臺灣公民團體監督立法院的行動並不罕見，早在1989年就有公民團體發起立委評鑑的活動，然而學界未曾對此做過系統性的研究。2007年公督盟正式成立後，自第七屆起，公督盟每會期結束後定期公布立委評鑑，引發民眾與不少朝野立委的重視，但也引起名列待觀察名單立委的反彈。本文有兩個層次的研究問題，首先，公督盟究竟如何做評鑑以及他們怎麼看立委評鑑這件事，本文除了分析公督盟的檔案資料外，也深度訪談其成員。公督盟做評鑑的目的希望為選民篩選出好立委，淘汰劣立委，也希望透過監督推動立法院更加透明開放。公督盟實際上在評鑑過程相當嚴謹，卻一直受到國民黨立委的抵制。然而，解決資源有限與強化質化評鑑是公督盟未來急迫的目標。 　　其次，什麼樣特質的立委較為關心立委評鑑？立委又是如何去看立委評鑑？為了解答本研究問題，本文使用質化的深入訪談以及量化的調查研究兩者混合的方法進行分析。在質化分析上，作者發現：國民黨立委普遍對公督盟持有敵意，民進黨立委則較為友善；此外，立委不分藍綠對評鑑指標過於量化表示不滿；同時，個人形象以及連任考量是影響立委關心評鑑的主因，因為選舉時可以加以宣傳政績；不過，立委評鑑看似使許多立委對立法問政較為積極認真，但不少立委卻是以做業績方式應付評鑑，諸如增加提案量、質詢次數以及高出席率等。而在量化分析上，統計模型顯示，區域立委、民進黨籍、重視立法問政、高教育程度以及女性的立委較為關心評鑑；而民進黨籍立委以及女性立委則較積極提供評鑑資料給公督盟；最後，立委關心評鑑的程度與其評鑑成績表現有正相關關係。總結來說，這些發現均說明了公督盟對立委的問政行為多少產生影響力，後續效應值得學界繼續追蹤研究。 / The NGO’s activities of supervision on the Legislative Yuan is not rare in Taiwan. As early as 1989, there were campaigns called “legislator-evaluation (hereafter ‘LE’)” held by a few NGOs. However, there are scarce systematic researches on it. In 2007, many NGOs allied into an alliance called “Citizen Congress Watch, CCW”. Since the 7th term, the reports of LE were regularly published by CCW after the end of each session. The reports of LE not only attracted the public and the legislators’ attentions, but also received serious criticism from legislators listed on the ‘watch-list’. This thesis has two levels of research questions: First level question is how the CCW conducts and treats the LE. I analyzed the archives and interviewed with the members of CCW to understand how and why they conducted the LE. The purposes of CCW are not only to filter out excellent legislators and to eliminate infamous legislators through LE for the electorate, but also to promote the transformation of Legislative Yuan to more transparency by supervision. Actually, the process of LE is rigorous, but the CCW still confronts the KMT legislators’ boycotts. However, under the situation of limited resource, it’s CCW’s urgent problem to solve and to reinforce the qualitative indicators. 　The second level questions intend to discern the characteristics of legislators more concerned about the LE, and how the legislators regard the LE. I combined the methods of in-depth interview and survey on legislators and their assistants. From the in-depth interview, I have several findings: First, because of suspicion on the CCW’s stand towards to the DPP, the KMT legislators are hostile to the CCW; in contrast, the DPP legislators are friendly to it. However, both the KMT and the DPP legislators are unsatisfied with the ways of conducting LE because it overly weights on quantitative indicators. In addition, the reasons legislators care about the LE is mainly due to their values on personal image and re-election considerations. Last, it seems that legislators had become more actively participating in the legislative process because of the LE. Actually many legislators purposefully cope with it by “upping grades”—the number of proposals, interrogations, and the attendance rates were magnified or boasted by the legislators. Also, my hypothses are verified. From the statistic model, it shows that district legislators, the DPP legislators, those who emphasize on legislative affairs rather than constituency service, and the females, are more concerned about the LE. Besides, the DPP and the female legislators are more willing to offer documents for LE to the CCW. In addition, there is a positive relationship between the degrees of legislators’ concern and their grades of LE. In conclusion, these findings imply that the CCW has more or less influence on legislators’ legislative behaviors. It worths conducting follow-up studies in the future.

The well-known outcome of the 1988 federal election – a Conservative Party majority in Parliament and an effective “yes” to the question of whether or not the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States was desired – tends to obscure the importance of the process by which a large non-party based opposition movement sought to cultivate and organize the public’s understanding of the election’s central premise. While the opposition movement failed to have Prime Minister Brian Mulroney removed from power, the discursive process that the movement both created and was the driving force behind, is key to understanding the historical context of the debate over free trade itself. This thesis will illustrate that there existed a discursive process amongst the efforts of the anti-free trade movement from 1985-1988 to cultivate, organize, and mobilize public opposition to Mulroney’s neo-liberal economic policies, through re-framing those objections into a larger and more deeply-rooted Canadian historical narrative. A discourse analysis was conducted using the various public education materials produced by major anti-free trade civil society organizations in Canada. The examination of that discourse revealed three major stages in the overall process: First, organizations relied heavily on classic paradigms of an anti-continentalist narrative to reinforce what was different between the two countries creating an us and them paradigm and building a case for Canadian exceptionalism. Second, there was an intensification of the us and them language into a more defined us versus them, or them against us, dichotomy. Third, the anti-free trade movement sought to effectively translate the previously established civic opposition into pragmatic political action in preparation for a national election campaign. The results show that there was an evolution in the ways members of the civil society opposition framed and evolved their arguments in order to turn their “issues” into more of a “crisis.” By employing (and expanding on) discursive tools used within that public narrative to generate fear of the other to validate illusions of self, and to construct believable threats to the collective, the more “micro” discussion over the growing pervasiveness of neo-liberalism took on a hyper-nationalistic and symbolic routine, one that mirrored the iconic political and electoral debates in 1891 and 1911, both of which had also been based upon the potential for free trade with the United States. Most of all, the evidence points to a popular opposition movement against free trade, which not only significantly pre-dated the official political opposition, but in some respects created its message and focus.

La présente étude porte sur le contentieux entre les branches législative et exécutive du pouvoir fédéral américain relatif à la légitimité de l'utilisation des pouvoirs de guerre. Il s'agit d'un examen de l'inertie relative du Congrès des États-Unis vis-à-vis des initiatives unilatérales de l'administration Clinton dans le cadre de la participation américaine au conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovine entre 1992 et 1996. Cette analyse documentaire cherche à expliquer à l'aide de deux variables la passivité des 103e et 104e Congrès relativement à la réaffirmation de leurs prérogatives constitutionnelles. Nous débutons par une mise en contexte du contentieux. Il est ainsi question des visées de la Constitution américaine, de certaines dispositions du document, de l'évolution juridique et historique du débat au cours du XXe siècle et de l'impact de l'institutionnalisme international sur la conduite des affaires militaires. Après avoir présenté de façon exhaustive le débat sur l'utilisation unilatérale de la force par la présidence dans le contexte du conflit en ex-Yougoslavie, nous présentons une analyse factorielle de l'inertie de la branche législative. Dans un premier temps, une variable permanente, la coutume, nous permet de comprendre l'impact de l'héritage historique, juridique et politique du XXe siècle sur les perceptions et positions des membres de chacune des branches du pouvoir fédéral par rapport à l'utilisation de la force. L'évolution de la culture politique dans le temps, l'usure institutionnelle, le rôle des tribunaux et de la jurisprudence et certaines nouvelles pratiques relatives à la bureaucratie sont ainsi présentés. Dans un deuxième temps, une variable particulière explique les raisons conjoncturelles et structurelles à la base de l'attitude du Congrès dans le cadre du conflit bosniaque. Cette variable comporte d'abord l'impact du facteur électoral et de la donne partisane. Par la suite les conjonctures nationales et internationales sont examinées. Finalement, le leadership au sein du législatif et de l'exécutif constitue le dernier facteur composant la variable particulière. La grille d'analyse élaborée permet ainsi de comprendre la passivité des 103e et 104e Congrès par rapport aux initiatives unilatérales de l'administration Clinton en regard du conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovine. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : États-Unis, Congrès, Président, Pouvoirs de guerre, Bosnie-Herzégovine

香港在西元1997年7月1日正式脫離英屬殖民地，回歸中國成為中華人民共和國領土的一部分，為了維持香港的穩定繁榮，中共以一國兩制、港人治港做為治港方針，並以中國憲法及在1990年通過並推行香港特別行政區基本法相關條例作為法律依據，給予港人高度自治的權力。 基本法推行至今業已九年，九年當中，中國最高立法機關全國人大常委會對基本法當中的模糊地界先後進行了包括「居港權案」、「雙普選案」以及「特首任期」案等三次釋法；人大釋法雖是寫入中華人民共和國憲法與基本法當中的合理權力，但在這三次釋法的過程中，仍存在有釋法的合法性、與中央是否干涉香港自治的爭議，這些爭議引起香港各界極大的討論，同時也影響了港人對一國兩制在港推行的信心。 香港特區基本法是以中國憲法做為依據的，其法律地位從屬於憲法，換言之，香港特區的自治權乃是由國家主權所派生出之地方自治權利。然而，所謂「一國兩制」，其最高原則就在於所謂「高度自治」之精神，因此，三次主要由北京當局主導的釋法行動難免引發中央過度干涉香港事務的疑慮，本文針對三次人大釋法之源起、內容、過程、及其所引發的爭議為主軸，試圖釐清中共中央是否意圖箝制香港的自治權限、抑或相關爭議只是港人過度恐慌所致？此外，特區政府與特區行政長官在釋法的過程當中又扮演何種角色？他們是否曾如實地反應民意？或者只是積極地配合中央，在相當程度上放棄自我管治的權利？這都是文中所欲釐清的焦點。撰者寄望能由本研究看出中共所大力宣揚的思想成就──「一國兩制」是否真能確實落實，也可為台灣在思考對中國大陸政策時更具體的思考方向。 關鍵詞：香港、基本法、一國兩制、人大釋法、中港關係 / Hong Kong has been a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1997, it maintains a high degree autonomy except it matters of defense and foreign affairs. It has well-established institutions that support the rule of law and vigorous civil society by the Basic Law. The Basic Law has been published in nine years. During this period, The Standing Committee of PRC’s National People’s Congress (NPC) has been approved to interpret the law for three times. Although the interpretation rights of The Standing Committee of NPC is undeniable, those moves are still causing a great deal of concerns---such as the validity of judicial procedure of interpretations and whether the PRC government interfere with the Hong Kong’s autonomy affairs or not, and so on…. Those controversial issues are not only causing a huge controversy over Hong Kong society, but also lower people's confidence in “one country, two systems”. If the Standing Committee of NPC’s thrice interpretation actions were just reflecting part of NPC membership’s opinions and Bejing’s will but totally disregarded of the view of the Hong Kong people. It will not only cripple the power of legal interpretation of Hong Kong’s judicial body. And even worse, it might cause Hong Kong’s judicial system towards to the mainland one. Meanwhile, by vesting power jointly with Bejing and the HK chief executive, the mainland authorities have succeeded in bring public opinions in HK under their thumb. This essay is aimed at the thrice interpretations, including the source, contents, process and the following issues. The NPC interpretations will have a deep impact on the development of HK’s judicial and political system. I believe, by observing the following situation after the interpretations in the HK, we will have a better understanding of the “one country, two systems”. Keywords：Hong Kong, Basic Law, One country two systems, the NPC interpretations, National People’s congress.

Vom 23. bis 25. Juni trafen sich Musikwissenschaftlerinnen und Musikwissenschaftler aus ganz Deutschland, Italien, Polen, Tschechien, der Schweiz, den USA und Australien zum Kolloquium „Das Instrumentalrepertoire der Dresdner Hofkapelle“ in der SLUB Dresden.

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Die Studie widmet sich dem heutigen Musikleben in Ägypten und legt den Schwerpunkt auf die Stadt Alexandria. Obwohl alle großen Einzelereignisse, die im 20. Jahrhundert zur Entwicklung der ägyptischen Musik beigetragen haben, in Kairo stattfanden, besteht auch in Alexandria ein breitgefächertes Musikleben, das alle musikalischen Entwicklungen dieses Jahrhunderts aufgesogen und trotzdem eine individuelle Prägung entfaltet hat. Auf einen historischen Abriss zur Geschichte der ägyptischen Musik im 20. Jahrhundert folgt eine Bestandsaufnahme der Musikszenen in Alexandria, wie die Verfasserin sie ihm Jahre 2013 selbst erlebt hat. / The study deals with music in Egypt today with particular emphasis on the city of Alexandria. Even if the major events that contributed to the development of Egyptian music in the 20th century took place in Cairo, there is a wide range of musical life in Alexandria that has absorbed all the musical developments of the last century while retaining its individual character. A historical overview of Egyptian music in the 20th century is followed by a survey of the music scene in Alexandria as experienced by the author in 2013.

L'influence du président de la commission du Sénat américain sur les Relations extérieures (Senate Foreign Relations Committee ou CSRE) a-t-elle inéluctablement diminué depuis 1945? Le président de la CSRE joue-t-il toujours un rôle déterminant dans la formulation et la conduite de la politique étrangère américaine? Ces questions animent plusieurs experts du Congrès des États-Unis et guident notre thèse. Décrivant l'expérience de quatre sénateurs qui ont occupé la tête de la CSRE depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, soit Arthur Vandenberg (1947-1949), J. William Fulbright (1959-1975), Jesse Helms (1995-2001) et Joe Biden (2007-présent), nous recourons à une approche récente de la politique intérieure américaine - l'étude du développement politique américain (American Political Development) - pour formuler trois conclusions à propos de l'influence du président de la CSRE sur la politique étrangère américaine après 1945. D'abord, les experts du Congrès ont tort d'affirmer que l'impact du président de la CSRE sur la politique étrangère n'a cessé de diminuer depuis 1945. Non seulement ces experts n'offrent-ils pas d'indicateurs précis pour mesurer le déclin du président de la CSRE, mais nos propres indicateurs et observations contredisent leur thèse linéaire et simpliste. Vandenberg, Fulbright, Helms et Biden se sont effectivement démarqués par rapport aux autres sénateurs qui ont occupé la tête de la CSRE depuis 1945, ce qui mine l'argument voulant que l'influence du président de la CSRE a décru de manière inéluctable. Ensuite, à l'aide d'une approche à trois niveaux d'analyse, nous utilisons les cas de Vandenberg, Fulbright, Helms et Biden pour développer une théorie de l'influence du président de la CSRE. À notre avis, les expériences de ces quatre sénateurs sont comparables et démontrent que les présidents de la CSRE qui marquent le plus l'histoire possèdent les trois caractéristiques suivantes, sans exception: a) ils dirigent la CSRE lors d'une période cruciale de la politique étrangère américaine, c'est-à-dire lorsqu'un événement international d'envergure les incite à s'imposer dans les débats à Washington (niveau international); b) ils oeuvrent dans un environnement institutionnel et sociétal qui favorise leur réussite (niveau national); et c) ils ont les intérêts, les aptitudes et les convictions nécessaires pour exercer un fort leadership au Congrès et face au président américain (niveau individuel). À notre avis, l'histoire se souvient moins des autres présidents de la CSRE parce qu'ils ne répondaient pas à un ou à plusieurs de ces critères. Qui plus est, notre thèse porte à croire que les présidents de la CSRE qui risquent le plus de marquer la politique étrangère à l'avenir sont également ceux qui rempliront ces trois conditions. Enfin, faisant la distinction entre les actions législatives (introduction de projets de loi et d'amendements, adoption des budgets, votes législatifs, etc.) et non législatives (apparitions télévisuelles, lettres au président américain, conférences publiques, etc.) du président de la CSRE, nous démontrons que les experts du Congrès ont tort de croire que l'influence législative des sénateurs est plus importante que leur influence non législative. Certes, l'influence législative permet au président de la CSRE d'exercer un poids plus significatif et direct sur la politique étrangère que les apparitions télévisuelles, sites Internet ou encore discours au Sénat. Or, les présidents de la CSRE n'ont pas le choix de recourir aux outils non législatifs pour garantir l'adoption de leurs projets de loi. L'influence non législative est donc un préalable à l'influence législative. À ce titre, Fulbright, Helms et Biden ont marqué l'histoire parce qu'ils ont su faire preuve d'innovation: ils ont créé de nouveaux outils non législatifs qui, comme les apparitions télévisuelles, les manoeuvres dilatoires et les apparitions sur Internet, ont permis au président de la CSRE de continuer à s'imposer dans les débats à Washington malgré l'avènement de la « présidence impériale » et l'évolution du contexte socio-politique américain. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Congrès des États-Unis, Sénat des États-Unis, Commission du Sénat sur les Relations extérieures, Politique étrangère des États-Unis, Politique intérieure des États-Unis, Arthur Vandenberg, J. William Fulbright, Jesse Helms, Joe Biden.

After its banning in 1961 the ANC, together with the South African Communist Party, adopted the armed struggle. Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) was formed and had its debut in December of the same year. When the MK command was arrested at Rivonia outside Johannesburg most of the remaining members went into exile. The banning of the ANC forced the members not just to go underground but also to go into exile and their first haven was the newly independent Tanzania. The 1960's witnessed the flight into exile of most members of the organisation. In Tanzania, members of the ANC and MK came into contact with members of other liberation movements, including the liberation movements [Tom Portuguese Africa. As the 1960's progressed MK was responsible for training recruits in various African countries, most notably in Tanzania and Zambia. In 1967 they launched their first major campaign, together with the Zimbabwe People's Union (ZAPU), into southern Rhodesia in an effort to reach South Africa. The campaign failed and several members were put in prison in Bechuanaland. On their release some of the cadres, amongst them Chris Hani, voiced criticism of the leadership. This criticism was expressed just as the leaders of the organisation gathered for their first major conference in exile, the Morogoro conference in Tanzania At Morogoro the emphasis on armed struggle was affirmed, and it was agreed that the other pillar supporting the struggle would be international relations. After the Morogoro conference MK continued to train recruits in Zambia and Tanzania, but the situation was increasingly difficult as internal problems in these countries led to the expulsion of several liberation movements. In 1974 a new wave of South Africans went into exile, and at the same time the liberation war in Portuguese Africa entered its last phase. When Angola became independent the ANC began negotiating with the new government about the possible establishment of new training facilities for MK in Angola. When the students of Soweto went into revolt, reacting against the introduction of Afrikaans as the main language in their schools, the ANC, the MK command and their rivals the PAC were taken aback. The first wave of new recruits was flown to Tanzania before they were re-routed to Luanda In Angola they were sent to the southern parts of the country, to Benguela and later to Nova Katengue. By 1979 nine camps had been established in Angola: there was a transit camp outside Luanda, and camps at Benguela, Nova Katengue, Gabela, Fazenda, Quibaxe, Pango, Camp 32 (Quatro) and Funda The main camp was Nova Katengue. The camp got the nickname of University of the South because of the emphasis there on ideological, political and academic courses. But one episode of attempted food poisoning and later the bombing by the South African Air Force focused attention on the need for internal security in the camps, and a Security Department took shape in the region. After the bombing which left Nova Katengue flattened to the ground, MK left their southern camps; a series of meetings took place in Luanda which resulted in a revised strategy outlined in "the Green Book". In 1979 MK participated in a second campaign together with ZAPU; as the attempt to reach South Africa was once again unsuccessful most of the participants found themselves back in the Angolan camps. This failure, together with the degrading conditions in which the cadres were living, fuelled a spiral of discontent in the camps. The food was sparse and the sanitary conditions were bad. A feeling of stagnation spread among the cadres, who were disillusioned at the bleak prospect of infiltrating back into South Africa. In the beginning of the 1980's the roads between Luanda and the eastern camps around Malanje, Caculama and Camalundi became unsafe as the South African-backed UNITA guerrillas increased their attacks. MK forces were deployed around the town of Cacuso to guard the railway line and secure the safety of the road, and this deployment aggravated the dissatisfaction of the cadres. At the end of 1983 some members of the security department beat a sick cadre to death. This triggered off a mutiny in some of the camps. The leadership defused this, the first in a series of mutinies. In 1984 a second mutiny took place in Viana The mutineers elected a Committee of Ten to forward a set of demands to the leadership. But the leadership was not ready to listen and the Angolan presidential guard quelled the mutiny. When a third mutiny erupted in Pango three months later no demands were made and no committee was elected, but the Pango mutiny was more violent. After the disturbances at Viana but before the Pango mutiny, a commission had been sent out from Lusaka to find the reasons for the uprising. The commission found that the main reasons were the deteriorating living conditions, the lack of proper health services and the deployment on the eastern front. Later reports came to similar conclusions regarding the reasons for the mutiny. However, the reports differ regarding the degree of punishment used in the region after the mutinies. The Committee of Ten was imprisoned after the mutinies. However preparations were made to meet their main demand, which had been for the calling of a national consultative conference and in 1985 the Kabwe conference took place in Zambia. Some restructuring of the organisation and army took place and the much criticised Security Department was made accountable to the leadership. Life in the Angolan camps continued much as before but efforts were made to provide some vocational training and better health services. The deployment on the eastern front came to an end, but soon MK came under attack on the roads between Luanda and their northern camps. The attacks intensified as other forces in Angola gathered around the south central town of Cuito Cuanavale, and eventually the siege of Cuito Cuanavale forced the South African regime to the negotiating table. After the siege the Namibia Agreement was signed. One of the terms of the agreement was that MK had to leave Angola and search for new havens, and in 1989 and 1990 most of the cadres were flown to Uganda. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

The well-known outcome of the 1988 federal election – a Conservative Party majority in Parliament and an effective “yes” to the question of whether or not the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States was desired – tends to obscure the importance of the process by which a large non-party based opposition movement sought to cultivate and organize the public’s understanding of the election’s central premise. While the opposition movement failed to have Prime Minister Brian Mulroney removed from power, the discursive process that the movement both created and was the driving force behind, is key to understanding the historical context of the debate over free trade itself. This thesis will illustrate that there existed a discursive process amongst the efforts of the anti-free trade movement from 1985-1988 to cultivate, organize, and mobilize public opposition to Mulroney’s neo-liberal economic policies, through re-framing those objections into a larger and more deeply-rooted Canadian historical narrative. A discourse analysis was conducted using the various public education materials produced by major anti-free trade civil society organizations in Canada. The examination of that discourse revealed three major stages in the overall process: First, organizations relied heavily on classic paradigms of an anti-continentalist narrative to reinforce what was different between the two countries creating an us and them paradigm and building a case for Canadian exceptionalism. Second, there was an intensification of the us and them language into a more defined us versus them, or them against us, dichotomy. Third, the anti-free trade movement sought to effectively translate the previously established civic opposition into pragmatic political action in preparation for a national election campaign. The results show that there was an evolution in the ways members of the civil society opposition framed and evolved their arguments in order to turn their “issues” into more of a “crisis.” By employing (and expanding on) discursive tools used within that public narrative to generate fear of the other to validate illusions of self, and to construct believable threats to the collective, the more “micro” discussion over the growing pervasiveness of neo-liberalism took on a hyper-nationalistic and symbolic routine, one that mirrored the iconic political and electoral debates in 1891 and 1911, both of which had also been based upon the potential for free trade with the United States. Most of all, the evidence points to a popular opposition movement against free trade, which not only significantly pre-dated the official political opposition, but in some respects created its message and focus.