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<p>Since the late 1970s, biomedical researchers have heavily invested in the development of portable insulin pumps that allow people with Type 1 Diabetes (T1D) to carry several days-worth of insulin to be injected on an as-needed basis. That means fewer needles and syringes, making regular insulin injections less time consuming and troublesome. As insulin pump use has become more widespread over the past twenty years among people with T1D, the social and cultural effects of using these medical devices on their everyday experiences have become both increasingly apparent for individuals yet consistently absent from social and cultural studies of the disease.</p><p><br></p><p>In this dissertation, I explore the technological, medical, and cultural networks of insulin pump treatment to identify the role(s) these biomedicalized treatment acts play in the structuring of people, their bodies, and the cultural values constructed around various medical technologies. As I will show, insulin pump treatment alters people’s bodies and identities as devices become integrated as co-productive actors within patient-users’ biological and social systems. By analyzing personal interviews and digital media produced by people with T1D alongside archival materials, this study identifies compulsory patterns in the practices, structures, and narratives related to insulin pump use to center chapters around the productive (and sometimes stifling) relationship between people, bodies, technologies, and American culture.</p><p><br></p><p>By analyzing the layered and intersecting sites of insulin pump treatment together, this project reveals how medical technologies, health identities, bodies, and cultures are co-constructed and co-defined in ways that bind them together—mutually constitutive, medically compelled, cultural and social. New bodies and new systems, I argue, come with new (in)visibilities, and while this new technologically-produced legibility of the body provides unprecedented management of the symptoms and side-effects of the disease, it also brings with it unforeseen social consequences that require changes to people’s everyday lives and practices. </p>

<p>This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist.</p>

The Gospel of Thomas is a collection of 114 sayings attributed to Jesus and is primarily composed of rhetorical statements that were used to preserve the teachings of itinerant Greek philosophers. These collections were used to persuade individuals to join the philosophical schools represented, much like the early followers of the Jesus movement would use his teachings to convince others to join them as well. However, the theological background for the text is still debated because it contains esoteric and enigmatic references not fully understood by most scholars. This work argues that the theological and philosophical background for the Gospel of Thomas is the Alexandrian School of Middle Platonism. This background contains an understanding of the divine, the secret nature of the teachings in the text, and the presence of daemons in the cosmos. In short, this is my attempt at supplying the hermeneutical key to the text or at least supplying a valid ideological background on which the Jesus tradition is cast in the Gospel of Thomas.

Submitted by Angela Maria de Oliveira (amolivei@uepg.br) on 2018-11-14T19:12:15Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Daniel Lucio.pdf: 1849801 bytes, checksum: 9f40c703e84f294bfa4ce9a95e933cc1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-11-14T19:12:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 811 bytes, checksum: e39d27027a6cc9cb039ad269a5db8e34 (MD5) Daniel Lucio.pdf: 1849801 bytes, checksum: 9f40c703e84f294bfa4ce9a95e933cc1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-06 / O presente trabalho procurou examinar algumas considerações do intelectual brasileiro João Cruz Costa sobre a relação entre a história e a filosofia. Esta relação perpassou por toda a trajetória intelectual do autor, sendo, portanto, observada desde seu primeiro texto sobre a história das ideias no Brasil, em 1938, até as suas últimas intervenções, em meados da década de 1970. Durante toda a sua trajetória intelectual, Cruz Costa buscou compreender, a partir das noções de “experiência histórica” e de “sentido”, as vicissitudes das ideias no Brasil, desde o século XVI até meados do século XX. Em seus textos se desprende uma discussão mais geral que indica a preocupação do autor em refletir sobre a relação entre a história e a filosofia. A partir de algumas considerações do próprio autor sobre esta relação, o presente trabalho lançou, como fio condutor, a seguinte questão: seria Cruz costa um pensador cético? Longe da pretensão de apontar uma resposta, este trabalho apenas procurou incidir um pouco de luz sobre o problema. Pode-se dizer que a única conclusão satisfatória deste presente trabalho foi a convicção da necessidade de um retorno à obra de Cruz Costa e, por consequência, a instauração de um exame minucioso sobre os textos do autor. Retorno que deve responder a duas questões ainda em aberto sobre o pensamento de Cruz Costa: 1) o que foi o ceticismo de Cruz Costa? e 2) o que foi o seu ensaísmo? / This work aims to examine a set of considerations regarding the relation between history and philosophy by the Brazilian philosopher João Cruz Costa. The matter played a central role throughout the writer’s intellectual trajectory, being present from his very first writings about the history of ideas in Brazil, in 1938, until his last interventions, in the decade of 1970. In his works, the author looks for the vicissitudes of ideas in Brazil from the 16th to the 20th century, in terms of historical and sense perception. Thus, a wholesome discussion on the aforementioned relation can be extracted from his production, from which was selected as leading thought for this research, the question: was Cruz Costa a sceptical philosopher? It is not the main objective here to pose a direct and objective answer to that, but to raise an axiomatic discussion, which points out to the necessity of a more detailed reexam of the referred works. Two main unanswered questions regarding Cruz Costa’s philosophy are: 1) what was his scepticism? 2) what was his essayism?

[pt] Em suma, o objetivo desta investigação é demonstrar o caráter logodicéico da idéia de Deus e sua peculiar cosmologia, cujas ambições mais evidentes consistem na fundamentação da moral em bases sólidas, e no alcance de uma solução ao problema existencial do sentido da vida, demonstrando ainda o caráter teodicéico (e, portanto, igualmente logodicéico) da doutrina metafísica que a acompanha, nomeadamente no que concerne à natureza humana, que se supõe dotada de livre-arbítrio. Finalmente, o presente estudo demonstrará o fracasso da logodicéia da idéia monoteísta de Deus, e das teodicéias que a acompanham, em significar a experiência do mal. / [en] This thesis intends to be a mere effort of critical analysis of the idea of God as an attempt to give a metaphysical and a religious answer to the problem of the meaning, as well of certain arguments in defense of this idea. – But mainly this essay intends to investigate the failure of the theodicy in finding a solution to the problem of evil.

Submitted by Nara Lays Domingues Viana Oliveira (naradv) on 2015-08-29T14:56:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 clorio.pdf: 1569404 bytes, checksum: 1d447767db6e54e17d83dc952781b7af (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-29T14:56:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 clorio.pdf: 1569404 bytes, checksum: 1d447767db6e54e17d83dc952781b7af (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Nenhuma / A História proporciona, em certa medida, um relato da sociedade na qual se está envolvido no presente. É naquela que está a possibilidade de respostas a certas inquietações, sem que tais respostas transbordem da sua condição de respostas para a de soluções. Mas olhar a História é, com efeito, olhar a tessitura e os vários “textos” que a formam. Os vários “eventos” devem ser considerados nesse contexto. No correr da História, no tempo e no espaço do Ocidente, ela sempre foi vista como uma sucessão de etapas, etapas vistas como mudanças que, por sua vez, decorriam de escolhas e supressões. O posterior, se não moralmente, ideologicamente superior ao anterior. Para essa narrativa ser possível, mister uma estrutura conceitual filosófica que representasse e justificasse os valores envolvidos nas escolhas: a Filosofia. A partir da filosofia grega, constitui-se um esteio justificador que permeou todas as demais instituições, especialmente o Estado e o Direito. Efetivamente as escolha são feitas; o que predomina, porém, jamais se demite da sua experiência anterior, pois não há rigorosamente nada de originário. O evento, seja o Estado, seja o Direito, sempre está vinculado ao contexto. Um contexto de ações, atitudes, de cultura, em um sentido amplo, envolvendo todos os comportamentos, modos de pensar e agir do homem; envolvendo o ethos; isso é o originário. Na dinamização da cultura é que se pode observar o valor das ações. O valor atribuído a elas é o critério usado para se proceder às escolhas e configura, portanto, o núcleo ético-mítico no espaço e no tempo da civilização ocidental. Se desde sempre se está em um mundo de escolhas, desde sempre se está num mundo prático. A Filosofia no entanto, transformada em metafísica, esconde essa questão originária da escolha, ao cindir a razão e subordinando a razão prática à razão teórica, na medida em que esta fornece os elementos estruturais necessários (transcendentes) para a formulação dos juízos. Cindir a razão é uma escolha, vinculada a um modo de agir, a uma atitude, a um ethos. Isso está repercutido na forma como a História é considerada (etapas sucessivas e superiores) e na fundamentação filosófica do Estado e do Direito. O exemplo da Modernidade é eloquente, pois, a pretexto de superar o Medievo, recupera materiais da Antiguidade clássica, sem dar-se conta, no entanto, que o Medievo sequer rompera com a Antiguidade. Assim, é possível olhar a História não na linearidade da sucessão de fases e períodos, mas como um desdobramento cultural em espaço definido. Esse ponto de vista permite identificar nas manifestações políticas (Estado) e jurídicas (Direito) a natureza das escolhas a partir da fundamentação filosófica. Estado e Direito, em que pese serem conquistas (no sentido positivo) da civilização ocidental, conservam a originariedade do ethos civilizatório. O desvelamento é possível a partir da filosofia hermenêutica ou da hermenêutica filosófica. Retirar o véu encobridor das relações, não apenas revela os tantos problemas sociais, deixa implícita uma contradição: mantém-se um discurso que substitui a realidade (o uno) pela aparência (a igualdade entre o uno e outro) e a verdade, com efeito, é entregue à retórica, ao argumento. A hermenêutica filosófica não é normativa, mas apenas por meio dela é que se pode dizer que desde sempre se está na razão prática, desde sempre se faz escolhas, na História e na Linguagem. / History provides, to a certain extent, a report of the society in which it is involved at the present. It is in that which is the possibility of responses to certain concerns, without which such answers exceeds its condition of answers to solutions. But looking at History is, in fact, look at the structure and the various "texts" that forms it. The various "events" should be considered in this context. In the course of History, time and space in the West, it has always been seen as a succession of steps, steps seen as changes which, in its turn, resulted from choices and omissions.The latter, if not morally, ideologically superior to the former. To be possible this narrative, it is necessary a philosophical conceptual framework that could represent and justify the values involved in the choices: Philosophy. From the Greek philosophy, is a mainstay justifier that permeated all the other institutions, especially the State and the Law. Effectively the choices are made; what predominates, however, never resigns from his previous experience, because there is absolutely nothing of originating. The event, being it the State, being it the Law, is always linked to the context. A context of actions, attitudes, culture, in a wide sense involving all behaviors, ways of thinking and acting of the human being, involving the ethos, that is original. In fostering the culture that it is possible to observe the value of the actions. The value assigned to them is the criteria used to make the choices and configures, therefore the ethical and mythical nucleus in both space and time of Western civilization. If since always one is in a world of choices, since always is in a practical world. Philosophy, however, turned into metaphysics, hides this original question of choice, splitting the reason and subordinating practical reason to theoretical reason, in so far as that it provides the necessary structural elements (transcendent) for the formulation of judgments. Split the reason is a choice, linked to a way of acting, to an attitude, to an ethos. This is reflected in the way history is considered (successive and superior stages) and the philosophical foundation of the State and Law. The example of Modernity is eloquent, thus the pretext of overcoming the Medieval period, recovers materials of classical antiquity, without realizing, however, that the Medieval period even broken with the antiquity. Thus, it is possible to look at History not in the linearity of the succession of phases and periods, but as a cultural unfolding in definite space. This point of view allows the identification of the political demonstrations (state) and legal (law) the nature of the choices from the philosophical foundation. State and Law, although being conquests (in the positive sense) of Western civilization, retain the originating of ethos civilization. The unveiling is possible from the hermeneutic philosophy or of philosophical hermeneutics. Remove the veil that covers the relationship, not only reveals the many social problems, but it is implicit a contradiction: it remains a discourse that replaces the reality (the sole one) by the appearance (equality between the one and another) and the truth, indeed, is given to rhetoric, to the argument.The philosophical hermeneutics is not normative, but only through it is possible to say that since one is always in practical reason, one always makes choices, in the History and Language.

A análise do distanciamento entre as orientações teóricas das instâncias decisórias (ID) sobre a inclusão da abordagem dos aspectos da História e Filosofia da Ciência no Ensino de Ciências Naturais (HFCECN) constitui o nosso objetivo de investigação, cujo problema foi identificar as ID e saber em que elas se distanciavam entre si em relação à HFCECN. Para tal, delimitamos o estudo de caso único qualitativo, tendo o Brasil como unidade caso sob o aspecto da HFCECN, cujas múltiplas unidades de análise foram as ID. Para coleta e análise de dados utilizamos a entrevista semiestruturada com especialistas, a análise de conteúdo e a análise documental. Da investigação resultou a identificação de quatro ID em relação à HFCECN, das quais três foram analisadas e identificamos que elas apresentam desconexão/discrepância metodológica e epistemológica de perspectivas diferentes, portanto, a convergência entre as ID está longe de ocorrer na realidade material do sistema educacional, o que pode inviabilizar a efetiva HFCECN. Os regulamentos oficiais apontam para a contextualização externa (sociocultural) e as pesquisas parecem assumir a HFC como conteúdo no ensino de ciências naturais, porém, dos 72 trabalhos de pesquisa analisados, 34 apontam para contextualização interna; 16, criticidade; 9, motivação; 8, contextualização externa. Na formação docente, a maioria das disciplinas aponta para contextualização interna (7); as percepções dos docentes formadores apontam para instrumentação didática e criticidade e uma abordagem da HFC enquanto perspectiva de reflexão crítica. As três ID constituem seus próprios cenários ontológico, político e decisório, formam uma constelação bicondicional com rupturas de sequência comunicativa e tomada de decisões. A realidade escolar não tem sido considerada enquanto instância decisória e nem consultada o suficiente para tomada de decisões e prescrições das três ID. Finalmente, apresentamos algumas reflexões e perspectivas propositivas sobre o tema. / Our research goal is to analyze the detachment of the theoretical orientations from the decision-making institutions (DMIs) with regards to the inclusion of aspects of the approach of History and Philosophy of Science in the Teaching of Natural Sciences (HPSTNS), in order to identify the decision-making institutions and learn where they distanced themselves from each other regarding HPSTNS. Thus, a single qualitative case was delimited, using Brazil as a study unit under the HPSTNS aspect and the DMIs as multiple analyses units. To collect and examine the data, semi-structured interviews with experts, content and documentation analysis were used. The outcome of the research was the identification of four decision makers related to HPSTNS, of which three were analyzed. We concluded that they exhibit methodological and epistemological disconnection/discrepancy with different perspectives, therefore, the convergence between the DMIs is far from occurring in the educational systems actual material, rendering unfeasible the effective HPSTNS. The official rules point to an external contextualization (social-cultural) and the research appears to assume the HPS as the natural science teaching content. However from the 72 research papers analyzed: 34 showed internal contextualization; 16, criticisms; 9, motivations; and 8, external contextualization. In teacher education, most of the courses point to the internal context (7), the teachers perceptions indicate didactic instrumentation, and criticism is an HPS approach as a perspective of critical reflection. The three DMIs constitute their own ontological, political and decision-making scenario, they form a bi-conditional constellation with communicative sequence and decision making disruptions. The school reality has not been considered as a Decision-Making Institution nor sufficiently consulted for the recommendations of decisions and directives of those three (DMIs). Finally, we offer some reflections and proactive perspectives on the subject.

De nos jours omniprésent sur la scène politique, le cynisme fut depuis son origine l’objet de polémiques. Le mode de vie scandaleux auquel il est associé pose la question de l’appartenance ou non de Diogène et des Cyniques à la philosophie. Par ailleurs, qu’a à voir le cynisme des sociétés actuelles avec celui que pratiquait Diogène ? Si des analystes situent au siècle des Lumières l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception du cynisme propre à la modernité, peu d’études historiques ont été menées sur la question. Il importe donc de retourner aux sources et de mesurer la validité de cette hypothèse. Par une étude de l’histoire du cynisme et de sa transmission, nous retraçons l’évolution des enjeux au cœur du mouvement cynique et de sa postérité, et présentons une synthèse des significations du cynisme ainsi que des tensions qu’elles comportent. De nombreuses références permettent de définir la place qu’occupe le cynisme au XVIIIe siècle. Les auteurs des Lumières se sont réappropriés l’antique sagesse de Diogène et ont voulu concilier son impudique franchise aux exigences de la sociabilité. Ainsi, l’étude de la réception du cynisme au siècle des Lumières doit tenir compte des débats moraux de l’époque. Visant l’élaboration d’une morale matérialiste sur un fondement naturel, les Philosophes ont tâché de contourner les problèmes de l’amoralisme révélés par le constat de La Mettrie selon lequel il y a inadéquation entre bonheur et vertu. Pour ce faire, Helvétius réduit la portée des déterminismes liés à l’organisation, en soulignant l’importance des facteurs externes dans la gestion des comportements ; Diderot et D’Holbach mettent l’accent sur la sociabilité afin d’assurer l’inhérence d’un fondement moral chez l’être humain, renforçant un désaccord déjà profond entre le cynisme et les idéaux des Lumières. Or, cette approche est-elle généralisée ? Ou le cynisme des Lumières est-il sujet à des variantes selon les auteurs ? Cette thèse se propose d’étudier, par l’analyse des occurrences du cynisme dans les textes de la France des Lumières, les différentes acceptions du cynisme, pour cerner les enjeux auxquels elles s’attachent. Des textes tels qu’Aihcrappih de Godart de Beauchamps, Le Diogène décent de Prémontval, le Socrate en délire de Wieland, Le cynique moderne de Cœtlogon, Le désapprobateur de Castilhon, Le cosmopolite de Fougeret de Monbron, Le paysan perverti de Restif de la Bretonne et Arlequin Diogène de Saint-Just seront pris en considération. Ils s’ajouteront à une étude du cynisme chez Diderot, chez qui la thématique parcourt l’ensemble de l’œuvre et atteint son expression la plus achevée dans Le neveu de Rameau. Par ses doutes, Diderot trouve également sa place dans l’étude des critiques des Lumières qu’ont formulées Rousseau et Sade, chez qui l’on évalue la pertinence de l’enjeu cynique. Il ressort de cette thèse que les acceptions moderne et contemporaine du cynisme comportent des distinctions conceptuelles qui nous interdisent de les amalgamer. Notre analyse du cynisme dans le contexte français des Lumières montre que l’on est, jusqu’à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, en présence d’une conception typiquement moderne du cynisme, laquelle met l’accent sur la redécouverte de l’impudeur de Diogène. Plus précisément, le cynisme se caractérise, au XVIIIe siècle, par un repli misanthrope et solitaire, lequel s’oppose à l’optimisme humaniste des Philosophes. Il est l’expression d’un rejet de la sociabilité mise de l’avant par ces derniers, en réponse au constat de corruption de la société. S’il est possible d’y situer l’émergence d’une nouvelle conception du cynisme, c’est donc seulement dans la mesure où les débats liés à l’élaboration d’une morale matérialiste, fondée en intérêt ou en sentiment, montrent que chacun de ces fondements comportent des failles, et non parce que certains auteurs des Lumières auraient entendu par cynisme ce que nous entendons aujourd’hui. Tout se passe comme si l’homme désabusé, qui tient pour acquis l’incorrigibilité de sa nature et de la société, choisissant d’en tirer profit malgré l’immoralisme que cela comporte, avait forgé le statut de cynique postmoderne. Cela rompt avec la tradition qui, jusqu’à la fin de l’époque moderne, tient le Cynique pour une figure d’un dire vrai fondamentalement désapprobateur du genre humain. Si l’impudeur poussée dans ses derniers retranchements conduit le cynique à n’éprouver aucune honte à mentir, il poursuit en cela la devise d’altération des valeurs initiée par Diogène, mais contribue désormais au maintien d’un statu quo sur l’état de corruption de la société qu’aucun cynique, ancien ou moderne, n’aurait accepté de taire. / Now pervasive on the political scene, cynicism has been contentious from its beginnings. The scandalous way of living to which it is linked raise the issue of whether or not Diogenes and the Cynics must be considered as part of the history of philosophy. Besides, what do today’s cynical practices share with those of Diogenes? Some interprets situate the emergence of a new conception of cynicism peculiar to modernity during the Enlightenment, but few historical studies have been centered on this question. It is consequently important to return to the sources of cynicism to measure this hypothesis’ validity. Through a study of cynicism’s history and its transmission we trace the evolution of the major issues at the core of cynic movement and its posterity, and present a synthesis of its significations and their internal tensions. Many references allow us to define the place that cynicism occupies within the XVIIIth century. Philosophers have tried to reclaim Diogenes’ antique wisdom while also accommodating his shameless frankness to the requirements of sociability. The study of the reception of cynicism in the XVIIIth century french Enlightenment must therefore be seen within the scope of the moral debates of that time. Those debates aim to elaborate a materialist moral on a natural basis, trying in doing so to tackle the problem of amoralism revealed by La Mettrie’s statement of the inadequacy between happiness and virtue. To do that, Helvetius reduces the scope of natural determinisms by underlining the importance of exterior factors when managing behaviors. Diderot and D’Holbach, on their part, emphasize the notion of sociability to make sure there’s a moral sense within human nature itself; this belief reinforces an already profound disagreement between the ideals of Enlightenment and cynicism. But is this approach that widespread? Or is cynicism subject to vary according to authors? This thesis proposes, by studying the occurrences of cynicism in French Enlightenment’s texts, to give an account of its different meanings in order to identify the issues that are put forward. Therefore, texts such as Aihcrappih by Godart de Beauchamps, Le Diogène décent by Prémontval, Le Socrate en délire by Wieland, Le cynique moderne by Cœtlogon, Le désapprobateur by Castilhon, Le cosmopolite by Fougeret de Monbron, Le paysan perverti by Restif de la Bretonne, and Arlequin Diogène by Saint-Just will be taken into account, as will be cynicism in Diderot’s texts; this thematic is present in his whole work, Le neveu de Rameau being the most achieved expression of it. Exposing his doubts, Diderot also finds its place in our exposition of the Enlightenment’s critics as they have been formulated by Rousseau and Sade; we’ll also analyze the relevance of their cynical stakes. The conclusion of this thesis is that the modern and contemporary meanings of cynicism entail important conceptual distinctions that forbid us to amalgamate them. Our analysis of cynicism in French Enlightenment’s texts shows that up until the end of the XVIIIth century, we are faced with a modern conception of cynicism that rests to a considerable extent upon the rediscovery of Diogene’s immodesty. More precisely, the XVIIIth century cynicism can be characterized by a solitary and misanthropic withdrawal, which opposes the Philosophers’ humanist optimism. Cynicism is therefore a rejection of sociability, a value put forward by Philosophers in response to the general state of corruption of society. In other words, if one can locate the emergence of a new form of cynicism in the Enlightenment, it’s not that some authors understood cynicism as we do now: it is because the debates linked with the construction of a materialist conception of morality, be it be founded on interests or sentiments, show that these fundaments carry some weaknesses. It is as though the disillusioned man who takes for granted the incorrigibility of nature and society and chooses to take advantage of it despite the immorality of doing so has given birth to the postmodern cynic. This is he who breaks with a tradition which, up to the modern era, considered the cynic as the figure of a blunt truth teller, disapproving of mankind. If immodesty, driven into a corner, leads the postmodern cynic to shamelessness in lying, he in a sense pursues the motto of the alteration of values initiated by Diogenes, but now contributes to maintain the corruption of society, which no cynic, may he be ancient or modern, would have accepted to silence.