Law and technology regularly conflict. The reasons for this are several and complex. Some conflicts are trivial and straightforwardly resolvable. Others, such as the creation of artificial minds, are not. History indicates that when law and technology conflict; both systems can adapt—often over periods of time—to new social circumstances and continue performing their societal functions. Simply: law and technology co-evolve. However, if the legal system is to retain its autonomous role in society, what are its adaptive limits in the context of profound, and perhaps unprecedented, technological changes? My thesis addresses the question of whether, and if so, to what extent, the legal system can respond to ‘conflicts’ with increasingly complex and legally problematic technological change. It draws on theories of legal and social evolution—particularly the Social Systems Theory (SST) of Niklas Luhmann—to explore the notion of a ‘lag’ in the legal system’s ability to respond to technological changes and ‘shocks’. It evaluates the claim that the legal system’s ‘lagged’ response to technological change is a deficit of its functioning. ‘Lag’ may be both good and bad. It allows the law to be self-referential while also limiting its effectiveness in controlling other sub-systems. Thus there is an implicit intersystemic trade-off. The hypothesis here: ‘lag’ is an endogenous legal advantage that helps to ensure the legal system’s autonomy, as well as the continuity of legal processes that help ameliorate potentially harmful or undesirable outcomes of science and technology on society and the individual. The legal system can adjust to technological change. However, it can only adjust its internal operations, which takes time and is constrained by the need to maintain legal autonomy—or in SST terms—sits autopoiesis. The signs of this adjustment are the conceptual evolution of legal concepts and processes related to new technological changes and risks, among other things. A close reading of Anglo-American legal history and jurisprudence supports this. While legal systems are comparatively inflexible in response to new technologies—due to doctrinal ossification and reliance upon precedent and analogy in legal reasoning—an alternative outcome is possible: the disintegration of the boundary between law and technology and the consequential loss of legal autonomy. The disintegration of this boundary would consequentially reduce society’s capacity to mediate and regulate technological change, thus diminishing the autopoiesis of the legal system. A change of this kind would be signalled by what some identify as the emergence of a technological ordering—or a ‘rule of technology’—displacing and potentially subsuming the rule of law. My thesis evaluates evidence for these two scenarios—the self-renewing capacity of the legal system, on the one hand, or its disintegration in response to technological change, on the other. These opposing scenarios are evaluated using a social ontological study of technology generally, and a case study using Artificial Intelligence (AI) specifically, to identify and predict the co- evolutionary dynamics of the law/technology relationship and assess the extent to which the legal system can shape, and be shaped by, technological change. In assessing this situation, this thesis explores the nature of AI, its benefits and drawbacks, and argues that its proliferation may require a corresponding shift in the fundamental mechanics of law. As AI standardises across industries and social sub-systems, centralised authorities such as government agencies, corporations, and indeed legal systems, may lose the ability to coordinate and regulate the activities of disparate persons through ex post regulatory means. Consequentially, there is a pressing need to understand not just how AI interfaces with existing legal frameworks, but how legal systems must pre-adapt to oncoming, and predominately unexplored, legal challenges. This thesis argues that AI is an autopoietic technology, and that there is thus a corresponding need to understand its intersystemic effects if there is to be an effective societal governance regime for it. This thesis demonstrates that SST provides us with the shared theoretical grammar to start and sustain this dialogue.

The aim of the research – to define the content, functions, manifestations, forms of the concept of legal culture and to investigate the specific character of the legal culture of Latvian senior-grade elementary school pupils, developing proposals for improvement of acquisition of the legal culture by elementary school pupils. Thus, no research studies of legal culture are actually being made in Latvia, and also attention is insufficiently paid to it in the studies of law, and in political and sociological studies. The scientific novelty of the Doctoral Dissertation is characterised by the fact that the Doctoral Dissertation is dedicated to the legal culture, its updating and consolidating in the scientific and research environment in Latvia. Moreover, such an original research study of the legal culture of Latvian elementary school pupils has been made for the first time in Latvia. / Daktaro disertacijos tikslas – santykio tarp įstatymo ir kultūros apibrėžimas, išryškinant reguliavimo sistemų tarpusavio santykį, kaip socialinių santykių, kurie taip pat yra apibrėžiami teisine kultūra, pagrindą. Autorius nagrinėja terminologijos, susijusios su terminais „teisinė kultūra“, „juridinė kultūra“ ir „įstatymo kultūra“, dilemą, analizuoja teisinės kultūros interpretaciją per įvairių mokslo šakų tyrimus, išskirdamas siaurąjį (mikro lygį) ir platųjį (makro lygį) teisinės kultūros supratimą, apsvarstydamas pagrindines teisinės kultūros formas, funkcijas ir elementus, apibūdindamas virtualią teisinę kultūrą kaip naują teisinės kultūros lygį, taip pat pabrėžia specifinį teisinės kultūros pobūdį pasaulinės krizės sąlygomis. Kaip šio tyrimo dalis, buvo atlikta vidurinės mokyklos aukštesniųjų klasių mokinių teisinės kultūros studija, kuria buvo siekiama išanalizuoti jų požiūrį į pareigą mokytis ir pamokų nelankymo priežastis, ypač atkreipiant dėmesį į 9 klasės mokinių požiūrį į įstatymą ir teisinės elgsenos modelio pasirinkimą, išanalizuojant teisinės kultūros pritaikymą studijų standartams. Galiausiai, buvo padarytos išvados bei pateikti pasiūlymai dėl tolimesnių tyrimų, įstatymų ir nuostatų tobulinimo, programos įdiegiant teisinę kultūrą plėtojimo, atkreipiant ypatingą dėmesį į teisinės kultūros įsisavinimą mokslo įstaigose ir visuomenėje apskritai.

Judge and Jurisconsult – Coercive and Persuasive Authority in Islamic Law (Richter und Rechtsberater- Zwingende und überzeugende Autorität im Islamischen Recht) Wer spricht das Recht in der islamischen Rechtsprechung? Die islamische Rechtsgeschichte konzentrierte sich lange auf den Einzelrichter (qadi) als Inbegriff der Rechtsprechung. Der Richter handelte jedoch nicht als einzige Verkörperung der Rechtsprechung. Ein Justizpersonal unterstützte seine und arbeitete von einer ihm unterstellten Position aus. Darüber hinaus hat der gelehrte Rechtsberater (mufti) die Rechtsprechung durch übereinstimmende und abweichende Meinungen vor Gericht in vielerlei Hinsicht geprägt. Die Arbeit konzentriert sich auf zwei Autoritäten am Gericht – qadi und mufti – in der frühen Abbasidischen Rechtsgeschichte (2. und 3. Jahrhundert nach der islamischen Zeitrechnung bzw. 8. und 9. Jahrhundert der gregorianischen Zeit), die miteinander kooperiert oder auch konkurriert haben. Die Grundlage ihrer Beziehung ist das islamische Prinzip der gerichtlichen Beratung von Experten in Rechtsfragen. Die islamische Rechtslehre ermutigt einen Richter, der mit Rechtsunsicherheiten konfrontiert war, einen gelehrten Rechtsberater (mufti) zu konsultieren, bevor er eine gerichtliche Entscheidung trifft. Die islamische Rechtsprechung entstand somit aus einem Verhältnis von Kooperation, Konfrontation und Kooptation zwischen Richtern und (außer-gerichtlichen) gelehrten Rechtsberatern. / Judge and Jurisconsult – Coercive and Persuasive Authority in Islamic Law Who dispenses justice at court? Islamic legal historians have long focused on the single judge (qadi) as the embodiment of the administration of justice. The judge, however, did not act alone in dispensing justice. A judicial staff supported his work, working from a position subordinate to him. In addition, evading a clearly demarcated judicial hierarchy, the learned jurisconsult (mufti) shaped adjudication in many distinct ways through concurring and dissenting opinions at court. This contribution focuses on two authorities—the qadi and the mufti—who cooperated or competed with each other at court in early Abbasid legal history (2nd-3rd century A. H. / 8th-9th century C.E.). Fundamental to their relationship is the Islamic principle of judicial consultation of experts on legal questions. Islamic legal doctrine encouraged a judge confronted with legal uncertainties to consult a mufti before issuing a judicial decision. Islamic adjudication thus emerged out of cooperation, confrontation and cooptation between judge and (extra-judicial) legal experts.

L’Inde est confrontée à la problématique des avortements sexo-sélectifs, où il est observé depuis déjà plusieurs décennies un déséquilibre entre le nombre de filles et de garçons âgé(e)s entre 0 à 6 ans. Et ce, malgré l’adoption en 1994 du Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act qui régule les techniques médicales de détermination et de sélection du sexe afin d’éradiquer la pratique du foeticide féminin. Nous observons par conséquent un problème social d’application des lois. Cette recherche s’intéresse à l’effectivité du droit, qui repose dans la comparaison du sens et de l’utilité assignés à une norme par l’Etat, et la réception sociale qui en découle sur le plan instrumental et symbolique. Il s’agit alors d’explorer ici à la fois les effets visés par le droit, et leur réception au sein de la sphère sociétale. Cette étude analyse de ce fait les usages étatiques du droit qui tentent d’influencer l’univers symbolique des représentations collectives et les objectifs juridiques concrets mis en place pour conformer le comportement des sujets vis-à-vis de la sélection sexuelle prénatale. Une observation documentaire et des entrevues semi-dirigées font état de la réception sociale de ce discours officiel contre la pratique du foeticide féminin. Par cette lecture, nous comprenons que le droit étatique entre en conflit avec un système de représentations sociales qui inculque une préférence pour le fils pour des raisons économiques, sociales et culturelles. / For many decades now, India has been facing the issue of sex-selective abortion in which there has been a noticeable imbalance between the number of boys and girls aged 0 to 6 years old. And this, in spite of the 1994 Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act which regulates sex selection and determination technologies so as to eradicate female foeticide. We can thus note that there is a social problem of putting laws into effect. This research focuses on legal efficiency by outlining the meaning and utility assigned to State norms as well as their social reception on an instrumental and symbolic level. The aim is thus to explore the effects intended by the implementation of such laws and their reception by society. This study analyses the strategic legal appeal of the State in order to influence collective representations and to comply individual’s behaviour regarding sex selective abortions. Literature review and semi-structured interviews demonstrate the social reception of this official discours against female foeticide. We conclude that State law enters in direct confrontation with a social representation system that induces a preference for sons for economic, social and cultural reasons.

Law in a transnational context loses the features with which it has been configured since modernity. Classic distinctions between national and international, public and private, substantive and procedural, legal and political, social and legal lose their rigidity in a context of norms, orders, institutions and agents that interact and overlap in diverse and changing ways. A legal theory capable of explaining and evaluating this overflowing legal reality is lacking. A theoretical reflection on international law is not enough. Transnationalism appeals to a plurality of legal actors and spaces that interact to create, interpret and enforce rules which they mutually identify with. Transnationalism does not only refer to the global or the supranational, but to the interdependence of both with the local and transit spaces. And this translates into a change of focus or perspective that is required of each legal agent: management of the interrelation between diverse orders aimed to create spaces for approach, contestation and innovation is a normative requirement and it must be weighed against other legal values. Concepts to which legal theory must focus its attention change their meaning. The work refers to four of those concepts that I consider essential: social group or community, relations between orders and interlegality, coercion and normative diversity. The last part of the paper addresses the way in which these necessary changes have a place in our theories elaborated from the perspective of the great traditions of legal philosophy. What legal positivism, socio-legal theory and legal realism have in common might be an appropriate approach to the review of our discipline. / El derecho, en un contexto transnacional, pierde los rasgos con los que lo hemos configurado desde la modernidad. Las clásicas distinciones entre lo nacional y lo internacional, lo público y lo privado, lo sustantivo y lo procedimental, lo jurídico y lo político, lo social y lo jurídico abandonan su rigidez en un entramado de normas, órdenes, instituciones y agentes que se entremezclan y superponen de modos diversos y cambiantes. Carecemos de una teoría del derecho capaz de explicar y evaluar esta realidad jurídica desbordante. No es suficiente una reflexión teórica sobre el derecho internacional. Lo transnacional apela a una pluralidad de actores y de espacios jurídicos que interaccionan para crear, interpretar y ejecutar normas con las que se identifican mutuamente. Lo transnacional no se refiere solo a lo global o a lo supranacional, sino a la interdependencia de ambos con lo local y los espacios de tránsito. Ello se traduce en un cambio de enfoque o de perspectiva que se exige a cada operador jurídico: la gestión de la interrelación entre órdenes diversos orientada a la creación de espacios para la aproximación, la contestación y la innovación es una exigencia normativa y debe ser ponderada con el resto de valores jurídicos. A partir de ahí cambia el significado de los conceptos a los que ha de orientar su atención la teoría jurídica. El trabajo se refiere a cuatro de dichos conceptos que considero esenciales: grupo social o comunidad, relaciones entre órdenes e interlegalidad, coerción y diversidad normativa. El modo en que los cambios necesarios tienen cabida en la teoría elaborada desde las grandes tradiciones de la iusfilosofía es abordado en la última parte del trabajo, considerando que lo que tienen en común el positivismo jurídico, la teoría socio-jurídica y el realismo jurídico puede ser una aproximación adecuada para la revisión de nuestra disciplina.

The present master thesis has its start point on Nicklas Luhmann's system theory and political science in David Easton to demonstrate that the legal system interacts with society through structural couplings, creating binding precedents through existing normative consolidation or, alternatively, from current legal system. One of the key points of the thesis is the participation of the amicus curiae as a legitimizing element of the binding precedents policy. Although they interpret the law in very open interpretation, we defend the thesis that this interpretation can not have the breadth defendend by Peter Häberle in the sense of being greatly enlarged, but the interpretations outside the legal system are realized through codes because a fundamental characteristic of any sound social system – including law system - is open cognitiveness and closed operability according to Luhmann's theory, creating rules and these same rules return to the environment. In the formation of the precedent, we analyzed the participation of the amicus curiae as an element of cognitive openness. In its application, we understand that the integrity of the system should not be understood only in its Dworkian principle theory, defended by Lenio Streck, but rather that it should be understood as a system, in the light of Luhmann's theory. The preservation of the internal operability of the subsystem of binding precedents is one of the means to avoiding systemic corruption - this defies the integrity of any kind of system. With regard to the application of the precedents, there is a need for a more detailed study of the ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum, in order to correct the innumerable imperfetcions of judicial decisions in Brazil, especially those coming from the Federal Supreme Court. When studying the precedents, it is discovered that frozen view of jurisprudence is more typical of the English system than the American system, which makes predict that the Brazilian system will also be more flexible than the two systems under study. In the Constitutional Court, we analyze the main arguments for and against the constitutionality of the binding precedents system and we conclude by its constitutionality. Finally, after the extensive study, it competed to frame the binding precedent - and not the jurisprudence - as a formal source of Brazilian law. / A presente dissertação parte da teoria sistêmica de Nicklas Luhmann e da ciência política em David Easton para demonstrar que o sistema jurídico interage com a sociedade, através dos acoplamentos estruturais, criando precedentes vinculantes através do adensamento normativo até então existente ou, alternativamente, extraindo normas do atual sistema jurídico. Um dos pontos chaves da tese é a participação do amicus curiae como elemento legitimador da política de precedentes vinculantes. Apesar dos mesmos interpretarem o ordenamento em uma possível interpretação aberta do ordenamento, defende-se a tese de que esta interpretação não pode ter o elastério emprestado por Peter Häberle no sentido de ser excessivamente ampliada, mas sim as interpretações advindas de fora do sistema jurídico são metabolizadas através de códigos próprios deste sistema, pois uma característica fundamental de qualquer sistema social íntegro é a cognitividade aberta e a operacionalidade fechada, na teoria de Luhmann, criando regras gerais e estas mesmas regras retornam ao meio ambiente. Na formação do precedente, é analisada a participação do amicus curiae como elemento da abertura cognitiva. Em sua aplicação, entende-se que a integridade do sistema não deve ser compreendida apenas em sua acepção dworkiana da teoria dos princípios, defendida por Lenio Streck, mas sim que ela deve ser compreendida como um sistema, à luz dos ensinamentos de Luhmann, ou seja, a preservação da operatividade interna do subsistema dos precedentes vinculantes é um dos meios de se evitar a corrupção sistêmica – esta sim desafiadora da integridade de quaisquer sistemas. No que se refere à aplicação dos precedentes, há a necessidade de um estudo mais aprofundado da ratio decidendi e do obiter dictum, de forma a se corrigir os inúmeros vícios das decisões judiciais Brasil afora, em especial daquelas oriundas do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ao se estudar os precedentes, descobre-se que aquela visão engessadora da jurisprudência é mais típica do sistema inglês que do norte-americano, o que gera uma previsão de que o sistema brasileiro será, também, mais flexível que os dois sistemas em estudo. Na seara constitucional, são analisados os principais argumentos a favor e contrário à constitucionalidade do sistema dos precedentes vinculantes e conclui-se pela sua constitucionalidade. Por fim, após o amplo estudo, competiu enquadrar o precedente vinculante – e não a jurisprudência - como fonte formal do direito brasileiro.

The present master thesis has its start point on Nicklas Luhmann's system theory and political science in David Easton to demonstrate that the legal system interacts with society through structural couplings, creating binding precedents through existing normative consolidation or, alternatively, from current legal system. One of the key points of the thesis is the participation of the amicus curiae as a legitimizing element of the binding precedents policy. Although they interpret the law in very open interpretation, we defend the thesis that this interpretation can not have the breadth defendend by Peter Häberle in the sense of being greatly enlarged, but the interpretations outside the legal system are realized through codes because a fundamental characteristic of any sound social system – including law system - is open cognitiveness and closed operability according to Luhmann's theory, creating rules and these same rules return to the environment. In the formation of the precedent, we analyzed the participation of the amicus curiae as an element of cognitive openness. In its application, we understand that the integrity of the system should not be understood only in its Dworkian principle theory, defended by Lenio Streck, but rather that it should be understood as a system, in the light of Luhmann's theory. The preservation of the internal operability of the subsystem of binding precedents is one of the means to avoiding systemic corruption - this defies the integrity of any kind of system. With regard to the application of the precedents, there is a need for a more detailed study of the ratio decidendi and the obiter dictum, in order to correct the innumerable imperfetcions of judicial decisions in Brazil, especially those coming from the Federal Supreme Court. When studying the precedents, it is discovered that frozen view of jurisprudence is more typical of the English system than the American system, which makes predict that the Brazilian system will also be more flexible than the two systems under study. In the Constitutional Court, we analyze the main arguments for and against the constitutionality of the binding precedents system and we conclude by its constitutionality. Finally, after the extensive study, it competed to frame the binding precedent - and not the jurisprudence - as a formal source of Brazilian law. / A presente dissertação parte da teoria sistêmica de Nicklas Luhmann e da ciência política em David Easton para demonstrar que o sistema jurídico interage com a sociedade, através dos acoplamentos estruturais, criando precedentes vinculantes através do adensamento normativo até então existente ou, alternativamente, extraindo normas do atual sistema jurídico. Um dos pontos chaves da tese é a participação do amicus curiae como elemento legitimador da política de precedentes vinculantes. Apesar dos mesmos interpretarem o ordenamento em uma possível interpretação aberta do ordenamento, defende-se a tese de que esta interpretação não pode ter o elastério emprestado por Peter Häberle no sentido de ser excessivamente ampliada, mas sim as interpretações advindas de fora do sistema jurídico são metabolizadas através de códigos próprios deste sistema, pois uma característica fundamental de qualquer sistema social íntegro é a cognitividade aberta e a operacionalidade fechada, na teoria de Luhmann, criando regras gerais e estas mesmas regras retornam ao meio ambiente. Na formação do precedente, é analisada a participação do amicus curiae como elemento da abertura cognitiva. Em sua aplicação, entende-se que a integridade do sistema não deve ser compreendida apenas em sua acepção dworkiana da teoria dos princípios, defendida por Lenio Streck, mas sim que ela deve ser compreendida como um sistema, à luz dos ensinamentos de Luhmann, ou seja, a preservação da operatividade interna do subsistema dos precedentes vinculantes é um dos meios de se evitar a corrupção sistêmica – esta sim desafiadora da integridade de quaisquer sistemas. No que se refere à aplicação dos precedentes, há a necessidade de um estudo mais aprofundado da ratio decidendi e do obiter dictum, de forma a se corrigir os inúmeros vícios das decisões judiciais Brasil afora, em especial daquelas oriundas do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Ao se estudar os precedentes, descobre-se que aquela visão engessadora da jurisprudência é mais típica do sistema inglês que do norte-americano, o que gera uma previsão de que o sistema brasileiro será, também, mais flexível que os dois sistemas em estudo. Na seara constitucional, são analisados os principais argumentos a favor e contrário à constitucionalidade do sistema dos precedentes vinculantes e conclui-se pela sua constitucionalidade. Por fim, após o amplo estudo, competiu enquadrar o precedente vinculante – e não a jurisprudência - como fonte formal do direito brasileiro.

Expression d’un mal législatif contemporain, les lois symboliques ne sont pas seulement des dispositions incantatoires sur le modèle des lois non normatives ou « mémorielles ». Elles peuvent aussi être des dispositions techniques, comme en comporte le droit de la propriété littéraire et artistique. Pour le comprendre, il convient, dans un premier temps, d’identifier les lois symboliques. Caractérisées par la disharmonie de leur discours et de leurs qualités normatives, ces lois donnent à voir un phénomène d’ineffectivité entendu en un sens large. Imprécises, irréalistes, menteuses, mais dotées d’un message vertueux, les lois symboliques sont le résultat d’un exercice instrumentalisé de l’action législative, davantage préoccupé par l’expression de valeurs que par la considération des effets concrets du texte. Dans un second temps, il importe de déterminer la manière dont les lois symboliques doivent être traitées. Signe d’une mutation de la production législative et du droit de la propriété littéraire et artistique, ces lois sont la figure d’un désordre : elles marquent le retrait du vrai symbolique et sa vaine compensation par un faux symbolique voyant. Cet enseignement commande une remise en ordre appelant au respect de règles de légistique et à la conscience morale des diseurs de normes animés par l’amour des lois. Alors que les réformes se multiplient en droit d’auteur et que la matière est attaquée par des revendications consuméristes et sociales, cette étude invite à une réflexion sur l’avenir de la discipline et à envisager des remèdes pour lutter contre l’apparition des lois symboliques. / Symbolic laws are a recent manifestation of a contemporary legislative evil. They are not only incantatory declarations on the model of non-normative or "memorial" laws, since they can also be technical rulings, as intellectual property law is. To grasp this phenomenon, we must first identify what symbolic laws are. Characterized by the disharmony between their discourse and their normative qualities, these laws show a phenomenon of ineffective implementation. Unclear, unrealistic, sometimes lying, but endowed with a virtuous message, symbolic laws are the result of the instrumentalization of legislative action, an exercise where expressing values is more a concern than the concrete effects of the text. Secondly, it is important to determine how symbolic laws should be dealt with. As a sign of a change in legislative production and in intellectual property law, these laws are the figure of disorder: they mark the withdrawal of the true symbolism and its vain compensation by a false and flashy symbolism. This discovery calls for a restoration of order and the respect of legistic rules, where those who write the norms should be animated by the love of laws and guided by moral conscience. As intellectual property law is under attack by commercial and social demands, this study invites to think about its future and see how we could prevent the appearance of symbolic laws.

La démocratisation de l’écrit dans notre société culturelle moderne a fait que tout un chacun peut se revendiquer auteur. La reconnaissance n’est plus désormais à rechercher à travers la traditionnelle publication chez un éditeur mais à travers l’immatérialité des outils d’auto-édition offerts en ligne. D’une part, avec la phase de désintermédiation qui se joue entre les différents acteurs du secteur littéraire, l’écrivain se passe d’une maison d’édition. L’éditeur disparaît. D’autre part, l’auteur, personnage romantique et emblématique sur lequel le droit d’auteur a été forgé, s’efface progressivement du paysage juridique. Avec l’effacement du mythe est emportée la vision propriétaire des droits d’auteur, au profit de l’utilisateur. L’auteur disparaît. Les nouvelles pratiques de cette société connectée bouleversent le droit et sa capacité d’adaptation. Pourtant le contrat d’édition littéraire, socle de la relation auteur-éditeur, existe bel et bien et constitue le sujet de cette étude. Modèle dominant des contrats d’auteur, l’ambition de cette recherche est d’arriver à saisir à travers cette relation la nature du contrat d’édition et le jeu des nouveaux équilibres posés par l'ère numérique (réforme du Code de propriété intellectuelle), mais aussi de saisir les mutations à la lisière du droit d’auteur qui redéfinissent la possession dans l’ère immatérielle avec les modèles alternatifs du contrat d’édition littéraire (licences libres et creative commons). Les moyens d'y répondre emprunteront à l'analyse juridique mais aussi dans une juste mesure à l'internormativité, qui permettra d'observer le droit avec les yeux du sociologue, de l'économiste et de l'historien / The liberalization of writing in our contemporary cultural society has made it so anyone can now aim for the title of author. The recognition of one’s work is now sought, not through the traditional means of publishing, with the assistance of a professional publisher, but through immaterial processes of self- online publishing. On one hand, thanks to these new means, the author is able to cut the intermediation of the publishing field and to avoid using a professional publishing company. On the other hand, the author, romantic and emblematic character upon whom author’s rights have been forged is fading away from the legal landscape. With the decay of the myth, the ownership conception of author’s rights is taken away by those of the user. The author is fading away. The new customs of our over connected society are dramatically changing law and its ability to adapt. Although, publishing contracts are still a part of the process and are the subject at the heart of this study. The French intellectual property code was able to grant this contract access to the dematerialized world by incorporating the paradigm shift. Main model of publishing contracts, its ambivalent nature is due to the merging of both civil and intellectual property law that can be applied to it. This study aims to capture the true nature of the publishing contract figure, through the relations established between authors and publishers, including their new balance, and also to grasp a full understanding of the mutations surrounding the authors’ rights and that redefine ownership in a now immaterial era through the new alternative means of self-publishing (free licenses and creative commons)

The thesis challenges the notion of effectiveness of law as being based on the formal institutions of courts, law enforcement and written law. It argues that the best way to measure the effectiveness of law is the legal self-efficacy of laymen who are the end users of law.  It presents a new perspective on the effectiveness of law. It turns the traditional perspective of studying the effects of legal institutions around and instead studies the effect of how individuals perceive their own ability to use law. This self-reflexive ability - legal self-efficacy -  is the answer to the question “How comfortable are with communicating with legal terminology?”. The thesis makes several comparisons using the traditional perspective and legal self-efficacy and finds that legal self-efficacy is a better measure of legal effectiveness. This thesis analyzes 246 businesspeople in Russia and their risk behavior  with regards to economic transactions in relation to legal self-efficacy.  The theory behind legal self-efficacy is a combination of Luhmann’s theory of law as communication and Bandura’s concept of self-efficacy.  The first paper applies the traditional approach. It analyzes the effect of legal efficiency on leverage and debt maturity for listed and non-listed companies. The second paper is describes the conceptual foundation of the legal effectiveness based on the individual. The third paper compares the effect of private order (including legal self-efficacy) and public order institutions on the granting of trade credit.  The fourth paper analyzes the impact of legal self-efficacy and formal legal institutions on sanctions against clients in a comparative perspective. The final paper seeks out possible sources of legal self-efficacy. Legal self-efficacy can be used to better understand the interaction of individuals and law including such fields of research as behavioral accounting, behavioral law and finance, legal sociology and legal studies.