Submitted by Marco Albuquerque (mafalbuquerque@hotmail.com) on 2014-02-19T11:24:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MEGAPROJETOS DE HIDRELÉTRICAS BRASILEIRAS_Um Olhar Sobre Responsabilidade Social Corporativa.pdf: 1672436 bytes, checksum: 932092b356faebfdb296091500ceca21 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2014-02-25T18:53:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MEGAPROJETOS DE HIDRELÉTRICAS BRASILEIRAS_Um Olhar Sobre Responsabilidade Social Corporativa.pdf: 1672436 bytes, checksum: 932092b356faebfdb296091500ceca21 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2014-03-06T17:56:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MEGAPROJETOS DE HIDRELÉTRICAS BRASILEIRAS_Um Olhar Sobre Responsabilidade Social Corporativa.pdf: 1672436 bytes, checksum: 932092b356faebfdb296091500ceca21 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-03-06T17:56:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MEGAPROJETOS DE HIDRELÉTRICAS BRASILEIRAS_Um Olhar Sobre Responsabilidade Social Corporativa.pdf: 1672436 bytes, checksum: 932092b356faebfdb296091500ceca21 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-06 / In a world where the issue regarding the necessity to protect the environment, and where the socially responsible movement is booming, this work came through as a result of the curiosity to understand the binomial economic development versus sustainable development. Aiming to understand how was this relationship evolution in great Brazilian hydroelectric projects. In this context, events surveys during the construction of the Itaipu Dam served as a comparative basis for what is being experienced today in the construction of the Santo Antônio Dam. The fact is that projects of this magnitude will cause impacts and externalities, but understanding how they are being treated is something that can guide the progress of these projects management. Therefore issues such as the preservation of fauna and flora, resettlement and local development, were put on the agenda to verify how today, even with the advance of technology and external pressures on the sustainability issue, the externalities of those projects are still same. The theories presented in Corporate Social Responsibility, sustainable and economic development, in addition to social movements structuring, will serve as basis for understanding the presented issues. It was identified that the sacrifice of a few for the enjoyment of others continues to be one of the main issues to be resolved, and in this we can include the land issue. As well as the non-integration between stakeholders and shareholders to achieve alignment on the best way to enjoy and interact with the environment in which the project will be inserted, the political exclusion of stakeholders on the decision-making process of hydropower projects to be implemented, are also identified. / Em um mundo onde a questão da necessidade de se preservar o meio ambiente e de movimentos socialmente responsáveis em alta, este trabalho surgiu da curiosidade de se buscar entender o binômio do desenvolvimento econômico versus o desenvolvimento sustentável, visando compreender como se deu a evolução desta relação em grandes projetos hidrelétricos brasileiros. Neste contexto, os levantamentos de acontecimentos à época da construção de Itaipu serviram de base comparativa para o que hoje está sendo vivenciado pela hidrelétrica de Santo Antônio. É fato que projetos desse porte vão causar impactos e externalidades, porém como, hoje estão sendo tratadas, é algo que pode nortear o andamento futuro de sua gestão. Por isso, questões como a preservação da fauna e flora, reassentamento e desenvolvimento local, foram colocadas na pauta para verificação de como, ainda hoje, mesmo com o avanço da tecnologia e com pressões externas a respeito da questão sustentável, as externalidades desses projetos são as mesmas. As luzes das teorias apresentadas de Responsabilidade Social Corporativa, desenvolvimento sustentável e econômico, além da estruturação dos movimentos sociais, servirão de base para entender as questões apresentadas. Identificou-se que o sacrifício de poucos para usufruto de muitos continua a ser uma das principais questões a ser resolvida, e neste, inclui-se a questão da terra, assim como a não integração entre stakeholders e shareholders para se conseguir em alinhamento a melhor forma de se aproveitar e interagir com o meio em que será inserido o empreendimento, a exclusão política dos stakeholders do processo decisório sobre os projetos hidrelétricos a serem implementados.

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas / Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:39:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:47:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T17:47:54Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-19T17:59:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100025.pdf: 397727 bytes, checksum: 462bc8ef0184918c4f273ec985521f93 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-16 / The aim of this study is to map the main aspects of corporate governance in Brazil used by publicly traded companies and analyze them from a comparative perspective, contrasting companies that have suffered Private Equity and Venture Capital investment with the remaining public firms. The investigation is a result of the companies that in fact responded to the third version of the Survey on Corporate Governance in Brazil, previously conducted in 2005 and 2007. Analysis of adherence to BM&FBovespa’s corporate governance levels show a significantly greater adherence of the PE/VC backed companies in higher listing levels. Particular characteristics of the corporate governance of companies are detailed in an attempt to determine whether the clear advantage found in the comparison among the premium listing levels extends to other issues. The findings show significant differences in certain areas, i.e. processes of the board of directors, formation of committees, external auditor, shareholders rights, disclosure and compensation of officers and directors, which can be explained by the previous relationship of the backed enterprise, the PE/VC investor and the term sheet agreed upon between the parties.

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas / Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T18:56:35Z No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100022.pdf: 712879 bytes, checksum: 317762f58b96ceaa23a90ce3daeaabd3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T19:02:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100022.pdf: 712879 bytes, checksum: 317762f58b96ceaa23a90ce3daeaabd3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel(gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2011-05-19T19:03:38Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100022.pdf: 712879 bytes, checksum: 317762f58b96ceaa23a90ce3daeaabd3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-19T19:05:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 61080100022.pdf: 712879 bytes, checksum: 317762f58b96ceaa23a90ce3daeaabd3 (MD5) / In this dissertation we provide an overview of the evolution of corporate governance practices in Brazil over time based primarily in Brazilian private firms which responded to the 2005 and 2007 Brazil Corporate Governance (CG) Survey. This study address issues related to the number of independent directors and non-independent, board structure and control of companies, audit committees and fiscal board. Shareholder rights, shareholder agreements, mechanisms for transparency, and transactions with conflict of interest will also be discussed in this work. We found that the evolution of corporate governance practices has been more significant in some areas. However, others are still less adopted by Brazilian companies. Board independence is an area relatively weak: only 13% of companies in 2007, versus 11% in 2005 have 50% or more of independent directors. The number of the companies that provide takeout rights to minority shareholders on a sale of control beyond the minimum required by Brazilian law has increased. There is an increase in formality of board processes, like system to evaluate CEO, CEO succession plan, system to evaluate other officers and materials before meeting. Moreover, financial disclosure has improved considerably during this period. / Nesta dissertação, nós fornecemos um panorama da evolução das práticas de governança corporativa no Brasil ao longo do tempo com base preliminarmente em empresas privadas brasileiras que responderam o Survey de Governança Corporativa no Brasil realizado em 2005 e 2007. Este estudo aborda questões relacionadas com o número de conselheiros independentes e não independentes, conselho de administração, controle das companhias, comitês de auditoria e conselho fiscal. Direitos dos acionistas, acordos de acionistas, mecanismos de transparência e de transações com conflito de interesse, também serão discutidos neste trabalho. Constatamos que a evolução das práticas de governança corporativa tem sido mais significativa em algumas áreas. Todavia, outros ainda são menos adotados pelas empresas brasileiras. Independência do conselho é uma área relativamente fraca: apenas 13% das empresas em 2007, contra 11% em 2005 tem 50% ou mais conselheiros independentes. O número de empresas que fornece direitos de proteção aos acionistas minoritários em uma venda do controle, além do mínimo exigido pela lei brasileira, aumentou. Há um aumento da formalidade dos processos do conselho, como sistema de avaliação de CEO, plano de sucessão de CEO, sistema para avaliar outros diretores e o envio de materiais antes da reunião. Além disso, divulgações de informações financeiras melhoram consideravelmente durante este período.

Text in Afrikaans / Daar is 'n toenemende bewuswording van die noodsaaklikheid van effektiewe beskerming vir minderhede. Die rede vir hierdie toenemende erkenning aan die behoefte aan minderheidsbeskerming is waarskynlik toe te skryf aan die beset dat dit nie alleen die minderheidsaandeelhouers is wat skade ly in geval van benadelende optrede nie, maar ook die ekonomie. Maatskappye word ingevolge die beginsel van meerderheidsbewind bestuur, met die gevolg dat die minderheid onderworpe is aan die wil van die meerderheid. Die minderheid kan hulself hierdeur in 'n onbenydenswaardige posisie bevind, veral indien die meerderheid hul mag aanwend om hul eie belange te bevorder. Gemeenregtelik is die reel in Foss v Harbottle 'n struikelblok vir minderheidsaandeelhouers wat gedingvoering beoog. In 'n poging om die gebrekkige gemeenregtelike beskerming van minderhede te ondervang, is bepaalde statutere maatreels ingevoer. Die evaluasie van hierdie maatreels geskied aan die hand van 'n regsvergelykende ondersoek na verskeie buitelandse stelsels, waarvan die van Nieu-Seeland en Kanada uit staan vanwee die innoverende aard van hul statutere beskermingsmaatreels. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die beskerming wat die Suid-Afrikaanse statutere maatreels aan minderhede bied, onbevredigend is om verskeie redes. Eerstens is hierdie maatreels dikwels te eng bewoord wat daartoe lei dat die aanwendingsveld van die maatreels beperk is. Tweedens hou die maatreels nie tred met ontwikkelings elders in die wereld en veranderende omstandighede en behoeftes in die praktyk nie. Derdens ontbreek goed geformuleerde remedies wat aanvullend tot artikel 252 van die Wet sal wees. Daar is verder bevind dat ad hocwysigings van bestaande maatreels nie die gewenste resultaat gaan bereik nie en 'n algehele hervorming van die Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappyereg word aanbeveel. Ten slotte word konkrete voorstelle in die vorm van konsepwetgewing gemaak en word vergesel van verduidelikende notas. Hierdie wetgewing is hoofsaaklik aan die hand van die Nieu-Seelandse en Kanadese modelle geformuleer. / There is a growing awareness of the need for effective protection of minority shareholders. This can probably be ascribed to the acknowledgement of the fact that prejudicial conduct harms not only minority shareholders, but also the economy at large. Companies are governed by the principle of majority rule; consequently the minority is subjected to the will of the majority. This often places the minority in an invidious position, especially when the majority use their power to further their own interests. The rule in Foss v Harbottle presents a stumbling block to minority shareholder action. Certain statutory measures have been introduced in an effort to counter defective minority protection. These statutory measures are evaluated in the light of a comparative study of several foreign jurisdictions, the most prominent of which are New Zealand and Canada, because of the innovative nature of the measures which they employ. The conclusion arrived at is that, for various reasons, the protection afforded minorities by the South African statutory measures is unsatisfactory. Firstly, the wording of these measures is narrowly construed; this in turn results in a narrow field of application. Secondly, these measures are not in step with developments elsewhere in the world and with the changing circumstances and needs in practice. Thirdly, well-formulated remedies needed in order to supplement section 252 of the Act are non-existent. It has also been found that ad hoc amendments of existing measures will not achieve the required result, and consequently a complete reform of South African company law is recommended. Finally, specific recommendations in the form of draft legislation are made; these are accompanied by explanatory notes. This draft legislation was formulated primarily along the lines of the New Zealand and Canadian models. / Private Law / LL.D.

La rémunération des grands dirigeants a augmenté de façon substantielle ces dernières décennies et a participé à l’accroissement des inégalités par les hauts revenus. Deux typologies pour les actionnaires de contrôle sont proposées pour analyser l’évolution et les pratiques de rémunérations des (P-)DG au sein des grands groupes cotés français. La première typologie se fonde sur l’identité de l’actionnaire et différencie des actionnaires actifs et engagés dans la stratégie de la firme, et des actionnaires passifs ou diversifiés. Parmi ces derniers se trouvent des actionnaires dont la stratégie est essentiellement financière. Les rémunérations sont plus élevées et plus sensibles aux performances de court-terme pour ces derniers. La seconde typologie se fonde sur deux critères : le degré (participation au capital) et l’ancienneté (années d’exercice du contrôle) du contrôle. En s’appuyant sur un modèle de données de panel à effet de seuil (modèle PTR), les politiques de rémunération des dirigeants permettent de différencier quatre régimes dans le degré, et deux dans l’ancienneté du contrôle. Cette typologie différencie les contrôles de type dispersé, influent, dominant et majoritaire, d’une part, et les effets des actionnaires de contrôle récents et de long-terme, d’autre part. L’évolution des rémunérations est enfin étudiée en se fondant sur ces deux typologies et sur une période de 12 années. Au-delà de facteurs liés au fonctionnement du « marché des dirigeants », les typologies mettent en évidence un phénomène de rattrapage et de contagion consécutif à la transparence des rémunérations depuis 2001, et une forte augmentation des bonus sous l’effet de l’augmentation des capitalisations boursières et des transformations de l’actionnariat qui l’ont accompagnée. / CEO compensation rose substantially in the last decades and contributed to the rise in high revenues. Two typologies for the controlling shareholders are suggested to study the evolution and the pay-setting process of CEO compensation in large French listed firms. The first typology is based on the identity of shareholders and differentiates active and involved ones to passive or diversified ones. While the former are involved in the industrial strategy of the firm, the latter comprise shareholders whose strategy is mainly financial. CEO pays are higher and more sensitive to short-term performance in this latter case. The second typology is defined according to two criteria, namely the degree and seniority of control. They respectively refer to the share of equity and the number of years of control. Based on a Panel Threshold Regression (PTR) model, CEO pay policies allows to differentiate four regimes in the degree of control, and two in the seniority of control, namely dispersed, influent, dominant, and majority control on the one hand, and new and long-term controlling shareholders, on the other hand. These two typologies are eventually used to study the evolution of CEO pay over a 12-year period in France. Beyond factors related to the so-called “market for CEOs”, the typologies reveal a catching up and contagion effect since the implementation of transparency since 2001, and a tremendous rise in bonuses that went hand in hand with the rise in market capitalizations and subsequent changes in ownership patterns.

Over the past decades, major changes have been noticed in annual reports. For instance, annual reports have become more comprehensive. Today, corporations can partly decide what to include in their annual reports. This is called voluntary disclosures. Furthermore, corporations chose to disclose pictures, narratives and other graphics material in their voluntary disclosures. This, to give an image of the corporation. Moreover, voluntary disclosures could impact shareholders’ trust towards corporations. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate whether shareholders trust is affected by the voluntary disclosures in annual reports.    The purpose of this study is therefore to examine in what way shareholders have increase trust in corporations based on the voluntary disclosures, including marketing aspects, that corporations publish in their annual reports. Furthermore, corporations view of the voluntary disclosures in their annual reports connected to shareholders trust are also examined.   This study was conducted with a qualitative research method. The empirical findings were collected through semi-structured interviews with both shareholders and listed corporations in Sweden. During these interviews, both shareholders and corporations answered questions regarding their view of the annual report, its voluntary disclosures and trust.   After completing this study, the authors identified parts of the voluntary disclosures that shareholders consider more interesting in trust purposes. For instance, more information about the CEO and managers increase trust among shareholders. Moreover, all shareholders emphasized that transparency and honesty were two factors that have a positive effect on trust. This is something the corporations showed awareness of. They disclose succinct and informativevoluntary disclosures rather than increasingly comprehensive. / Under de senaste årtionden har stora förändringar i årsredovisningen skett. Ett exempel är att de ökat i omfattning. Företag har idag delvis frihet att själva bestämma vad som ska ingå i deras årsredovisning. Denna del kallas för den frivilliga informationen. Vidare kan företag med hjälp av bland annat bilder, berättande text och annat grafiskt material måla upp en bild av sig själva. Detta är något som kan ha en påverkan på aktieägarnas upplevda tillit gentemot företagen. Därför är det av intresse att studera huruvida aktieägarnas tillit påverkas av den frivilliga informationen i årsredovisningar.   Syftet med studien är således att undersöka hur aktieägares tillit påverkas av ökad frivillig information som företag väljer att publicera i sina årsredovisningar. Studien kommer även att undersöka om marknadsföringsaspekter i årsredovisningar ökar aktieägarnas tillit. Vidare kommer det även undersökas hur företag ser på den frivilliga informationen och marknadsföringsaspekterna i deras årsredovisningar som ett sätt att öka aktieägarnas tillit.    Denna studie genomfördes med en kvalitativ forskningsmetod. Därmed samlades studiens empiri in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med både aktieägare och svenska börsnoterade företag. Under dessa intervjuer fick både aktieägarna och företagen svara på frågor gällande deras syn på årsredovisningen, dess frivilliga information och tillit.   Efter genomförd studie har författarna identifierat delar i den frivilliga informationen som anses vara mer intressant i tillitssyfte. Ett exempel är att ökad information från VD:n skulle öka tilliten hos aktieägarna. Vidare pratade samtliga aktieägare om att transparens och ärlighet är två faktorer som påverkar tilliten positivt. Detta behöver inte innebära mer information utan det kan även betyda att det ska vara kvalité på den information som företagen publicerar i deras årsredovisningar. Detta är någonting som företagen även identifierat och satsar därför på att publicera kortfattad och informativ frivillig information i sina årsredovisningar.

Selon les théoriciens de la transparence, qui de tous horizons disciplinaires, en clament les vertus, l’information financière permet l’équilibre, en remédiant à l’asymétrie de connaissances entre l’émetteur et ses dirigeants, d’une part et les destinataires de l’information financière, d’autre part. Elle lève le voile, combat l’opacité, permet la décision et donc, le jeu même du marché. Les économistes parlent alors d’ « efficience informationnelle » car la circulation fluide et rapide des flux d’information en provenance ou en direction de tous les acteurs des marchés boursiers (émetteurs et dirigeants, opérateurs, actionnaires, autorités de régulation, presse, …) permettraient de fournir à tout instant la meilleure valorisation possible des entreprises cotées compte tenu des informations pertinentes publiquement disponibles. Pour ces raisons, de nombreuses réformes ont été opérées ces dernières années afin de multiplier les obligations d’information à la charge des sociétés cotées. Cependant, force est de constater, au vu de la dernière crise financière, que les marchés peuvent ne pas fonctionner efficacement et évaluer correctement la valeur fondamentale d’un actif financier, alors même que les informations relatives à l’actif sous-jacent sont largement diffusées. De là, se pose la question de la pertinence de la transparence des sociétés cotées. / According to theorists of the transparency who of any disciplinary horizons cry out the virtues, the financial information permits the balance by remedying the asymmetry of knowledge between the company and his management on one hand, and the addressees of the financial information on the other hand. The transparency raises the veil, fights the opaqueness, permit the decision and thus, the game of the market. The economists speak then about “informative efficiency” because the fluid and fast circulation of the flows of information in origin or in the direction of all the actors of stock markets (company, management, operators, shareholders, authorities of regulation, press …) would permit to supply all the time the best possible valuation of listed companies considering the publicly available relevant information. For these reasons, many reforms were operated these last years in order to increase the obligations of information towards listed companies. However, we have to admit, in view of the last financial crisis that markets can not work effectively and estimate correctly the fundamental value of a financial asset while the information relative to the underlying asset is widely broadcasted. From there, we have to ask the question of the relevance of the listed companies’ transparency.

This thesis deals with company capital structure, that is characterized according to methods of horizontal and vertical analysis. Then it deals with prices of particular capital items, costs for capital and influeces on business performance, it means with the calculation of economic value added. Theoretical part describes capital structure items in general, prices of particular items of capital, costs for capital and particular methods for EVA calculation, it means both EVA entity and EVA equity. Practical part characterizes individual items of capital structure and application of chosen model, that is the second model for EVA calculation {--} EVA equity {--} on a concrete company. This calculation was processed through benchmarking on websides of Departement of industry and Trade. The model was applicated on a company, that deals with production of motor and joining vehicles, machines production, machineries production and means of transport repairs {--} ČZ, a.s.

O presente estudo versa sobre a conduta de administradores e controladores em contexto oferta hostil, tendo como principal objetivo a análise desta à luz do interesse social e dos deveres fiduciários, buscando, ao fim, comprovar que o Brasil possui um arcabouço legislativo apto a regular tais situações, bem como que a experiência norteamericana pode servir como fator de auxílio na investigação do papel desses sujeitos no referido contexto. / This paper deals with the behavior of managers and controlling shareholders in hostile tender offer context, with the main goal of analyse it in the light of the “proper role of the companies” and the fiduciary duties, aiming, finally, to prove that Brazilian law is able to rule those situations, as well that American experience could serve as a helpful instrument in the search for directors and officers “proper role” in the related situations.

Esta tese tem como propósito o estudo da limitação dos poderes do controlador como mecanismo fundamental de proteção dos demais acionistas que integrem as companhias fechadas, sobretudo no contexto das operações de transferência de controle, nas quais é frequente que os minoritários fiquem impossibilitados de vender conjuntamente suas ações na mesma operação em que o controlador tiver transferido a sua participação a terceiros. A questão possui relevância na medida em que o art. 254-A da Lei das Sociedades por Ações (LSA Lei no 6404/1976) não cuida das companhias fechadas, e a obrigatoriedade da realização de oferta pública decorrente de alienação de controle nele prevista destina-se tão somente às companhias abertas. Na análise do assunto, discute-se a limitação dos poderes do controlador como o núcleo dos mecanismos de proteção das minorias, tendo em vista principalmente que as decisões nas companhias fechadas brasileiras são tomadas, como regra, por uma maioria estável, ficando os demais acionistas em uma posição de mera subordinação às decisões tomadas pelos controladores. É imperativo esclarecer que não se pretende assumir uma posição estanque de defesa dos minoritários, tampouco uma postura de ataque ao controlador. Ao revés, o verdadeiro desafio está em contrabalancear o legítimo poder conferido ao controlador, com os interesses dos minoritários. Para tanto, ao tema é conferido um tratamento de composição de interesses mediante o estabelecimento de limites aos poderes do controlador na exata medida necessária à proteção das minorias, sem, contudo, destronar o predomínio da maioria. Utilizam-se como fontes de pesquisa a literatura revisada nacional disponível em livros, periódicos, jurisprudência, decisões administrativas e na legislação pertinente ao tema. Na escassez de regulamentação substanciosa, complementa-se o estudo com teoria extraída da doutrina e da jurisprudência estrangeiras. / This thesis aims to study the limitation of the powers of the controller as a fundamental mechanism for the protection of the other shareholders that are part of the closely held companies, especially in the context of transfer of control transactions, in which it is common for minority remain unable to jointly sell their shares in the same transaction that the controller has transferred its equity interest to third parties. The matter is relevant as the article 254-A of Corporate Law (LSA Lei no 6.404/1976) does not regulate closely held companies, and the obligation to make public offering resulting from de transfer of control provided in such article is intended solely to publicly held companies. In analyzing the subject, it is discussed limiting the powers of the controller as the minority protection mechanisms core, especially in view of the fact that decisions in Brazilian closely held companies are taken, as a rule, by a stable majority, being the other shareholders in a position of mere subordination to the decisions taken by controllers. It is imperative to clarify that it is not intended to assume a standing position defending the minority, nor a posture of attack the controller. To the contrary, the real challenge is counterbalance the legitimate power given to the controller with the minority interests. Therefore, the subject is addressed in a sense of composition of interests by establishing limits to the powers of the controller in the exact extent necessary for the protection of minorities, without, however, dethrone prevalence of majority. As sources of research are used the national reviewed literature available decisions and pertinent legislation. In dearth of material rules, the study will be complemented with foreign doctrine and case law.