La rationalisation du parlementarisme se définit comme la constitutionnalisation du principe parlementaire, c’est-à-dire le fait de soumettre complètement la vie politique au droit constitutionnel. C'est le fait de normaliser la vie parlementaire par des règles constitutionnelles pour lutter contre le despotisme du parlement. Cette idée a été prise en compte, dès 1918, par les nouvelles Constitutions Européennes. Plusieurs États arabes s’en sont ensuite inspirés dans leur constitution. Compte tenu de l'importante de cette rationalisation, les constituants se sont préoccupés de renforcer l’exécutif face au parlement et ont tenté de préserver la stabilité du gouvernement face aux embuscades parlementaires. Ce sujet est important, surtout dans un pays arabe comme le Koweït, où l'expérience de la démocratie parlementaire est encore jeune, pour montrer les tentatives constitutionnelles concernant la rationalisation du parlementarisme et la question du contrôle politique. Les constituants koweïtiens se sont efforcés d’établir une rationalisation du parlementarisme concernant la question de contrôle politique du gouvernement afin d’en assurer la stabilité. Cette étude, au regard de l’expérience française permet de préciser les mécanismes de la rationalisation du parlementarisme adoptée dans les deux États. Ces deux états ont opté pour un régime parlementaire, cependant ils diffèrent concernant l’organisation politique dans leurs pays respectifs, ainsi que la mise en œuvre des mécanismes de la rationalisation du parlementarisme. / The rationalized parliamentarism defines itself as the constitutionalisation of the parliamentary principle that is the act of completely submitting the political life to the constitutional law. This idea was introduced in the new European Constitutions as early as 1918. Several Arab States were inspired by it in their constitutions. It meant normalizing the parliamentary life by constitutional rules to fight the tyranny of the parliament. The constitutional competence granted to the parliament, to watch the activities of the government counts among the major principles of the parliamentary system and is a typical element of the relationships between the powers in a parliamentary system. The constituents’ concern resulted in a double effort: to ensure, through constitutional procedures, both the right of the Assemblies to control the government and the political stability of the government. This subject is important, especially in an Arab Country such as Kuwait where the experience of the parliamentary democracy is still young, in order to show the constitutional attempts concerning the rationalization of the parliamentary government and the question of the political control. This study, with regard to the French experience, allows to put some light on the mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarism adopted in both States. These states have both opted for a parliamentary system, however they differ concerning the political organization in their respective countries, as well as the implementation of the mechanisms of rationalised parliamentarism.

Les droits français et allemand ont, par des dispositions constitutionnelles ou des lois d’exception, contribué à l’avènement des régimes autoritaires des années 30 et 40. Et l’on sait qu’à la suite de la seconde guerre mondiale, les attaques se sont multipliées contre la doctrine positiviste, accusée d’avoir favorisé une attitude de passivité à l’égard de l’instrumentalisation du droit par les forces antidémocratiques. C’est pourquoi,à l’encontre de la neutralité des théories juridiques et politiques de l’avant-guerre, il est assez généralement admis depuis que les valeurs de la démocratie méritent d’être défendues, en particulier en distinguant l’état d’exception (légal ou non) démocratique et de l’état d’exception antidémocratique. Or, loin de naître après la seconde guerre mondiale, l’idée d’après laquelle le formalisme juridique rendrait les constitutions démocratiques impuissantes à se préserver de leurs ennemis émerge dès l’entre-deux guerres chez le sulfureux juriste allemand Carl Schmitt. C’est la genèse du déplacement qui conduit à faire de l’état d’exception une question proprement démocratique et substitue à la question du respect de la légalité celle de la préservation de la démocratiequi fait l’objet de notre travail de doctorat. Nous examinons d’abord comment les conflits qui scindent la réflexion juridique portant sur les pouvoirs de crise répondent en France à la crise du parlementarisme en prenant appui sur les travaux de Hauriou, Duguit et Carré de Malberg ; nous montrons ensuite qu’elle correspond en Allemagne à de véritables alternatives opposants des conceptions antinomiques de la démocratie en prenant appui sur les travaux de Schmitt, que nous éclairons par l’étude des auteurs auxquels le juriste fait référence – en particulier Kelsen. / French and German law contributed, through constitutional provisions or laws of exception, to the rise of the authoritarian regimes of the 1930 and 1940s.Following the Second World War, positivist doctrine increasingly came under attack for having induced passivity when law was used to serve antidemocratic purposes.Accordingly, the interwar vision of legal and political theories as neutral gave way to the view that the values of democracy must be defended, particularly by distinguishing between the democratic state of exception (legal or not) and the antidemocratic state of exception.But interestingly, the idea that legal formalism rendered democratic constitutions powerless to protect themselves from enemies was first formulated not after the Second World War, but during the interwar period,by controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt. The genesis of a shift that turned the state of exception into a democratic issue, substituting respect for legality with conservation of democracy, is the object of this work. Drawing on Hauriou, Duguit and Carré de Malberg, we first examine how conflicts over the emergency powers that opposed legal theorists emerged as a solution to the crisis of parliamentary government in France. We then show how in Germany the theory constituted a real alternative to conflicting conceptions of democracy. The works of Schmitt are examined in the light of other authors, particularly Kelsen, to whom he referred.

La présente recherche se propose d'analyser et de comparer les articulations juridiques et politiques réalisées entre le système du gouvernement responsable et la fonction de chef de l'état dans deux républiques européennes très peu étudiées en France, la Grèce et l’Irlande. Il s'agit de tenter d'apporter une contribution à la théorie générale et à la pratique des régimes politiques de l’Europe contemporaine, en plaçant l'attention sur une problématique constitutionnelle majeure dans les républiques parlementaires mais relativement négligée. Malgré la primauté incontestable du gouvernement majoritaire, il n'en reste pas moins qu'il laisse subsister, dans les régimes républicains, des virtualités dualistes longtemps en sommeil, mais que des évolutions récentes paraissent vouloir réveiller ou au moins remettre en question dans certains pays. En d'autres termes, la fonction présidentielle, qui semblait condamnée à une inéluctable neutralisation dans les systèmes dominés par le premier ministre, tend à (re)trouver une vocation sinon gouvernementale, du moins centrale. Par-delà leurs différences structurelles, culturelles et politiques initiales, les constitutions grecque de 1975 (révisée de façon significative en 1986) et irlandaise de 1937 offrent deux exemples permettant de tester l'hypothèse retenue. / The present thesis proposes an analysis on comparative basis of the legal and political articulations that take place between the system of the responsible government and the presidential function in these two parliamentary democracies, not thoroughly studied in France. The aim of this research is a contribution to the general theory and practice of the political systems in modern Europe, stressing out aspects of an important constitutional topic for parliamentary republics which is still relatively neglected. Although the supremacy of the majoritarian government is not put into question, it can be still claimed that within the republican political systems, certain dualist implications, that remained for long inactive, tend to be reactivated again in some countries by recent events. In other words, the presidential function that seemed to be condemned to an inescapable neutralisation within the systems dominated by the political figure of the Prime minister tends to find once again a reason of being, if not governmental, at least central. Beyond their initial structural, cultural and political differences, the Greek Constitution of 1975 (revised significantly in 1986) and the Irish Constitution of 1937 offer two fruitful examples of the constitutional dynamics that could test the above-mentioned assumption.

Isaiah Berlin pensait que la démocratie libérale se fonde sur le pluralisme radical. Érigeant le « scepticisme » en « valeur éternelle », il définissait le libéralisme comme le fait d'accepter les opinions divergentes et « d'admettre que ce sont peut-être vos adversaires qui ont raison ». Dans toute démocratie libérale, ce scepticisme se traduit entre autre par l'existence d'une opposition parlementaire. Au début du siècle dernier, Fahlbeck expliquait que « l'élément permanent » du parlementarisme, « c'est l'antagonisme entre le parti de gouvernement et de l'opposition ». Le juriste Adolf Arndt définissait la démocratie comme « un État avec opposition » : « le rang accordé à l'opposition détermine, dans une démocratie, le rang du parlement ». Alors qu'elle a été reconnue tôt dans les pays anglo-saxons, sur le continent l'opposition est longtemps restée ignorée du droit. C'est pourquoi il convient de voir comment la France et l'Allemagne, deux systèmes continentaux suffisamment proches pour être comparés mais simultanément différents, ont abordé le problème. Si dans un cas comme dans l'autre l'opposition parlementaire est « reconnue », elle ne l'est qu'« imparfaitement ». Dans quelle mesure le droit peut-il encadrer et institutionnaliser l'opposition parlementaire, fruit de contingences politiques ? Afin qu'elle remplisse efficacement ses missions de tribune, de contrôle et de contre-pouvoir, le droit peut-il contraindre l'opposition ? L'opposition parlementaire exerce-t-elle les mêmes fonctions selon que l'on se trouve de ce côté-ci ou de ce côté-là du Rhin ? Par quels canaux ces fonctions tendent-elles, le cas échéant, à être remplies ? / Parliamentary opposition is certainly an evidence of parliamentarism, but it is not easily defined because of its extreme institutional and behavioural variability, to such an extent that constitutional law fails to be realized. This opposition is partially unwritten as its foundation and practice have preceded its the official recognition by strict law. But, by definition, formal law cannot cover all the oppositional phenomenon’s configuration possibilities, as proven by the importance of conventions beyond written law. Despite everything, its institutionalization was finally required. The vocation of constitutional law is indeed to fix fulcrums for political game, but the question of the juridicity of such a phenomenon must be dealt with. The aim of this work consists of underlining the delicate connection between constitutional law and the parliamentary opposition in Germany and France. If law struggles (imperfectly) to capture it, then in return the opposition mobilizes the juridical instruments that are placed at its disposition. However, this relationship is ambiguous, since constitutional law does not limit itself to writing and because some determinant variables have influenced the implementation of juridical texts. Thus the “performance” of the oppositional phenomenon is not assured, even if it was recognized by the law. The examination of the legal significance of the opposing minority tends to reveal the intrinsic tensions of constitutional law and its political character. Far from being purely static, normativy seems to conceal a certain dynamic.Keywords : parliamentary opposition, system of parliamentary government, parliamentarism, constitutional law, parliamentary law, political law, constitutional order.

<p>Oвa диcepтaциje ce бaви законодавнoм функцијoм паpламентa и њeгoвим<br />oднocoм ca дpyгим кoнкpeтним инcтитyциjaмa, кoje пpeyзимajy oд парламента<br />пoвjepeнe мy надлежности, yзpoкyjyjyћи њeгoвy мapгинaлизaциjy. Oвaj пpoцec ниje<br />нoв, aли пocтaje cвe комплeкcниjи. Нa почeткy cy тo билe влaдa и политичке<br />партије, aли ce вpeмeнoм бpoj cyбjeкaтa кojи yгpoжaвajy законодавнy надлежност<br />паpламентa пoвeћaвao. У oвoм кoнкpeтнoм питaњy, парламент ce cyoчaвa ca<br />oзбиљним изaзoвимa, диjeлeћи надлежност joш и ca шeфoм дpжaвe, ycтaвним<br />cyдoм, нeзaвиcним peгyлaтopим тиjeлимa. Нaжaлocт, тy ниje кpaj. Пpoцec<br />eвpoпcкиx интeгpaциja, кpoз eвpoпcкy лeгиcлaтивy, кpeиpao je jeднy нoвy oблacт<br />законодавнe дjeлaтнocти изyзeтe oд надлежности нaциoнaлниx парламенaта.<br />Cнaжнe и вeoмa диcциплинoвaнe политичке партије дoминиpajy, нe caмo<br />политичким пpoцecимa, вeћ и кoмплeтним парламентарним пpoцeдypaмa и њиxoв<br />нapacтajyћи yтицaj yгpoжaвa пoдjeлy влacти кojy ycпocтaвљa ycтaв и пpoyзpoкyje<br />прoблeме y фyнкциoниcaњy парламентa yoпштe. C oбзиpoм нa њиxoв знaчaj, oнe cy<br />y oвoм paдy aнaлизиpaнe кao нeпocpeдни aктep, aли и индиpeктнo, кao чинилaц кojи<br />кoнтpoлишe oдpeђeнe инcтитyциje кoje yгpoжaвajy законодавнy надлежност<br />парламента.<br />Знaчaj диcepтaциje oглeдa ce y тoмe штo oвoj пpoблeмaтици дo caдa ниje<br />пocвeћeнa пyнa пaжњa, кoja yкљyчyje пpoцec eвpoпcкиx интeгpaциja и нeзaвиcниx<br />peгyлaтopниx тиjeлa. Зaкљyчaк кojи cмo дoниjeли нaкoн иcтpaживaњa je дa<br />oчиглeднo пocтojи пoтpeбa за парламентарнoм peфopмoм коja ћe yчинити<br />законодавни пocтyпaк eфикacниjим, a законодавнo тиjeлo cнaжниjим. Гeнepaлнo,<br />cмaтpaмo дa je нeoпxoднo cнaжeњe тpaдициoнaлнe пoдjeлe влacти. Диcepтaциja<br />тaкoђe пpeдлaжe cпeцифичнa кoнкpeтнa pjeшeњa y кoнтeкcтy peфopмe<br />законодавнoг пocтyпкa.</p> / <p>Ova diceptacije ce bavi zakonodavnom funkcijom paplamenta i njegovim<br />odnocom ca dpygim konkpetnim inctitycijama, koje ppeyzimajy od parlamenta<br />povjepene my nadležnosti, yzpokyjyjyći njegovy mapginalizacijy. Ovaj ppocec nije<br />nov, ali poctaje cve komplekcniji. Na početky cy to bile vlada i političke<br />partije, ali ce vpemenom bpoj cybjekata koji ygpožavajy zakonodavny nadležnost<br />paplamenta povećavao. U ovom konkpetnom pitanjy, parlament ce cyočava ca<br />ozbiljnim izazovima, dijeleći nadležnost još i ca šefom dpžave, yctavnim<br />cydom, nezavicnim pegylatopim tijelima. Nažaloct, ty nije kpaj. Ppocec<br />evpopckix integpacija, kpoz evpopcky legiclativy, kpeipao je jedny novy oblact<br />zakonodavne djelatnocti izyzete od nadležnosti nacionalnix parlamenata.<br />Cnažne i veoma dicciplinovane političke partije dominipajy, ne camo<br />političkim ppocecima, već i kompletnim parlamentarnim ppocedypama i njixov<br />napactajyći yticaj ygpožava podjely vlacti kojy ycpoctavlja yctav i ppoyzpokyje<br />probleme y fynkcionicanjy parlamenta yopšte. C obzipom na njixov značaj, one cy<br />y ovom pady analizipane kao nepocpedni aktep, ali i indipektno, kao činilac koji<br />kontpoliše odpeđene inctitycije koje ygpožavajy zakonodavny nadležnost<br />parlamenta.<br />Značaj diceptacije ogleda ce y tome što ovoj ppoblematici do cada nije<br />pocvećena pyna pažnja, koja ykljyčyje ppocec evpopckix integpacija i nezavicnix<br />pegylatopnix tijela. Zakljyčak koji cmo donijeli nakon ictpaživanja je da<br />očigledno poctoji potpeba za parlamentarnom pefopmom koja će yčiniti<br />zakonodavni poctypak efikacnijim, a zakonodavno tijelo cnažnijim. Genepalno,<br />cmatpamo da je neopxodno cnaženje tpadicionalne podjele vlacti. Diceptacija<br />takođe ppedlaže cpecifična konkpetna pješenja y kontekcty pefopme<br />zakonodavnog poctypka.</p> / <p>This dissertation is dealing with legislative parliament function and its relation<br />with other particular institutions that take away stipulated powers from parliament<br />causing his marginalization. This process is not new but it‟s become more complex to<br />deal with. In the beginning there was government and political parties, but during the<br />time, number of actors that threaten the legislative competence of parliament increased.<br />On this particular issue, modern parliament facing difficult challenges, sharing his<br />competence with head of the state, constitutional court, independent regulatory agencies.<br />Unfortunatelly, that is not the end. EU integration process, through the European<br />legislation, creates new area of legislative activity excluded from the national<br />parliaments.<br />Strong and highly disciplined political parties are dominating not only political<br />process but whole parliamentary procedures, and its increasing influence causes further<br />damage to separation of powers that constitution establishes and harms parliament<br />particulary. Considering their impact in this process, they are studied in this work<br />directly, and indirectly &ndash; as an acter that control other particular institutions which<br />threaten legislative competence of parliament.<br />The importance of the dissertation is reflected in the fact that this issue does not<br />have full attention including EU integration process, indepedent regulatory bodies. The<br />conslusion that we made after the research is that obviously there is a need for<br />parliamentary reform which will make law-making process more efficient, and legislative<br />body stronger. Basically, we find it necessary strengthening of the traditional separation<br />of powers. Dissertation also proposes specific solutions in the context of the law-making<br />process reform.</p>

No description available.

Cette thèse explore la continuité entre le Reichstag de Weimar et le Bundestag de Bonn à travers les itinéraires de 34 élus ayant siégé dans les deux chambres. L’élaboration du portrait socio-politique du groupe considéré aboutit au constat d’une diversité fondamentale, mais aussi à l’identification de milieux socio-moraux structurant la vie politique de l’Allemagne impériale. Ces acteurs vécurent différemment leur passage au Reichstag avant 1933, suivant leur parti, leur genre, la date et circonscription de leur élection ou les fonctions qu’ils exercèrent au parlement. La mise au pas du Reichstag et l’effondrement de la République marquèrent un tournant dans leur existence. La recherche des causes de l’échec weimarien les accompagna toute leur vie. Les personnalités étudiées réagirent différemment à la dictature nazie. Si leurs situations varient considérablement entre 1933 et 1945, ces années se résument globalement à une expérience de la perte. Les anciens du Reichstag furent les cibles privilégiées de persécutions visant à briser toute opposition au nazisme. L’expérience de l’oppression les mua en démocrates attentifs et favorisa leur retour en politique dès 1945. La plupart participèrent à la refondation institutionnelle de l’Allemagne de l’Ouest entre 1945 et 1949. Leurs retrouvailles avec le parlement à partir de 1949 furent difficiles dans la mesure où ils percevaient le Bundestag à travers le filtre de leur souvenir du Reichstag. Au Bundestag, ils mirent à profit leur connaissance du travail parlementaire, contribuant ainsi à stabiliser le nouvel État. Certains y perpétuèrent une culture politique forgée avant 1933 qui peut être qualifiée d’« esprit de Weimar ». / This PhD thesis studies the continuity between the Weimar Reichstag and the Bundestag in Bonn from the perspective of 34 representatives who were elected in both chambers. Constructing the socio-political portrait of this group reveals an essential diversity while at the same time leading to the identification of the socio-moral backgrounds that structured political life in imperial Germany. These men and women experienced their time in the Reichstag differently, depending on their party, gender, constituency, the period in question, and the place they occupied in parliament.The neutralisation of the Reichstag and the fall of the Republic marked a turning point in their lives. The question of why the Weimar Republic had failed would follow them for the rest of their lives. The members of this group reacted differently to the Nazi dictatorship. If their situations varied considerably between 1933 and 1945, the period was generally marked by the experience of loss. The former members of the Reichstag were the main targets of Nazi persecutions aimed at opponents of the regime. Living through oppression turned them into considerate democrats and encouraged their return to politics. Most took part in the institutional reconstruction of West Germany between 1945 and 1949. Their reunion with the parliament from 1949 onward was difficult, since they perceived the Bundestag through the prism of their past experience in the Reichstag. In the Bundestag, they built on their knowledge of parliamentary work, thereby contributing to stabilising the new state. Some of them perpetuated a political culture that had been shaped before 1933 and which can be described as “the Weimar spirit”.

[pt] A União Europeia se apresenta como a mais bem sucedida experiência supranacional. Diante do seu inevitável, e necessário, projeto de integração regional, a presente pesquisa tem como objetivo verificar a existência de um déficit democrático em sua instituição parlamentar. Para tanto, serão abordadas as teorias democráticas liberais que dão forma teórica à democracia representativa ocidental, para que se possa fundamentar as instituições que compõem o bloco. Após, serão analisadas as posições quanto à existência do déficit democrático na União, a perspectiva de um constitucionalismo para além do Estado-Nação, a impossibilidade de aprofundamento federalista, e às críticas à abordagem liberal europeísta, para que assim se analise a atuação do Parlamento Europeu como órgão democraticamente legítimo de representatividade supranacional. / [en] The European Union presents itself as the most successful supranational experiment. In view of its inevitable and necessary regional integration project, the present research aims to verify the existence of a democratic deficit in its parliamentary institution. To this end, liberal democratic theories that give theoretical form to western representative democracy will be addressed, so that the institutions that make up the bloc can be founded. Afterwards, the positions regarding the existence of the democratic deficit in the Union, the perspective of a constitutionalism beyond the Nation-State, the impossibility of federalist deepening, and the criticisms of the liberal Europeanist approach will be analyzed, so that the performance of Parliament can be analyzed. European Union as a democratically legitimate supranational representative body.

In February 1914, Sweden faced a time of constitutional crisis, dubbed the Courtyard Crisis, when King Gustaf V publicly distanced himself from Prime Minister Karl Staaff and the Liberal Government over differences of opinion regarding the Swedish defence. Behind this, however, was also a dispute between two different political systems. On the one hand, there was the current form of government based on monarchical rule, and on the other hand, the advancing form of government, a government based on parliamentarism. This thesis is concerned with explaining the tension that arises between, on the one hand, different forms of government, and, on the other hand, aspects of decision making in the process of securitisation. To do this, the thesis uses Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde’s securitisation sectors, though limited to the military, political, and societal sectors, as entry points for the analysis and uses political discourse analysis to analyse the language used by the Left and the Right during parliamentary debates held between 6 and 18 February 1914. The thesis concludes that, though the results were not conclusive, the Courtyard Crisis can be used as an example to explain the tension between different forms of government by showing the difference in ideas between the two powers of state in Sweden and how these affect the decision making in the process of securitisation.

A Revolução Federalista e o ideário parlamentarista remonta à história política do Império do Brasil. Com a proclamação da República em 15.11.1889, a vida política e social modificou-se sobremaneira. A forma de Estado deixou de ser Unitária para ser Federativa, o sistema de governo deixou de ser Parlamentarista para ser Presidencialista, a forma de governo deixou de ser Monárquica para se tornar Republicana. Tais reformas lideradas pelo Marechal Deodoro da Fonseca e por Benjamin Constant depositaram grandes expectativas no povo brasileiro. Todos os males do império projetavam-se na república. Com o tempo, o povo foi vendo, pouco a pouco, que as velhas mazelas que assombravam a vida imperial, rondavam, igualmente, a vida republicana. O sistema eleitoral e as reformas eleitorais não garantiam a plena democracia, tanto que Deodoro e os seus garantiram, artificialmente, a maioria na Constituinte de 1891. O alistamento ainda era forjado, a grande naturalização favorecia os Republicanos Históricos, sendo que a vontade da Nação distanciava-se, cada vez mais, da vontade dos proclamadores da República. A instabilidade política e social era acompanhada pelo abalo econômico. As constantes emissões, a jogatina na bolsa, o encilhamento, a substituição do trabalho servil pela mão de obra livre, a substituição dos velhos liberais e conservadores do Império pela mocidade imberbe da República, toda ela inexperiente, toda ela não versada no serviço público é que passou a gerir a vida pública nos mais diferentes estados da nossa federação. A ala jovem republicana, lotada em importantes cargos administrativos e governamentais, trocou os pés pelas mãos, angariando a raiva das forças tradicionais do Império. O Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, por exemplo, assistiu, durante o Governo Provisório, passar pelo Estado, nada menos que seis Governadores. A instabilidade política era total. A diátese revolucionária prenunciava levantes armados em poucos dias. Parafraseando D. Pedro, Deodoro abandonou o poder, momento em que assina o decreto de alforria do verdadeiro escravo do Brasil. Assume o poder o Vice-Presidente, Marechal Floriano Peixoto, o qual presta apoio político ao Governador do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, o Sr. Júlio de Castilhos. Ambos aliam-se contra o exército libertador de Gaspar Silveira Martins, que havia retornado do exílio e fundara o Partido Federalista Rio-Grandense, no Congresso de Bagé, para fazer frente ao Governo autoritário de Júlio de Castilhos. Travou-se no Rio Grande do Sul uma das mais sangrentas guerras de nossa história. A Revolução Federalista foi um guerra fratricida, que matou mais de dez mil homens. Estes revolucionários liderados intelectualmente por Gaspar Silveira Martins e militarmente pelo General Joca Tavares, Gumercindo Saraiva e Aparício Saraiva, guerrearam por três estados da federação (RS, SC e PR), fazendo a república tremer. Em certos momentos, a revolução parecia que garanharia contornos nacionais, e o Presidente Floriano temia o futuro da República. No governo de Prudente de Morais foi assinado, na cidade de Dom Pedrito, a paz farroupilha, momento em que os maragatos de Silveira Martins e os Chimangos de Júlio de Castilhos apertaram as mãos: estava consolidade, de vez, a República. / The Federalist Revolution and the ideas of Parliamentarism start from the Political History of the Brazilian´s Empire. With the Republic\'s proclamation in 11.15.1889, the political and social life changed substantially. The state form stopped being unitary to be federative, the government system stopped being parlamentarism to be presidentialism, the government form stopped being a monarchy to be a republic. Such reformations, leaded by Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca and by Benjamin Constant created great expectations in the Brazilian people. All the evils of the empire protruded in the republic. Over time, the people started to understand, inchmeal, that the old evils that haunted the empire, also prowled the republican life. The electoral system and the poll reformations do not assured full democracy, so that Deodoro and his cronies achieved, artificially, majority in the 1891´s constituent. The voter registration was wrought, the great naturalization favored the historic republicans, as the nation´s will distinguished increasingly from the will of the republic proclaimers. The social and political instability was accompanied by the economic debacle. The constant issuance of paper money, the gambling on the stock exchange, the encilhamento, the change from the slave work by the free work, the substitution of the old empire´s liberal and conservative politicians by the republic´s beardless youth, all of them lacking experience, without knowledge of the public service, started to manage the public life in the diferent states of the Brazilian federation. The republican´s youth wing, occupying important administrative and governmental positions, created confusion, causing rage by the traditional forces of the empire. The Rio Grande do Sul´s state, for instance, under the Brazilians Provisional government, had no less than six governors. There was a complete political instability. The revolutionary diathesis foreshadowed armed uprisings in few days. Paraphrasing D. Pedro, Deodoro abandoned the power, in the moment in which signs the emancipation decree of the true Brazi´s slave. The vice president, Marshal Floriano Peixoto, assumes the power, and provides political support to the Rio Grande do Sul´s state´s governor, Mr. Júlio de Castilhos. They both allied against the Gaspar Silveira Martins´s liberator army, which had returned from the exile and founded the Rio Grande do Sul´s Federalist Party, in the Bagé´s Congress, to oppose Júlio de Castilhos ´s authoritarian govern. Then happened one of the bloodiest wars of our history. The Federalist Revolution was a fratricidal war, that killed over ten thousand men. These revolutionaries, intellectually leaded by Gaspar Silveira Martins and military commanded by General Joca Tavares, Gumercindo Saraiva e Aparício Saraiva, waged war in three states of the federation (RS, SC and PR), making the republic tremble. In certain moments, the revolution seemed to gain national contours, and the President Floriano feared for the future of the Republic. In the Prudente de Morais presidential government was signed, in the town of Dom Pedrito, the farroupilha peace, when the Silveira Martins´s maragatos and the Júlio de Castilhos´s chimangos shaked hands: the Republic was consolidated, once and for all.