornos científicos no final do século XIX, decorrente da própria elevação da Jurisprudência à ciência. A denominada teoria geral do processo visa a sistematizar os estudos sobre o processo em geral, sem propiciar ao pesquisador o conhecimento necessário para a exata compreensão do instituto analisado. No Brasil, o processo de democratização instaurado pela Constituição da República de 1988 inspirou a elaboração de trabalhos especializados pelos cientistas da área do Direito Processual Penal. A compreensão de institutos, regras e princípios próprios do processo penal exige conhecimento especializado. Esses trabalhos elevam a ciência jurídica para tornar o processo penal eficiente meio de alcançar o bem comum, a fim de proteger a sociedade em duplo sentido: contra os possíveis excessos estatais decorrentes do poder-dever de punir na busca infrator da lei penal durante a persecução penal e; contra os violadores da paz social (os criminosos). A reunião desses trabalhos especializados dos cientistas possibilita a organização sistêmica de uma teoria própria do Direito Processual Penal, capaz de formar uma nova escola de processualistas penais. A organização do ordenamento jurídico através do pensamento sistemático permite a visão do todo, mas sem generalizações indesejáveis, que denigrem o objeto de estudo. O conhecimento especializado pode implicar na elaboração de um Código de Processo Penal democrático e eficiente, capaz de proteger o acusado e de punir o culpado de forma célere e segura

La décision conditionnelle constitue un objet délaissé de la recherche en droit administratif français. Injustement perçue comme une affaire privée de spécialistes du droit des actes administratifs unilatéraux, elle n’occupe les écrits des publicistes que dans la mesure où la réalisation de la condition porte atteinte à la garantie des droits acquis. Cette réserve explique pour partie la faible contribution de la doctrine à la construction d’une définition de la décision conditionnelle, autonome du droit civil des obligations, et les difficultés corrélatives à déterminer les contours de cette notion mal identifiée. Pourtant, les orientations prises par le juge administratif et, dernièrement, par le codificateur, rendent nécessaire la recherche d’une définition clarifiée de la décision conditionnelle en droit administratif français. Depuis longtemps, le juge administratif range la décision conditionnelle dans la catégorie des actes administratifs unilatéraux et met en œuvre les principes qui les gouvernent. Or, de son côté, la doctrine ne parvient pas à l’intégrer pleinement dans la catégorie de l’acte unilatéral ou du contrat.Le visage inhabituel qu’elle présente, aux yeux des juristes, force la réévaluation des classifications traditionnelles.La doctrine malmène ses catégories binaires, dans le but de souligner la particularité de cette décision unilatérale qui ressemble à s’y méprendre au contrat. Il en résulte une contradiction inévitable entre la présentation doctrinale de la décision conditionnelle et les données du droit positif. Pour la dénouer, il apparaît nécessaire de renouveler l’appareil théorique jusqu’alors mobilisé. En prenant appui sur les données pertinentes du droit positif, il a été possible de définir la condition comme une norme juridique à part entière, à la fois dépendante et distincte des autres dispositions de la décision, et dont la fonction se limite à moduler les effets dans le temps de la norme principale qu’elle prend pour objet. À travers ces éléments de définition, transparaît un régime juridique cohérent et unifié / Conditional decisions remain much overlooked in the legal scholarship on French administrative law. Wrongfully considered as the exclusive province of the specialist on unilateral administrative acts, conditional decisions have received the attention of public lawyers only in so far as they come to present a risk for the protection of aquired rights. This goes some way to explaining both the scarcity of doctrinal contributions to a definition of the concept of a conditional decision – autonomous from the paradigm of the obligations in French civil law –, and the difficulties encountered in trying to bring some clarity to the subject by attempting to determine precisely the boundaries of the notion. Nevertheless, recent turns taken by the administrative courts, and more recently by codifiers, do call for a clear and consistent definition. The case law has for long considered these legal acts as unilateral acts, thus subjecting conditional decisions to the corresponding legal principles. Despite this, the legal scholarship on the question has never managed to fully integrate conditional decisions in either branch of the main binary subdivision – contracts and unilateral acts –, ill-using both in order to stress the highly unusual character of the notion (for instance underlining the peculiar relevance of an analysis of this unilateral decision in contractual terms). This unusual object therefore forces us to reevaluate our traditional classifications, which otherwise systematically result in a severe inconsistency between substantive law and its doctrinal exposition. In order to do so, the theoretical tools and approaches used up to now must be renewed. This doctoral dissertation aims to reconcile the positive law and its doctrinal exposition, thus proposing a clear definition of the condition itself as a legal norm in its own right – both dependant on, and distinct from, the other provisions of the decision it is attached to – the function of which is to modulate the effects over time of the main decision. These proposed elements of definition come to reveal a unified and coherent legal status of the conditional decision in administrative law.

Les questions de légitimité et de stabilité des systèmes politiques ont longtemps été étudiées séparément des problèmes de mise en oeuvre du droit en sciences économiques. L’objectif de cette thèse est concilier ces différentes approches afin de replacer la mise en oeuvre de la norme juridique au centre du débat institutionnel. Ce travail se décompose en cinq investigations empiriques ou expérimentales portant chacune sur une des étapes du processus politique et judiciaire.Le premier article s’intéresse à l’impact des droits constitutionnels sur les dépenses publiques. La seconde étude explore l’influence des biais d’auto-complaisance sur la demande et l’offre de redistribution. Le troisième travail analyse les décisions rendues par le Conseil Constitutionnel. La quatrième partie examine la réforme de la carte judiciaire des Conseils de Prud’hommes de 2008. Le dernier chapitre étudie la relation entre la composition syndicale des Conseils de Prud’hommes et les issues des litiges qui y sont portés.Nos analyses reposent sur les outils économétriques et expérimentaux. Elles font usage de méthodes d’estimations classiques (OLS, GLS, Probit, Logit, Within OLS), de modèles à sélection (Heckman, Triprobit), des outils destinés aux problèmes d’endogénéité (2SLS)et des techniques d’estimation de systèmes d’équation (3SLS). L’approche expérimentale contient également des tests statistiques communément appliqués (tests de permutation,tests de comparaison de moyenne, tests de proportion) ainsi que de récentes méthodes pour traiter l’hétérogénéité (wild clustering). / The legitimacy and the stability of political systems have very often been studied in economics separate from considerations about legal norms’ enforcement. My objective is to combine these different approaches, and to place the question of the legal enforcement at the heart of the debate about institutions. This work is made of cinq empirical and experimental investigations that deal with each of the stages of the political and legal process.This first paper analyzes the impact of constitutional rights on public expenditures. The second article explores the influence of self-serving biases on the demand and the supplyof redistribution. The third analysis focuses on the decisions of the French Constitutional Council. The fourth work deals with the recent reform of the judiciary map of Frenchlabor courts. The last study investigates the relationship between the composition of the elected jurors in French labor courts and the way cases are terminated.Our investigations rely on econometric and experimental techniques. They use standard estimation methods (OLS, GLS, Probit, Logit, Within OLS), selection models (Heckman,Triprotibt), techniques for endogeneity correction (2SLS), and methods to estimate systems of equations (3SLS). The experimental analysis makes use of standard statistical tests(permutation tests, proportion tests, two-group mean-comparison tests), and more recent methods to solve heterogeneity (wild clustering).

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Thiago Buschinelli Sorrentino.pdf: 3995173 bytes, checksum: bd95b32c746e3b64c8723cdce5cd1d48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-05-06 / This paper examines the judicial review of how tax liability is ascribed to non-taxpayers, upon the Brazil Supreme Court point of view (Supremo Tribunal Federal). Studies, at first, the role of language, logic and Systems Theory as tools which will be used throughout the investigation. Then, rebuilds the syntactic and dynamic structures of the norms that ascribe tax liability. Searches for the constitutional and non-constitutional (National Tax Code) parameters of control. Emphasizes proportionality, reasonableness and the role of general taxation norms within the system. Scrutinizes some of the instruments available to the Brazil Supreme Court (the ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, the recurso extraordinário and the reclamação constitucional). At last, reckons scenarios in order to test some of the conclusions / Esta dissertação de mestrado examina o controle da atribuição de responsabilidade tributária, tomando por parâmetro os instrumentos disponíveis ao Supremo Tribunal Federal. Estuda, inicialmente, o papel da linguagem, da lógica e da Teoria dos Sistemas na formação do quadro. Reconstrói, então, as estruturas sintáticas e dinâmicas das normas de responsabilidade tributária. Procura pelos parâmetros de controle, constitucionais e infraconstitucionais (Código Tributário Nacional). Em especial, dá ênfase à proporcionalidade e a razoabilidade e ao papel das normas gerais em matéria tributária. Escrutiniza alguns dos instrumentos disponíveis ao Supremo Tribunal Federal para o controle da responsabilidade tributária (a ação direta de inconstitucionalidade, o recurso extraordinário e a reclamação constitucional). Por fim, elege cenários para testar alguns pontos das conclusões