The concept of judicial law-making impacts on the extent, meaning and scope relationship between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is an integral function of the courts while its shape, meaning and nature seem to lack sufficient formulation and articulation, which results in an inherent problem regarding its legitimacy. This study examines the legitimacy and the working of the South African constitutional judicial law-making concepts. Its effect on the constitutional relationships between all three branches of government is scrutinized. In order to fully probe this concept, its impact and application on the separation of powers, judicial review, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences becomes inevitable. The introductory part of this study looks at origins and historical development of the separation of powers doctrine and its application under the 1996 South African Constitution. The latter part focuses on the nature and the scope of judicial review, judicial law-making, constitutional deference and mandatory minimum sentences with a view establishing the impact of these concepts in our judicial law-making. The development of these concepts by South African courts, and what seems to be the lack of formulation and articulation of South African constitutional judicial law-making which raises questions regarding its legitimacy is probed. This research recommends that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa develops its own unique and comprehensive doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution further requires reforms in order to clarify the extent to which the courts can go when formulating laws and public policy in the interests of justice, and whether the interests-of-justice test is capable of delivering a well-informed outcome in developing this jurisdiction’s laws. South African jurisprudence also needs to be developed in empowering the legislature to make laws which are constitutionally compliant without making the courts the sole expositor of the Constitution. Lastly, the extent to which the legislature can enact certain laws must be redefined, which on face value might seems to be encroaching into the courts’ independence and authority. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. D. (Criminal and Procedural Law)

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

This dissertation deals with judicial review of governmental action and individual legal activism. It investigates whether judicial protection of individual rights and individual legal activism, within the field of public law, can be seen as an alternative or complement to electoral control of political and administrative powers. To discuss the effect of various standing rules and the potential societal function of public law adjudication, a model for analyzing the character of public law adjudication has been developed. The model allows for a characterization of public law adjudication as either Liberal or Republican, depending on features of standing rules, court proceedings, and court decisions. It concludes that judicial protection of individual rights and individual legal activism within the field of public law can be seen as an alternative or complement to electoral control of political and administrative powers, especially when public trust in, and the powers of, the legislative assembly and political parties is low and decreasing, and if the preconditions for individual legal activism are of such a character that access to justice is available to the larger public and not only a limited group of advantaged individuals. This theoretical framework is then used to analyse judicial protection of individual rights and individual legal activism in post-Socialist Russia. The results show that the Russian state is best described as authoritarian and that the traditional principal-agent relationship is weak. Thus, in order to strengthen the individual in relation to the state, alternatives for exercising control and participation are required. An analysis of the legislative framework, i.e., the law as it is laid down in the books, shows that Russian administrative law is rights-based and that the character of Russian public law adjudication is closer to the Republican model than the Liberal. However, the Russian support structure is still weak and finds itself in an increasingly inhospitable environment – legally, financially, and politically. In addition, this dissertation concludes that Russia’s membership in the CoE has had an impact on judicial protection of individual rights within the sphere of public law in terms of: improving the legislative framework; developing Russian court jurisprudence referring to the ECHR and to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR; exerting pressure on the Russian state to improve practices of the state bureaucracy; stimulating individual legal activism, and increasing individuals’ knowledge and awareness of their lawful rights and how to implement them.

公民投票是一種直接民主的表現、是直接民主的實踐，而直接民主也是民主政治最原始的形式，早從古雅典式的民主開始，公民的直接參與政治便已然成形，但是直接民主在實際運作上是有其困難性的，因此公民將其權力委託給代議士的代議民主，就成為當今世界民主國家主導政治運作的核心機制。 雖然代議政治儼然成為世界最為普遍的民主政體，但由於受委託的代議士經常會受到個人利益或是其他利益團體之影響，無法完全展現委託人之意志，因而，產生了許多代議政治下的偏差現象，怎麼樣的機制能夠彌補這諸多代議制度下的失靈現象呢？於此之際，「公民投票」遂為當前必須加以著重討論的重要課題。 本論文試圖就公民投票的定義、理論、類型分析，從中找出公民投票在施行上所可能受到的限制以及其可能造成的偏差現象，並從國外的實際施行的經驗中，找出可以避免或修正公民投票弊病的方法。

Il n'existe pas de principe général de proportionnalité en droit américain. Un contrôle est néanmoins présent dans la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême, bien qu'il ne soit pas toujours reconnu comme tel. Au vu des techniques utilisées à cette fin, une partie de la doctrine évoque une expérience exceptionnelle tandis qu'une autre relativise ce point de vue dans le domaine de la limitation des droits. La décision US c Carolene products de 1938 marque la fin d'une période d'interventionnisme judiciaire et constitue le point de départ de cette étude. Sous l'ère Lochner, l'invalidation quasi automatique des lois restreignant les libertés économiques valut à la Cour le qualificatif de « Gouvernement des juges ». Afin d'asseoir sa légitimité, elle élabora la doctrine des « degrés du contrôle » selon laquelle le standard de justification des atteintes dépend de la nature du droit restreint. Son travail est depuis lors rationalisé par la « contrainte substantielle » des droits fondamentaux qui participa à l'émergence d'une nouvelle théorie du contrôle de constitutionnalité. On peut observer que plusieurs juridictions s'autolimitent d'une façon comparable à leur homologue américain, à travers l'analyse des techniques du contrôle de proportionnalité. En particulier la Cour suprême du Canada, la Cour constitutionnelle sud-africaine et la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, bien que chacune d'entre elles présente des spécificités en ce domaine. Les deux grands modes de « mise en balance » permettent alors de souligner les convergences et les divergences entre les systèmes / There is no general proportionality principle in the United States but, if not always recognized, the review appears in the Supreme Court's case law. For most part of the legal community its techniques reveal american exceptionalism. Other ones say this remark deserves some qualification in view of right's limitation. This study historically begin with the US v Carolene products case ending a period by which the Court invalidated most statutes restricting economic liberties. Thus, the Lochner Era was called « Government by the judiciary ». By the « levels of review » doctrine she found a way to prove her legitimacy, making the standard of justification depends on the nature of the right limited. This « substantial fundamental rights'constraint » rationalized her work and contributed towards a new theory of judicial review. However many jurisdictions share the same self-restraint as their american neighboor. With regard to the techniques of proportionality review, the canadian Supreme Court, the south african Constitutional Court and the European Court present several common characteristics in spite of their specific experience. Two modes of « balancing » highlight convergence and difference between those four legal systems. Stare decisis especially conditions methodological and normative coherence in the United states, having an influence on the fundamental right's constraint. It curbs differently the judicial expanding power of interpretation. According to a comparative perspective the american particularism should be revealed by their definition and their effect on a differentiated right's guarantee

La question du traitement de l’aléa affectant les contrats publics semble opposer de façon « incommensurable » les droits anglais et français. Si le droit français est doté de règles de droit objectif permettant, dans l’intérêt général, le traitement de l’aléa affectant les contrats publics sans accord des parties, rien de tel n’existe en droit anglais ou la règle de la force obligatoire commande l’intangibilité de l’accord initial. La comparaison anglo-française permet, grâce à cet antagonisme, de mettre en exergue les ressorts profonds du traitement de l’aléa affectant les contrats publics au travers de l’opposition théorique entre force obligatoire et intérêt public. Dans cette perspective, les règles générales permettant, en droit français, le traitement de l’aléa sans accord des parties apparaissent comme étant fondées sur une conception économique et téléologique du contrat et de sa force obligatoire, que l’on peut également identifier dans certains aspects du droit anglais des contrats. En outre, le mode de traitement de l’aléa priviligié en Angleterre aussi bien qu’en France est l’accord de volontés – initial ou subséquent. Néanmoins, les possibilités de modification du contrat en cours d’exécution sont drastiquement limitées par le droit de l’Union européenne. A l’inverse, les stipulations initiales qui tendent à ériger, du fait de la généralisation des clauses standardisées, un régime contractuel autonome de traitement de l’aléa, apparaissent désormais comme le mode incontournable d’adaptation des contrats publics en cours d’exécution. / The question of the treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events affecting public contracts seems to oppose in an immeasurable way English and French laws. While, in French law, general rules provide, in the public interest, the treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events affecting public contracts without the consent of the contractors, no such provisions exist in English law, where the sanctity and intangibility of contract prevails. Thank to this antagonism, the proposed comparison enables to highlight the deep motivations of the treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events affecting public contracts, through the theoretical opposition between sanctity of contract and public interest. In this respect, the general rules allowing, in French law, the treatment of the uncertain/unforeseen events without the consent of the parties appear to be based on an economic and teleological approach of the contract and its biding force. Surprisingly, the latter approach can also be noticed, in some respects, in the English law of contracts. Moreover, the priviledged mean to treat uncertain/unforeseen events in England as well as in France is the agreement of the parties – whether ex ante or ex post. Nonetheless, the possibilities of variating the contract in the course of its performance have been drastically limited by the European Union law. By contrast, the intial terms which tends to erect an autonomous regime of treatment of uncertain/unforeseen events through the spreading of standard terms appear to be the major and indispensable mean of adaptation of public contracts in the course of their performance.

A presente tese se ocupa do processo em que o órgão judicial realiza o controle de constitucionalidade de normas ou de omissões normativas. Mais precisamente, a investigação recai sobre a índole ou natureza objetiva de que se reveste tal processo no sistema pátrio, buscando-se: (i) analisar a sua real dimensão (o que, como e em que medida o mencionado caráter objetivo repercute na configuração estrutural e procedimental daquele processo); (ii) identificar o conjunto normativo processual e concepções da dogmática processual civil que se compatibilizam nesse quadrante (até mesmo porque, a esse respeito, muitas são as polêmicas no ambiente doutrinário e muitas são as dúvidas surgidas em razão de uma não-uniformidade de pronunciamentos do Supremo Tribunal Federal). A hipótese do trabalho reside na seguinte ideia: o caráter objetivo do processo não se restringe ao controle abstrato de constitucionalidade e se harmoniza, ainda que com limites, com as regras do direito processual civil brasileiro. Desse modo, o estudo se inicia com um exame de premissas conceituais, classificatórias e terminológicas que tangenciam os domínios da jurisdição constitucional; nessa parte da pesquisa, também são colhidos subsídios aptos para consolidar a noção de que o caráter objetivo pode se apresentar com maior ou menor expressão em toda atividade jurisdicional. Para compreender como a natureza objetiva em estudo se afirma no sistema jurídico atual, parte-se para uma análise de seus aspectos históricos e conceituais, prosseguindo-se com um exame que confere ênfase ao exercício do controle principal e abstrato modalidade que viabiliza em maior escala a projeção da natureza objetiva do processo. Nesse contexto, inclusive, enfrentam-se questões processuais relacionadas à existência ou não de lide, partes, contraditório, cognição judicial sobre fatos e de atividade probatória, rompendo-se mitos que doutrina e jurisprudência chegaram a estabelecer sobre esses assuntos. Para a demonstração de que o caráter objetivo também se apresenta no controle difuso e concreto, embora com menor projeção, realiza-se uma abordagem sob a ótica da tutela jurisdicional coletiva; posteriormente, o foco se volta para o fenômeno da expansão de caracteres da natureza objetiva para as vias processuais vocacionadas à proteção de interesses subjetivos. Considerações conclusivas de cunho crítico encerram o trabalho. Pondera-se, sobretudo, que a natureza objetiva conduz a uma modelagem processual de feição diferenciada, mas que, ao mesmo tempo, contempla padrões que não se desvencilham das vigas mestras e dos institutos fundamentais do direito processual civil. / The focus of this thesis is the process by which a judicial body carries out the constitutional control of rules or the omission of regulatory groups. The research more specifically deals with the character or objective nature with which this process is covered in the national system. The aim of the work is to (i) analyse its real dimension (what, how and to what extent the aforementioned objective character affects the structural and procedural setting of the process); (ii) identify the procedural set of rules and dogmatic civil procedural conceptions that are compatible in the area (because there are many controversial issues in such regard in the doctrinal environment and many doubts have arisen due to non-uniform Supreme Court pronouncements). The hypothesis of this work rests in the following idea: the objective character of the process is not restricted to the abstract control of constitutionality. It is rather in harmony, under certain limits, with the rules of Brazilian civil procedural law. The study therefore starts with an examination of conceptual, terminological and classificatory assumptions that constitute the constitutional jurisdiction fields. State support is also chosen in this part of the research to consolidate the idea that objective character is expressed in different levels across all jurisdictional activity. An historical and conceptual analysis is conducted in order to understand better how objective nature in study is present in the current legal system. The emphasis of the examination is on the exercise of principle and abstract control, which allows for a greater scale projection of the objective nature of the process. In this context, the thesis also encompasses procedural questions dealing with leads, parts and contradiction and judicial cognition about facts and evidential activity. Myths that doctrine and case law have established on these matters are thereby broken. In order to demonstrate that objective character is also present in the diffuse control, albeit with less projection, the perspective of collective legal protection is focused on and in turn moves on to the phenomenon of character expansion of objective nature of the procedures that are directed at the protection of subjective interests. Concluding considerations of a critical nature complete the work. It is, in sum, a reflection that objective nature does shape procedural features, but at the same time is unable to affect the structure of the fundamental institutions of civil procedural law.

Le contrôle de constitutionnalité des révisions n’est pas encore accepté en France. Il s’agit d’une position qui fait consensus en doctrine depuis les débuts de la IIIème République. Dans sa décision du 26 mars 2003, le Conseil constitutionnel a également rejeté sa compétence en matière de lois constitutionnelles. Pour autant, la situation française reste, à l’aune du droit comparé, si ce n’est exceptionnelle, du moins isolée par rapport à ses proches voisins allemands et italiens. En outre, il existe dans le texte de la Constitution de 1958 une disposition formellement non-révisable. L’article 89 alinéa 5 dispose ainsi : « La forme républicaine du Gouvernement ne peut faire l’objet d’une révision ». Loin des débats sur la supraconstitutionnalité, il est donc possible d’envisager un contentieux spécifique des lois de révision constitutionnelles sur le fondement même de la Constitution. On désigne ces normes comme des normes à constitutionnalité renforcée. Il s’agit d’envisager d’abord s’il existe en théorie une hiérarchie entre les normes à constitutionnalité renforcée et les normes à constitutionnalité simple. Cette recherche ne peut se fonder que dans le cadre d’une analyse positiviste et kelsénienne du droit. Elle montre bien que le pouvoir constituant pose des normes spécifiques lors de la production de la constitution que le pouvoir de révision, mais aussi tous les autres pouvoirs constitués de l’État, doit respecter. Ensuite, il convient de vérifier que cette théorie est effective dans la pratique. L’étude des « changements de constitution », lors de transitions constitutionnelles ou des révisions totales conforte cette posture théorique. L’analyse de la jurisprudence constitutionnelle comparée démontre enfin que, loin d’être la prémisse d’un « Gouvernement des juges », le contrôle des révisions constitutionnelles permet le parachèvement de l’État de droit / Judicial review of constitutional amendments is not yet accepted in France. The legal community quasi-unanimously agreed on that solution since the early days of the III Republic. In its decision dated from march 26th, 2003, the Constitutional Council has explicitly denied its power concerning constitutional amendments. In view of the situation in neighboring countries Germany and Italy, the French situation remains singular, if not exceptional.The Constitution contains a provision which cannot be amended. Article 89 para 5 thus states: The republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment.” Far from the debate on supraconstitutionaliy, it is therefore possible to envisage a specific action of constitutional amendment, based on the Constitution itself. These norms are called constitutionally enforced. The idea is to determine whether a hierarchy exists between “enforced constitutionally norms” and “simple constitutionally norms”. This research must be conducted under a positivist and kelsenian approach. It demonstrates that the constituent power creates specific norms that the amending power, along with all delegated power must respect. It should then be assessed if this theory is effective. The analysis of “constitutions changes” during constitutional transition reinforces the theoretical analysis. Comparative constitutional law studies demonstrate that judicial review of constitutional amendments is not a “Government by judiciary”; it further advances the rule of Law

"L’Eglise s’est toujours considérée comme un ordre infra-étatique (l’Eglise dans l’Etat avec ses paroisses et ses diocèses), tout en obéissant aux règles posées par une autorité étrangère à l’Etat, la papauté. De ce fait, l’Eglise est un ordre juridique concurrençant l’Etat, car elle exerce une domination sur le même territoire et les mêmes sujets. Le Gallicanisme se présente comme la synthèse permettant de régler juridiquement ces conflits. Il prône l’indépendance de l’Eglise de France et de l’Etat face à la papauté et suppose l’intervention du Souverain dans les affaires ecclésiastiques. Deux mécanismes juridiques essentiels servent à remplir ces fonctions. D’une part, au moyen des techniques assurant la réception des règles ecclésiastiques dans l’Etat, le Gallicanisme produit un discours technicien ancré dans une doctrine de la souveraineté, pour préserver l’existence d’une « exception française » menacée par les prétentions hégémoniques romaines. D’autre part, inventée pour résoudre les conflits de compétence opposant les autorités étatiques et ecclésiales, la procédure de l’appel comme d’abus subordonne l’Eglise de France à l’Etat par le contrôle juridictionnel de ses actes. Elle désigne l’Etat comme l’instance titulaire d’un pouvoir exclusif de déterminer l’étendue de sa propre compétence et de celle de l’ordre ecclésial. Envisagé sous l’angle des rapports entre ordres juridiques, le Gallicanisme apparaît alors comme une étape incontournable dans la construction intellectuelle de l’Etat moderne, à laquelle il fournit des supports théoriques et techniques". / By the properties that characterize it, Catholic Church is often considered, following the example of the State, as a legal system which takes place inside and outside State. Before the 1905 Act, Gallicanism struggles for independance of the Church of France and the State against papacy, encouraging Sovereign’s interventions in ecclesiastical affairs. Gallicanism can be translated in terms of relations between two legal systems, and the matter of this study is to prove this movement has been a momentum in the intellectual building of Modern State through the reflexion of french jurist from the Ancient Monarchy to the end of the 19th century. Church and State are, by many ways, concurrent systems aiming to dominate the same territory and the same subjects. Gallican thoughts present themselves like an answer to these conflicts. Canonical rules promulgated by the Pope or a Council are not self-executing, and have to be approved by the Sovereign to be Law of the State. Gallicanism build a technical discurse based on State sovereignty to preserve a french particularism against the Roman hegemonic threath. Invented to resolve conflicts of competences between ecclesiastical and State’s authorities, the procedure named « appel comme d’abus » gives exclusive power to the State to determine the extent of its competence. Furthermore this procedure subordinates Church of France to State by the judicial review of its administrative acts.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:24:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Mantovanni Colares Cavalcante.pdf: 1132580 bytes, checksum: e7dbe998a4f456037093139124a59c4a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-22 / The proposal of this thesis is to demonstrate that the effects attributed by the Supreme Court on judicial review can not be defined without proper bond with the previous steps to the judgment of the legal action; and this modulation, considered the technique to restrict the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality, or determine that a statement only be valid from the final judgment, from decision or other time as may be fixed, and this effects are more relevant in relation to norm of tax law, because of weakening of judicial review in a special appeal, and the strengthening of abstract judicial review, which is the analysis of tax law without regard to the particular case. As a methodological option, the thesis covers the fields of Constitutional Law, Tax Law and Procedural Law, supported by legal texts and decisions of the Supreme Court, anchored in one of the elements of the Paulo de Barros Carvalho theory of tax law, and its construction within the jurisdiction, and Pontes de Miranda theory of preponderance of loads efficacy, in order to demonstrate that there is a specific efficacy in relation to the court decision, which is to procedural efficacy. From these premises, the thesis contains a defense that modulation is the result of a link between the nature of the legal action and its efficacy from the force generated by procedural technique of kinetic energy. In the end, we present suggestions that the modulation could not be an isolated act in the judgment of Supreme Court, on the constitutionality control, with suggestion's split into three guidelines, to serve as parameters in the use of modulation, from the most rigorous, and through a median suggestion, to arrive at a proposal to set minimum procedural standards / A proposta da presente tese consiste em demonstrar que os efeitos atribuídos pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal no controle de constitucionalidade não podem ser definidos sem o devido vínculo com as etapas anteriores ao julgamento da ação direta de inconstitucionalidade; e essa modulação, tida como a técnica de restringir os efeitos da declaração de inconstitucionalidade, ou de determinar que tal declaração só tenha validade a partir do trânsito em julgado, da decisão ou de outro momento que venha a ser fixado, se mostra mais relevante em relação à norma tributária, por causa do enfraquecimento do controle de constitucionalidade realizado em recurso extraordinário, e do fortalecimento do controle abstrato de constitucionalidade, em que se tem a análise da norma tributária independentemente da existência de caso concreto. Como opção metodológica, a tese percorre os caminhos do Direito Constitucional, do Direito Tributário e do Direito Processual, tendo como suporte textos jurídicos e decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal, ancorada em um dos elementos da teoria da norma tributária de Paulo de Barros Carvalho, qual seja, o da sua construção no âmbito da jurisdição, e na teoria da preponderância das cargas de eficácia de Pontes de Miranda, a fim de demonstrar que existe uma eficácia específica em relação à decisão judicial, que é a eficácia processual. A partir dessas premissas, faz-se a defesa de que a modulação é consequência de um vínculo existente entre a natureza da ação e a eficácia respectiva, a partir da força gerada pela técnica processual da energia cinética. No final, apresentam-se sugestões para que essa modulação não continue a ser um ato isolado e posterior ao julgamento elaborado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal no controle de constitucionalidade, desdobradas em três diretrizes, a servir de parâmetros no uso da modulação, desde a mais rigorosa, passando por uma sugestão mediana, até se chegar a uma proposta de fixação de mínimos critérios procedimentais