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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

立法院預算審議制度之研究 / A Study of the Budget Approval System in the Legislative Yuan, R.O.C

廖文正, Liaw , Wen-Jeng Unknown Date (has links)
本文之目的在探討我國立法院預算審議制度實務運作現況以及改革方向。以立法院審議九十二年度中央政府總預算案程序為經,相關審議法律規範為緯,分析探討預算審議制度、過程及結果。首先經由預算審議制度之理論及相關文獻進行探討,接著分析我國預算審議制度及實際運作情形,並以主要民主國家美國、日本及英國預算審議制度作探討與比較,最後依據對學者與專家深度訪談意見之彙總分析,提出檢討及強化立法院預算審議制度之建議。結果發現現行立法院預算審議制度之缺失:□委員會未建立資深專業制;□黨團協商存有組成門檻過低,無法反映各政黨在院會的代表性、延擱總預算案審議之時程、黨團協商紀錄只有結論而無過程致立法原意難以查考、黨團協商代表未貫徹利益迴避原則、黨團協商結論凌駕委員會之決定,致損害委員會之預算專業審查功能;□立法委員質詢偏離預算審查議題;□審查預算案未掌握審查重點及審查方式;□全院各委員會聯席會議審議預算功能不彰;□預算委員會委員游走各委員會參與預算審查之表決,影響專業預算審查;□預算審查之專業幕僚單位,有待強化;□預算書編製不夠詳實,預算資訊不夠公開與透明化,影響預算審議效率;□未能如期完成總預算案審議,影響預算執行進度。爰針對缺失提供下列建議:強化委員會專業預算審查機制,以強化其專業性及權威性;立法院預算審議要掌握預算重點;取消全院各委員會聯席會,以增加委員會審查時間;黨團協商機制之改進;強化專業的預算審查幕僚機構;預算編製內容應清晰詳實,預算資訊要公開透明;公開真實政府債務資訊,積極面對並處理。 / This paper is to study the current budget approval system and its possible reform in the Legislative Yuan, ROC. The budget approval system, process and outcomes were analyzed based on the 2003 Government Budgetary and related regulations.The assessments and enhancement suggestions to the budget approval system in the Legislative Yuan of ROC were based on the in depth study of public budgeting theories and literatures on the ROC’s current budget approval system and practice , on the comparative analysis of the budget approval systems of USA , Japan and the United Kingdom and interview with the scholars and budget professions. Some shortcomings of the budget approval system in the Legislative Yuan of ROC were found out. First , the committees don’t build up the seniority professional system. Secondly , the negotiation among different parties has some defects : the low threshold of the negotiation results in unequal representatives of different parties ; the slow process of the negotiation delays the budget approval timetable ; it’s hard to trace the purposes of legislation since it only includes conclusions with no records of discussion process ; the negotiation representatives do not avoid the interests conflicts ; and the conclusion of the negotiation can exceed the decisions made by the committees , damaging the professional function of the committee’s budget approval. Thirdly , the interpellations of the legislators are not related to the issues of the budget approval. Fourthly , the legislators do not dominate the main points and the methods of the budget approval. Fifthly , the function of the Joint Session of All Committees doesn’t perform well. Sixthly , the legislators of the Budget and Final Accounts Committee engage in the budget approval votes of other committees , and it will influence the professional image of the legislators. Seventhly , the professional staff department of the budget approval need to be expanded and enhanced. Eighthly , the budget approval process can be more effective if the budget books are more detailed and the related information is more public. Finally , the delay of the budget approval timetable will impact the execution gradation of the budget. Possible suggestions to overcome the shortcomings are presented as follows : The professional mechanism and the authority of the committees’ budget approval need to be strengthened. The Legislative Yuan should be able to catch up the key points of the budget in the process of the budget approval. The Joint Session of All Committees should be cancelled so that the committees can have enough time to proceed the budget approval. The mechanism of the negotiation among different parties should be improved. The staff department of the professional budget approval should be expanded and its function should be enhanced. The contents of the budget books should be clear and detailed and the information of the budget should be public. Finally , the government should proclaim the real information of the government debts and handle it more aggressively.
2

國會中政黨的立法聯合--第三屆立法院的探討 / Legislative Coalition of Congressional Parties:The Third Legislative Yuan

吳宜蓁, Wu, Yi-Chen Unknown Date (has links)
過去對於國會中政黨的研究,多限於探討政黨體制的制度面,或偏重於從國會議員的角度闡述政黨對國會議員行為的影響力,本研究則是試圖突顯政黨身為動態立法過程中的重要政治行動者,必須採取各種行動與策略,整合自身成員的力量,與他黨進行立法聯合互動,以達成特定目標。 本研究主張政黨在進行各種立法聯合時,乃以其選民基礎及其在特定議題上的立場為主要考量,同時在面對實際立法情境時,亦須將因政黨本身資源有限所導致的立法限制,及政黨為表現善意或獲取自身利益而與其他政黨進行立法交換等因素一併加以考量,如此方能更精準地推估立法聯合的可能情況,並完整地描繪出政黨在多元動態的立法過程中所扮演的政治行動者角色。研究結果顯示,政黨在各類法案上確實受上述因素影響而出現不同的立法聯合狀態,如:大陸定位問題類法案即因其涉及的選民基礎及特定議題相當明確,而每呈國新兩黨與民進黨對立的局面。 本研究以政黨的選民基礎與在特定議題上的立場此兩項政黨的基本考量,連結政黨在選舉中的競爭態勢與其在國會中的立法聯合表現,彌補過去研究較少論及國會中政黨競爭的缺憾,有助於對政黨競爭互動的實際情況進行更全面、連貫且深入的瞭解與詮釋。 / Most previous studies on congressional parties concentrate either on institutions of party system, or on the effects that a party could have on individual legislators' behavior, predominantly from the legislators' aspect. However, this research aims to emphasize that the parties are the important political actors in the dynamic legislative process, during which they must adopt some valid actions and strategies, integrate their members' strength, and form legislative coalitions with other parties in order to reach particular political goals. When parties form legislative coalitions, they must consider their bases of constituents and their positions in particular issues. At the same time, they must consider the legislative restrictions caused by their limited resources and the possible legislative exchange with other parties in order to show their benevolence or to accomplish their self-interest goals. The author strongly believes that this is an appropriate method through which people may get a whole picture of the role that the parties play in the complex and dynamic legislative process. The research findings show that the bill categories influenced by the factors stated above as to have different styles of legislative coalitions. For instance, when a bill concerning the status of China is raised, the legislative coalition of the KMT, aligning with the New Party, against the DPP is ineluctable, because their bases of constituents and their positions in particular issues are clear and definite. This research is based on two major considerations of the parties:their bases of constituents and their positions in particular issues. The research furthermore uses these two considerations to connect competitive circumstances of parties in the elections and the legislative coalitions in the legislature. It may help to unravel and interpret the real situations of party competition completely, coherently, and profoundly.
3

none

Hsien, Chien-hsun 28 August 2006 (has links)
none
4

電視新聞來源人物之訊息分析及其與客觀事實之比較--以立法院第七十九會期為例

楊秋蘋, YANG, GIU-PING Unknown Date (has links)
本研究約有五萬字,共分為研究動機、文獻探討、研究方法、資料分析與結論等五章 。 研究動機源自於曾參與觀察三家電視台國會記者採訪過程,禸感於立法院第七十九期 的議事多元化,而不知電視媒介的處理方式是否因應改變。 文獻探討是以「媒介建構社會事實」及「訊息來源人物的新聞處理」此兩個概念作為 衍伸。落實到研究問題則為: 1.不同屬性的立委之間。不同屬性立委與官員之間、及總體立委與官員之間,其電 視新聞議題及新聞處理方式有何不同? 2.不同屬性的立委之間。不同屬性立委與官員之間、及總體立委與官員之間,其電 視新聞處理方式比對客觀事實有何不同? 本研究以系統分層間隔抽樣,分析三台自2月24日至7月17日期間之立法院院會 及委員會新聞,共計有117天,以出現在新聞中直接或間接說話的訊息來源人物( 立委與官員)作為分析單位,新聞內容再比對立法院公報及新聞稿的記錄,以了解其 間的差異。
5

立法院召集委員議程設定之研究—以政黨為核心之分析

鄭勝元, Cheng,S. Y. Unknown Date (has links)
本研究之對象為立法院委員會的召集委員,利用文獻分析法、深入訪談法及內容分析法,深入探討召集委員設定委員會議程的過程及其挑戰與限制。同時分析影響召集委員議程設定之因素為何? 研究結果發現制度因素、政黨因素、委員會因素、選區因素和個人因素皆會影響召集委員設定委員會議程的偏好,其中政黨因素更是最重要的影響因素。透過統計模型檢證後可知執政黨召集委員較傾向設定立法議程,反之在野黨召集委員則傾向設定監督議程。此外,不論任何政黨的召集委員都傾向設定本身政黨的立法議程。執政黨和在野黨召集委員設定監督議程的偏好也有所不同。同時召集委員的議程設定存在著政黨聯盟的可能性,以藍綠為分野的政黨聯盟較個別政黨更具解釋力。 而且召集委員也會因為所處的委員會性質不同而產生不同的議程設定偏好。如在法案供給量較高的委員會,召集委員會較傾向設定立法議程特別是的本黨立法議程和定期性業務報告此類的監督議程。 在選區因素上,相較於區域召集委員,不分區召集委員較傾向設定立法議程,同時也會因個人理念與其他同聯盟的召集委員進行合作,而非純粹從政黨標籤去考量。但是執政黨的不分區召集委員仍然較傾向設定所屬政黨或聯盟的立法議程。而在監督議程上則較偏好業務報告和專題報告。 在個人因素上,相對於女性,男性召集委員較傾向設定監督議程,對於本身政黨的立法議程較不忠誠。而新任召集委員為求提升知名度對於引起媒體注意的監督議程如業務報告和專題報告較為熱衷。最後相對於低教育程度召集委員,高教育程度召集委員不僅較傾向設定立法議程,還會與其他同聯盟的召集委員進行合作。
6

院會與委員會的權力關係

鍾智明 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究從我國立法院中院會與常設委員會之間政黨組成結構的角度出發,試圖探討兩者之間組成差異的程度以及方向對於法條審查所造成的影響。本文假設委員會與院會之間的政黨組成差異若越大,則委員會對於法案的審查結果在院會遭到修正的情況將越為明顯。研究結果顯示,在第三屆中政黨組成差異比例越大的委員會,其審查通過的法條在院會所遭到的修正程度越小,而院會多數黨若在審查委員會席次過半,則有助於減緩審查通過的條文在院會遭到修正的情況。另一方面,由於委員會組成方式改變導致院會與委員會之間的組成依政黨比例為原則,因此第六屆的部分在研究中主要僅提供參考,其中政黨組成差異比例與多數黨是否在委員會中過半皆並不對法條審查造成任何影響,而將兩屆資料合併分析則是如同第三屆所呈現的結果。換言之,本文對於院會與委員會政黨組成差異對於法案修正影響的研究假設並未能得到經驗上的支持。 / This research takes its departure from observing different percentage of party constitution between floor and standing committees in Legislative Yuan, and tries to examine how the difference affects the process and consequence of bill amendments. The main hypothesis of this research is that higher different percentage of party constitution will result in higher degree of bill amendment on the floor. Empirical evidence shows that in the third term, higher different percentage of party constitution in a committee results in lower degree of floor amendment. Nevertheless, when the majority party comes to enjoy more than a majority in a committee, lower degree of bill amendments is found. On the other hand, because the method to compose committees changed, the proportion of parties in floor and committees was similar in the sixth term. So, the data of the sixth term is just for reference; the different percentage of party constitution and majority party’s seat advantage in committees do not impact the extent of floor amendments. The combination of the third and sixth term also shows the same result with the third term. In other words, the hypothesis regarding different percentage of party constitution is not supported by empirical data.
7

Intelligence Oversight Mechanism Used by Congress Study¡ÐCompare with U.S. Congress and Taiwan's Legislative Yuan

Su, Lung-Chi 10 August 2004 (has links)
Abstract This thesis focuses on the oversight mechanism used by congress to supervise the intelligence department, mainly through examining the historical development of the oversight mechanism that the U.S. Congress uses over the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, as well as evaluating the mechanism¡¦s successes and failures, in order to find a suitable direction for establishing an oversight mechanism for our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan over the National Security Agency, NSA. First of all, the inceptive backgrounds and historical developments of the CIA and the NSA are introduced. After establishing an understanding of the special backgrounds and developments of the two agencies, the writer, using the Institutional Process Theory, analyzes and discusses how the U.S. Congress¡¦ oversight mechanism over the CIA has progressed, thereby determining the key to the successes and failures of the U.S. Congress¡¦ intelligence oversight mechanism. Having analyzed the intelligence oversight mechanism of the U.S. Congress, the writer brings up suggestions as to how our country¡¦s Legislative Yuan can develop an oversight mechanism over the NSA in the future. Lastly, from these discussions, the writer addresses the contributions, propositions, and limitations of this research and hopes that these research and discussions can assist the Legislative Yuan in institutionalizing a comprehensive intelligence oversight mechanism over the NSA.
8

Analysis of Possibility for Neutrality of the Premier of Legislative Yuan in Republic of China

Ueng, Ming-an 03 August 2005 (has links)
¡iabract¡j From the past to the present, we can find no matter mass media, public opinion, and even the government party and opposition party is in support of neutrality of the Speaker, nevertheless, it had been unable to accomplish the purpose in past decade. What we see is endless arguments, as often as there is election of the premier of legislative yuan or bill battle. Hence, the author thinks there is a gap between our subjective expectation and objective reality about neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan, otherwise why we can¡¦t put neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan into practice for a long time. So this text thinks whether the premier of legislative yuan should be development toward neutralization, it is worth to discuss. It is necessary to inspect the possibility of neutral development for the premier of legislative yuan. In this article, we define the meaning of neutrality of the Speaker includes three levels, such as neutrality of agenda, neutrality of political party and neutrality of electoral district, etc., and under the prerequisite of these three meaning, the Speaker acted multiple roles including congress chairman, legislative chief, representatives of political party, representatives of electoral district and coordinator, etc. And some of them are useful to neutrality; some of them are conflict and contradictive to neutrality. Further, these roles would be influenced by the historical background, political culture, constitutional government system, political party, electoral system, and parliamentary norm and convention. So from this point of view, we observe experience of foreign the Speaker and inspect key factor influencing role of the Speaker. At the same time, we also explored key factor influencing role of the premier of legislative yuan, and compared with both, to present useful and unfavorable conditions about neutrality. Eventually, according to these conditions, we analyze the possibility of neutral development for the premier of legislative yuan, and make the relevant suggestions. We find out something in the course of studying. At first, our government trends towards presidential government in constitutional government system, the administration and legislation is split, it is useful to strengthen orientation of representatives of political party of the premier of legislative yuan. Secondly, if the premier of legislative yuan wants to be the Speaker, he has to rely on the strength of the political party in election, it makes the premier of legislative yuan cant¡¦t keep neutrality. Finally, the establishment of legislative yuan is very short, norm and conventions that it is useful to neutrality is not formed, such as the Speaker withdrawing from the political party or setting up several vice speakers to share agenda resources. And this also makes neutral development of the premier of legislative yuan more and more difficult. So we get a clear understanding of our current institutional reality, it is unfavorable to neutrality of the premier of legislative yuan. Consequently, we should develop towards the American type of the Speaker, to strengthen authority of the premier of legislative yuan, to make him lead the political party and integrate the legislative to restrict the executive power, to improve the entity of the whole legislative yuan. Key word: the premier of legislative yuan, the Speaker , neutrality of the Speaker , neutrality of agenda , neutrality of political party , neutrality of electoral district, Constitutional government system , political party , electoral system , parliamentary norm and convention
9

國會倫理對立法院議事運作之分析

王幼萍 Unknown Date (has links)
我國之政治文化從早期之臣屬型轉變為參與型,政治體制由威權體制轉型為民主體制,在民主化的過程中,立法院之結構與功能產生極大的變化,從以前「行政院之立法局」,成為今日全國政治運作的中心,復經六次修憲之結果,立法院集所有職權於一身,為民主國家實質的國會。 立法委員係在眾多優秀之候選人之中,經過選舉之洗禮產生,其專業素養、品德修養理應有超於常人之標準。惟揆諸今日之立法院,立法委員之表現似乎違背了多數選民之期待。有鑑於此,立法院於民國八十八年一月十二日,三讀通過了國會改革五大法案,之後復經歷次修正,期能改善目前議事效率與品質低落之窘境。 國會議事運作之失調,並非一朝一夕所造成,而是有其歷史性結構的因素。然時至今日,立法院的生態與以前大不相同,民國八十九年的總統大選亦首度出現政黨輪替的情形,惟國會的議事運作並未隨著民主政治的進步而改變過去非體制內之抗爭,反而有過之而無不及。 議事運作的過程中所產生之諸多問題,大多繫於利益之糾葛,近年來雖已陸續通過國會改革五大法案、公職人員財產申報法、公職人員利益衝突迴避法等規範公職人員倫理的法律,惟拘束力並不彰顯。因此,本研究經深度訪談、參與觀察及蒐集國內、外相關文獻,探討立法院議事運作失調之原因,並提出擬提昇立法品質與效率之方式,應從強化立法院內部之自律機制、公權力制衡與社會之監督三個面向,型塑國會倫理,始能為國會改革帶來新契機。同時,亦能建立我國立法問政之優良典範。 / The political culture of our country transformed from feudalism to participation, and the political system from autocracy to democracy. In the process of getting democratic, the structure and function of Legislative Yuan has altered dramatically. It used to be Legislative Bureau under the Executive Yuan, but now, it has become headquarter of national political operation. After the six constitutional amendments, Legislative Yuan has been literally the all-in-one congress in a democratic state. Legislators are elites with outstanding professional knowledge and morality, chosen out of a number of brilliant participants. On the other hand, though, the incumbent ones in the Legislative Yuan seem to let the voters down. To pull up this declination, the Legislative Yuan passed 5 major acts on congressional innovation after 3rd reading on January 12th, 1999, and several amendments following that, hoping to improve the inefficiency and low quality. The malfunction of Legislative Yuan didn’t start from yesterday but with historical background. Till now, the environment in it has been so different from before. The first rotation of ruling party took place in 2000, but this improvement in democracy made the working of congressional agenda have even more conflicts inside the framework. Most problems derived from the process of agenda processing can find its root in the tangle of benefit. Though the major acts on congressional innovation, the law of official’s property exposure, and the law to prevent official’s benefit conflict, that help regulate the virtues of officials, had been passed respectively, the binding force is not strong enough and obvious. Therefore, on the basis of interview, observation, and collection of the domestic and foreign document, this research will discuss the reasons leading to the malfunction of Legislative Yuan and come up with the quality and efficiency resolution, which is strengthen the self-control inside the structure, the balance of public power, and the monitor of the whole society. To bring a new opportunity for revolution in our congress, we have to mold the congressional ethics, and then a terrific well-function Legislative system can be built as well.
10

數位國會與電子民主:立法院應用資訊通訊科技與公民互動之研究 / Digital Parliament and E-Democracy: A Study of ICTs Application for the Interaction between Legislative Yuan and Citizens

鍾政廷, Chung, Cheng Ting Unknown Date (has links)
數位時代下,政府機關致力推動電子化政策,希望藉由資訊通訊科技(ICTs)的協助提供民眾更好的服務;立法院推動的「數位國會發展規劃案」,如同行政機關「電子化政府」,透過建設網站系統架構,提供完善的議事資訊並將議案資料公開化,創造我國邁向電子民主的有利條件。從文獻和世界民主國會的經驗觀察,數位化具有促進民主發展的潛能,但如何有效應用則是必須思考的課題。據此,本文以電子民主應具備的資訊公開、公眾接觸、公民參與、提升服務效率及效能等各項指標,檢視立法院網站系統在功能設計與應用上的優點與不足。研究架構以網站系統中具有電子民主指標的系統為核心,瞭解立法院對於應用網站與公民互動的構想及規劃,以及現行政策之成果。 研究執行採取網站內容分析法和個別深度訪談法,以議案設定為導向,挑選立法院審議中最受關注的議案為例,尋找與議案相關之公民團體代表為標的,瞭解公民對國會電子民主的看法;並如何透過網站資源,獲取所關注議案的資訊;而立法委員應用ICTs與民眾互動的態度和做法,更是國會數位化之後,影響電子民主發展方向的關鍵因素。 實證結果發現,立法院網站系統當前所提供的議事資訊及議案資料等內容可謂完整且豐富;然而,公民角色的使用人數稀少且使用頻率偏低,立委方面也不常應用做為與民眾互動或提供服務之管道,意謂其功能並未彰顯,應用效果遠不及時下熱門社群網站。究其原因:一、立法院網站資訊雖充足,但部分介面設計過於繁複,應簡化操作或提供指導;二、立法院網站公開的資訊,未符合多數使用者需求;公民團體另以私人管道獲得所需資訊,但一般公民卻無法取得,因而產生資訊落差;三、網站系統缺乏有效宣傳,應擴展民眾知悉程度、提高使用意願和培養使用習慣。 本文結論建議:一、立法院網站是具備發展電子民主潛能的理想雲端空間,擁有豐沛的議事資料可供運用,應持續加以耕耘,建立有特色的網站系統,讓民眾更親近、瞭解立法院;二、資訊處須妥善管理網站系統,培養公民民主素養教育,促進理性對話空間;三、秉持更開放的態度落實公民參與訴求,結合官方與民間力量,推廣國會數位資源,使其效用極大化,朝向全面性、深入性的電子民主為未來發展目標。 / In the digital era, the Taiwanese governments have been advocating its paperless government initiatives by adopting Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) to provide better services to the public. The Legislative Yuan is also carrying out the Digital Parliament Development Program, similar with the Paperless Government initiatives, which aims to foster e-democracy in Taiwan by offering comprehensive information of congressional schemes through a strong back-end IT platform. The previous literatures as well as successful applications from other democratic countries have indicated that paperless government can potentially accelerate democracy development; however, how to apply effectively is a practical issue to pay attention to. Thus, this study attempted to utilize the e-democracy index such as openness, citizen interaction, citizen participation, efficiency and effectiveness of services, to assess the functionality of the Legislative Yuan website and to compare with other similar government websites. The methodologies of the current study were content analysis and individual in-depth interview. Several bills under the legislative review process were selected and some follow-up interviews with key interest group representatives who are familiar with the aforementioned issues were conducted to collect their insights on congressional e-democracy and how they acquire relevant information from the Legislative Yuan website. Moreover, the use of ICTs for interaction with citizens among the Legislators is also a key factor impacting of e-democracy. Based on the research results, information and document offered by the Legislative website are completed and abundant. Nevertheless, there is less number of users whose identification is general citizen, and the using frequency is still low. Besides, the Legislators seldom use the website as a tool to interact with citizens. It means that the Legislative website functions are yet to be revealed and the effects are inferior to those community websites. The reasons may include: (1) The interface design of the website remains complicated for citizens to use. The officials must simplify operation and offer instructions; (2) The website cannot meet the need of citizen groups, who acquire information by private access, not by the website. But individual citizens could not utilize the same access. This situation would cause information gap; (3) The officials should propagate the Legislative website to the public and promote its popularity and utilization. According to the previous findings, three points are suggested. Firstly, the website of Legislative Yuan is a potentially wonderful cyberspace for e-democracy which should be maintained to attract the citizens closer to realize e-parliament. Secondly, the Legislative Yuan should properly manage its website, cultivate the citizens’ democratic literacy and engage them to rational dialogue. Thirdly, the public officials should keep an more open attitude, combine those diverse powers around the Parliament to get itself ready heading towards e-democracy.

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