Orientador: Paulo Sérgio de Vasconcellos / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T22:50:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bregalda_MairaMeyer_D.pdf: 1603873 bytes, checksum: 73b64fdd6282e9c3dffd18a7d6f49282 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: Este trabalho objetivou verificar que aspectos de conceitos encontrados durante a época republicana de Roma - como, por exemplo, a glória, a liberdade, a fama etc - se mostram na obra de Sêneca (4 a.C. - 65 d.C.). Constatou-se que a maneira segundo a qual o filósofo constrói essas noções difere da de Cícero (106 - 43 a.C.). Pode-se dizer, seguramente, que Sêneca "interioriza" conceitos que estavam, antes do Império, restritos a um contexto social e político. Para o Estoicismo, o importante é a vida moral dos seres humanos, e é nesse campo de ação que os escritos de Sêneca se desenvolvem. A investigação pretendeu demonstrar o modo como Sêneca trata os conceitos romanos, apresentando, de maneira original, as noções equivalentes gregas. Em sua obra, notadamente nas Epistulae morales ad Lucilium e em alguns Dialoghi - como o De breuitate uitae e o De tranquillitate animi - o filósofo emprega instrumentos linguísticos lexicais e morfossintáticos (esses últimos, de modo mais numeroso) referentes à interioridade. Em Sêneca, não somente os recursos linguísticos como também os imagéticos constituem parte do processo de interiorização. Nosso intuito, neste presente estudo, buscou expor tais recursos na medida em que surgiam juntamente com os conceitos por nós trabalhados / Abstract: This dissertation aimed at ascertaining which aspects found during the republican time period in Rome - for instance glory, freedom, fame, among others - are evident within Sêneca's work (4 BC - 65 AD). It was observed that the way this philosopher goes about building these notions is different from that of Cícero (106 - 43 a.C). One may firmly state that Sêneca "interiorizes" concepts that had been, prior to the Empire, restricted to social and political contexts. To Stoicism, the most important thing is the moral life of human beings, and it is within this field of action that Sêneca's writings are developed. This investigation intends to show the way Sêneca deals with these Roman concepts by showing, in an original way, the equivalent Greek notions. In his work, notably in Epistulae morales ad Lucilium and in some Dialoghi - such as De breuitate uitae and De tranquillitate animi - the philosopher makes use of linguistic instruments such as lexical and morphosyntactic ones (the latter being used more frequently) to refer to interiority. Within Sêneca's work, the process of interiorization involves not only linguistic but also imagery resources. Our goal, in the present study, sought to expose these resources as they emerged along with the concepts we work with / Doutorado / Linguistica / Doutor em Linguística

By combining literary criticism, philology, and contemporary psychoanalysis, this dissertation offers an innovative interpretation of Neronian court literature (Seneca, Lucan, and Petronius). I argue that the works of these three authors thematize and embody a problematic relation between the human subject and language. Language is not conceived or represented as an inert tool that can be easily appropriated by the speaking subject, but rather as a powerful entity that may, and often does, take control of the human subject, directing it from without. Besides analyzing how Seneca, Lucan, and Petronius portray the relation between the human subject and language in the internal plots and characters of their works, I also explore the relation between these three authors themselves and language. My conclusion is that this relation is defined by unresolved ambiguities and neurotic tensions, and I suggest that this might be a consequence of the traumatizing circumstances that the three examined authors endured at Nero’s court.

Cotutelle entre l'Université de Montréal et Sorbonne Université / Zénon de Kition, le fondateur du stoïcisme, a reçu une partie de sa formation philosophique chez le cynique Cratès de Thèbes. Ce contact a laissé une empreinte durable sur l’école stoïcienne, qui a continué d’entretenir des liens étroits avec le cynisme. Ma thèse propose une contribution à notre connaissance de ce rapport entre les deux courants philosophiques en analysant toutes les références au cynisme dans les écrits stoïciens, de Zénon à Marc Aurèle. La première partie de ma thèse recense tous les textes du corpus, cités en grec ou en latin, avec une traduction française. Chaque texte est accompagné d’un commentaire philologique et philosophique. La complexité du rapport que les stoïciens entretiennent avec le cynisme se manifeste particulièrement chez ceux dont les écrits sont bien conservés. C’est le cas de Sénèque, qui offre dans son œuvre philosophique des portraits élaborés de deux cyniques, Diogène et Démétrius, tout en critiquant certains aspects du cynisme. La contribution d’Épictète est encore plus importante, puisqu’il consacre un entretien complet à la vie et au rôle du cynique, et réserve à Diogène une place de premier choix dans son enseignement. Son admiration pour les véritables cyniques contraste avec le jugement sévère qu’il porte sur les faux cyniques de son temps. La deuxième partie de ma thèse analyse en détail trois textes qui font état d’un débat stoïcien sur la possibilité que le sage « cynicise » (D.L., VII 121 ; Cic., Fin. III 68 ; Arius Didyme apud Stob., II 7, 11s). Certains stoïciens refusent que le sage cynicise, d’autres l’acceptent dans certaines circonstances, et d’autres encore, comme Apollodore de Séleucie, considèrent que le cynisme est une voie d’accès à la vertu rapide mais difficile. En établissant un lien entre les portraits du sage et la doctrine des actions convenables, j’analyse le débat à travers la classification morale des actions dans l’éthique stoïcienne. Pour éclairer davantage la position d’Apollodore, je m’intéresse au lien qui l’unit à la doxographie cynique générale (D.L., VI 103-105) et j’examine la signification de l’image de la voie vers la vertu à travers sa genèse et sa postérité. Il en ressort trois caractéristiques fondamentales du cynisme : le rejet des devoirs sociaux, le choix de la pauvreté et le refus des longues études. Pour approuver ce mode de vie, dont les traits sont contraires aux recommandations stoïciennes habituelles, les stoïciens pro-cyniques adoptent une posture de compromis et fixent des limites étroites à l’intérieur desquelles la pratique du cynisme devient légitime. / Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, received part of his philosophical instruction from the Cynic Crates of Thebes. This connection left a lasting imprint on the Stoic school, which continued to maintain strong ties with Cynicism. My dissertation proposes a contribution to our knowledge of the relationship between the two philosophical movements by analyzing all the references to Cynicism in Stoic writings, from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. The first part of my dissertation lists all the texts composing the corpus, cited in Greek or Latin, with a French translation. Each text is accompanied by a philological and philosophical commentary. The complexity of the Stoics’ perspective on Cynicism is made evident in those whose writings are well preserved. This is the case of Seneca, who offers in his philosophical works elaborate portraits of two Cynics, Diogenes and Demetrius, while criticizing some aspects of Cynicism. The contribution of Epictetus is even more important, since he devotes an entire discourse to the life and role of the Cynic, and gives Diogenes a prominent place in his teaching. His admiration for true Cynics contrasts with his harsh judgment on the fake Cynics of his time. The second part of my dissertation analyzes at length three texts that report a Stoic debate on the possibility for the sage to “cynicize” (D.L., VII 121; Cic., Fin. III 68; Arius Didymus apud Stob., II 7, 11s). Some Stoics refuse to allow the sage to cynicize, while some accept it under certain circumstances and others, such as Apollodorus of Seleucia, consider Cynicism to be a quick but difficult path to virtue. By establishing a link between the portraits of the sage and the doctrine of proper actions, I analyze the debate through the moral classification of actions in Stoic ethics. To shed further light on Apollodorus’ position, I explore his connection to the Cynic doxography (D.L., VI 103-105) and examine the meaning of the image of the path to virtue through its genesis and posterity. Three fundamental characteristics of Cynicism emerge: the rejection of social duties, the choice of poverty, and the refusal of extended studies. To endorse this lifestyle, whose features are contrary to customary Stoic advice, pro-Cynic Stoics adopt a posture of compromise and set narrow limits within which the practice of Cynicism becomes legitimate.

The thesis consists of five chapters: the first functions as an overture; the second, third and fourth deal with Plato, Cicero and Montaigne respectively; and the fifth raises some questions. The overture explores the ways in which Odysseus, Lucretius and Seneca approached death, and in the process introduces some obvious distinctions - between death viewed as the act of dying and death viewed as the state of being dead, between the death which comes to everyone and the death which comes to me, between our own death and the death of others - and anticipates certain recurring themes. The second chapter, on Plato, is concerned chiefly with the Phaedo and the question of what is involved in "the practice of death". This entails an examination of related concepts and terminology in the Gorgias and the Republic, and of the whole subject of Platonic myth. The third chapter discusses Cicero's views on death and immortality - both the considered reflections of the philosopher and the spontaneous reactions of the bereaved father - principally as these emerge from the Tusculan Disputations and the letters to Atticus. The fourth chapter approaches Montaigne - his own experiences of death, the relationship between his earlier and later approaches, the tension between his professed Catholicism and his pagan inclinations, the difficulty and perhaps undesirability of extracting a 'message' from the Essais on this or any other subject. The conclusion asks to what extent these various approaches succeed in what they set out to do, and whether any generalised, objective approach to death can ever successfully address the individual predicament, either in relation to one's own death or in facing bereavement.

E' possibile approfondire la conoscenza del pensiero senecano tenendo conto delle conoscenze mediche del filosofo. L'influenza della scuola medica Pneumatica, di ispirazione stoica, consente di dimostrare che le passioni come l'ira non sono per Seneca solo malattie dell'anima, ma sindromi psicofisiche che coinvolgono tutti i livelli dell'individuo, alla luce di un monismo corpo- anima possibile solo alla luce delle dottrine Pneuamtiche. Malattie come la mania e la melancolia, inoltre, hanno un decorso particolare che oltre ad influenzare la visione senecana dell'ira, permette anche di comprendere il carattere apparentemente incoerente di alcuni personaggi delle tragedie (Clitennestra, Atreo, Fedra e Medea), che possono essere considerati traduzioni drammaturgiche di sindromi maniaco- depressive. / It's possible to deepen our knowledge of Senecan thought by considering his medical knowledge. The influence of the Pneumatic school, inspired by Stoic philosophy, makes possible to show that passions like anger are for Seneca not only soul diseases, but also a kind of psycho- physical syndrome that concerns every aspect of the individual in the light of a psycho- physical monism that is possible to understand only through the Pneumatic doctrines. Diseases like mania and melancholy, moreover, have a peculiar development which, influencing Senecan view of anger, let us understand the apparently incoherent features of some characters of the tragedies (Clitaemestra, Atreus, Phaedra, Medea) who can be considered dramatic translations of manic- depressive syndromes

Le phénomène de laïcisation, qui, dans nos sociétés occidentales, cherche à s’affranchir du sacré, a contribué à l’émergence d’une figuration de l’humain au centre de l’univers. Malgré ce progrès, perdurent aujourd’hui, sur le terrain même de la laïcité, des traces du sacré qui induisent des tensions entre foi et savoir. Deux universaux, qui légitimement s’attirent et se repoussent, interrogent plus fondamentalement l’humain, allant jusqu’à remettre en question l’élaboration ontologique dont il a fait l’objet. Un constat qui pose le diagnostic de sa propre fin. En effet, la question de l’anthropos persiste malgré tout à s’articuler à l’intérieur de la tradition de la religion. Si la modernité, notamment amorcée par l’anthropologie kantienne, pose les premières tentatives d’une émancipation du sacré en prônant l’autonomie de la raison, il reste que l’idéal de cet humain, dit laïc, ne renonce pas vraiment au monde de Dieu. Et, pour cause, il se représente toujours sur le terrain de la laïcité en contraste avec l’humain religieux. Cherchant à dépasser les résistances relatives au monde de Dieu, je propose de faire émerger et de se représenter, au travers d’une expérience de la pensée, l’humain laïc par-delà le geste interprétatif imposé par l’institutionnalisation de la religion. Je remonte donc aux premières traces de l’humain qui persistent dans ses testaments, ses métarécits, avant tout humain. Des testaments qu’on pourrait croire oubliés, mais non perdus. Je remonte comme un archéologue de la langue au moment des premières nominations dans l’écriture qui surgissent de la Genèse. À ces Écritures qui, en définitive, viennent aussi rappeler que le syndrome de Babel plonge toujours l’humain dans sa propre dissémination, celle de son nom propre. Surgit la nécessité de se traduire comme une oeuvre, à nouveau, dans sa propre langue, pour survivre. Se traduire, pour « se savoir » humain, plutôt pour « se savoir anthropos ». Pour en comprendre la tâche, j’ai convoqué trois anciens : Paul de Tarse, Sénèque et Clément d’Alexandrie. J’ai scruté et croisé les mises en scène des nominations de l’humain à partir des occurrences du mot « anthropos » et « homo » dans l’écriture en écartant le plus possible le prisme interprétatif imposé par l’institutionnalisation de la religion. Je me suis inspiré d’un dispositif interprétatif stoïcien à partir d’Épictète pour faire surgir, au travers d’une mise en dialogue de ces trois anciens, la traduction d’un humain laïc. Une traduction qui relève d’une anthropologie du bonheur fondée sur la cohérence des disciplines du jugement, du désir et de l’action. Une traduction, certes, mais aussi une expérience d’écriture qui a amené à penser, en dernière instance, qu’au demeurant, avant la lettre, il y a lieu de penser l’émergence d’un anthropos, ni profane, ni sacré, ni religieux, ni laïque, qu’il y a lieu de « se savoir » anthropos. / The secularization phenomenon, which in our western societies seeks to free itself from the sacred, has contributed to the emergence of a human figuration at the centre of the universe. Despite this progress, traces of the sacred that induce tensions between faith and knowledge continue to prevail today within secularization. These two universal concepts, which legitimately attract and repel each other, fundamentally question the human, to the point of putting into question the human’s underlying ontology. An observation that poses its own diagnosis. In fact, the question of the anthropos continues to articulate itself within the tradition of religion. If modernity, initiated by Kantian anthropology, poses the first attempts of an emancipation of the sacred by advocating the autonomy of reason, this idealized secular human does not renounce the world of God. And with good reason, as it is always represented as secular in contrast with the human of the religious sphere. Seeking to overcome all forms of resistance regarding the divine dimension, I propose letting the human emerge and come to be represented by means of a thought experiment that extends beyond the interpretative gesture imposed by the institutionalization of religion. I will go back to the first traces of the human that persist in early documents and texts that precede the concept of human as we understand it. This legacy may have been forgotten, but it was not lost. In the manner of an archaeologist of languages, I return to the first moments of naming in writing that takes place in Genesis. In these writings, which recall the event of Babel that plunges the human into the dissemination of its proper name, emerges the need for the human being to translate itself anew, as a work, in its own language, just to survive. Translate itself in order to know itself as human rather than as "anthropos". To understand the modalities of this task, I’ve brought together the ancient thinkers Paul of Tarsus, Seneca, and Clement of Alexandria. In analyzing these writings, I have scrutinized and cross-referenced the nominations of the human from the occurrences of the words "anthropos" and "homo", while avoiding as much as possible the interpretive prism imposed by the institutionalization of religion. I sought inspiration from a stoic interpretive framework deriving from Epictetus to create, through dialogue with these three ancient thinkers, the translation of the secular human. A translation that stems from the anthropology of happiness based on the coherence of the disciplines of judgment, desire and action. A translation, has ultimately led to thinking that, avant la lettre, before writing, there is a way to think the emergence of anthropos, neither profane, sacred, religous or secular, that there is a way to "know oneself" as anthropos.

Dans le souci de rendre tout homme heureux, le Portique a élaboré une philosophie qui consiste à former à la vertu. A l’instar du socratisme, il a affirmé, lui aussi, que la vertu suffit pour assurer le bonheur. Sénèque, l’un des grands philosophes stoïciens de la Rome impériale, a réduit toute la philosophie à l’éducation de l’âme. Dans son développement, après avoir montré que toute érudition est vaine quand l’homme ne se prend pas au sérieux sur le plan éthique, il a affirmé comme ses prédécesseurs que la quête du bonheur réside dans la vertu qui est « une âme éduquée et instruite, que de perpétuels exercices ont conduite au sommet de la perfection. » De ce fait, il s’agit d’acquérir la sagesse à partir de la réalisation de soi afin de se mettre au service des autres. En bref, le progrès individuel doit nécessairement s’accompagner du progrès social ; et c’est justement dans cette perspective que le philosophe latin a défini la sagesse comme « l’institutrice des âmes, qui n’a pas produit les armes, la fortification, tout ce qui sert à la guerre, mais qui plaide pour la paix et appelle le genre humain à la concorde. » Là, se trouve l’éducation à la vertu, procurant la tranquillité de l’âme, comme la condition nécessaire et suffisante pour bâtir la paix, relativement au fondement de l’éducation à la paix définie par l’Unesco : « les guerres prenant naissance dans l’esprit des hommes, c’est dans l’esprit des hommes que doivent être élevées les défenses de la paix. » Cette paix est conditionnée non seulement par la solidarité humaine et la fraternité universelle mais aussi par l’écologisme que garantissent les principes stoïciens (unité et ordre du monde, sympathie universelle, vertu comme modération, principe d’oikeiosis). Ce qui montre que le stoïcisme de Sénèque est plus que jamais d’actualité et pourrait servir de source d’inspiration au monde contemporain en général et à l’Afrique en particulier dont les valeurs traditionnelles sont en voie de disparition, à cause de l’influence de la culture occidentale, lesquelles cependant sont compatibles avec celles de la philosophie humaniste que constitue le stoïcisme. / In order to make everyone happy, the Portico elaborated a philosophy aiming at training in virtue. Like the socratism, the Portico alleged that virtue is sufficient to ensure happiness. Seneca, one of the imperial Rome’s great stoic philosophers, reduced all philosophy to soul’s education. In his arguments, after having shown that all erudition is vain when man does not take himself serious ethically, said, like his predecessors, that the quest of happiness lies in virtue, "an educated and instructed soul, which perpetual exercises lead to the summit of perfection." Therefore, it is a matter of acquiring wisdom from the realization of oneself so as to be able to be at the service of others. In short, social progress must necessarily accompany individual progress; and it is precisely in this perspective that the Latin philosopher defined wisdom as "the teacher of souls, who has not produced weapons, fortification and all that serves for war but advocates for peace and calls the human race to harmony." It is here that lies education to virtue, providing tranquillity of the soul, as the necessary and sufficient condition for peace-building, in relation to the foundation of education for peace as Unesco posits: "because wars start in people’s mind, it is in their minds that should be erected defences of peace." Peace conditioned by human solidarity and universal brotherhood as well as the ecological policy that stoic principles guaranteed including unity and world order, universal sympathy, virtue as moderation, and the oikeiosis’ principle. Such brings to light how the stoicism of Seneca is more than ever relevant and could serve as a source of inspiration for the contemporary world in general and Africa in particular whose traditional values are in the process of disappearing through the influence of Western culture, which, however, is compatible with the values of the stoicism’s humanist philosophy.

Dans le De constancia sapientis, Sénèque formule le portrait d'un sage que l'injustice et l'outrage n'affectent pas. Selon le Commentaire au livre de la Sagesse de Robert Holkot (OP + 1349), cette description conceptuelle définit la notion de sagesse présente dans le livre biblique. Ainsi, dans les années 1336-1338, le sage stoïcien est-il présenté, dans une exégèse biblique, comme l'exemple même de sagesse. Partant, la thèse s'attache à retracer l'élaboration de cette figure sapientielle au prisme du prologue de ce commentaire biblique. Elle en analyse ensuite l'enjeu conceptuel : la revendication d'un modèle vie chrétien inspiré du comportement exemplaire des philosophes antiques. Dans ce contexte, la figure de Platon acquiert une importance cruciale. Une approche critique de la philosophie comme modèle de vie forme enfin la dernière partie de ce travail. En effet, tant le recours antique et médiéval à l'exemplum que la définition de la philosophie comme manière de vivre prennent appui sur une conception de l'acte moral comme imitation d'un héros (saint, sage, etc.) qu'Immanuel Kant congédie. / In the De constancia sapientis, Seneca portrays a wise man as unaffected by injustice and outrage. For Robert Holkot (O.P., †1349), writing in his Commentary on the Book of Wisdom, this conceptual description defines the notion of wisdom present in the Biblical book of the same name. Thus, in the years 1336-1338, the Stoic wise man appears in a work of Biblical exegesis as the very example of wisdom. This thesis takes as its point of departure the portrayal of the wise man in the prologue to the Commentary on the Book of Wisdom. It then analyses what is at stake: the assertion of a Christian model of life inspired by role models from ancient philosophy. Plato becomes a figure of crucial importance. Finally, the last part of this work consists in a criticism of philosophy as a model way of life. In fact, both the ancient and medieval use of exempla and the definition of philosophy as way of life depend on a conception of moral action as the imitation of a hero (saint, wise person, and so on), a conception dismissed by Immanuel Kant.

No description available.

L'objectif de ce travail est d'étudier l'évolution des vers lyriques à Rome du premier siècle avant J.-C. au premier siècle après J.-C., à travers l'usage qu'en font trois poètes : Catulle (œuvres complètes), Horace (Odes, Chant Séculaire et Épodes) et Sénèque (chœurs non anapestiques de ses tragédies). Ce corpus polymétrique permet d'étudier l'adéquation d'un mètre à un genre ou à une tonalité donnés. À partir d'une étude statistique portant sur les variations du schéma métrique, la fréquence des élisions, l'emploi des coupes, le volume verbal recherché et le rapport entre l'ictus et l'accent, il s'agit de montrer comment s'opère le processus de régularisation du vers entre Catulle et Horace, puis entre Horace et Sénèque, en proposant également des interprétations stylistiques de passages où apparaissent les phénomènes les plus marquants. Le travail est organisé en trois parties, consacrées respectivement aux vers éoliens, aux vers dactyliques et aux vers iambiques. Les résultats obtenus montrent que la régularisation du vers s'opère à travers la réduction du nombre d'élisions, la diminution des mots au schéma atypique ou la raréfaction des coupes originales. Ils mettent également en évidence l'importance des hellénismes dans les particularités stylistiques observées et la possibilité pour Catulle et Horace d'employer un mètre lyrique de façon parodique dans un poème satirique. Enfin, l'utilisation que fait Sénèque des mètres horatiens et la richesse de sa lyrique chorale témoignent du caractère théâtral de ses tragédies, qui ne sont pas de simples illustrations d'idées stoïciennes, mais des œuvres véritablement dramatiques. / The aim of this work is to study the evolution of lyric verse in Rome, from the first century B.C. to the first A.D., through the writings of three poets : Catullus (complete works), Horace (Odes, Carmen Saeculare and Epodes) and Seneca (non anapaestic choruses in his tragedies). This polymetric corpus gives us the opportunity to study how a metre adapts to a specific genre or tonality. We conducted statistical studies on the variations of the metrical scheme, the frequency of elisions, the use of caesurae, the word length and the link between ictus and accent, so as to show how the verse is more and more regular from the poems of Catullus to Horace, and from Horace to Seneca. We also propose stylistic interpretations of passages in which striking phenomena appear. The work is divided into three parts, dealing respectively with aeolic, dactylic and iambic verse. The results reveal that regularization of the verse is obtained by the decreasing use of elisions, words with an atypical scheme or original caesurae. They also highlight the importance of hellenisms in the stylistic particularities observed and the possibility for Catullus and Horace to use a lyrical metre through parody to compose a satirical poem. Finally, the way Seneca uses Horatian metres to create rich choral poetry demonstrates his tragedies are not mere illustrations of stoician ideas but are undoubtedly devised for the stage.